Remote Housing Policy Challenges in the NT

Remote Housing Policy Challenges in the NT

If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches and poor men’s cottages princes’ palaces.

The Merchant of Venice Act 1, Scene 2

The Northern Territory election is scheduled for 27 August, so we have been seeing a spate of announcements from all sides of NT politics recently. The Giles CLP Government has been putting considerable effort into retaining the support from remote Indigenous communities which shifted to it at the last election. Labor too, led by Michael Gunner, is making a strong effort to win support in the bush. It has announced a number of pro-bush policies, including in relation to increased support for the highly successful Indigenous rangers program, education and health.

A key issue for decades has been the poor state of housing in the bush, linked to a complex set of structural forces which appear to have placed solutions beyond the capacity of governments to find or develop.

In no particular order, there are at least four structural forces at play which make management of the remote housing asset base challenging.

The environment in northern Australia places extraordinary demands on physical infrastructure, which inevitably leads to shorter asset lifespans.

The demographic explosion amongst remote Indigenous community residents has placed enormous pressure on housing and community stability generally. A substantial proportion of remote community residents are under 25 years of age. The resultant chronic overcrowding has placed enormous pressure on asset lifespans, as have short sighted policy responses from successive governments in terms of investing in regular maintenance, generally referred to as Property and Tenancy Management (PTM).

The limited financial capacity of the NT Government, and the structural limitations of Australia’s fiscal equalisation processes (which limit the assessment of revenue sharing to recurrent funding requirements) has meant that there has been chronic underinvestment over many years in remote community housing by the NT. As a result of those financial constraints, the Territory has under-invested in remote housing from its own resources over many years. Consequently, the Commonwealth was required to step into the breach and has been the major source of capital investment in remote Indigenous housing for at least the last two decades. The current Commonwealth budget ‘crisis’ and the bipartisan focus on achieving balanced budgets suggests a major Commonwealth investment in remote housing will be unlikely in the next decade.

Finally, land tenure arrangements have not been well aligned with the requirements for optimal management of the social housing asset portfolio in the NT, and have not encouraged private sector investment in remote communities by residents nor Indigenous owned businesses. The ongoing scepticism from Aboriginal interests regarding the motivations behind tenure reform efforts by government suggests that the likelihood of tenure changes within communities over the coming decade is quite low, and will be largely incremental in nature. Having said that, the ability of Aboriginal traditional owners to grant leases under the current legislation means that private sector investment is not entirely ruled out.

The current state of play in the remote housing sector remains dire. In the half decade to 2006, the NT Government was investing less than $5m a year of its own resources into remote housing, and the Commonwealth was investing around $20m (from a $100m national program for Indigenous social housing). At the time, the NTG estimated that its share of the Commonwealth program based on need should have been at least $40m per annum.

In 2007, the Howard Government established the Strategic Indigenous Housing Infrastructure Program (SIHIP), which allocated around $527m over three years to the NT subsequently lifted to $672 million, to construct 750 new houses, rebuild 230 houses and refurbish 2500 houses by December 2013. In 2008, the Rudd Government established the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH) with a $5.5bn national allocation over ten years, of which $1.7bn was allocated to the NT. The NT Government allocated $200m over the ten years, bringing the total allocation close to $2bn. NPARIH incorporated the resources previously allocated to SIHIP.

The NPARIH targets for the NT were 1456 new houses of which 821 had been completed by March 2013; and 2915 rebuilds and refurbishments of which 2693 had been completed by March 2013. I understand that NPARIH remains on track to meet or exceed these targets.

As an aside, access to comprehensive and up to date reporting on progress against the targets set at the beginning of the program by COAG appears non-existent, at least on the PMC website, and similarly on the NT Housing website. What we get instead are random statistics about numbers of new houses or refurbishments which provide minimal information and allow no meaningful assessments of progress by the relevant agencies. In 2016, Australian citizens, and indigenous interests in particular, deserve more than smoke and mirrors.

The NPARIH program was extremely contentious, because it required communities to provide state and territory governments with long term leases or other forms of secure tenure to ensure that state government housing authorities would have legal rights and responsibilities in relation to the assets built and the tenancies involved. It also bore the brunt of sustained criticism because of what appeared to be a slow start with high administration costs, when this was in fact the necessary implication of implementing a major construction project, involving immense logistical and technical challenges. NPARIH did have failings, including well publicised problems with the operations of one of the three major consortiums utilised to deliver NPARIH in the NT operating on Groote Eylandt. That consortium was ultimately replaced. With the benefit of hindsight, and notwithstanding teething issues and concerted criticism from both ends of the political spectrum, it seems clear that NPARIH has been a substantial success, funding a major boost in infrastructure provision in some of the largest remote communities in Australia (Wadeye, Maningrida, and Nguiu to name just three) and making substantial inroads into the significant outstanding housing needs in remote communities.

Nevertheless, it was always recognised that the funds allocated to NPARIH would only meet about one half of the outstanding social housing need in remote Australia (though governments have unsurprisingly not articulated this reality). Moreover, while NPARIH incorporated strengthened Property and Tenancy Management (PTM) requirements, these were always vulnerable to financial cuts at both state and federal levels, and indeed this has been what has largely occurred with substantial cuts from NPARIH PTM made to expand funding for the Governments new Community Development Program. The importance of PTM for remote housing stock is that it is a very cost effective means of extending the lifespan of the existing housing asset base, albeit one which does not have any tangible visibility in a political sense.

Turning to more recent developments, it has been apparent for some time that since taking responsibility for bush housing, the NT Housing Department has effectively failed to meet its statutory responsibilities as landlord, failed to provide and maintain safe and decent housing, and failed to respond in a timely way to tenant requests and complaints for improved services in a number of communities. It recently emerged that the NT Housing Department apparently failed to provide adequate alternative housing when undertaking repairs and maintenance to housing stock. Link here.

There are now strong grounds for concluding that the NT Housing Department is systemically incapable of delivering effective social housing services across the span of its responsibilities. (The echoes with the recent revelations of systemic problems in the youth detention system are striking!) As a consequence, there has been a spate of adverse publicity (one media story link is here) and a number of legal actions by tenants facilitated by a relatively new organisation, Australian Lawyers for Remote Aboriginal Rights. Link to their website and relevant media stories here.

