Vale 2020

 

At the end of 2020, I thank the small coterie of regular readers of this idiosyncratic blog and the wider group of more occasional readers.

 

To express my appreciation and acknowledge my readers, I have attached a link to a short article by Barry Lopez “Love in a Time of Terror: On Natural Landscapes, Metaphorical Living, and Warlpiri Identity” (link here).

 

Lopez, who died last week, was previously unknown to me. His best known book was Arctic Dreams, an account of five years living in the Arctic. A 2005 review (link here) by Robert Macfarlane, whose work I have read and enjoyed, described Lopez as ‘the most important living writer about wilderness’.

 

This sentence from Love in a Time of Terror struck a chord with me:

It is more important to live for the possibilities that lie ahead than to die in despair over what has been lost.

 

Apart from the challenge of seeing the world in non-rational and metaphorical ways, embedded in these words is a deep respect for human agency, and perhaps even an argument for the importance of individual agency over structure.

 

It is an essential thought and touchstone, even for policymakers, upon which to end 2020, and begin 2021.

The Joint Council on Closing the Gap review of the National Indigenous Reform Agreement

 

His promises were as he then was, mighty,

But his performance, as he is now, nothing.

Henry VIII, Act 4, scene 2.

 

The path-breaking December 2018 Closing the Gap Partnership Agreement (link here) between COAG and First Nation interests made a commitment to review the National Indigenous Reform Agreement (NIRA). The NIRA established and formalised the Closing the Gap process that operated from 2008 to 2018. The Partnership agreement also established a Joint Council co-chaired by the Minister for Indigenous Australians and the CEO of the Coalition of Peaks, Ms Pat Turner.

 

At its second meeting on 23 August 2019, the Joint Council met to consider the Closing the Gap process. The communique issued after the meeting (link here) noted:

The Joint Council considered a review of the National Indigenous Reform Agreement (NIRA), completed by the Partnership Working Group, and agreed to develop a new National Agreement on Closing the Gap, covering the next ten years, continuing the NIRA’s successful elements, strengthening others and addressing foundational areas that were previously excluded from consideration.

 

On 26 August 2019, I submitted a Freedom of Information request for the review. Following a long and convoluted 15 month process, that review was released in full on 23 November 2020, and is available on the FOI disclosure log of the NIAA (link here).

 

The review takes the form of a nine page agenda paper for the Joint Council prepared by a ‘Partnership Working group’, presumably comprised of representatives of NIAA, the states and territories, and the staff of the Coalition of Peaks. It is headed ‘Lessons learned from the National Indigenous Reform agreement’. The review paper is not so much an independent assessment of the NIRA as a consensus document that lays out its supposed strengths and weaknesses. It thus effectively provided each of the parties with the opportunity to introduce their perspective, and to begin to lay out their log of claims for the negotiation ahead. This is presumably the explanation for the countervailing and somewhat inconsistent views embedded throughout the document.

 

This post does not attempt to summarise the document. It is short and easily read. Instead, I have subjected it to a brief critical assessment and commentary, focussing particularly on the more contentious or self-serving claims made. Going forward, the review document will also provide a useful benchmark against which to assess the final outcomes of the negotiation as agreed in the July 2020 National Partnership on Closing the Gap (link here).

 

In a section titled Strengths and Weaknesses - Overview, the review states:

Target setting was highly aspirational. While this helped to highlight the issues and create a sense of urgency, the trajectories were not based on historical trends or evidence about what could be achieved in a given timeframe. This lack of distinction between final policy goals and an ambitious-yet-achievable rate of progress further contributed to a deficit narrative by creating the perceptions of continuous failure…

 

This text is both deeply problematic and fundamentally misconceived. Problematic, because it betrays an underlying agenda to abjure aspiration, and replace it with acceptance of limited progress or even implicit regress. The whole point of a strategy is to aspire, to lay out objectives that will move the nation and First Nations forward, and devise a feasible pathway to achieving those objectives. Misconceived, because it betrays an attempt by governments to appropriate and apply to themselves an argument or viewpoint that has been promulgated by Indigenous advocates to the effect that pointing to deficits implicitly define First Nations citizens as failures. The argument may have some validity when applied to analyses of the actions of Indigenous peoples, but in my view, it has absolutely no validity when used as an excuse for government failures or shortcomings.

 

Governments are effectively arguing that we should not focus on their failures and the structural implications of their policies, because to do so somehow reflects negatively on First Nations. Deconstructed, this text is signalling that governments are not committed to substantively closing the gap, but instead are focussed on the mere appearance of action.

 

In a further paragraph, the review notes that while NIRA did not provide funding:

…it was underpinned by a series of Indigenous specific and mainstream National Partnerships that committed Commonwealth funds often paired with state and Territory funds. These provided the critical foundation for Closing the Gap implementation, and as these began to expire from 2013 without renewal, bipartisanship and implementation fell away.

 

This text is misleading in two respects.

 

First, the pairing of state funding was invariably comparatively minor. The Commonwealth provided the vast bulk of funding under NIRA addressing Indigenous disadvantage. One might argue that the states should have provided more, but the reality is that Closing the Gap was effectively a Commonwealth Government initiative. The states do not have the fiscal capacity of the Commonwealth, and are subject to electoral and political dynamics that virtually ensure under-investment in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. Commonwealth policy leadership is essential if the nation is to successfully close the gap.

