Addressing family violence: the wider strategic context

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,

Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Hamlet, Act one, Scene five.

In November 2025, I published a post arguing for tangible actions to address the family violence epidemic across the nation, and especially amongst Indigenous families (link here). In that post, I wrote, inter alia:

The deeper problem of course is that governments are adept at creating policy silos, commissions, action plans and advisory committees that provide a defensive fig leaf against criticism when some egregious event hits the headlines but are content to do nothing to address systemic issues facing the most disadvantaged members of the Australian community. 

In recent months there have been two further related policy developments related to family violence policy.

The first policy development was in February when the Government announced, in the words of Minister McCarthy’s media release (link here), the ‘First ever dedicated plan to end violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children’. The plan (link here) is backed up by a funding package, described in Minister McCarthy’s media release as follows:

Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices is backed by $218.3 million in new funding over four years. As an immediate step, the funding will invest in a national network of up to 40 Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations (ACCOs) to deliver community-led specialist support services that help Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and families who are experiencing family, domestic, and sexual violence.

The minister goes on to note that:

This new funding [is] in addition to the record $262.5 million we’ve already invested in addressing immediate family, domestic and sexual violence safety needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families and communities through the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Action Plan 2023-2025, and our significant investment of $367 million to more than double funding for Family Violence Prevention Legal Services as part of the National Access to Justice Partnership 2025-2030.

There is more detail in her media release, and I am not in a position to establish the substantive value of these investments. They are surely welcome. I wonder however whether the amounts allocated are commensurate with the overall need for the types of services they fund, and whether the services are themselves effective in reducing family violence rather than assuaging its consequences. These are issues only an effective evaluation could determine, but despite rhetoric to the contrary, program evaluation is not a priority for recent Australian governments.

Unfortunately, I found the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan to be a deeply disappointing document. If it had been labelled a statement of aspirations, or a statement of values to be applied in devising policies, it could be defended (though even then I consider there are strong grounds for critique). But it is not a plan, and it is definitely not an action plan. It is best described as a plan to develop a plan about a plan.

Reading through the 100 page document, I found only three substantive proposed actions: first, a proposal to develop an action plan and sector strengthening plans (which appear essentially directed to clarifying relationships and roles) outlined in the Implementation section on pages 40; second, the establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to measure progress toward [yet to be agreed] outcomes that are to be agreed in partnerships [with unspecified partners] mentioned on page 43; and third, the establishment of a new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peak body for family, domestic and sexual violence [which has recently been established — see below]. In my view, none of these initiatives, either separately or together, amount to an effective plan to end violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families.

Reinforcing my pessimism, in the section on Implementation (page 41), it is noted, without any irony whatsoever, that the plan

will sit alongside and complement the large number of existing policies and plans designed to prevent and respond to violence nationally and in each State and Territory (see Appendix 2).

Appendix Two lists around seventy complementary strategies, frameworks, plans and the like across a range of jurisdictions which will complement this latest national plan. I recommend readers study Appendix 2 closely and ask themselves the question, if the seventy existing plans have not succeeded and are still in place, why should we take any notice of this current ‘non-plan’. While this is worrying on its own, of even greater concern is that this National Plan, which has been drafted by a Steering Committee of experts, has been endorsed in a Joint Ministerial Statement by ten Ministers responsible for overseeing family violence issues across the federation (pages 14-16).

As the Ministers themselves correctly state (with my added emphasis):

Across Australia, the unacceptable reality is that the prevalence of family, domestic and sexual violence remains too high. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children, the impact of violence is even greater, shaped by the legacy of colonisation, dispossession and intergenerational trauma. Behind every statistic are individuals, families and communities that deserve safety, respect and healing. 