As an aside, the Commonwealth, which after all is funding virtually all capital investment in the remote housing sector in the NT, appears to have done nothing to hold the NT Government and its Housing Department to account for what has been an appalling performance. It will inevitably be the Commonwealth (and Australian taxpayers generally) who will fund the cost of rectifying the NT Government’s poor performance in this area. While the Federal Indigenous Affairs Minister’s close links to the CLP Government in the NT may make it harder for him to hold them to account, he would be helped in fulfilling his duties if the Labor Opposition in Canberra did their job and put him under some pressure, not least because between them, the current NT and Commonwealth Governments appear to be undoing the good work achieved under the NPARIH program to date.

The media, to its credit, has to a limited extent filled the gap. The ABC PM program ran an item on 8 July 2016 on the continuing need for housing in remote regions. Here is the link.

In the face of this chronic underperformance, and the underlying shortfall in social housing across remote NT communities, both parties have promised action.

Labor moved first, promising in December 2015 to commit a further $1.1bn over ten years starting in 2017-18. The Labor commitments were to:

Provide five focused programs to construct new houses, build more living space and repair and maintain existing housing in the bush;

Allow local recruits working for the Government to access Government Employee Housing;

Devolve to shires, regional authorities or to housing organisations, decision making about what to build, where to build, how to build and who will build;

Devolve the tenancy management for remote communities away from Territory Housing; and

Work with homeland residents to address new housing and repairs and maintenance in new and innovative ways.

The CLP Government has responded in two tranches. In mid-May, the NT Chief Minister outlined a proposal to establish a Remote Housing Development Authority to effectively give control of Remote Housing to Indigenous interests. He announced that during the first 12 months of a re-elected Government, there would be detailed consultation over the form and role of the proposed authority, which would be supported by eight to ten regional housing boards which would manage remote housing in each region. Here is the link to the ABC article reporting those proposals. The response from Indigenous interests was sceptical.

In July, Chief Minister Giles announced a $2bn plan for remote housing, comprising an additional $1.645bn over eight years in addition to the remaining $350m in NPARIH. The program, to be named the Better Remote Homes program would commence from 2018-19 and be delivered by the proposed Remote Housing Development Authority to be established from 1 July 2017.

The Chief Minister stated that the program would include associated planning, road construction and essential services such as water, electricity and sewerage, and that the annual spend for the eight-year program was expected to be more than $200 million which would come from the Federal and Northern Territory governments as well as the private and philanthropic sector.

The ABC reported additional comments from the Chief Minister in relation to the source of the funding for the proposed program:

The Chief Minister said he had already received interest from private investors, which would expect to recoup some money through rent.

"We've had a number of proposals put to us which are currently being considered, that see both private sector corporation money, philanthropic money and social impact investment bond money seeking to be a partnership with investing in housing development, building and management in the Northern Territory," he said.

In relation to the ownership of the remote housing asset base, the ABC reported in the story mentioned above that the Chief Minister was proposing to eventually hand back control of all remote Indigenous housing to Aboriginal organisations.

"We believe in self-determination. We believe that Aboriginal people should continue to have the opportunity to provide the governance over their own affairs," he said.

So what are we to make of the current state of play? I will limit myself to a number of high level and necessarily provisional observations.

The first observation is to note that in the face of systemic underperformance by the NT Housing Department, there appears to have been no ministerial accountability for the failures of administration which are all too clearly on display. This is not an issue related just to housing or the NT, but goes much deeper to the state of our current democracy, the capacity of our parliamentary and oversight institutions to cope with the implementation of complex policy, the shortcomings of an extremely short media cycle which in its incessant search for new material provides ‘space’ for only a miniscule number of high profile issues to receive sustained attention, thus allowing governments off the political hook once they weather the initial storm of media focus and attention. It does suggest, however, that we need to seek alternative mechanisms to ensure effective accountability for policy outcomes.

Second, the respective commitments of Labor and the CLP to greater investment in social housing provision in the bush are to be commended. It is clear that at the level of vote allocation, the democratic system is working in the NT, insofar as both parties have acknowledged in the clearest way possible that remote community residents expect better housing provision and will reward those who can persuade them that they will deliver.

Nevertheless, both parties commitments represent a considerable increase in budget commitments and this will need to be funded either through reallocation of existing outlays, increased taxes, use of revenues from asset sales, or government borrowings.

The ALP commitment appears to be rock solid as there are no caveats. The CLP commitment appears much less so, based as it is on unspecified access to Commonwealth, private sector and philanthropic funding. Philanthropists are unlikely to fund governments, but prefer community organisations. The private sector requires secure tenure, a generous expected return on capital, and stable and low risk operating environments. Uncertainties exist in relation to each of these requirements. The Commonwealth is operating under the most serious political budget constraint in decades. All three potential funding sources for the CLP ‘commitment’ (I think we can add the inverted commas at this point!) are problematic. The CLP ‘commitment’ is also scheduled to start a year later than Labor’s planned program.

The third observation is that while each party has their own implementation model, they both share a common attribute, namely they are each seriously flawed.

A key reason for this is that both parties have failed to understand the leap made by the transition to NPARIH, that is, from a micro-program delivering a total of thirty or forty new houses each year in ten or fifteen different locations using ten or fifteen contractors to a major project, with a billion dollar price tag, delivering hundreds of new houses in a limited number of locations over multi year periods. This is the equivalent of building a major dam or a major port, but disguised by the fact that we are accustomed to thinking about the components rather than the whole. While the reality has shifted, the mindsets of the media and politicians – and consequently many stakeholders too – has failed to shift.

The result was (and remains) a focus on numbers of houses and numbers of upgrades, whereas NPARIH’s progress and achievements is in reality based on an overall reduction in overcrowding across the remote social housing sector, delivered largely through tailored investment in around twenty locations which included the construction of a series of new, serviced and turn-key ready subdivisions, investment in asset upgrades where cost effective, and new houses where necessary. In other words, this was a systemically driven investment program, not a component based or rhetoric driven micro-program.

As a consequence, very few stakeholders understood that NPARIH represented a major step change in housing infrastructure provision in remote Australia, and needed to be project managed as a major infrastructure project, with all the associated planning, logistics, and project management strategies one would expect in a major infrastructure project.

It appears however that both parties while being prepared to pocket the gains delivered by NPARIH (for example the substantial step up in Indigenous employment outcomes over previous models derived from the scale and multiyear nature of the investment) have failed to realise that they must manage the next phase as a major infrastructure project. Given the scale of the outstanding housing need, and the outcomes both parties are promising, it is clear that the next phase cannot be managed as a micro-program and deliver the outcomes sought.