 

Second, the non-renewal of the National Partnerships as they expired was a conscious and explicit decision of the incoming Abbott Government elected in September 2013. Bipartisanship and implementation did not gradually and incrementally ‘fall away’. These were deliberate decisions made by the current Liberal/National Coalition Government to stop the pre-existing and arguably inadequate funding directed to addressing Indigenous disadvantage, and thus closing the gap. The most egregious example of this was the decision not to renew the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing that I have analysed at length in previous posts. See the dot points on page 4 of the review document for more specific examples.

 

Finally, the review notes:

Two additional factors compounded the impacts of this withdrawal of resources: the absence of a formal structure for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander involvement in the governance of the framework, and the dissolution in 2013-14 of the two key oversight bodies for the Closing the Gap framework (the COAG Reform Council and the Working Group on Indigenous Reform). Both factors facilitated a period of policy drift. The Close the Gap campaign’s 10-year review concluded that:

By 2014-15, the Closing the Gap Strategy as a coherent, national response to Indigenous disadvantage was effectively over. […] In practice, [it] persists in name only…

 

This text was clearly inserted at the insistence of the Coalition of Peaks. In a stark assessment, it supports and reinforces the points I made above regarding the underlying commitment of governments.

 

Implications

 

So what are we to make of this rather sorry document. At one level, it might be argued that it has been overtaken by the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, and is arguably of minimal or merely historical significance. That is certainly its formal status.

 

However, to my mind, it points directly towards the risks inherent in the current Closing the Gap institutional framework. It reinforces the deeply embedded predispositions of the current Government (and potentially future governments) merely to go through the motions while kicking substantive reform down the road.

 

It points to the path-breaking importance of implementing the Priority Reforms set out and agreed to by all governments in the National Agreement on Closing the Gap.

 

It also points to the very real risk of under-investment by Governments in addressing the Closing the Gap targets identified in the new National Agreement. It is significant in my view that since the announcement of the Agreement and notwithstanding the largest ever stimulus budget in the nation’s history, the Commonwealth has not come forward with any major budget initiatives apart from funding of $46.5m for Community Controlled service agencies (link here). Similarly, the states have made no substantive funding announcements, apart from funding for community controlled services. Western Australia recently announced funding of $4.8m for the community controlled sector (link here).

 

While funding community controlled services is important, addressing substantive disadvantage requires much more substantial funding commitments. These are nowhere to be seen. There is a real risk that Governments have decided to invest in the community controlled sector to facilitate a strategy of non-investment in substantive reform. The lessons of the implementation of the NIRA, identified in the review report the Government sought to keep hidden, have clearly not yet been learnt.

 

Furthermore, there is at present no single data repository recording the investments of governments under the agreement. This is a priority if the agreement is to have a substantive impact.

 

Finally, the fact that the Government was not prepared to release this document immediately it was requested points to an underlying fear that its contents would reveal too much about the governments underlying agenda during the negotiation of the National Agreement. That in itself lends credibility to the analysis above. It should be cause for real concern in the engine room of the Coalition of Peaks.

 

Transparency is an important means of ensuring governments are kept to their word. In coming weeks, I hope to post a short outline of the arguments used to justify the review’s non-release for over a year.

 

I have previously expressed concern about the level of substantive commitment by governments generally, and the Commonwealth in particular, to the substantive reforms required to close the gap (link here and link here). Close analysis of the NIRA review does nothing to change my mind on this score.

The media and Indigenous political aspirations: a book review

 

Here is a link to a book review I recently wrote published on the Australian Policy and History website (link here).

The role of the media, broadly defined, in covering Indigenous policy is under-analysed in academic and wider public discourse. In particular, the footprint of the media is very uneven and increasingly highly segmented. The book under review is one very useful and stimulating perspective.

Of course, a focus on mainstream media is arguably overly narrow. Indigenous art, broadcasting, film making, and social media activity are alternative ways for First Nations’ to promulgate and circulate their own narratives and perspectives.

Further, as my review hints, the ways in which governments and corporate interests use the media (in all its formats) to advance self-serving narratives relating to aspects of Indigenous policy deserve critical analysis too.

This is to say that the role and impact of the media on Indigenous policy and political aspirations deserves greater focus, but perhaps within a wider theoretical framework or set of frameworks than usually brought to bear.

Minister Wyatt and the NT Land Councils: a policy rapprochement?

 

So may the outward shows be least themselves:

The world is still deceived with ornament.

The Merchant of Venice, Act 3, scene 2.

 

Recently there have been signs of improved relations between the Northern Territory Land Councils and the Commonwealth. This post sets out to document some of the public milestones in that process, examines the possible motivations of the respective parties, and asks what this means for remote policy generally.

 

But first, some context. The NT land councils are established under Commonwealth legislation and constitute hybrid statutory corporations. Their members selected by Aboriginal communities, their funding guaranteed (subject to ministerially approved budgets) outside the budget process, their expenditures audited by the ANAO.