Yet collectively, these ministers are prepared to accept this reality. Their lack of substantive action, and particularly their complete silence regarding the systemic drivers of family violence, which include the insidious impact of alcohol and substance abuse magnified by loose regulation (link here), and widespread financial precarity of the most disadvantaged sectors of the community (where Indigenous families are over-represented) which are magnified by punitive welfare policies, lax regulation of gambling, and sub-optimal financial literacy support. Addressing these systemic drivers is not beyond the capabilities of governments, but effective responses are never considered let alone pursued, and instead a conspiracy of silence is maintained, and substantive action is replaced with the flim flam of (now) 71 plans to make more plans. The word alcohol appears only eight times in the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan, invariably in contexts which downplay or elide its substantive significance. Clearly governments are subservient to the corporate interests involved in the alcohol and gambling industries. This failure represents in my view an egregious disservice to the wider community.

The existence of this ‘plan’, and the seventy or so other ‘plans’ in effect represents an attempt to persuade the wider community that governments are taking the action necessary to address family violence issues. That in turn ultimately leads the wider community to blame the victim, to avoid the necessity of taking individual action, and diminishes the civic values that we purport to value and cherish. If one needs to understand why the general community is losing faith and trust in governments, one could do worse that consider this case study and think about what it means over the medium and longer term when governments do not address the very real issues that are impacting very real families.

The most recent policy development was the announcement of the peak body referred to above, now known as Our Ways Strong Together (link here) and which comprises the third proposed action in the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan. Minister McCarthy’s statement announcing its creation (link here) states:

The Albanese Government and the Coalition of Peaks have today launched a new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander National Peak Body for Family, Domestic and Sexual Violence – Our Ways Strong Together. 

Our Ways Strong Together brings together Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled organisations including specialist family, domestic and sexual violence services, peak bodies and the broader community-controlled sector. 

By amplifying the perspectives and experiences of community-controlled organisations and the communities they serve, Our Ways Strong Together will also play an invaluable role in shaping government policies and programs.  

Our Ways Strong Together also contributes to the Government’s work towards Target 13 of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, to reduce family violence and abuse against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children by at least 50% by 2031.  

The Coalition of Peaks and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sector leaders worked alongside government to establish the new peak body, drawing on their deep expertise and leadership across their sectors and communities.  

The proposed leadership of the new Peak Body is very experienced and highly regarded, a sentiment I share. I sincerely hope that they can guide the organisation to a position of real and sustained influence. That said, it concerns me that there is, as yet, no detail on the funding for the peak body (membership is free), nor its constitution and its staffing profile. The question that arises then is just how much influence and independence will the government grant this new Peak Body? And how will it sustain its own legitimacy with its Indigenous constituents if that autonomy is compromised? Imagine the response of a firms in a major industry, say chemists or farmers, if the government decided it would establish a new peak body to represent the voices of firms in those industries, and offered some firms or relevant chambers of commerce funding to establish it, funded a secretariat, and asserted the new entity would henceforth be influential in shaping government policy on regulation of pharmacies or agriculture. Deep scepticism would be pervasive. How would individual chemists or farmers be sure that the new peak was in fact truly representing their interests and not being unduly influenced by government?

A second concern related to the Peak Body is that Closing the Gap Target 13 is seriously flawed and in need of revision. I went to some lengths to demonstrate this in my previous post in November last year (link here). Yet the Minister blithely proceeds to argue that the new Peak will contribute to the Government’s efforts to meet this target, presumably by participating in the bureaucratic sludge of planning to plan.

Over and above the deliberate downplaying of the structural and systemic drivers of family violence, one further obvious gap in the whole approach outlined in this ‘First ever dedicated plan to end violence against women and children’ is any focus on system wide policies and initiatives aimed at changing men’s behaviour (noting of course that family violence is not only perpetrated by men). If the new Peak Body is to make a substantive difference in the pervasiveness of family violence, and play an influential role in shaping policy, it will need to engage proactively with the systemic drivers of family violence and find ways to counter the attitudes of entitlement that encourage or allow men to see resort to violent behaviours as being acceptable.  In other words, to succeed, the new Peak body will need to step beyond the limited policy imagination of governments and the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan.