Labor’s model of devolving overall responsibility for managing the program to shire councils (or similar bodies) may satisfy the grass roots demand for greater say in program delivery, but virtually guarantees a return to spreading new house builds thinly to the maximum number of locations, without a whole of system overview of comparative needs. The Shires (or any equivalent regional organisations) are in a much weaker negotiating positon with local contractors, and indeed may often have a degree of conflict of interest. The pressure will be both to share the new house build around each local government area, and to share the contracting work around to a range of small contractors of varying capacity and experience. As a consequence, economies of scale in the current program will disappear. My firm prediction is that in a decade’s time, dollar for dollar, Labor’s program if left unchanged will have delivered fewer new houses than NPARIH has.

The CLP model of establishing a new Remote Housing Development Authority to effectively transfer control of the program into a statutory corporation controlled by an Indigenous Board along with more localised advisory committees is marginally better than Labor’s model given that it appears to retain the capacity for a Territory wide approach to resource allocation. The point of difference is not so much about Indigenous control when one notes that the shires are effectively controlled by Indigenous councillors elected by an Indigenous electorate.

The fundamental issue with the CLP proposal relates to why is there a need for a separate remote housing entity at all. The Territory is a socially and politically small place. Despite its vast geographic size, all key decision makers in politics, business and the bureaucracy know each other; the populations involved are small; and consequently there is no good reason why Territory Housing should not operate efficiently and effectively and be made to do so. IF there is an argument for establishing a statutory corporation then it should include social housing provision and management in the towns and cities.

The creation of a new organisation or set of organisations solely for the bush would merely create duplication and add to the likelihood that one or more of the housing authorities will fail administratively for want of resources, expertise, capacity, governance or scale. Moreover, reverting to a system which existed only 15 years ago when the housing system was bifurcated, with one for the towns and one for the bush (or one for the white population and one for the black population) will inevitably lead to pressure to allocate more of the available resources to the towns (as was the case then). While a separate Remote Housing Development Authority is a seductively appealing proposal to bush voters, it would also be a retrograde and potentially discriminatory proposal.

I am tempted to conclude that the Chief Minister’s comments regarding self-determination are effectively an admission of defeat, and that he recognises that the challenge of making the social housing system in the NT work effectively is beyond his Government’s capacity to achieve. His proposal effectively amounts to what in rugby is termed a ‘hospital pass’, leaving Indigenous interests to face the oncoming point of reckoning and shoulder the challenge of providing adequate social housing without the resources and the administrative structures necessary to achieve the objective.

Finally, if Indigenous interests wish to take greater control of social housing provision in the NT, they should concentrate on establishing their own community housing organisations to own, manage and rent social housing assets. The required capital could be raised from a number of sources: mining royalties, the Aboriginal Benefits Account, private sector borrowings, even philanthropists. Mainstream community housing organisations in other states would be prepared to assist, and even partner with them.

But whether or not Indigenous interests pursue such a course should not absolve government of its responsibility to provide a viable and effective social housing sector for remote communities. It is a tragedy that the current NT Government in 2016 appears to be preparing to walk away from what is in fact a core responsibility of Government.

Whichever party wins the forthcoming Territory election (it seems likely it will be Labor) they will need to initiate a major revamp of the administration of Territory Housing, and ensure that it is resourced adequately from day one, and has the capacity to implement its remit effectively. They need to ensure that the key Territory housing agency has the capacity ‘to do’.

The incoming Government should also revisit the mindset which currently underpins their thinking on housing provision; the task ahead is equivalent to a major infrastructure project with a large number of moving parts. It will need overarching management, coordination and resourcing to deliver the outcomes that are required on the ground. In other words, the incoming Territory Government must also ensure that they know ‘what were good to do’.

A failure to address both these issues will quickly escalate into a deeper crisis in the NT housing sector as raised expectations in the bush turn to disenchantment. This in turn will have political implications for the NT Government.

In the event that Labor wins Government, the current Commonwealth Government is much less likely to turn a blind eye to poor housing performance in the bush.

Given the structural importance of adequate and non-crowded housing to addressing Indigenous disadvantage, there is a strengthening case not just for increased investment, but for systemic reform of the oversight arrangements which ensure that key investment programs such as NPARIH stay on course.

It is increasingly clear that existing oversight mechanisms - parliaments, audit offices, ombudsman offices, and the media - are not fit for purpose in monitoring complex and major government programs in the Indigenous policy domain, remote housing being just one case in point. The identification of problems often emerges, but sustained analytic proactive attention to effective program delivery and implementation is non-existent, and that gap is one that no-one, least of all our latter day princes, seem keen to close.

Disconnected from Power

 

The ABC has reported on the consequences of power supply cuts to sewerage pumps in a town camp within the boundary of the town of Derby in the Kimberley.

Given that I recently posted on this topic, I will largely let the article speak for itself, and merely note that it is extraordinary that Western Australian citizens residing within the town of Derby do not have access to local government services and guaranteed continuity of standard essential services.

The article quotes a comment from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs:

It is unfortunate that Horizon Power turned off the power at the Derby Town Based Reserve, an action which has led to the failure of a sewer pump. Horizon Power has acknowledged that power was disconnected in error and its policy is not to disconnect power to essential services," the statement reads.

"The long-term arrangements of this and other Town Based Reserves is being considered by the Regional Services Reform Unit."

The ABC contacted the Department of Housing, and the Regional Services Reform Unit, recently launched by the Minister for Regional Development Terry Redman, but they declined to comment, directing the ABC back to the DAA.

The statement points to a deeper and ongoing avoidance of responsibility by relevant government agencies. There is clearly a need for ministerial involvement to cut through the evasion of responsibility and to set in train action to implement structural reforms which guarantee Indigenous citizens access to the same services as other residents of Derby.

It is time that local government and other essential services are made available universally to all citizens in Western Australia.

A Ray of Sunlight at Last: Youth Detention in the NT

Youth Detention in the NT

 

Following last night’s ABC Four Corners Program which exposed to wider public view the outrageous treatment of juvenile detainees by NT Corrections staff, the Prime Minister has this morning announced a joint Royal Commission will be established by the Commonwealth and the NT Governments.

The report follows a review of youth detention arrangements in the NT undertaken by Michael Vita, a NSW public servant with a background in the management of prisons and youth detention facilities.  A link to Mr Vita’s review, dated January 2015, is here. Bob Gosford’s summarised the Review neatly in his blog the Northern Myth. A subsequent blog post by John Lawrence SC provided a scathing assessment of the NT youth justice system following the release of a later report initiated by the then NT Children’s Commissioner,  Dr Howard Bath, and finalised by his successor Ms Colleen Gwynne.

