Indigenous policy and northern Australia

Nothing will come of nothing: speak again

King Lear Act One Scene 1

The Prime Minister, Minister for Resources and Northern Australia, Minister for Indigenous Australians, and First Ministers of WA, NT and Qld issued a media release on 13 December titled ‘Boosting Indigenous participation in Northern Development’ (link here). The media release states, inter alia:

Indigenous Australians will take a stronger role in the economic development of Northern Australia under a new Accord launched at a Northern Australia Ministerial Forum in Katherine…

[The accord] will provide a framework for parties to work together to advance Indigenous economic development in northern Australia.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison said …“This is about creating jobs across northern Australia, which is so important for the region, and our indigenous population….”

Minister for Resources and Northern Australia Matt Canavan said Indigenous participation had always been a key aspect to economic development in the north…“The Northern Australia Indigenous Development Accord (the Accord) will ensure that governments, communities, individuals and industry work together to advance Indigenous economic development across our north.” …

… “The Accord sets out the commitment of governments to strengthen Indigenous economic participation in this nationally significant northern development agenda…” Minister Wyatt said…

…Ministers agreed to extend the term of the Indigenous Reference Group until December 2020. The next steps in developing an Indigenous Commercial Research Plan and locations for Regional Collaboration Areas will be considered at the next Ministerial meeting in 2020.

This all sounds terrific. Please read the whole statement.

While optics are not everything, it is strange that in contrast to Minister Ken Wyatt, the Commonwealth Minister for Northern Australia, Matt Canavan, failed to post this media release on his ministerial website. Moreover, his claim in the media release that Indigenous participation ‘had always been a key aspect to economic development in the north’ is not only historically misleading if not incorrect, but remains problematic today.

Of course, it is the new Accord (link here) where the rubber hits the road. Set out below is my brief and selective assessment of the likely impact of the NAIDA.

The headline conclusion must be that this is a deeply unambitious document.

The Accord has been developed in consultation with the Government appointed Indigenous Reference Group (IRG) (para.1) and is intended to provide a framework…to advance Indigenous economic development in northern Australia.

Point one: this framing of policy opportunities for northern Australia as all about commercial development is in my view deeply problematic. It essentially operates to provide a cover for governments to tread water on other potential policy opportunities, for example, the implications of climate change (link here) or mass incarceration of Indigenous citizens (link here) or welfare policy (link here).

Point two: given the extraordinary levels of deep-disadvantage impacting remote Indigenous citizens, one might have expected that the IRG and governments would have laid out a comprehensive policy agenda to address structural disadvantage and if necessary to allocate greater resources to improving outcomes. Instead, the Accord states (para.3):

The IRG has challenged governments to do more with existing resources; go beyond business as usual to facilitate Indigenous economic development; and improve collaboration across government…(emphasis added).

Point three: the contrast between the co-design approach adopted by COAG in relation to the Closing the Gap refresh where COAG has entered into a partnership agreement with the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks, and this process where Indigenous interests are not parties to the agreement, and the Indigenous representatives are appointed by the Commonwealth is stark.

Point four: the specific roles and responsibilities of the various governments are spelt out in the Implementation Plan at Schedule A of the Accord. They are deeply unambitious while apparently designed to give the appearance of government proaction. When contrasted with the aspirational language in para. 15 of the Accord, the Implementation plan is pathetically inadequate. Para.15 states, inter alia:

The Parties …agree to undertake decisive actions that contribute to…creating jobs…attracting infrastructure investment…facilitating access to capital…..activating the economic value of land….creating institutional arrangements that work to activate , accelerate and optimise Indigenous economic development across northern Australia.

The Implementation Plan proposes [underling added for emphasis]:

·         ‘expanded fee for service opportunities for Indigenous ranger groups’;

·         development of a ‘proposal for developing a Northern Australia Indigenous Enterprise and Employment Hub system’ (presumably four or five enterprise incubators across the North);

·         the ‘Ministerial Forum to understand options for funding feasibility studies’;

·         the provision of ‘proposal/s to consider for progressing land use planning and water reforms”;

·         the identification, trialling and scoping of ‘a process for selecting Regional Collaboration Area sites’ in each jurisdiction; and finally

·         the provision of a ‘proposal for developing a Northern Australian Indigenous Commercial Research Roadmap and Research Plan.