 

The key financial mechanism within the NT Land Rights Act is the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA). It is funded by automatic appropriations by the Commonwealth equivalent to the royalty revenues accrued by the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory from mines on Aboriginal land; thus the term ‘royalty equivalents’. The ABA is used for three broad purposes (I am ignoring some minor technicalities here). First, section 64(3) requires 30 percent of all ABA revenues be paid to land councils for distribution to corporations whose members are affected by the resource project that generates the royalty equivalent appropriation.  Second, section 64(1) provides for an amount determined by the Minister to be paid from the ABA to fund the administrative costs of the Land Councils. Third, the Minister can determine further amounts to be paid ‘to or for the benefit of Aboriginals living in the Northern Territory’ (s.64(4)). An advisory committee is established to assist the Minister in this latter function.

 

The four land councils (NLC, CLC, Tiwi LC, and Anindilyakwa LC) operate as key institutions and gatekeepers in relation to Aboriginal land extending over more than fifty percent of the NT. Moreover, their significant budgets and employment, their influence over royalty distributions, and their networks into the broader Indigenous domain means that they exercise significant political power within the NT. As early as 1988, they were described as ‘para-governmental’ in nature (in an article I co-authored with Jon Altman). Consequently, the land councils have multiple points of interaction with all three levels of government in the Northern Territory and these extend from cooperative to conflictual modes of engagement.

 

Recent Developments

 

I want to point to six seemingly independent data points, and argue that they are elements in the separate, but overlapping, larger political and policy strategies on the part of both the Commonwealth and by implication the Land Councils.

 

Data point one: the 2019-2020 Annual Report of the NIAA (link here), which includes the financial statements for the ABA, includes the following salient information. As at 30 June 2020, the net assets (excluding future commitments) of the ABA were $1,266 million (let’s call it $1.26bn), a 19 per cent increase over the $1.06bn at 30 June 2019 (p.173 NIAA Annual Report). This increase was the result of higher mining royalty revenue collections by the NT Government, largely originating from manganese mining at Groote Eylandt.

 

Data point two: the Minister approved $10m in emergency support payments to the four land councils as part of the larger $123m COVID-19 support package approved in April 2020. This is mentioned in the ABA Annual Report at page 173. In addition, but not explicitly mentioned except in the financial statements, the Minister approved an increase in administrative support funding to the four land councils of $24.2m, up from $61.4m to $85.6m. The two larger land councils were the major beneficiaries. This represents an unannounced and unexplained increase in funding of 39.4 percent over the previous year’s funding (refer p.162 NIAA Annual Report).

 

Data point three: In both a speech to the NLC (‘Connecting and activating the Northern Territory’) and in a media release, Minister Wyatt announced on 25 November 2020 what he termed a ‘$100m stimulus package for Indigenous businesses and jobs in the NT’ (link here and here). In the speech, he asserted that he was signing off on a Land Council proposal.  In the media release, he states:

“Working with the NT Land Councils, we are releasing $100 million from the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA) for Aboriginal people to create and sustain jobs through capital injections in ‘shovel-ready’ economic, social and infrastructure projects.” (emphasis added).

 

Data point four: In the speech to the NLC, the Minister attacked the NT Government for their failure to make adequate progress on housing upgrades funded by the Commonwealth.

It is unacceptable that so many Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory live in over-crowded and inadequate housing. This is despite the Commonwealth committing to providing the Northern Territory with $550 million over five years to deliver 1,950 new bedrooms, equivalent to 650 houses, in remote NT communities.

The Northern Territory Government’s roll out of these houses is slow – and it is unacceptable.

The NT Government is responsible for housing and essential services. People in remote communities should expect their housing services to be provided – just as they would in any other location in Australia.

The fact that this is not happening is a disgrace – and in the year 2020 – and looking ahead to 2021 - something that neither I nor the Northern Territory Government should allow to happen.

 

Data point five: In the same speech, the Minister stated:

I am serious when I say – where we have failings – we must explore new ways of working. To this end, I note that the Land Councils are continuing to develop a proposal which would see a direct partnership established with the Commonwealth for the provision of housing services in the NT – led by the Central Land Council. We don’t need to accept the current situation as the only option.

 

Data point six: Notwithstanding the Minister’s visit focussing on a major funding announcement directed to job creation, there was no mention of advice from the Northern Australia Indigenous Reference Group established by Ministers Canavan and Scullion to assist in the implementation of the Government’s 2015 White Paper on Northern Development: ‘Our North, Our Future’. The Department of Industry , Science Energy and Resources website lists the most recent meeting of the IRG as December 2019 (link here). There appears to be a major hiatus of the IRG’s work since the changeover in ministers from Canavan to Pitt and from Scullion to Wyatt. This parallels the Government’s decision to discard (without announcement) the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Indigenous Affairs (link here).

 

Implications

 

So what are we to make of these events, individually and together?

 

Over the years I have worked in proximity to Ministers, I have observed a tendency for Ministers to adopt a transactional mindset when making decisions that bestow favours or benefits on particular interests. For this reason, in relation to the Minister’s unannounced decision to increase Land Councils’ funding, it is a reasonable to assume that he made the decision with an expectation of a quid pro quo of some kind. He may or may not have had a discussion with key Land Council players regarding his expectations, and I am certainly not suggesting that any such expectation is necessarily inappropriate let alone illegal.

 

The most plausible reason for the Minister to seek to woo the NT Land Councils are to obtain a political advantage or benefit of some kind. An outcome that created a disincentive on the Land Councils to support the Labor Party either in the NT or federally, or to not criticise the Liberal/National Party aligns with the political agenda of the Liberal/National Party Government federally and of the CLP in the Territory.