Conclusion: the wider strategic context

I have long been a supporter of the potential of the Coalition of Peaks as a major addition to the institutional landscape that constitutes the Indigenous policy domain (link here). However, its major internal flaw is that it is not independent of governments and indeed is almost entirely reliant on government funding. Its first convenor, the recently retired Pat Turner, did an amazing job in standing the organisation up from a zero base. In doing so, she almost singlehandedly drove the most significant institutional reform within the Indigenous policy domain in a generation. It represents an extraordinary achievement. To do so she presumably made a conscious decision that to find the necessary funding and obtain the access necessary to establish the legitimacy and credibility of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap and to create the opportunity to work constructively with the Federal Government, she would have to accept the loss of financial independence given that there was no obvious alternative. She had the bureaucratic experience and skills, and the charisma, to work around that constraint. Moreover, she would not be the first successful policy innovator to pragmatically accept the necessity to work with the contradictions that are inherent in engaging with governments in order to gain a strategic foothold or traction on an issue or set of issues.

Unfortunately, her successors may not share her capabilities and will likely be constrained by the major limitation of working from the inside, namely, that the first and only rule is that one must never publicly rock the boat.

The strategic problem however is that eventually, the limitations of working on the inside will become apparent to the Coalition of Peaks constituency — the broader Indigenous population — and the support necessary to sustain it will wane and ultimately disappear. Perhaps of more pressing significance, there is an external threat linked to the internal contradictions of Closing the Gap emanating from the lack of commitment from governments to driving substantive change (link here). The threat is that a change of government or some other trigger will lead to governments walking away from the National Agreement. When that happens (I assess that it is near certain at some point in the coming decade) the Coalition of Peaks will lose its raison d’etre, and the funding essential to its long-term survival will dry up. For both these reasons there is an imperative for the Coalition of Peaks to begin the process of finding ways to become financially independent of government.

The bottom line is that the new Peak body must look ahead, decide how it would like to operate, and devise a strategy consistent with its aspirations and strategic choices. To the extent that it decides to seek to influence policy only from ‘inside the tent’, the prospects of driving the systemic change necessary to make a real difference to the crisis in family violence will be severely circumscribed. Unfortunately, even if the Coalition of Peaks can become more independent, and/or if the Indigenous leadership writ large is prepared to focus its advocacy on reforming these systemic drivers of family violence, the road ahead will be long and hard. And every day, every month, every year for as long as that journey takes, many Indigenous families are at risk of, and subject to, the trauma of family violence. As the Ministerial Statement included within the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan observed:

Behind every statistic are individuals, families and communities that deserve safety, respect and healing.

 

13 April 2026

 

 

 

 

 

Guest Post: Jon Altman on AINT and the ABA

 

This is the first Guest Post I have published on A Walking Shadow, so a short introductory explanation is in order.

Jon Altman is widely recognised as one of Australia’s pre-eminent scholars on Indigenous policy. I won’t seek to categorise him further as his prodigious output over many decades defies simple categorization. He is an Emeritus Professor at the School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet) within the ANU College of Law, Governance and Policy. He is also a Director of Karrkad Kanjdji Trust (link here) which operates across Arnhem Land with a diverse focus on supporting ‘healthy country’.

Just one of his abiding interests has been the policy issues around land, culture, traditional use of land resources, land rights, native title, Indigenous economic development, royalties, mining on Indigenous land, and the Aboriginals Benefit Account in the NT.

I first met Jon when I was working for the Central Land Council and he was researching his 1983 book Aborigines and Mining Royalties in the Northern Territory, and subsequently worked closely with him on the Review he chaired at the request of the then Government published in 1985 as the Report on the Review of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (and Related Financial Matters) in the Northern Territory Land Rights Legislation. Since then, we have collaborated formally and informally on various projects and publications related to these wide-ranging issues. A long-winded way of saying that we share a longstanding interest in the policy issues which underpin the financial architecture of the NT Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976, legislation that an academic historian at the ANU described in a seminar last week as the ‘highwater mark of Australian land rights legislation’.

