East Kimberley postscript

For those interested in more information related to the previous post on Emerging Developments in the East Kimberley, I have just come across the debate on the Auditor General’s report on the Ord Development in the West Australian Parliament.

It is an excellent insight into the way important policy issues are dealt with in the political domain. The link is here. See page numbers 5569 to 5578.

Emerging developments in the East Kimberley: lessons for policymakers

My previous post argued the case for policymakers to give greater attention to regional Indigenous voices. This post takes the next step and examines albeit quite briefly recent experience in one particular region, the East Kimberley.

The East Kimberley was amongst the last areas in the country to be explored and colonised, and the impact of colonisation is still very much in the communal memory of communities there. Perhaps the best description of what colonisation meant on the Kimberley pastoral frontier is by Maryanne Jebb in her 2002 book Blood, Sweat and Welfare. John Boulton’s recent book Aboriginal Children, History and Health, based on evidence related almost entirely to the lives of Kimberley families, sets out a persuasive argument that structural violence with its roots in the process of colonisation is the primary cause of poor health via the mechanism of inter-generational disruption of effective parenting skills (Boulton 2016:14).

The process of dispossession continued right through to the 1960s with the establishment of the Ord River Irrigation Scheme, and it has only been since the Mabo case, and the passage of the Native Title Act that local Indigenous people have had any formal recognition of their prior (and continuing) land ownership rights.

The region continues to have severe social problems. A recent account in Crikey argues that the region’s Aboriginal people exhibit the symptoms of widespread trauma, and associated issues.

There are a number of policy relevant developments emerging in the East Kimberley which deserve more detailed attention. In addition, a couple of important regional Indigenous organisations are making substantial contributions to addressing the challenges faced by local communities.

Recently the former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott spent a week in the East Kimberley along with Human Services Minister Alan Tudge. In a follow up opinion piece, Abbott extolled the virtues of the cashless debit card being trialled in Kununurra and Wyndham (and Ceduna), and argued that it ought to be extended to the rest of Australia. While we are yet to see any formal evaluation of the outcomes derived from the roll out of the card, the anecdotal evidence appears positive. While income management can be a valuable tool in addressing the most serious symptoms of welfare dependency, it is far from straight forward as a policy tool, particularly if used on its own, or as the primary policy intervention. I dealt with some of the issues involved in a previous post.

A key organisational supporter of the cashless debit card trial in the region is the Wunan Foundation, led by energetic Chair Ian Trust, with a strong policy reform agenda based on individual responsibility. The most recent PMC publication of Senate Order Entity Contracts lists some $3.68m in funding for the Wunan Foundation over the past year and the next two years for projects related to school attendance, early childhood, school programs and ‘remote Australia strategies’. Trust has been a strong supporter of the Empowered Communities proposal, and the Jawun organisation, which has had a long involvement in Kununurra providing local organisations with secondments from the corporate sector. Jawun has also been closely involved with Noel Pearson in Cape York, as well as a number of other sites nationally.

A second major organisation in the region is the MG Corporation. In 2005 the Ord Final Agreement (OFA) between the WA Government and local native title holders/claimants cleared the way for a major expansion of irrigated agriculture in the Ord Valley downstream from Lake Argyle and Kununurra. The OFA also provided for the establishment of the MG Corporation to manage the financial benefits of the agreement on behalf of the relevant traditional owners / native title holders. MG Corporation undertakes a range of commercial and social activities directed to ensuring the benefits of the agreement negotiated in 2005 are sustainable into the future. A quick review of its website and latest annual report suggests that so far it has done a pretty good job.

The MG Corporation appears to take a more sceptical view of the policy approaches adopted by Governments and Wunan. So for example, a former Chair, Teddy Carlton has been prominent in drawing public attention to some to the potential flaws in the ways the cashless debit card works.

Notwithstanding these differences, much of the work of the two organisations is complementary, and the region is benefitting from having a diversity of organisational advocates for Indigenous interests in the region. No doubt other Indigenous organisations in the region are making positive contributions too.