 

There was a Territory election in August 2020 just two months after the end of the year where the increased funding occurred. There may well be a Federal election in the second half off next year. Indigenous voters in the NT are no longer rusted on Labor voters and have shown in recent elections that they are prepared to vote for either party and/or Independents. There are also indications that many Indigenous voters have tuned out and do not vote despite the existence of compulsory voting (link here).  While Labor has won both House of Representatives seats in the NT in the last election and won a return to Government in the Territory in August, the margins are not so wide, particularly in some electorates, that it would not be worth investing in raising political support for non-Labor parties and candidates.

 

An essential element in pursuing a successful political strategy such as appears to be in place here would be to promulgate a pro LNP / CLP narrative amongst key Indigenous thought leaders and interests and/or to negate pro-Labor or Green support from key organisations and leaders. Some version of this strategy is likely behind the motivations of Minister Wyatt in going out of his way to improve relations with the Land Councils while promulgating an anti-NT government narrative on housing. Whether such a strategy will work is unclear.

 

Of course, the Indigenous leadership of organisations such as the Land Councils understand these motivations, and the risks of governments effectively buying their silence. These issues go with the territory.

 

While the description above might accurately be characterised as a statement of the obvious:  ‘politicians indulge in political behaviour’, my concern is to focus on the associated implications for policy when institutional domains become politicised.

 

One of the risks with the overt politicisation of an institution such as the ABA is that it can inhibit the emergence of good long-term policy outcomes.

 

A key challenge for engaged citizens, including Indigenous citizens, seeking to understand what is occurring in relating to policy development in particular sectors are the extraordinarily poor levels of transparency and the absence of well presented and basic information to underpin announcements and ongoing government decisions.

 

In the present case, for example, there is no information on the public record about the nature of the Land Councils’ proposals to which the Minister is responding in announcing his $100m ‘stimulus package’. The policy effectiveness of this initiative in creating and sustaining jobs (the Minister’s objective) will depend in large measure on the quality of the grants made from the ABA. Given that last year the ABA only spent around $20m in general grants, it is not clear that there exists a pool of high quality ‘shovel ready’ projects to fund. In the absence of a comprehensive evaluation, it is unlikely we will ever find out how that goes however, as neither the Minister nor his predecessor publish in an accessible place information on grants made under section 64(4), nor any information on the outcomes of the grants made. I was critical of this in a 2017 post (link here), and note that previous Governments up to and including the Rudd/Gillard/ Rudd Government did make such information accessible and available. The last major evaluation of the operations and effectiveness of the ABA, undertaken by Jon Altman, was published in December 1984.

 

Similarly, in relation to remote housing, the lack of transparency is overwhelming. Minister Wyatt’s critique of the NTG is data free although he clearly has access to detailed performance data as it is standard in funding agreements. The NIAA website does not provide basic data on the progress of expenditure in relation to the Commonwealth’s $550m investment in the NT. The NT Housing and Local Government Department website does provide some quite basic information but has a range of shortcomings including a lack of clarity on timeframes being reported upon (link here). That data shows that while the NTG has spent or contracted some 40% of its own allocation, it has only spent or contracted 28 % of the Commonwealth’s allocation. What is unclear from the table is whether the Commonwealth allocation began after the NT allocation. Also unclear is what action has been taken by Commonwealth officials to ensure that the Commonwealth contribution was being prioritised, a matter that ultimately is Minister Wyatt’s responsibility.

 

While the NT Government’s performance in recent years in constructing remote housing and maintaining the existing housing asset base has been underwhelming at best, and in many respects unacceptable, the hypocrisy that suffuses Minister Wyatt’s narrative is breathtaking. His Government walked away from funding responsibility for remote Indigenous housing nationally notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s prior involvement over more than fifty years. His Government refused to renew the ten-year $5.5bn National Partnership put in place in 2008, and walked away from a ten-year allocation of $1.6bn or $160m per annum in the NT. In the NT alone, it was replaced by a five-year offer of $550m (or $110m per annum) only when the Commonwealth realised it was exposed. Some ten years ago, the Land Councils decided to insist that in relation to many (but not all) communities in the NT, they would only agree to Commonwealth held leases to secure the NPARIH investments in those communities. The Commonwealth assented. This meant that a total Commonwealth retreat from funding would leave it with landlord responsibilities in relation to many hundreds of houses in remote communities that it would have to deliver itself.

 

The suggestion by the Minister that he is considering a CLC sponsored proposal for a partnership with the Commonwealth to deliver remote housing in the NT is tantalising. It may be a positive sign. Or it may be merely a ploy to justify inaction. Again, there is limited information available on the public record; a media release from the Land Councils in July 2020 appears to be the only public record available (link here). More importantly, the issue of the establishment of a Territory wide community housing provider is not something that should be seen only through the single prism of the existing public housing asset base, and nor should it be seen as a way of bypassing the NTG (which was the implicit narrative deployed in the Minister’s speech).

 

Given the substantial and potentially growing demand for remote housing, there is a cogent argument for a large-scale community housing provider across the NT, supported by governments and established with the capacity to source private sector borrowings. The existence of a new and alternative source of housing in remote communities would create significant incentives for Government public housing providers to lift their game and offer more choice to remote residents. The absence of a private housing market in these locations, and the significant levels of poverty and formal unemployment suggest that innovative policy solutions such as this idea should be explored.

