Interests shape policy more than voters

 

You spotted snakes with double tongue,

Thorny hedgehogs, be not seen;

Newts and blind-worms, do no wrong,

Come not near our fairy queen.

A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act 2, Scene 2.

  

A few days ago, trudging in misty rain through a field near the village of Tintagel in Cornwall, I came across a recently deceased hedgehog. It had been flattened by a tractor. This put me in mind of the Greek poet Archilocus’ aphorism: "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog knows one big thing".

 

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin wrote a famous essay, The Hedgehog and the Fox, categorising thinkers and writers as either hedgehogs who interpret the world through a single overarching idea or theory, or foxes who are open to multiple theoretical explanations in explaining events.

 

It strikes me that most policymakers and analysts — not just in the Indigenous policy domain — are prone to being hedgehogs of one sort or another, often without realising it. I don’t exclude myself from this generalisation. If true, one obvious implication is that complexity is systematically overlooked. Another less obvious implication is that particular big ideas become so embedded and ubiquitous that we unconsciously constrain our analyses to processes and options that implicitly assume the correctness or validity of the particular big idea to which we subscribe, and thus ignore the potential influence of alternative big ideas. It is this less obvious implication that I explore here.

 

One particular big idea that is widely assumed to be innately correct is that our system of electoral democracy is of paramount importance in shaping policy outcomes.

 

A recent CAEPR research publication, Indigenous electoral power in the 2022 Federal election: a geographical snapshot of latent potential,  by Francis Markham and Bhiamie Williamson (link here) is just one of numerous examples I could point to which reinforce the big idea that electoral democracy is crucial and/or paramount in framing policy. The consequence is that these analyses implicitly shift focus away from alternative, and potentially more relevant, influences on policy formation.

 

Markham and Williamson’s analysis is at once straightforward and eye-opening. They analyse Indigenous voting participation and persuasively demonstrate that notwithstanding the existence of compulsory voting, the national Indigenous electoral participation rate is extremely low. They estimate it to be around 44%. To my mind this is the most significant policy implication of their excellent analysis, and one deserving of much more attention from policy analysts.

 

However, Markham and Williamson have a different point to make. They go on to compare the winning margins in particular electorates in the recent Federal election (they focus particularly on ten electorates: see Table 3) with an estimate of the estimated Indigenous voting eligible population (VEP). Their detailed analysis demonstrates that there is a theoretical opportunity to mobilise both existing Indigenous voters and electorally disengaged Indigenous citizens, which if successfully implemented could determine electoral outcomes in multiple electorates across remote, regional and even urban Australia. They argue this represents unrealised Indigenous voting power, and conclude, contra the extant dominant narrative of Indigenous electoral powerlessness, that this latent electoral power ‘has significant potential to be assembled in exchange for policy reform or Indigenous representation’.

 

A critique of Markham and Williamson’s argument is feasible, based the undoubted challenges involved in assembling such an Indigenous electoral constituency. These challenges presumably include arguments that Indigenous heterogeneity, including political heterogeneity, is so deeply embedded that it would preclude the assembly of such a constituency; or that Indigenous electoral disengagement is in fact a rational and intentional response by potential Indigenous voters to the ubiquity of political exclusion.

 

My intention however is not to critique this research on its own terms, as it is clearly extremely valuable in understanding the level of Indigenous engagement with the electoral system. While they forego this path, their analysis opens a portal to further analysis that might seek to understand both the reasons for this disengagement, and the consequences. This should be an issue of major concern to both governments and the community at large as it may foreshadow much more widespread disenchantment with the electoral system itself amongst the wider community (link here).

 

Rather, I suggest that by focussing on voting and electoral participation as a pathway to greater political and policy influence, Markham and Williamson have implicitly reinforced the big idea that electoral democracy is crucial in shaping policy outcomes.

 

I take a different view. Elections are important, inter alia because they are the mechanism we use to choose the executive arm of government, and to also choose the Parliament which enacts new laws (and repeals old laws). Yet our system of representative democracy also operates in informal ways. The Executive dominates the legislature, often prioritises political considerations over the public interest, and most importantly, is itself influenced by, and at times captured by, or co-opted by, powerful corporate interests (link here and link here).

 

In fact, once you start looking, the determinative influence of interest groups on policy are ubiquitous, including in the Indigenous policy domain. Why did the Hawke Government’s proposals for national land rights fail? Why is there no mining veto in the Native Title Act? Why did the Federal Environment Minister not take action to prevent the destruction of Jukuun Gorge? Why did the NT Government seek to ignore its Licencing Regulator and allow a major alcohol outlet to be built near Aboriginal camps in Darwin? (link here). Why has the NT Government recently reversed 14 years of policy to implement a policy that nudges remote communities towards allowing alcohol in previously dry communities (link here).

 

Moreover, the collateral damage amongst vulnerable and Indigenous citizens as interest groups pursue their interests in mainstream contexts are also considerable: Why are punitive policing and incarceration the first ports of call in the administration of justice in Indigenous contexts? Why are social security payments maintained below the poverty line? Why are funds available for tax cuts targeted primarily at high income owners, but not for essential services and housing in remote communities? (link here). Why do governments fail to adequately fund the policies required to close the gap? (link here).

 

Of course (to adopt some fox like traits), not everything is explained by the role of external and powerful corporate interest groups: politicians develop strong views, often ideologically determined; partisan politics rather than interest group advocacy can determine particular policy approaches; and some Indigenous interest groups within the Indigenous domain exert influence over policy.