The Vita report notes that 96 percent of youth inmates in the NT are Aboriginal. Both reports pointed to systemic problems in the NT Youth Detention system, and while the NT Government went through the motions of ‘accepting’ the recommendations (except for one in the Gwynne Report), it seems clear that neither report managed to get to the bottom of what had been going on in the NT’s youth detention facilities. The Prime Minster in his comments this morning suggested that the Royal Commission would be asked to explore why this was so.

I don’t propose to reprise the most recent revelations, nor attempt to summarise the two formal reports. Rather, I want to focus on some of the issues for the public policy process raised by what has been revealed.

Increasingly, it seems clear that Governments can stare down critical reports and routinely adopt the view that they should just weather the storm of adverse criticism. Thus, notwithstanding the highly adverse comments on the performance of the Corrective Services administration in the NT in both reports, the Minister was not held accountable, and nor was the Commissioner (although he did resign in 2015 over another matter). 

We already know that there are systemic issues within the NT corrections system, and we have a good idea of the sorts of issues which need to be addressed to fix the system. What we don’t know is how it is that the public were misled by the NT Minister in 2014 and later when he praised the actions of the officers involved, who was responsible for the provision of the misleading information which was released and how it is that the responsible minister was not held to account, nor the Commissioner at the time (who was actually present at the event which was the main source of the ABC story).

In other words, while the details of the treatment and the operational shortfalls at the detention facilities are important, we already know (since it is plain to see courtesy of the video footage) that procedures are flawed and not followed, that the culture is flawed, and that human rights of NT citizens were cavalierly breached. The key issues at stake here go beyond those issues to matters of accountability and transparency in the implementation of public policy.

It will be important that the terms of reference for the proposed Royal Commission are broad enough to examine those broader questions.

It is worth considering why it is that it took the publication of video footage to ignite public outrage, when most of the salient information was already in the public domain. What does this say about the effectiveness of our current oversight institutions, and what does it say about the effectiveness of our parliamentary oversight mechanisms. My own conclusion is that both sets of institutions are woefully inadequate for dealing with the complexity of modern societies.

The ABC’s role in exposing the issues in play in the NT deserves widespread commendation, as do the lawyers and whistle-blowers who played a role. As a nation, we do ourselves a major disservice when we allow constraints on our media and potential whistle-blowers to be established and strengthened.

The Prime Minister is to be commended for acting swiftly. The next test of his mettle will be the adequacy of the terms of reference for the Royal Commission, and the calibre of the Royal Commissioner appointed.

Infinite space and bad dreams: the WA Government's roadmap for remote communiites

The WA Government’s Regional and Remote Communities Strategy

 

O God, I could be bounded in a nut shell and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams.

Hamlet Act 2, Scene 2.

 

The WA Government has just announced its policy vision and future directions for remote communities in the Kimberley and Pilbara regions of the state.

The policy announcement follows the Government’s retreat from its November 2014 decision to close up to 100 remote communities after a national backlash against the decision, and presumably as reality dawned on the Government that there would be myriad adverse consequences of carrying through with such a blunt sledgehammer of a policy. That original WA Government decision was precipitated by the decision of the Commonwealth to cease its longstanding funding municipal and essential services in remote communities given that primary responsibility for these functions rests with state governments.

The Commonwealth became involved in funding these communities in the 1970s when it became apparent that State governments were not delivering basic services to their Indigenous citizens. Upon coming to office, the current Commonwealth Government resolved to cease this funding, and provided financial compensation to state and territory governments to encourage them to accept the ongoing funding responsibility.

The ABC article linked to above reported that the WA Government received $90m in compensation payments, albeit characterised by WA officials as being “forced to accept” the payments. The arrangements over the compensation paid to the states by the Commonwealth are quite opaque, and in particular, there has been no line of sight in relation to the use of those funds by the relevant state governments.

The new policy framework released this week is a substantial improvement over the previous approach, but remains a deeply flawed approach. An ABC report on the policy is here.

The WA policy approach echoes moves a number of years ago in the Northern Territory by the previous Commonwealth and NT Governments to focus investment support on major communities. This policy approach appears to have been substantially reversed in recent years, following changes to the NT Government’s ministry and in the face of much greater political contestation for the Aboriginal vote in the NT.

The WA Government report is titled Resilient Families, Strong Communities: A roadmap for regional and remote Aboriginal communities. It can be found here.

I will refer to the document and its attendant policy settings as the roadmap. It was based on a year’s work by a Regional Services Reform Unit led by a former head of the WA Housing Department.

The Positives

The roadmap appears to have been based on a serious attempt to consult key interest groups, and to put some process around what is undoubtedly a complex set of inter-related issues. The fact that the Government is prepared to put out a formal document outlining its policy intentions and providing a rationale for those policy intentions is highly commendable, and a rarity in Indigenous affairs policy contexts in recent years.

A second positive is the revised and more nuanced policy approach evident in the roadmap. It confirms that Indigenous people have a right to choose where to live, and to choose their own lifestyles, while clearly indicating the Government's views on what it will be prepared to support. It also confirms that it will not be seeking to actively close communities, although over time, there is a substantial risk that some, if not many, will cease to be chosen as places of residence by Indigenous people.

The third positive is that the roadmap explicitly acknowledges the rights of Indigenous citizens to access their country, and signals that government recognises that it understand this to be an important priority for most Indigenous citizens in the north west of the state.

The fourth positive is that the roadmap makes clear just how difficult and challenging are the circumstances facing remote communities and their residents. While the roadmap only addresses the implications of this obliquely, it is evident that change, development, better wellbeing, will take time to achieve and will require both persistence and a degree of stability in government policy settings.

Fifth, the roadmap is refreshingly honest about the structural incapacity of government agencies to work together cooperatively (an issue which extends way beyond Western Australia) and the absence of community input into the design and implementation of government services. And it explicitly acknowledges that Aboriginal citizens have a voice and deserve to be heard.

Sixth, the Government has been prepared to allocate extra dollars to addressing these issues, including from the Royalties for Regions program. While there is not a lot of clarity around the investment proposed – a table listing each initiative and the proposed investment over the forward years would have been helpful – it is clear that there is increased investment.

The Negatives

Notwithstanding the positives, and the evident good intentions of the ministers and bureaucrats involved in developing it, the roadmap is in my view deeply flawed.