 

Finally, the absence of the IRG from the Minister’s public narrative is intriguing, and throws light on broader approaches by governments to the use of appointed advisory bodies. I previously posted on the lack of ambition of the Government’s policy agenda in the White Paper on Northern Australia and the role of the IREG in that process (link here). In particular, it aligns with a hypothesis that such bodies are used as a means of internalising policy debate; as a means of managing down community expectations; and slowing down policy development. Once the political and policy agenda moves on, and/or the Advisory body membership refuses to adhere to the implicit expectations of Ministers, the advisory body can be quietly sidelined and eventually disbanded. This was the fate of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council and appears to be the likely fate of the IRG.

 

To sum up, I would make three general points. They share a simple assumption: that good policy is good politics; however good politics is not always good policy.

 

First, it is past time that governments had a close look at making better use of the ABA and the associated royalty flows into many communities. An obvious way forward would be to initiate a forward looking evaluation/review process in conjunction with Indigenous interests designed to identify opportunities for better use of the existing royalty and royalty equivalent flows in remote Australia. The risk Indigenous interests face is that as the overarching governance of the current system becomes tired and degraded, and in the absence of a culture of transparency, there will emerge higher levels of politicisation, poor accountability, and perhaps even corruption in the ways governments deal with these institutions. This would undermine trust in the system, and could lead to significant reductions in financial resources to Indigenous communities into the future.

 

Second, governments at all levels must lift their game in terms of transparency and the presentation of clear and accessible information to citizens. While this is relevant across the whole span of government activity, it is particularly important in the Indigenous policy domain as it operates to inhibit building the case for the necessary policy reforms to allow Indigenous interests to achieve their political and policy aspirations. In the absence of such transparency, citizens are within their rights to assume the worst. Trust in governments is declining. If governments and politicians value our democratic systems, they should demonstrate that by being much more transparent about their decisions, the processes they use and the outcomes they achieve. Statutory corporations in the Indigenous policy domain are not exempt from these same dynamics, and indeed it is incumbent on the Minister to ensure that they too meet normal accountability requirements.

 

Third, while the NT is a special case insofar as the Commonwealth has specific responsibilities derived from the NT’s status as a territory and the existence of Commonwealth land rights legislation, the policy issues at play in the NT pertaining to remote communities are also present in other jurisdictions. The Commonwealth should use its more direct policy involvement in the NT to inform a new national policy approach responding to the very specific needs of remote communities. In particular, while it espouses the rhetoric of economic development, the current Commonwealth Government has failed to pursue any substantive policy reforms that would deliver sustained improvements in economic status. One obvious starting point would be remote housing policy; a second would be to ensure that the financial provisions related to land rights legislation in the NT and native title across the board are fit for purpose. A third not discussed in this post would be to reverse course on the punitive welfare policies applicable to remote Australia (link here).

 

The challenge for the Government and its Minister for Indigenous Australians is to ensure that the ‘outward shows’ of working with Indigenous interests is more than politics, more than mere ornament, and delivers substantive and sustained policy reform. The challenge for Indigenous leaders and interests and mainstream citizens alike is not to be ‘deceived with ornament’. Unfortunately, the fact that Shakespeare’s words still ring true 400 years after they were written is cause for pessimism rather than optimism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Red Earth Walking

 

 

What's past is prologue

The Tempest Act 2, scene 1

 

The Australian Policy and History Network has published on its excellent website (link here) two reviews of historian Anne Scrimgeour’s recent monograph on the history of the 1946 Pilbara strike On Red Earth Walking (link here). The first by historian Tim Rowse explores issues of Indigenous agency and policy transition elaborated upon in Scrimgeour’s history. The second by historian manqué Michael Dillon explores the lessons for the present in the history of the strike. Both reviews are recommended.

Anne Scrimgeour’s book (link here) is also highly recommended to anyone interested in Australian political history, Indigenous affairs policy, and the history of north-west Australia.

Policy Invisibility: Indigenous Disability

 

O jest unseen, inscrutable, invisible,

As a nose on a man's face, or a weathercock on a steeple!

Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act 2, scene 1

 

 

The Disability Royal Commission has released an Interim Report on its activities over the past 18 months (link here).

 

The Commission issued an Indigenous Issues Paper in June 2020 (link here) which suggested that the Commission is interested in understanding Indigenous disability issues through the lens of a life course approach. To my mind, an eminently sensible approach.

 

The Interim Report includes no recommendations, but lays out key issues that have come to the Royal Commission’s attention to date. The final report is due by April 2022. The report includes a chapter on First Nations disability issues (pp 447- 478). I recommend interested readers look at the chapter as I have not attempted to summarise all it contains. The chapter canvasses issues such as the concept of disability within Indigenous communities; quantitative measures of disability; the comparative invisibility of Indigenous disability in public policy discussions; and an extensive discussion of the experiences of First Nations people with disability across a range of contexts.

 

In relation to levels of disability, the Report states (p 451):

Data recently updated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that more than one-third of all First Nations peoples (38 per cent) have disability. The data shows that more than one in five First Nations children have disability (22 per cent) and almost half of all First Nations adults (48 per cent), aged 18 years and over, have disability. [Footnote removed].