When I published my post yesterday on AINT titled Confusion Abounds (link here), Jon sent me the short paper he had written on the same subject. While our two papers were written independently, they cover much of the same ground, albeit from somewhat different perspectives. In many ways they are serendipitously complementary. Bearing in mind Shakespeare’s observation in Hamlet (V ii): ‘There's a divinity that shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how we will’, it seemed too good an opportunity to miss. Hence my offer to Jon to publish his short article on this Blog, an offer I am extremely pleased he has agreed to accept. He has asked me to make clear that the views expressed are his alone and arise from his role as an independent academic.  The text below comprises Jon’s paper.

 

Jon Altman: How is NTAIC/AINT travelling three years on?

The ABA or Aboriginals Benefit Account is an institution established by ALRA in 1976 whereby the equivalents of royalties raised from mineral extraction on Aboriginal-owned land in the NT is reserved for Aboriginal, not just landowner, use.

The ABA has a history dating back to 1952 and an earlier fund the Aborigines (Benefits from Mining) Trust Fund or ABTF. This progressive arrangement was initiated by then Minister for Interior Paul Hasluck, the royalties were generated from mining on Aboriginal reserves.

Since 1978, in accord with ALRA, these payments were principally applied in four ways: a proportion (usually 40%) was paid to administer land councils, 30% was paid to the traditional owners of the land where a particular mine was operating, and the balance was either paid as grants to or for Aboriginal people (via incorporated organisations) in the NT.

For some unclear reason never properly explained, from 1978 payments out of the ABA were levied a mining withholding tax set at 20% of the base tax rate, a current impost of 4%. This amendment to tax law was imposed after land rights law was passed.

A summary table that I have compiled of the income and expenditure of the ABA 1978-79 to 24-25, a period of some 46 years, indicates that an estimated $5.3 billion in MREs have been paid to the ABA from consolidated revenue, with an additional $512 million earned in interest giving the ABA a total income of $5.9 billion. Note that MREs are then reduced by 4% through the levying of the mining withholding tax.

Of this amount a total of $1.58 billion (30%) has been paid to traditional owner organisations in areas affected by mining as required by law. $1.6 billion (30%) has been paid to the four NT land councils to claim and then administer Aboriginal-owned land that now covers 50% of terrestrial NT; and $928 million has been paid in grants to or for the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT. This last amount constitutes about 15.7% of total ABA income as grants have generally been paid from interest income to avoid the MWT. The balance was held in reserve and by the end of the 2021-22 financial year this totaled $1.4 billion.

This arrangement has prevailed for much of the last 50 years since the passage of ALRA with two exceptions.

In 2007, ALRA was amended to allow the leasing of townships for 99 years with lease payments to be made to organisations representing traditional owners of townships. Since 2007-08 $108 million has been paid to the traditional owners of a handful of townships that have adopted these arrangements. The $108 million is to be repaid with $28 million (26%) returned to the ABA to date.

In 2021, ALRA was again amended with the establishment of the NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation or NTAIC that has subsequently been renamed Aboriginal Investments NT or AINT.

This new arrangement has had a long gestation.

The original statutory arrangements under ALRA legislated for the establishment of an ABA Advisory Committee that would make grant recommendations to be approved by the Minister for Indigenous Affairs.

A review of the ABA completed in 1984 that I chaired criticized these arrangements as paternalistic and counter to the principle of self-determination and recommended that in five years’ time, that is by 1989, the ABA Advisory Committee be delegated full granting powers.

This proposition was revisited from 2016 in negotiations between Ministers Scullion and then Wyatt and the four Aboriginal land councils and incorporated in amendments to ALRA in 2021.

However, and there is always a however, what eventuated has been somewhat different from what was envisioned in 1984.

In establishing NTAIC as a corporate Commonwealth entity, the amendments did not guarantee the new body a future flow of MREs but rather made it a one-off allocation of $680 million. This amount represented 49% of the $1.4 billion the ABA held in reserve in 2021-22.

In effect, the government with the support of the four NT land councils was establishing a new body that would take over by and large the somewhat cumbersome granting functions of the ABA. I say be and large because the ABA still holds $800 million (at 30 June 2025) that the Minister for Indigenous Australians can allocate at her discretion.