Turning to mainstream policy development in the region, the WA Auditor General has recently released a report on the implementation of the next phase of the Ord-East Kimberley Development in Western Australia. ABC media report here. The Northern Territory is undertaking its own process of opening up land for irrigated agriculture on the NT side of the border. The Australian Government’s Office of Northern Australia appears to be playing a facilitative role in the process.

Following the 2005 OFA, in 2008, the WA Government approved $220m for expansion of the Ord Scheme which had been in operation since the 1970s. In 2009, the Commonwealth approved funding to the WA Government of $195m, in what was described as a stimulus package, for 27 associated social infrastructure projects, including a number directed to improved Indigenous housing in Kununurra.

The audit concluded that the expanded irrigation projects took 3 years longer than planned, and cost $334m, an over-run of $114m. Perhaps of most concern, and most surprisingly, the audit found that there was no specific business case or detailed costings undertaken for the entire project before it was commenced in 2009 (although there were costings for the first phase at that time). The audit report pointed to a number of other issues, including a comprehensive governance structure for the project not delivering the oversight expected, and a Steering Committee which did not meet for long periods, and did not receive regular financial reports nor approve revised budgets.

The Steering Committee membership included the heads of the relevant WA agencies and worryingly (at least to my mind) also included representatives of Ministerial offices. This raises fundamental questions about the competence of the WA bureaucracy and points to a fundamental breakdown in the distinction between an independent bureaucracy capable of providing robust advice and ministers responsible for taking decisions. The necessity for a distinction relates to the desirability of providing taxpayers and citizens with an assurance that ministers have at least had the benefit of objective advice before decisions are taken.

In relation to Indigenous employment issues, the audit found that there had been good outcomes during the construction phase, with over 200 Aboriginal people employed comprising around 21 percent of all jobs, and similar outcomes for the Commonwealth funded social infrastructure package. The audit notes however that the employment created during the construction phase has not been sustained since completion.

The audit noted that the original justification of the project relied heavily on the socio-economic advantages which would be delivered. It notes that a baseline of social indicators was compiled in 2008, but that there is not plan to reassess these indicators to identify if there has been any sustained improvement.

The audit notes a new policy approach by the WA Government whereby it intends to not fund further infrastructure development on the Ord, but will limit its role to land release and negotiation of developer agreements. Private sector developers will be required to fund their own infrastructure, obtain environmental approvals and negotiate native title clearances. There are suggestions on the MG website that negotiations with the company responsible for implementing the Ord expansion are progressing over particular areas listed for development.

The conclusion I wish to draw arising from the WA Auditor General report is that centralised bureaucratic management, especially when politically directed, is fundamentally ill-suited to responding adequately to regional Indigenous concerns (and as an aside, in this case at least the broader public interest). Notwithstanding the existence of at least two substantial, competently run, and effective Indigenous organisation in the region, the bureaucracy managed to ignore them completely in implementing the expansion phase. Moreover, while these Indigenous organisations were involved in delivering some services related to the Ord expansion scheme to the Indigenous community on the ground, they had no inkling of the problems which permeated the policy management of the process in Perth.

In other words, in the Indigenous policy domain, the existence of effective local organisations is not enough to ensure responsive and effective government policy at a regional level. There must be a conscious decision by Government to engage, preferably through a formal structure which has status across the breadth of government.

Consider a hypothetical alternative, which involved the existence of a formal regional voice for Indigenous interests, and which thus ensured that governments, both state and federal, engaged with key Indigenous organisations and interests as they progressed through the various stages of implementing the scheme. In such a scenario, it seems unlikely that the deficiencies in financial planning, and in implementation of the Ord-East Kimberley Development identified by the Auditor General would have occurred and been allowed to run. It was the fact that there was no line of sight, that there was no visibility of what was happening (and not happening), which led to the poor outcomes identified retrospectively by the Auditor General.