 

In relation to public policy invisibility, the Commission has this to say in relation to the recent National Agreement on Closing the Gap:

A 2015 Australian Human Rights Commission report, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander social justice and native title report, emphasised a need to elevate disability in the policy discussions concerning First Nations peoples. The report noted that disability had been long overlooked, further marginalising First Nations people with disability and ignoring their distinct needs. This was followed by a call from a coalition of First Nations peak organisations in the Redfern Statement for the Australian Government to do more to meet the needs of First Nations people with disability.

The Closing the Gap report 2020 does not specify disability as a priority area, despite persistent calls to include it. Disability does not sit alongside the existing indicators in the framework as a standalone target monitoring child mortality, early childhood education, school attendance, literacy and numeracy, Year 12 attainment, employment and life expectancy….

… The new Closing the Gap National Agreement (National Agreement), which was announced at the end of July this year, presented an opportunity to elevate the rights of First Nations people with disability.

The Royal Commission welcomes the shared responsibility across all governments under the National Agreement, including the references to disability status and the importance of data across some of the 16 new target areas. However, the Royal Commission notes that the changes have not included a stand-alone target on disability…

… The long awaited inclusion of disability in the Closing the Gap Framework under the new National Agreement may be considered by some as taking a staged approach to elevating disability as a key area of concern and investment. The strategy focuses on building up First Nations disability services and advocacy providers and improving the capture of data on people with disability by targeting some key areas aimed at improving outcomes.

It is welcome news that the National Agreement is being presented as a living document, open to change as new information and considerations come to light. In regards to this, the work of the Royal Commission will be a source of information to enlighten and enliven discussion regarding content on disability in the National Agreement. [footnotes excluded].

 

Reading between the lines, one would have to say that the Commission will clearly be giving serious consideration to recommending that the National Agreement be amended to include a specific target on disability.  Of course, the framing of an appropriate and effective target is not necessarily easy or straightforward. Depending on how the target is framed will inevitably influence both policy frameworks and funding allocations, so it is to be hoed that the Commission gives some particular attention to this issue if it is going to go down this path (a path I would support).

 

In an ideal world, NIAA would already be active on issues of both reducing and addressing Indigenous disability given its impact on Indigenous life opportunities and the widespread prevalence of disability within First Nations. The prospect of a set of Royal Commission recommendations within the next two years is just an added incentive. However, there is little indication that NIAA sees a role for itself in this area. A search of its website found just one document related to disability, an evaluation of the NDIS East Arnhem Co-design project (link here). This report, issued in June 2018, was heavily qualified and constrained by its focus on an early stage project, and it recommended further evaluation work two years on (ie now). There is no indication that this is happening.

 

Apart from ad hoc project evaluations, what is required is for NIAA to build a capability to add value in necessary and important policy discussions going forward. These include the effectiveness of the NDIS, the potential negotiation of a new disability target in the Closing the Gap domain, the policy oversight of whole of government activities in relation to Indigenous disability, and the support of key Indigenous disability service providers operating in extremely challenging circumstances across the breadth of the nation.

 

Disabled First Nationals citizens and their families deserve no less.

 

Finally, for those interested in issues related to Indigenous disability policy, I recommend the websites of the First Peoples Disability Network (link here) and the Machado Joseph Disease Foundation (link here).

 

The NIAA Annual Report 2020

 

Make not your thoughts prisons

Antony and Cleopatra Act 5, scene 2

 

NIAA is a new agency within the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) portfolio. The PMC Annual report had previously covered Indigenous affairs issues as Program 2 in its program structure. The PMC Annual Report (link here) deals with the Department’s oversight and assistance to advancing the Government’s Indigenous affairs agenda at pp. 105-107 of the PMC Annual Report. The Department sees its major achievements in this area as the development of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap with the Coalition of Peaks and the states and territories, as well as the development of an early national response to protecting Indigenous Australians from Covid-19 (see page 195).

 

The NIAA Annual Report for 2019-2020 was tabled last week (link here).

 

In this post, I propose to comment on three aspects of the NIAA Annual report: the overall approach of the Report; the various Activity Statements that report on areas of priority action; and the issue of evaluation and in particular evaluation expenditure. I will leave consideration of some technical issues related to the management of the Aboriginals Benefit Account to a subsequent post. While I proceed by pointing to perhaps the most egregious examples of shortcomings or shortfalls, it is my more general thesis that this Annual Report is designed to provide minimal information, and it fails to deliver a coherent account of the activities of the NIAA over the course of the past financial year.

 

Overall approach

 

I found the overall approach of the Report to be too narrow. On page 11, the Report helpfully lists the nine key functions of the agency as outlined in the Executive Order signed by the Governor General in May 2019. Yet having done so, there is no ordered (or even disordered) outline of the agencies activities against each of these functions. I won’t undertake a detailed analysis, but will point to just a few examples: the fourth function is to ‘lead Commonwealth activities to promote reconciliation’. Yet there does not appear to be any account of the Agency’s work on this issue, and the index makes no mention of reconciliation. Perhaps the best defence to this critique would be to argue that the agency’s work in relation to a voice and to constitutional recognition (see pp.38-9) is related to reconciliation. However, these activities do not involve open public engagement particularly with the wider community, and to my mind at least, do not constitute the promotion of reconciliation per se.