And the board of the new authority includes two independent members nominated by land councils and two members nominated by government, with the other eight being representatives (at two each) of the four land councils.

The new authority is subject to scrutiny under the the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) established to ensure a coherent system of governance and accountability for public resources, with an emphasis on planning, performance and reporting.

This indicates that whether MREs raised on Aboriginal owned lands are public as argued by government or private as argued by Aboriginal interests, an issue that was hotly debated in 1984 when the ABA was reviewed, has been resolved in favour of the government’s position.

It is early days, just three years on from the operationalization of NTAIC in April 2023 it is difficult to make any definitive judgments on how effectively the new arrangements are operating and whether they are superior to the old arrangements.

NTAIC has published two annual reports for 2022-23 and 2023-24 and AINT somewhat belatedly a report for 2024-25 that was published on its website and then removed.

Arguably, the new arrangements are just in the ‘bedding down’ phase and AINT is proceeding cautiously given its operations under the PGPA Act carapace.

But in my opinion, there are already some worrying signs, some of which I predicted in my critical submission to a parliamentary committee that briefly scrutinized the amendments bill in late 2021 (link here).

The AINT (let’s stick to its most recent name) website provides quite a few documents: annual reports for 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25 (for a time) and three corporate plans (the latest for 2025-2029). There is also the Strategic Investment Plan required before $500 million was released from the ABA and to invest; and a summary of all grants made by NTAIC then AINT to 31 March 2026, with many being legacy grants from the ABA.

I have scrutinized these documents that aim to ensure a high degree of transparency and accountability.

The central message is that AINT is ‘Backing Aboriginal led development through innovative investment’.

Simultaneously, there are two broad objects that are not necessarily compatible: to deliver self-management and economic self-sufficiency to Aboriginal people living in the NT; and to ensure the social and cultural wellbeing of Aboriginal people living in the NT.

Note that these objects refer to Aboriginal people living in the NT not traditional owners of land or Aboriginal people (and one assumes Torres Strait Islanders) born in and of the NT.

These are AINT’s interpretation of ALRA’s requirement that s64 (4) grants are applied to or for the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT.

As noted earlier, prior to the amendment of ALRA $928 million has been allocated as grants since 1978-79 and in recent years have totaled in the region of $60 million (2020-21) growing to $97.7 million in 2023-24.

To deliver on these goals AINT’s strategy is to make three types of grants – community quick response grants (up to $20,000 each), community impact and innovation grants and business grants – alongside in a Future Fund.

When ALRA was amended and NTAIC was created as a corporate Commonwealth entity it was allocated $680 million from the ABA, $60 million per annum for three years to maintain grants more or less at existing levels (in recent years) and $500 million for a Future Fund that would generate annual sustainable allocations in perpetuity from which to make grants.

The publicly available information on AINT’s grant making is difficult to interpret.

Audited financial statements verified by the ANAO indicate that no grants were made in 2022-23, $9.1 million in 2023-24, and $19 million in 2024-25.

But a 26-page document on the AINT website that lists NTAIC grants made between 2022 and 2025 (actually to 31 March 2026) tells a somewhat different story.

It shows that 30 quick response grants with a total value of $310,171 were approved; 15 community impact and innovation grants totaling $11.86 million; and 83 business grants totaling $8 million. Additionally, 131 grants totaling $38.7 million are listed as approved under NTAIC’s grants program guidelines 2022-2025 are listed (with 4 double-counted). On can only assume that most of these grants were made under the ABA rather than NTAIC/AINT banner?

This list matches, more or less, the message of the headline summary (link here): 250+organisations supported with grants totaling $60.3 million. This total figure over three years to 31 March 2026 (at an average of $20 million per annum) is significantly less than the 64 (4) grants made in each year since 2021-22.

I make just a few comments about immediate issues of concern.

First, to date, the granting operations of AINT appear expensive: in 2023-24 $9.2 million was granted with wages and salaries and directors’ annual fees totaling $5 million; in 2024-25, the ratio was better at $19 million in grants at a cost of $6.2 million. Admittedly these figures are inclusive of activities beyond grant making undertaken by AINT, but it is noteworthy that prior to the amendment of ALRA in 2021 these costs were borne by government not the ABA. Apparent independence comes at a real cost.