Decisive action indeed! The Government and the IRG have been developing this agenda since 2107, and on the present timeframes outlined in the Implementation plan, decisions to develop what are a set of extremely modest key initiatives will only be green-lighted by the Ministerial Forum later in 2020 and in some cases perhaps 2021. In the words of Sir Humphrey Appleby, implementation will follow in ‘due course’.

So what might a comprehensive plan for Indigenous participation in Northern Australia look like? Set out below is a provisional list of just some of the blindingly obvious candidates for driving improved economic, social, health and environmental outcomes in remote northern communities:

Increased investment in remote human capital development: Greater investment in early childhood programs, teacher quality and tenure, and a stronger focus on bicultural and ‘two way’ curriculums are each a prerequisite for improved outcomes.

Remote housing: A major need and opportunity is to significantly upgrade the quantum and quality of remote housing. This might be through expansion of public housing, but a better option may be to pursue alternative policy ideas including community housing options (link here). Capital might be obtained from a re-energised NAIF, from the Commonwealth’s new social housing bond aggregator (the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation), and ultimately from the private sector (particularly if underwritten by a short or medium term government guarantee).

Remote property and tenancy management: a plan to ensure locally based Indigenous corporations undertake remote housing maintenance would pay big dividends both socially and economically. 

Land tenure reform: There is a major and complex policy challenge in this area, but it requires sustained policy commitment and a clear vision of the outcomes sought. The failure of Governments to advance the COAG endorsed land tenure reforms (link here) serves to reinforce the political unwillingness of Governments to move forward even on the issues they identify themselves as important. Note that while land tenure is a major transaction cost impediment to efficient services and commercial activities in remote communities, it is not the only transaction cost impediment to commercial development in remote communities.

Governance reform of the native title benefits space: This is primarily a matter for the Commonwealth, Reforms might include requiring PBC’s to appoint independent directors from an approved list; to appoint their auditors from an approved list; and most importantly the provision of adequate core funding for PBCs by the Commonwealth. This is an area where there is probably a case for a short sharp review aimed at identifying a reform agenda.

NAIF Reforms: The Commonwealth could allocate say $1bn for remote Indigenous infrastructure from the $5bn in concessional loans available for infrastructure generally. This would need to be accompanied by a wider definition of infrastructure to include social infrastructure (as suggested by Infrastructure Australia in its most recent reports). Because the NAIF is effectively structured to provide access to concessional loans, there will be a need to develop a delivery strategy to ensure that these funds are able to be both allocated and spent for the benefit of remote Indigenous communities. For example, the Commonwealth might expand the capital base of Indigenous Business Australia with NAIF loans for on-provision to smaller Indigenous owned projects and enterprises in northern regions.

CDP Reforms: the operation of the operation of this program is excessively punitive and creates strong incentives for remote citizens to disengage entirely from both welfare and other government services.

Strengthened financial literacy programs: it was striking that a number of the case studies in the Hayne Royal Commission into the banks were drawn from the experience of Indigenous communities in the remote north.

Finally, it is worth asking the question, is the IRG model fit for purpose? Why is it that after two years work, none of the pressing policy priorities identified in the alternative comprehensive plan set out above have emerged in the IRG’s advice to Government? Is it the case that the Commonwealth Government is limiting the advice that it is prepared to receive? Alternatively, is it the case that the IRG is providing hard-hitting advice, but government is not listening or hearing? Either way, there seems to be a case for an independent review of the IRG’s operations.

The details of the IRG’s advice to the Ministerial Forum do not appear to be public, and I would argue that this lack of transparency is a case where the confidentiality of advice (contra the accepted wisdom reiterated in the recent Thodey Review of the APS link here) actually encourages and facilitates sub-optimal outcomes. There is in my view no justification for the advice of a Government advisory body to be kept confidential. Indeed, how can the appointed members reassure their own communities that they are providing effective advice if their work remains confidential? The question whether the subsequent consideration by policymakers of those recommendations should be kept confidential under FOI is a separate matter. The risk is that the Commonwealth is effectively using the IRG as a convenient cover for government inaction. How else might we explain the deep-seated and sustained lack of substantive action in relation to the Government’s stated policy objectives for northern Australia?