 

Similarly, the eighth core function of NIAA is to ‘coordinate Indigenous portfolio agencies and advance a whole-of-government approach to improving the lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’. There is no account in the Report of the Agency’s activities in oversighting the key portfolio agencies, no reference in the index to the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation, the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, nor to Aboriginal Hostels Limited, and only a single fleeting reference to Indigenous Business Australia. The Agency organisation chart at pp 18-19 mentions two statutory office holders, the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, and the Executive Director of the Office of Township Leasing, but neither Office is described or reported upon in the body of the report, and nor are they mentioned in the Index. There is a brief discussion of the operations of the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (pp. 181-2), although given its significance, even this is arguably too limited.

 

Similarly, the seventh function is to ‘analyse and monitor the effectiveness of programs and services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, including programs and services delivered by bodies other than the NIAA’ (emphasis added). There is some discussion of evaluation in the Report (see below), and somewhat confusingly, in the CEO’s overview where he states:

In 2019–20, we continued to implement the IAS Evaluation Framework, in place since 2018, as a guide for evaluation of programs and activities under the IAS. The Evaluation Framework aligns with the wider role of the Productivity Commission in overseeing the development and implementation of a whole-of-government evaluation strategy of policies and programs that affect Indigenous Australians (emphasis added).

 

Nowhere is it made clear how the role of the Productivity Commission in overseeing a whole of government evaluation strategy meshes with the function of the NIAA to analyse and monitor the effectiveness of programs and services. And nowhere do we get a succinct description of the state of play (as assessed either by the Productivity Commission or the NIAA) of the effectiveness of whole of government programs directed to Indigenous citizens. The significance of this gap is heightened by the Auditor General’s recent conclusions in his midterm report (link here).

 

Arguably, there is inadequate discussion of the NIAA’s activities in relation to other functions, although there is at least some reference to activities that might come within the allocated function, so I won’t press the point.

 

Given the centrality of the NIAA to the Government’s Indigenous affairs agenda, there is a strong case for the Annual Report to provide a more expansive overview of the breath of the Government’s activities in the Indigenous policy domain. For example, there are a number of entities and program initiatives that are focussed on Indigenous Australians, but are the responsibility of other agencies. The significant programs administered by the Health Department, and the operations of the Indigenous Land and Sea Fund administered within the Future Fund are just two examples. There is a case for NIAA to provide a conceptual map or overview so that the reader can obtain a sense of the totality of the Commonwealth’s activities in the Indigenous policy space. A point reinforced by the NIAA functions in the April 2019 Executive Order that require it to adopt a whole of government perspective in relation to a range of matters.

 

Activity Statements

 

Section three of the Report deals with Annual Performance Statements. I don’t propose to undertake a comprehensive analysis, but instead will merely comment on a number of issues that in my view deserve to be highlighted.

 

Between pages 23 and 27 the Report summarises nine activities (comprising 20 sub-activities) against its corporate plan objectives. Of the 20 sub-activities, 8 were listed as achieved, 9 were partially achieved, and 3 were not achieved. Two of the ‘not achieved’ activities related to the delivery of workshops and cultural activities related to mental health services for young adults. The third related to school attendance in communities where the RSAS program operates. I have previously commented on mental health and school attendance issues (link here and here). I am sceptical of the utility of these performance templates, since they lean heavily towards process rather substantive outcomes. Nevertheless, they at least provide a starting point for assessing performance, and the NIAA is to be applauded for adopting a degree of realism in its self-assessment. What is missing however is any analysis of discussion related to the implications of these shortfalls, their significance, and most importantly, what the agency proposes to do to ensure that there is substantive progress in the areas chosen as policy targets into the future.

 

Embedded in the various activity statements are various clues to the Government’s policy narrative and approach in Indigenous affairs that are worth flagging or noting. So, in relation to Activity 3: ‘progressing co-design of a voice for Indigenous Australians’ (p. 38), we see the repeated reliance on the co-design motif. Notwithstanding the assertion of co-design, the Government retains strong control over the development of options by its appointed committees, will then unilaterally consider the proposals , and then initiate a process, whose details are yet to be announced, of wider consultation ‘from late 2020 to early 2021’, and then again consider how it will proceed. There is nothing inherently wrong with this process, but it is not ‘co-design’. The codesign narrative is political spin.

 

In relation to Activity 4: ‘Progressing constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians during the current parliamentary term, providing there is consensus and a good chance of a referendum succeeding’ (p.39).  This heading almost says it all! In the section headed ‘Analysis’, the Agency notes:

 In line with the recommendations of the 2018 Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the Government supports finalising co-design of a voice ahead of constitutional recognition.

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in Minister Wyatt providing an updated timeframe for the Indigenous voice co-design process on 12 June 2020. Minister Wyatt noted that the substantial impact of COVID-19 could impact on the timing of reaching a consensus and progressing to a referendum within the current parliamentary term.

 

Activity 4 could have been more succinctly titled ‘Don’t hold your breath’ !

 

Activity 9 is headed ‘Undertaking evaluations of the National Indigenous Australians Agency programs in line with the IAS Evaluation Framework’. The agency reports that it achieved publication of an evaluation work plan, and achieved the finalisation of long-term performance measures, but only partially achieved the public release of completed evaluations. These are all process targets. In the analysis, the Agency notes (p.53):

To support transparency and use of evaluations in program and policy decision-making, the NIAA committed to publicly release all evaluations. To ensure evaluations are released in a timely manner, it is a requirement that completed evaluations are published within four months of receipt of the final report. Of the six evaluations that were completed in 2019–20, four were publicly released and one is on track to be published within agreed timeframes. The remaining evaluation is complete but publication has been delayed such that it wasn’t released within agreed timeframes.