Second, much of the published strategic investment and corporate planning of AINT including its ‘theory of change’ seems to over-promise: AINT might articulate a vision to ‘back Aboriginal led development through innovative investment’ but it is far from clear what resources it will have at its disposal to do this, especially as its risk-averse goal is to earn a minimum 3% (+CPI) on its Future Fund of $500 million: even a doubling of this rate of return will only provide $30 million per annum, less than granted by the ABA in recent years. I suspect with such lofty goals expectations will be increasingly difficult for the AINT board of directors to manage.

Third, and perhaps most worrying, is the relationship between AINT and the ABA. When the ABA review of 1984 recommended Aboriginal-led independence for the ABA’s granting function it envisioned that MREs would continue to flow to be applied to or for the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT. The current arrangements fall way short of that historical proposal. Not only does the Minister currently control a larger financial pool than AINT, but her pool will grow with annual injections of MREs, while the AINT pool has no guarantee of growth irrespective of how much resource extraction occurs on Aboriginal-owned land in the NT.

It strikes me that the immediate struggle to gain some Aboriginal control of some ABA funds has been successful. One could argue optimistically that ‘from little things big things grow’ and with time AINT will persuade future governments to transfer a greater proportion of MREs to AINT on an ongoing basis. Less optimistically one might argue that some of the structural shortcomings in the ALRA amendments foreshadowed in 2021 will undermine any attempt to productively deploy a share of MREs ‘to or for the benefit [and unquestionable need] of Aboriginal people in the NT’. It beggars belief that during five years of negotiation to amend ALRA between 2016 and 2021 some of these fundamental problems were not considered and resolved.

 

JCA 8 April 2026

Confusion abounds: the AINT strategy for the coming decade

My thoughts are whirled like a potter’s wheel;

I know not where I am, nor what I do.

1 Henry VI, Act two, Scene four.

Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) is a corporate Commonwealth entity established in November 2022 under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA). Initially named NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation, the operational name was changed by ministerial fiat from Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) to Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) in August 2024.

There are 12 board members: two appointed by each of the four Northern Territory land councils, two appointed by the Australian Government, and two appointed by the board. Board membership is specified in section 65EA of the ALRA. The board appoints a CEO who is responsible for day-to-day administration. Under the PGPA Act, the board is the accountable authority for Aboriginal Investment NT.

AINT was funded from the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA), with an initial $680 million over three years to invest and provide grants to Indigenous businesses and communities across the Northern Territory. The ABA is established by the ALRA to receive and distribute funds generated from mining on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory. Section 64AA of the ALRA sets out funding arrangements for the Northern Territory Aboriginal Corporation, also known as Aboriginal Investment NT. The $680m for investment and grants was allocated under subsection 64AA of the ALRA. AINT’s purpose is:

• To promote the self-management and economic self-sufficiency of Aboriginal people living in the Northern Territory (NT); and

• To promote social and cultural wellbeing of Aboriginal people living in the NT.

The outline above was taken from the 2024 ANAO Performance Audit (paragraphs 1.9 to 1.12). The text has been paraphrased to incorporate some footnotes and improve accessibility:

The ANAO 2024 Performance Audit

In December 2024, the ANAO published a Performance Audit examining the management of conflicts of interest by three portfolio agencies within the Aboriginal Australians portfolio, including for present purposes AINT (link here). The report is useful for a number of reasons, including for the high-level overview of the formal legislative and regulatory approach of the Commonwealth to conflict-of-interest issues in relation to Commonwealth agencies. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Summary and Recommendations section of the ANAO Report outline these, and Appendix 3 provides more detail in respect to the relevant legislative provisions.

AINT was established in 2022, and the ANAO audit was clearly designed to provide an early snapshot of the state of compliance.