There remains a deeply embedded assumption in the roadmap at virtually every level that there is only one way forward for Aboriginal people (essentially around acceptance of mainstream values based on the economic organisation of mainstream Australia), and that Aboriginal people must be encouraged or incentivised to ‘choose’ that pathway. The risk is that policymakers will revert to aggressively pushing Indigenous people towards the worldview which permeates mainstream Australia rather than allowing Indigenous citizens to choose their own futures.

Yet while the assumption is that Aboriginal citizens should just get on and make changes to their ways of living, governments have been unable (for decades) and remain incapable of making the structural changes to bring Indigenous spaces into mainstream arrangements. The two obvious examples in the roadmap are land tenure issues relating to remote communities, where the roadmap identifies the issue, but provides zero indication of how it proposes to proceed; and the responsibilities of local governments which have been off the hook for over fifty years in providing basic services to Indigenous citizens. Clearly both these policy zones are highly contentious and politicised. My point however is that there is a double standard in play; Aboriginal citizens must change, the mainstream has the luxury of avoiding necessary change.

There are a number of related and subsidiary negatives embedded within the roadmap. At almost every salient point, the roadmap is hedged or caveated. To take one example, the “Priority Action” for remote communities is described as follows:

The State Government will identify up to 10 communities by the end of 2016 with which it will work to upgrade essential and municipal infrastructure and introduce commensurate charges” (emphasis added).

Apart from the fact that the structural solution would involve working with shire councils and not communities, the words in bold are used to deliberately provide a degree of flexibility for government policymakers. Yet one of the roadmap's five principles underpinning regional services reform is that Aboriginal people should “have certainty about the State Government’s framework for investing in remote communities”. 

A second example is in the section of the roadmap dealing with Family-centred services. After identifying an over-investment in reactive programs responding to the acute symptoms of long term trauma and disadvantage, the roadmap states that “over time”  the State Government “will look to” invest more in prevention, earlier intervention, capacity building and family empowerment. The obvious point to make is that if the analysis is correct, then it requires immediate action, not a promise on the never-never.

A related negative is that at key points the roadmap fails to provide certainty to Indigenous interests. The section on Land Tenure is perhaps the most egregious example. The Directions Statement states unequivocally that the Government “will make tenure changes progressively….to support improvements in essential and municipal services, assist the supply and management of housing, facilitate economic and social development that is restricted by current tenure”. However, after a page of text outlining the challenges facing tenure reform, the roadmap concludes by stating:

The State Government is considering policy and funding options to streamline arrangements for Aboriginal individuals or corporations that want to use the (Aboriginal Land Trust) estate more productively …(emphasis added)

The inability of the report to provide certainty for Aboriginal citizens in key areas is a major flaw.

A final negative in the roadmap is the excessive reliance on trials and pilots. I won’t go into detail on the various pilots in the roadmap, but merely note that governments in Australia from across the political spectrum have exhibited a tendency to rely on geographically limited initiatives which have the political advantages of allowing governments to be seen to do something while keeping costs down. Often they are justified on the basis that what is required are ‘place-based’ solutions. There are strong arguments for place based initiatives in Indigenous policy contexts, but they should operate in every place, not just a few.

Conclusion

I haven’t dealt with every issue in the Government’s policy roadmap. For example, the roadmap proposals for Housing have both positive and negative elements. The roadmap is worth reading in full as it is relatively short, largely free of jargon and easy to comprehend.

The WA Government has indicated that it proposes to consult further with key stakeholders going forward regarding the implementation of the roadmap. Hopefully Aboriginal interests will actively utilise this opportunity to put their own reactions and views on the table.

Perhaps the most significant issue going forward will relate to the bona fides of government regarding this process. Without greater certainty about key issues, without meaningful consultation, and without a commitment by government to reconsider its own ways of operating, Aboriginal citizens would be within their rights to form a view that this roadmap, while not a sledgehammer, is merely a more sophisticated and nuanced implement – perhaps one of those screw nutcrackers which progressively increase the pressure until the nut shell disintegrates  - to crack the nut which represents an Indigenous determined future for remote citizens and their communities.


Revised 21 July to correct minor typographical errors.

Review of Sacred Site Protection in the NT: rhetoric outweighs substance

The NT Minister for Local Government and Community Services, Bess Price, has released a report commissioned from PriceWaterhouse Indigenous Consulting (PIC) into the Northern Territory’s Sacred Sites Protection legislation.

She has also announced that the Government will move to ‘strengthen sacred site protection’ by immediately beginning work on implementation of nine of the report’s recommendations, but failed to indicate which nine recommendation were to be implemented. The reference to “see below” in the media release provides no information on the nine recommendations which have been accepted. Hopefully this is an oversight and will be remedied quickly. The reference in the media release to “my government’ suggests that the release was originally drafted for the Chief Minister (who has responsibility for Indigenous affairs), but that a decision was made to reduce his profile in the issue.

The release of the report now, three months after its finalisation in April 2015, is unfortunate. It seems designed to send a positive message to Indigenous voters in the lead up to the coming NT election while deferring any contentious announcements or decisions till later. The NT election is scheduled for 27 August this year.

The PIC Report appears both comprehensive and thoughtful, and provides a useful summary of the history of Indigenous site protection in the NT (and beyond). It lays out an accessible roadmap to the intricacies in the site protection regime in the NT, involving both Commonwealth and NT legislation, and an inevitable myriad of thorny cross cultural and policy conundrums.

I don’t propose to summarise the report, nor discuss every element, but have picked out three areas which deserve comment.

The first is to reflect on the purpose of the review, as set out in the Terms of Reference (emphasis added):

The purpose of the Sacred Sites Processes and Outcomes Review (the review) is to investigate the extent to which the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 (the Act) supports economic development in the Northern Territory. The review will examine the scope and operation of the Act as well as the strategic and day-to-day operations of the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority (AAPA), the statutory authority set up by the Act to carry out the functions set out within it. The review should provide advice on:

1. Areas in which the Act might be strengthened to improve protections for sacred sites

2. Areas in which the Act might be strengthened to reduce red tape and provide certainty and improved processes for economic development in the Northern Territory

3. Ways in which the Authority can:

a. Become more efficient

b. Balance the need for development with the need for protection of sacred sites.

 

The terms of reference (attached as an Appendix to the PIC report) were clearly designed to facilitate findings which would tilt the playing field to assist commercial proponents to navigate the statutory requirements of the Territory’s heritage protection regime with greater ease.