The deficiencies identified by the WA Auditor General tell us a lot about the calibre and quality of the WA Government, its political priorities and its bureaucracy. While a serious issue, a strategy to improve the quality of political and bureaucratic governance is achievable assuming the requisite political support is brought to bear.

The more important and more extensive systemic lesson is that without a formally recognised regional forum which guarantees substantive engagement with Indigenous voices, the quality of Indigenous affairs policymaking will be structurally unsound. This is a lesson which extends way beyond the Kimberley, beyond Western Australia, and deserves national attention.

A ‘new engagement’: lessons from the Torres Strait

Last week Minister Scullion spent a week in North Queensland, visiting communities:

“I acknowledge the important role that mayors and local councillors have in communities as the elected authority, and the Coalition Government respects their leadership and is committed to working with them to improve outcomes for their communities.” ….

…"The Coalition Government has delivered a new engagement with our First Australians and I am taking every opportunity I get to meet with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians across the country in their own communities,…

Notwithstanding the unfortunate use of the word ‘our’ to refer to First Australians, these sentiments are further evidence of a recent shift in narrative from the Minister and the Government as outlined in my last post ‘tectonic shifts or mere tremors’.

The Minister’s travels included a visit to the Torres Strait where he attended the 100^th meeting of the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), and announced a $15m grant through the Government’s Major Infrastructure Program for ‘water security and sustainable infrastructure projects’ in the Torres Strait. The media release notes that the funds would be matched by the Queensland Government. Interestingly, there appears to be no announcement from the Queensland Government of this commitment; normally these types of Commonwealth-State joint investments are announced jointly. As an aside, one of the gaps in the Minister’s policy approach to date appears to be substantive engagement with the states and territories.

The following day, Minister Scullion announced a further $70k grant for a biennial cultural festival in the Torres Strait.

The Torres Strait Regional Authority is a successful institution for representing Torres Strait Islander interests, with a 22 year history of stability and organisational resilience. Australia’s Torres Strait Islanders have a strong presence on the mainland, and a long history of movement or ‘orbiting’ for employment. The TSRA emerged in 1994, in amendments to the ATSIC legislation, replacing the previous elected regional council in place since 1989. This development was separate from, but occurred in broad parallel with the slow progress of the Mabo case through the Queensland legal system and ultimately to a decision by the High Court in 1993. Both policy changes were driven by a strong sense of Torres Strait Islander identity and independence.

Those interested in exploring the history of Torres Strait Islander’s advocacy for greater autonomy should consult Tim Rowse’s biography Nugget Coombs A Reforming Life for an account of the negotiations over Prime Minister Whitlam’s desire to see the Australia-PNG boundary shift south, and Coombs’ role in developing an innovative solution which both protected Torres Strait Islander interests and protected the environment. As Rowse sums up:

‘By tirelessly presenting this formulation of Torres Strait Islander’s economic and environmental interests, …Coombs laid the basis for Cabinet’s decision, 26 February 1976, to endorse what became known as the Protected Zone….His achievement was to persuade both the Islanders and the Commonwealth that the border was but a minor detail in a settlement that effected Islanders economic and ecological sovereignty. Australia’s maritime boundary with New Guinea is one of Coombs’ greatest, but least known, achievements’. (Rowse 2002:343)

Similarly, Chapter 12 of Robert Tickner’s memoir Taking a Stand outlines his (somewhat subjective) perspective on a frustrated campaign for self-government by Torres Strait Islanders in the first half of the 1990s which led to the emergence of the TSRA within the ambit of the ATSIC legislation and Commission.

When ATSIC was subsequently dismantled, the TSRA and other statutory bodies established alongside it survived.

What is clear is that like many institutions, the TSRA emerged as an institutional and organisational compromise, reflecting as much the broader political concerns and interests of the Commonwealth and Queensland, as any rational process of policy development. For example, it arguably duplicates the local government councils which exist under Queensland legislation in the Torres Strait. Nevertheless, it has reached an accommodation with them over respective roles, and is clearly valued by Torres Strait Islanders. It thus appears to have stood the test of time within the region, and twenty two years later, attracts bipartisan acceptance in Canberra.