 

Clearly the evaluation involved is potentially embarrassing in some way. The Report provides no information on which evaluation has not been released, and no explanation for the delay: was it an agency decision, or a Ministerial decision? The Agency’s ‘commitment’ to transparency, and particularly to evidence based policy and evaluation transparency goes only so far. Readers (and citizens) deserve better treatment than this.

 

Evaluation Expenditure

Nowhere in the Report is there a table outlining the detailed expenditure for each of the Activities nominated by the Agency as central to its overall performance. Activity 9 relating to evaluation is no exception.

 

Yet on 3 February 2017, the then Minister issued a media release on strengthened evaluation in the portfolio (link here). The release noted inter alia:

The Coalition Government will allocate $10 million a year over four years to strengthen the evaluation of Indigenous Affairs programmes.

Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Nigel Scullion, said the multi-year programme of evaluations would be underpinned by a formal Evidence and Evaluation Framework to strengthen reporting, monitoring and evaluation at a contract, programme and outcome level.

“The IAS has already greatly improved the transparency and accountability of Indigenous Affairs funding,” Minister Scullion said.

“As a result of the reforms the Coalition introduced through the IAS, we now know, for the first time, how much money is being spent across the Indigenous Affairs portfolio – and what outcomes we expect from the investment of taxpayers’ money. (emphasis added)

 

At pages 82-3 of the Report, the Agency reports on ‘Administered Program Performance’. Table 4.15 lists an expenditure of $6.0m for Evaluation and Research activities against a column headed IAS. This figure falls short of the $10m a year commitment in 2017. A search of the budget papers reveals that last year there was a significant under-expenditure against budget for evaluation and research.

 

The PMC 2019-20 Portfolio Budget statements lists the research and evaluation budget for 2019-20 as $12m (p.45) (link here). The 2020-21 NIAA Budget Statements (link here) provide an estimated actual for 2019-20 as $5.99m and indicate that the four out years budgets will be $10m, $10.1m, $10.2m and $10.3m, presumably reflecting expected indexation off the base of $10m. The budget papers reveal that the agency only spent 50% of the budget allocation for Evaluation and Research in 2019-20. Notwithstanding this shortfall, nowhere in the Annual Report is any explanation offered. Nor is there any information on where the unused funds were redirected.

 

Furthermore, there are two fundamental issues worth considering. First, why is the IAS program (administered expenditure) used for this purpose and not departmental expenditure. The use of administered expenditure for a function related to the work of government has the effect of undercounting the true cost of delivering programs. If used more widely it would in effect short-change the potential recipients of programs.

Second, table 4.15 notes that total NIAA expenditure in 2019-20 was $1.93bn, comprising $1.66bn in administered expenditure and $272m in departmental expenditure. The Evaluation and Research expenditure amounts to 0.4% of this allocation.  What is the appropriate level of investment in evaluation and research for an agency such as NIAA? I would argue that it is much higher than 0.4%. Nowhere is there any discussion of the rationale for the level of investment in evaluation. The Auditor General’s mid-term report referenced above in effect make the case for much greater investment in program effectiveness, not the minimal investment that appears to have been incurred (and effectively hidden) in the Agency’s Annual Report.

 

Evaluation will continue to have a salient profile in the Indigenous policy domain over coming months. According to its website (link here) the Productivity Commission’s Final report on an Indigenous Evaluation Strategy has been completed and was delivered to Government on 16 October. It will be publicly released on 30 October. NIAA will be an important player in assessing the report and providing advice to Cabinet on the future directions of evaluation in the Indigenous policy domain. In due course, the Government will announce its proposed response to the Productivity Commission proposals, no doubt accompanied by further rhetorical flourishes on the importance of evaluation Indigenous related programs.

 

Conclusion

 

The NIAA Annual Report suffers from a lack of imagination and preparedness to adopt a more open and engaging style. It is permeated with bureaucratic opaqueness and fails to substantively engage with the most significant issues of concern to Indigenous Australians and the wider community. It is just one document amongst many; a single snapshot floating in the huge and continuing avalanche of information that tumbles out of government.  One of the strongest arguments for adopting a new and more open approach is that for so long as citizens are fed a diet of manufactured information dressed up as accountable governance, levels of trust in government will remain low.

 

An Annual Report is an opportunity for an agency like NIAA to bring some order and coherence to the disorganised and chaotic state of public administration in this policy domain. To describe what is going on across the country, whether in remote communities, regional towns, or urban environments in metropolitan Australia. To canvass some of the important demographic challenges facing Indigenous citizens and the nation. To describe, explain and constructively critique the impact of whole of government activities on Indigenous Australia. To explore issues relating to regulation and regulatory failure as they impact Indigenous citizens. It is an opportunity to explain, to synthesise especially complex data sets, to acknowledge different views and opinions, and to argue for the hard decisions that governments are inevitably required to make.  

 

The fact that such an outcome is virtually unthinkable reflects the reality that the NIAA does not see itself as having a proactive and engaged stance vis a vis Indigenous Australia, and/or that Governments have decided that real policymaking is just too hard, and that it is much easier to manufacture the appearance of policymaking. Either way, not only do Indigenous citizens lose out, but so too does the nation and the public interest.