Governments increasingly see every problem through the lens of economic development and jobs, and while this is a legitimate aspiration for any society and its government, it becomes problematic when it is the only lens through which policy issues are considered and assessed.

The second issue relates to the issue of compensation for damage to sites. The terms of reference identified this as an issue which should be considered, and PIC has recommended in favour of establishing a formal framework for the determination and payment of appropriate compensation to the traditional owners of sacred sites damaged by developers (see pages 34-36 of the Report).

This is an intriguing issue, as there are in my view arguments both for and against the proposal. Indigenous societies (as the report points out) involved customary processes for the punishment of breaches of customary law, and for the payment of compensation as a means of redressing such transgressions. There are more than a few instances of damage to sites by developers, mostly unintended or negligent, but sometimes deliberate. Where this happens, at present, there is no easy way for the owners of sites to be compensated short of litigation with all its risks and costs.

On the other hand, a move to a more flexible system which provides for compensation to be routinely paid will change the cost/benefit equation facing developers, and may have the (unintended?) consequence of increasing activities which place sites at risk of damage or destruction. The mantra “act now, pay later” may become an easier way to operate when profitable developments are facing firm opposition from traditional owners. This ‘moral hazard’ issue is exacerbated by the fact that the costs of compensation will most often be business expenses which are tax deductive for commercial interests.

Perhaps the solution can be found in careful drafting of the relevant provisions. On balance, my own inclination tends to reluctance to change the existing arrangements (contrary to the recommendation in the Review).

The third issue worth a brief comment relates to the recommendations relating to the governance and staffing of the NT Aboriginal Sacred Sites Authority. The report recommends some changes to the Board structure which appear sensible, but goes on to recommend that the CEO be appointed by the Board and not the Minister, and that the current confusion over the public service status of Authority’s staff be fixed by amending the legislation (which currently provides that the staff of the Authority be employed on public service terms and conditions). In effect, the recommendations take the Authority a step further away from Government and its status as a government corporation.

My own perhaps counter-intuitive perspective is that there are benefits to having the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Authority clearly located within the NT Government. Such positioning makes it harder for governments to distance themselves from the decisions of the Authority, and thus will serve as a prophylactic against future marginalisation of the Sites Authority and its important remit. While there is merit in the Authority Board selecting their CEO, there would be merit in providing the relevant Minister with a veto power over the appointment so that there is a shared responsibility. There is certainly precedent for this sort of arrangement in some Commonwealth statutory agencies.

Finally, given the forthcoming NT election, there would be merit in knowing where the Labor Opposition stands on the issues raised by the Sacred Sites review. They will require some time to consider a position, but Territorians deserve to know their position in advance of the election. The same applies to the Government; notwithstanding having had three months to form a view, their ‘announcement’ so far is all rhetoric and no substance.

 

No wiser than a daw: the case for stronger regulation of funeral insurance

“But in these nice sharp quillets of the law, Good faith, I am no wiser than a daw.” William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part One, Act 2, Scene 4.

In October 2015 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission issued a report Funeral Insurance: A snapshot. This report dealt with the mainstream insurance industry, and raised a substantial number of consumer protection issues.

Key findings were reported as follows:

On the whole, premiums rose steeply for persons over 50, as most consumers held stepped premiums that increase with age. For consumers aged 80–84, the average annual premium was four times as much as for consumers aged 50–54. There was a high rate of policy cancellations, with nearly 55% of cancellations occurring during the first year of the policy. Of the cancellations, 65% were actively initiated by the customer, while the rest (35%) were cancelled by the insurer for non-payment of premiums. Most insurers identified the cost of premiums as the most common reason for cancellation. While over half (51.2%) of consumers with funeral insurance were aged 50–74, funeral insurance sold to Indigenous consumers had a much younger age profile (50% were aged under 20). A higher proportion of Indigenous consumers also had their policies cancelled for non-payment of premiums. (emphasis added).

The report also noted that for some welfare recipients, funeral insurance premiums comprised up to ten percent of their pensions.

In relation to Indigenous consumers, the report noted:

While a few insurers had unusually high numbers of young persons insured due to offering free additional cover for children, there was only one insurer with significant numbers of persons insured under 30 for which premiums were being paid. This insurer’s products were marketed to Indigenous consumers and their age profile of persons insured was anomalous compared with those of other insurers we reviewed. For this insurer, 50% of persons insured were aged under 20 and 33% were under 15. A higher proportion of Indigenous consumers also had their policies cancelled for non-payment of premiums.

Notwithstanding efforts by ASIC to highlight the potential pitfalls and costs to Indigenous consumers of funeral insurance policies (see links here and here), it seems that this is an issue which won’t go away.

In November 2015, Minister Scullion told the ABC that he would look into the reports and:

would write to Aboriginal land councils for advice and speak with consumer affairs about ensuring safeguards and education for people as to what they were getting for their money.

There appears to have been no outcome to date announced by the Minister arising from this promised action. There would be merit in an update being provided by the Minister to the public at large.

The latest development is a Federal Court decision which overturned a Government decision to prevent the use of Centrepay (which automatically deducts payments from a welfare recipient’s entitlements at source). Media report here.

The decision of Logan J in this case is somewhat curious. The first two paragraphs provide a succinct account of the history of state paternalism in relation to Aboriginal peoples. However the decision taken by Centrelink, based on a policy decision of former Minister for Human Services Marise Payne in 2015, was framed as applying to the use of Centrepay for all funeral insurance services, and not indigenous services specifically. The focus on Aboriginal policy arose because only one insurance company, The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (and its associated corporate entities) utilised Centrepay, and the vast majority of its customers are Indigenous citizens. The reasons for the decision of Justice Logan, while extremely convoluted (at least to this non-lawyer), appear to boil down to a finding that there is no power within the relevant statutes authorising the CEO of Centrelink to make such a decision. In other words, Logan J’s formal reasons do not relate to paternalism, but are based on statutory interpretation of the relevant legal framework.

Putting aside the legalities, there appear to be strong grounds for Government to put in place a robust regulatory framework which ensures that consumers (whether indigenous or not) are adequately informed prior to making purchases of funeral insurance policies.

The weight of evidence appears to be shifting towards a conclusion that there is scope for government to strengthen the regulatory regime. It also seems to be a no-brainer that government ought not to allow its Centrepay system to be accessed by private sector firms without robust checks and balances. It appears that such a situation does not currently exist. In relation to Indigenous welfare recipients, it is arguable that they are may be particularly vulnerable, and that this merely increases the weight of argument in favour of more general protections.