 

Nevertheless, it is my contention that the big idea of democratic electoral politics being the primary pathway to policy influence in today’s Australia is deeply flawed. An alternative big idea, that interest groups, together and individually, shape most significant policy should replace it or be added to the mix.

 

This leads me to the view that the pathway to greater policy influence and ultimately greater inclusion and political power within Australian society for Indigenous interests lies in building robust and independent Indigenous advocacy capability. To do this requires building Indigenous advocacy institutions independent of direct government funding and support. Implicit in this idea is the notion that the influence and power of mainstream interests must be countered and alternative policy narratives proposed and advocated at the genesis of policy proposals. Moreover, an effective Indigenous advocacy capability would operate to ‘plough the ground’ with politicians and policymakers in advance of particular issues arising to ensure good channels of communication exist and can be available when needed. This is not rocket science; it is exactly what key interests such as the National Farmers Federation or the Minerals Council, or the scores of lesser interest group organisations do now. 

 

Assuming my assessment has merit, what are the implications for key existing and proposed institutions in the Indigenous policy domain?

 

The first point to make is that the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, and the emergence of the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks has been, and should continue to be, an extraordinarily important step in the direction of building a robust Indigenous advocacy capability in Australia. I have discussed this in some detail previously (link here). Nevertheless, it is still in its infancy and will take at least ten years to reach the level of effectiveness required to begin to meet its full potential. Moreover it faces considerable challenges going forward, not least transitioning from its current leadership that has built it from the ground up, to a second generation leadership focussed on embedding and strengthening the substantial and in many respects extraordinary gains made to date. Additional challenges include strengthening its financial independence as insurance against future co-option by governments (it is presently entirely funded by government), and strengthening its internal coherence given that its membership comprises some fifty or so sector specific peak bodies, each with their own agenda for prioritising the Coalition’s focus and efforts.

 

A key reason that the Coalition of Peaks is so important is that it effectively covers and has expertise in the broad expanse of policy, from health, ageing, housing to criminal justice, disability, alcohol policy, human rights, social security and native title. This extraordinary policy breadth is increasingly impacted by mainstream policies, thus ensuring a logarithmic growth curve in policy complexity that must be mastered to ensure it is working in the interests of Indigenous citizens, particularly the most vulnerable of them.

 

The second development is the near certainty that a referendum to amend the constitution to require the establishment of an Indigenous Voice will be held next year, and if successful, that legislation will be enacted to create such a Voice.

 

The currently proposed text of the amendment (link here) is as follows:

There shall be a body, to be called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice.

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice may make representations to Parliament and the Executive Government on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws with respect to the composition, functions, powers and procedures of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice.

 

It is presently unclear how the membership of a Voice would be selected, though it seems likely that it will involve elections of members wither directly or in some tiered arrangement where regional elected bodies choose a representative such as was used by ATSIC.

 

While it seems likely that many of the members of the national Voice will have policy expertise and experience, the reality will be that very few will have broad policy experience across multiple sectors, and the complexity of the policy issues the Voice will confront will be daunting. The stark reality is that members of any national level Voice will inevitably rely on access to the views of Indigenous organisations (interests) dealing with the particular issues under consideration, and these views are most likely to be best developed by the peak bodies dealing with those issues.

 

My core point is that for Indigenous interests to be effectively advocated, the proposed Voice, and the existing Coalition of Peaks are necessarily complementary, and will need to work together and in tandem. This point is valid whichever of the two big ideas discussed above are paramount. But it is especially the case if it is accepted that the advocacy of interest groups are more important than the operation of the institutions of representative democracy in shaping policy.

 

In February 2021, I posted an article (link here) arguing that any Voice would require a substantial research capability, and arguing that it would be undesirable to give the Voice a remit beyond advice to Parliament. This post is worth reading or re-reading. I maintain the views expressed in that post, while recognising that the temptation to give the Voice a wider remit is difficult for both Indigenous proponents and governments to resist.

 

My earlier post also argued that Indigenous interests should advocate for a mechanism to ensure that whichever design is chosen by the Parliament in the near term or the longer term, it is not able to be starved of financial resources. A failure to achieve some level of financial independence means that future governments will be able to use the carrot or stick of funding to influence and co-opt the Voice.

 

Whether the Voice’s remit is limited to Parliament or extends to the Executive as well, it will still be the case that the Voice and the Coalition of Peaks are complementary and synergistically related. It would be a simplistic misreading to argue that they are duplicate. To make a rough analogy, the existence of the NFF does not mean that National Party representation in Parliament is not seen as important by primary production interests, and nor does the existence of substantial parliamentary representation mean that the NFF does not have a role to play in advancing primary producer interests. The same duality applies to the Indigenous domain in the context of the Voice.

 

To return to where I began, the hedghog’s big idea is that it can rely on its spines and its ability to roll into a ball to protect itself from most predators. Yet this survival strategy evolved in an environment where tractors were unknown.

 

If the Indigenous leadership base their long term strategy on the big idea that electoral processes are the secret to shaping better policies, they run the risk that they will be flattened by the tractor of mainstream interest group dominance. The solution is to build the capability to counter mainstream interest group influence with sophisticated and sustained Indigenous advocacy insulated against co-option by governments or others. In my view, this will require that the Voice, the Coalition of Peaks, and other significant Indigenous organisations work in tandem. In the absence of such coordinated leadership, Indigenous interests will likely continue to be marginalised, and their influence in shifting the embedded structural imbalances within the Australian polity will be constrained and sub-optimal.