Perhaps of most policy significance for today, the TSRA provides a tangible demonstration that in Indigenous affairs policy, regional interests and regional representation of those interests are both important and can be successfully implemented.

Arguably, the most serious and substantial gap in the national policy framework for Indigenous affairs nationally is the absence of a comprehensive regional framework such as existed with ATSIC’s regional councils. While Torres Strait Islanders have a regional Indigenous voice, many other regions do not have one, and this contributes to the deep disenchantment within Indigenous communities over the directions of policy at the moment. The current Government’s incapacity to successfully implement the Empowered Communities proposals to date provides further evidence in support of this conclusion.

While ministerial visits backed by a frenzy of positive media releases, formal dialogue opportunities, and the occasional announcement of funding for basic infrastructure (which most Australians take for granted) all are appreciated by Indigenous interests, my experience tells me that it is not adequate as a foundation for a new policy approach which engages Indigenous citizens.

The high level history of Indigenous- Government relations over the last 15 years can be summed up as a series of key policy initiatives: the abolition of ATSIC; the imposition of the NT intervention; the adoption of Closing the Gap; the reshaping of the NTER into ‘Stronger Futures’; and ‘jobs and school attendance’. What is striking is that none of these policy initiatives, whether positive or negative, engaged effectively with grass roots Indigenous communities. This is not a surprise, because as a result of the ATSIC abolition, the structures which facilitated the expression of regional voices disappeared, and they have not been replaced.

The deep disenchantment with Indigenous policy amongst Indigenous communities is in no small measure due to the exclusion of local and regional Indigenous voices from the policy debate and discussion, and the implementation of policies which have at their root exclusionary dynamics. The tougher breaching requirements for the new Community Development Program, is a case in point. It is excluding large and growing numbers of Indigenous citizens from access to income support, and driving a deeper wedge between remote communities and the wider Australian society.

A ‘new engagement with … Indigenous Australians’ is overdue and is necessary, but it requires substantive policy change – not political spin - directed to the inclusion of Indigenous interests in the policy and political system. Any such change must be well planned, and implemented in consultation with Indigenous interests. In the three years since the Government first came to office, it is difficult to think of any such policy change which might be described as unequivocally inclusive rather than exclusionary.

The Torres Strait provides lessons for the broader Indigenous policy arena. Structures which provide a means for regional voices to be heard are important. Concepts such as autonomy, self-determination, and empowerment continue to be core aspirations for Indigenous people and are not inconsistent with the overarching sovereignty of the Australian Parliament and nation state. The challenge for governments, present and future, is to have the courage to initiate innovative policy development processes which give force to these aspirations and make them tangible.

Tectonic shifts or mere tremors: resetting Indigenous affairs policy

There are increasing indications that the Federal Government is adjusting its policy settings and shifting position in relation to Indigenous affairs.

The current state of play is depressingly downbeat. The Closing the Gap strategy appears stalled and progress frustratingly beyond reach. The stop/start/stop/start debate on constitutional recognition appears at risk of still birth unless the government can develop a consensus vision for the path forward based on a constructive relationship with the broad Indigenous leadership. The Government’s moves to revamp Indigenous funding while cutting some $500m from the forward estimates were at best a public relations set-back, and at worst a policy mistake which will reverberate adversely for a decade. In the remote employment program designed by Minister Scullion and administered by PMC, the imposition of tough participation requirements in the remote income support program has seen breaches of participants skyrocket, as many participants in effect are forced out of the program and denied access to income support.

Following an election which saw a number of high profile Indigenous MPs elected, and the associated prospect of greater focus on Indigenous issues within the Parliament over the coming term, and the Prime Minister blindsided into establishing (with the NT Government) a Royal Commission into child protection and youth detention in the Northern Territory, it must have become extremely clear to the Prime Minister and his key advisers that the Indigenous affairs portfolio is an area which demands more proactive policy management than it has received to date. The Prime Minister and his advisers will be increasingly conscious that the potential upsides in Indigenous affairs are extraordinarily hard to grasp and retain; while the potential risks and downsides encroach on all sides.