Paternalistic policies in relation to Indigenous citizens have played a sorry part in our history, and racism, segregation, and repression often hid under the guise of ‘protection’. But there is a place for regulation of inappropriate behaviour by firms, particularly in relation to vulnerable citizens. Not all regulation is inappropriately paternalistic.

So what policy conclusions should be drawn from these most recent developments?

First, as I have argued previously, poor financial literacy is a major issue of concern in Indigenous affairs, and needs urgent and significant policy priority. The range of issues around financial literacy and banking would benefit from further sustained attention from one of the Parliament’s Committees.

Second, the Commonwealth should urgently examine the available options to address the use of Centrepay by private sector firms, and in particular ensure there is a robust set of checks and balances around any such use. This may require legislation.

Third, the Commonwealth should initiate action to strengthen the regulatory regime around the same of funeral insurance products, particularly to vulnerable consumers.

Fourth, the Commonwealth should release the results of the investigations undertaken by Minister Scullion and his Department in response to the November 2015 revelations of issues of concern around Indigenous people’s purchase of funeral insurance policies.

Election outcome: provisional thoughts on the implications for Indigenous affairs

As I write this, the outcome of the election remains uncertain. It is likely to be days, and potentially weeks until we see a new Government and ministry sworn in. Clearly, the devil will be in the detail, so it is perhaps unwise to even venture a view on what it is likely to mean for Indigenous issues in Australia.

However, I think there are some general conclusions which can be drawn.

Whichever party forms government, they will have a more challenging time obtaining senate support for their legislative agenda, and in particular, there is likely to be a bias towards more populist views in the Senate. A minority government or narrow majority, combined with a challenging Senate increases the odds considerably of circumstances arising which would lead to an early election in the coming term.

This adds a sharper partisan edge to the ideologically significant issues which divide the nation; indigenous issues fit within this category, particularly issues around recognition, treaty, and over-representation in the criminal justice system.

In relation to constitutional recognition, the desirability of substantive change, and indeed the increasing expectations of Indigenous Australians for such a change are increasingly significant elements in our national political dialogue. However the likelihood and political feasibility of substantive (as opposed to merely symbolic or semantic) change appears to have been receding over the last year, and the election outcome reflecting strongly polarised views across both the nation’s political elites and the community at large appear unlikely to reverse that trend.

If Malcolm Turnbull is able to muster a majority on the floor of the house and hence retain the Prime Ministership (as currently still seems most likely), he will have reduced authority, and will likely be required to grant an even greater say to conservative elements within his party (who tend to have strong views on key Indigenous issues such as constitutional recognition).

The Nationals relative influence within the Coalition appears to have been strengthened as the majority of seats lost by the Coalition are within the Liberal party room. The likelihood of Nigel Scullion retaining his current portfolio (or an equivalent Cabinet post) is thus strengthened.

However, we can expect a lift in the priority and profile which Labor allocates to Indigenous issues with two high profile and high calibre Indigenous MP entering Parliament: Linda Burney in Barton and Patrick Dodson as a Senator for WA. There are a number of other possible incoming Indigenous parliamentarians, notably Kado Muir who is a Nationals Senate candidate in WA. The result is that there will be a strong case for a Turnbull Government to consider appointing Ken Wyatt as Minister for Indigenous Affairs. He would immediately blunt the potential for Dodson and Burney to set the agenda on key Indigenous issues, and would also facilitate a shift in emphasis to Indigenous health issues (Wyatt’s background and strength).

If Bill Shorten is able, against the odds, to form a minority Government, he will face formidable obstacles in the Senate, and serious budget challenges. He would likely think very seriously about appointing Dodson or Burney as Indigenous affairs minister. They would in turn face huge expectations from the Indigenous community and their supporters, but would also confront a more sharply polarised community, and an Opposition with a rather more conservative bias on Indigenous issues than under Prime Minister Turnbull.

To date, under Shadow Spokesman Shayne Neumann,  Labor has appeared to hold back on a proactive Indigenous affairs agenda, in favour of a more restrained stance emphasising  ‘bipartisanship’ and a focus on the relatively abstract ‘motherhood’ of constitutional recognition.  This has facilitated an ongoing emphasis on their core messaging around health, education and fairness for the community as a whole.

This strategy is likely to come under increasing internal pressure over the coming term, and in the event Labor forms a minority Government will necessarily change. Perhaps the largest risk for a Labor Government (since Indigenous interests appear to expect more from Labor than the Coalition) will be in attempting to craft a specific proposal for constitutional recognition which simultaneously meets the legitimate Indigenous expectations for substantive change and avoids a negative campaign from conservative interests which sabotages its chance of success.

So whichever party forms Government, Indigenous issues are likely to increase in profile in the next parliament. However, a combination of increased profile and increased expectations will quickly hit the fiscal reality wall. What seems clear from the election campaign we have just had, and the external uncertainties which dominate much global financial policymaking, is that (notwithstanding Keynes insights into the appropriate role of government in stimulating overall demand) whoever takes the government benches in the next parliament will seek to work hard to cut government spending and reduce the budget deficit.

We are likely to see a further cross government effort to find savings, involving the early convening of the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet, or perhaps the creation of a specialist ad hoc committee of ministers; what the tabloids used to refer to as a ‘razor gang’. The Department of Finance will have a swathe of savings options, across every portfolio, and indigenous affairs will not be excluded. Austerity will be the name of the game; the only issue really is whether it is a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ version. The only conceivable brake on this would be a view within the incoming Government that an early election will be necessary or desirable.

 My point, however, is that Indigenous interests are not well positioned to resist further budgetary cuts, as they lack the generalised political support in the community necessary to do so and their peak bodies are not influential on detailed policy issues being fought out within the interstices of government.

Consequently, the task of protecting Indigenous specific programs as well as mainstream programs which service large proportions of Indigenous citizens will largely fall to the minister, and those inside the government who take an interest in Indigenous issues. The current minister does not have a great record of protecting the Indigenous budget from cuts. If there is a new minister, he or she will face a major challenge, and may not have the experience or party networks to assemble and maintain the necessary coalition of support to successfully resist cuts.

To sum up, whichever party forms government, Indigenous issues are likely to attract a higher profile and increased expectations from Indigenous citizens in the next term of Government. The Indigenous budget (broadly defined) is likely to come under increased pressure. Substantive constitutional recognition is necessary yet highly unlikely, although there may be a chance of a purely semantic change. Such an approach however would likely increase Indigenous citizens’ sense of alienation, and in my view would likely be counter-productive in the long term. For what it’s worth, I have long held the view that the best opportunity for substantive recognition will be as an integral element of a move to a republic. But that is clearly some way off!