In these circumstances the location of the Indigenous affairs bureaucracy within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet creates a particular vulnerability for the Government, and in particular the Prime Minister. I have written previously on this topic; link here.

The fact that the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Senator Scullion, who as a CLP member was closely associated with the former CLP Government in the Northern Territory led by Adam Giles, and yet appeared to be totally unaware of the youth detention issues which emerged on the ABC Four Corners program must have caused the Prime Minister to wonder whether he was wise to reappoint him as Minister. The Minister’s apparent lack of awareness is surprising as he is renowned for keeping a close ear to the ground and for his skill in relating to people in the bush.

Until Minister Scullion’s original appointment, it had been accepted wisdom (at least within the bureaucracy) that it would be unwise for any Prime Minister to appoint a Territorian as Minister for Indigenous affairs. The myriad potential conflicts of interest were seen to be just too great.

Prime Minister Abbott saw himself as Prime Minister for Indigenous Affairs, so may have felt that the potential conflicts of interest would be moderated. Or he may have just taken the view that the issue wouldn’t matter. The comprehensive rejection of the NT CLP Government by bush communities at the recent NT election, and the deep-seated and open antipathy of the major Indigenous organisations in the NT to Minister Scullion will have been noted by the Prime Minister, and I would argue, confirm that the potential for conflict between loyalty to Territory interests and national interests is very real indeed for any NT based Indigenous affairs minister.

Of course, as a senior National Party senator in Canberra, Minister Scullion is given extra leeway since the Prime Minister will always be loath to antagonise his coalition partners unnecessarily. Even so, it appears that following the recent federal election, Senator Scullion’s position in the ministry was threatened by an internal challenge from younger up and coming MPs within the National’s party room. In these circumstances, one obvious defence is to seek a stay of execution based on a promise to depart at some specified time in the future.

The Nationals party room endorsed Senator Scullion’s ministerial appointment, but we don’t know what, if any, the terms of that endorsement were. We do know that following his Government’s election defeat, Adam Giles canvassed the possibility of a move to Canberra, and that this earned him a vociferous rebuke from Shane Stone, a former CLP Chief Minister of the NT, and a Liberal Party powerbroker. What few have focused on however is that for Giles to make such a move, there would have to be a vacancy. The obvious vacancy would be a decision by Senator Scullion to retire.

There are other indications that the ground may be being prepared for Minister Scullion’s exit as well as a change to the departmental arrangements for the Indigenous Affairs Group within PMC.  The Minister’s longstanding chief staff has reportedly moved on and is being replaced on a short term basis by a well-respected Indigenous bureaucrat from PMC. And an unannounced review of the Indigenous Affairs Group (IAG) is underway. As I argued in my earlier post, the likely outcome is the establishment of the IAG as an autonomous agency within the PMC portfolio, although other administrative options also exist.

While I think the arguments for separation of the IAG from PMC are strong and outweigh those for the status quo, there are many potential critics of such a move (both within and outside the Government). It could be characterised as a downgrade in status, and has the potential to further antagonise the Indigenous community.

To mitigate any such criticism, the Prime Minister could do a number of things: he might appoint an Indigenous Minister – Ken Wyatt would strengthen the Governments capacity to counter the political and persuasive firepower of Labors three Indigenous members. He might also change tack, and seek to actively reach out to the broader Indigenous leadership, thus reducing the potential pool of critics.

Minister Scullion’s recent media release announcing that he will shortly convene a workshop with the 18 organisations which signed the Redfern Declaration is consistent with such a strategy, and begins the process of rebuilding a better long term relationship with the Indigenous leadership. Should a future decision be taken to provide funding to the National Congress, it would ram home the point that the Government is seeking a new relationship.

Of course, I may be wrong, and the Government may be blithely unaware that it has dug a hole for itself in the indigenous policy area, or it may be aware, but decided to do nothing. Assuming my assessment of what is happening is correct, or close to correct, there are a number of implications which follow.

One set of implications relates to the nature and quality of stakeholder engagement, and in particular, where and how the Government obtains advice and feedback on its Indigenous affairs policies. To date, apart from the bureaucracy and corporate players such as Andrew Forrest, it has relied on the Indigenous Advisory Council chaired by Warren Mundine as the formal mechanism for stakeholder engagement. The nature of the advice provided by the Advisory Council is quite opaque.

In addition, from time to time the Government has been prepared to engage with other influential Indigenous leaders such as Noel Pearson, Marcia Langton and Ian Trust in relation to particular issues. Yet to Pearson’s frustration, the Government appears to have failed to progress the Empowered Communities proposal championed by Pearson and others in any substantive way, and thus has an extremely limited capacity for formal engagement at regional levels. As Pearson noted in his January 2016 speech to the Press Club:

We are seeing good things in isolated areas but not seeing the tectonic shifts which are needed…there is a structural challenge in the relationships between our people and governments….it will soon be a year since we submitted out blueprint. It appears we may have cast pearl under swine. There has been no proper engagement in the ideas we’ve proposed and the institutions that we believe are necessary to rationalise that relationship…

In addition to Pearson’s plea, the issue of engagement with regional Indigenous people and voices is an area which requires attention in my view.

Second, the history of government/Indigenous interactions is littered with examples of governments of all political persuasions under-estimating the resources and focus required to establish, maintain, and sustain effective relationships. The risk for the Government is that it reaches out to the Indigenous leadership, establishes some forums, provides some funding, but assumes that this will be enough to bring Indigenous interests on board. History tells us that not only will tokenism not succeed, it will ultimately be counter-productive.

Third, the Government appears to lack an overarching substantive policy agenda in Indigenous affairs. The Closing the Gap strategy is mentioned from time to time, but does not appear to be driving policy directions. The Government is fighting off a conservative push within its own ranks to amend section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act. Its mantras on jobs and on school attendance are directed as much to the expectations of the wider community as to the aspirations of Indigenous citizens.

What an overarching policy agenda might be is the crucial question, and ideally would be a matter for dialogue between Government and Indigenous interests. My intuition tells me that the development of mechanisms to allow regional indigenous voices to be heard in the policy development process would be a good place to start.

Adjusting the Government’s approach and associated narrative in Indigenous affairs would be a smart move politically, and would open up opportunities to reset policy directions which might begin to ameliorate the deep-seated and systemic challenges Indigenous citizens face. A change of Minister at the end of the year, or early next year, would create greater opportunities for improved stakeholder engagement, and facilitate the introduction of new ideas into the policy mix. Establishing a stand-alone agency would begin the process of rebuilding the skills, capabilities and capacity to understand what is going on – in short, the intellectual capital - which was deliberately stripped out of the Indigenous affairs group following the Government’s election in 2013. Ultimately, rebuilding these capabilities would improve the quality of advice available to the Government from the bureaucracy.

I suspect that the Prime Minister is keen to see such a re-set. Given that the PMO and central agencies such as PMC are inevitably focused on managing the political challenges of the day, and thus by definition are less focused on driving systemic changes which will deliver longer term outcomes, the risk is that the commitment required to make the re-set work will dissipate over time. Establishing formal structures to reinforce whichever changes are determined upon, and building in a degree of transparency would help to mitigate this risk.

In complex areas such as indigenous affairs, there are rarely effective short term fixes. The best approach is to live by the maxim that ‘good policy is good politics’. Initiating a series of short term tremors to the policy framework will only be effective if it not only undermines the foundations of the current dysfunctional arrangements but if it also leads to a tectonic shift towards addressing the underlying causes of Indigenous disadvantage, and towards creating a policy environment where Indigenous interests feel they have a voice.