In the meantime, there are a range of important and very real policy challenges in Indigenous affairs which the next Government will need to address and manage. They require focus and attention if the nation is to make progress towards reconciliation, recognition and ending Indigenous disadvantage. In doing so, the incoming government would be wise to considerably ramp up proactive and constructive engagement with Indigenous Australia.

Moral hazard and police services on Groote Eylandt

This week saw an intriguing joint media release from NT Chief Minister Giles and federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs (and Senator for the NT) Nigel Scullion.

The pair announced funding of $15m for increased police facilities and resources on Groote Eylandt.

Here is the text of the announcement, with emphasis added:

More support for policing on Groote Eylandt

Community safety on Groote Eylandt will be increased through a greater police presence and improved police infrastructure, thanks to a joint investment from the Turnbull Coalition and Giles Country Liberals Governments. 

Minister for Indigenous Affairs and Country Liberals Northern Territory Senator, Nigel Scullion and I announced a $15 million investment in policing on Groote Eylandt to upgrade local police stations and increase police resources in the region. 

“This investment will upgrade the police stations at Angurugu and Alyangula and support additional police and a new police dog unit," Minister Scullion says. 

“Community safety is one of the key priorities of the Turnbull Coalition in Indigenous Affairs and this funding will ensure police are spending more time in community working with local residents. 

“Importantly, the investment includes funding to support local Aboriginal community police officers to make sure police work in partnership with communities to improve community safety. 

“I would also like to express my appreciation to the Anindilyakwa Land Council Chairman, Mr Tony Wurramarrba, for the significant co-investment that traditional owners have provided for these police facilities.” 

The Northern Territory Government has been working hard to combat crime and improve safety throughout the Territory. Our Remote Policing Model helps to ensure that police operations in remote areas across the NT are well supported and resourced. It's a flexible policing model that maximises community engagement across remote communities, which means we can deploy our resources when and where they are needed most. The funding has been provided out of existing resources from the Indigenous Advancement Strategy.

No-one is going to begrudge the Groote community access to adequate policing resources, and the focus on community safety and community policing is clearly a major priority in anyone’s terms.

There have been ongoing community safety issues on Groote for many years, and NT Governments have not been prepared to stand up to the policy union’s longstanding antipathy to its officers being based, or staying overnight, in the communities of Angurugu and Umbakumba, preferring to reside in the mining town of Alyangula.

Most recently, in November last year a riot involving up to 60 people led to two deaths and six convictions. See press reports here and here and here. The media reported police admitting that four police officers were unable to control the affray. The media reports indicate that a number of the men convicted are from the community of Umbakumba (which is not a beneficiary of the announced funding).

The announcement appeared to coincide with a ceremony on the Island attended by both Ministers to celebrate the renewal of the longstanding manganese mining agreement between local Traditional owners and South 32 which owns the Groote Eylandt Mining Company (GEMCO).

The rights of citizens to safe communities and safe lives are clearly still a very live issue on Groote (and in many other remote communities). Apart from issues of community safety, the communities on Groote (and many others) continue to face significant shortfalls in housing, infrastructure, health services, disability services, and financial literacy. Issues around the robustness of local community governance are a continuing challenge.

The community is also a major node of an insidious neurological disease, the Machado Joseph Disease, which places increased social and health pressures on many families across Groote Eylandt (and beyond). Minister Scullion reversed a $10m grant to the MJD Foundation soon after being appointed as Minister, and is currently appealing a Federal Court decision overturning his decision.

Labor and Coalition Governments have done much in the last decade to invest in major communities such as those on Groote through programs such as National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing, the Stronger Futures National Partnership, and in general purpose funding to the Northern Territory Government from GST revenues. Yet the current Commonwealth Government appears intent on rolling these National Partnership Agreements into recurrent grant programs where they are much more vulnerable to annual savings decisions, and fail to lock in complementary state and territory policy and program contributions.

To their credit, the Groote traditional owners have over the past decade sought to leverage their royalty income through a regional partnership agreement with the NT and Commonwealth Governments which led to a number of joint projects involving contributions of their own mining royalty resources to a range of communal projects, including a contribution of $5m towards the sealing of the road to Umbakumba. Unfortunately, in recent years, governments appear to have backed away from this formal engagement and commitment of resources, presumably because it injected a degree of inflexibility into their newly centralised funding arrangements, and diminishes government capacity to find savings.

So what are the policy issues raised by joint announcement on policing?

The fundamental issue raised is why the Commonwealth must fund facilities which are core responsibilities of the NT Government.

And of course, the decision involves a large dose of what economists term ‘moral hazard’ for the Commonwealth: every time it funds these responsibilities, it sends a signal that the NT Government is not expected to fund this function.

The suggestion in the release that there is a ‘joint investment’ by the two governments appears farfetched given the indication in the last sentence that funding is from the Commonwealth’s Indigenous Advancement Strategy program.

There is no indication of the assessment process adopted in relation to the grant; presumably the federal minister has used his discretion to approve the funding without a comparative assessment of alternative needs and opportunities. The admission that the funding is from within existing appropriations means that it comes at the expense of other Indigenous priorities.

The release is deliberately vague on the breakdown of the financial support, and the timeframe over which the recurrent elements (such as the dog support unit or the employment of local community police) will be offered.

Crucially, the announcement fails to provide any clarity on whether police will be posted 24 hours a day to Angurugu, and by implication, we can assume that they won’t be posted 24 hours a day to Umbakumba. This is the single most important decision government could take to increase community safety on Groote, but it appears that it has been squibbed.

While the announcement thanks the local community for their contribution, it fails to indicate both the source and the quantum of this contribution. While it is commendable that there has been a community contribution, it is surely unprecedented for a local community to have to contribute to its own policing investment. If governments are not prepared to fund adequate levels of policing within their jurisdictions, then they fail a core test of legitimacy.

And of course, the announcement has been made within a week of the federal election. Presumably Minister Scullion made his decision before the caretaker period began and held it over.

Setting aside the politics which so clearly infuses this announcement, it provides a clear cut example of the structural lack of transparency in government decision making in remote communities, at both process and output levels.

And counter-intuitively, the very necessity of Commonwealth and local community funding for what is a core NT Government responsibility provides yet a further example of the chronic underinvestment by responsible governments in their core responsibilities in remote Australia.