The ANAO high level conclusions are outlined in paragraphs 13 to 15:

13. … Aboriginal Investment NT …. [was] partly effective in the management of conflicts of interest. While there were frameworks in place to manage conflicts of interest, there were shortcomings with the implementation of those frameworks. There were deficiencies with the documentation of board consideration of conflicts and documentation of conflicts of interest declarations and management actions for procurement, recruitment and grant activity.

14….  Aboriginal Investment NT [has] developed largely appropriate arrangements to manage conflict of interest consistent with legislative requirements of corporate Commonwealth entities …

15. The entities were partly effective in implementing arrangements for managing conflicts of interest. Board assessments of declarations of interest were not sufficient to record whether the board had determined declarations to be material personal interests. Aboriginal Investment NT’s board did not include declarations of interests in three out of session meetings and a workshop and did not always record the nature and extent of declared conflicts. There were instances of Aboriginal Investment NT Grants Committee members with declared conflicts of interest recommending grant applications for board approval ….  Aboriginal Investment NT did not adequately document conflict of interest management for procurement as required by its policy.

Most of these issues appear to have been addressed subsequent to the performance audit, but their early emergence demonstrates both the internal pressures in play in what are cross-cultural organisations, and the risks that continue into the future.

The AINT 2024-25 Annual Report

Under the PGPA Act, the AINT report was due on October 30, 2025. The AINT advised the Minister that the ANAO had experienced delays in finalising the audit, and as a result the Minister initially agreed to an extension to the end of November and then extended it to the end of February (link here). In the event the Annual Report was published on the AINT website in the first week of March 2026. The Chair wrote to the Minister providing a copy of the audited financial statements on 18 February, the accountable authority statement was signed by the AINT Chair, CEO and Chief Operating Officer on 19 February 2026, the unqualified ANAO audit opinion was signed on 20 February 2026. We live in strange times where time appears to move backwards (at least in the NT). The financial statements (without the ANAO audit opinion) are also available on the ACNC web site as the AINT has charitable status. Somewhat bizarrely, the Annual Report has since been removed from the AINT website and is not available on the Department of Finance Transparency Portal. To my knowledge, there has been no explanation provided by either the Minister or AINT for this action.

In addition to the apparent reversal of time, there is an unfortunate error in the heading to the figures in Note 10 to the (original) financial statements page 92 which has the effect of multiplying the relevant management personnel salaries one thousand times. It is not clear if this will be remedied when the Annual Report is finally republished. I do not believe that this is the reason for the withdrawal of the report as this error also occurs in the equivalent section on page 82 of the previous AINT 2023-24 Annual Report.

Given the comparative complexity of the AINT financial statements, and the delayed release of the report, the 2025 ACNC Annual Information Statement (link here) provides the best current snapshot of the AINT’s overall financial status. This shows that in June 2025, the AINT held net assets/liabilities of $693.3m. This comprised current assets of $422.9m (comprising according to the more detailed financial statements $300m in cash and cash equivalents and $100m in ‘other investments’), and non-current assets of $272.5m. Liabilities were only $2.1m. It seems likely that the non-current assets are all invested in the AINT Unit Trust (see below). It is unclear if any of the current assets are also in the Unit Trust.

The AINT Strategic Plan (available on its website) is built around the establishment of two Funds, the Future Fund and the Community Ready Fund. The Future Fund invests the AINT corpus, the Community Ready Fund is utilised for financing AINT operations and ongoing grants. See page 32 of the Strategic Plan for the best description of the Future Fund so far made public. Section 7 of the Strategic Plan describes the approach of the Community Ready Fund including some one-off allocations which allow the project grant profile to continue in the short term above the long-term level available from the Future Fund. See the graph on page 51 displaying the forecast grant spend from the Fund into the next four years.

The Annual Performance Statement in the Annual Report (pages 32-37) reports that both funds delivered above target returns over the past year.. In a section titled Investment Performance, AINT reports that the Future Fund achieved an annualised return of 5.8%, exceeding its benchmark target of CPI plus 3%. (In contrast, on page 36, the report states that the Future Fund achieved a 5.9% return). At 30 June 2025, the Future Fund held $522.5m in assets, comprising $100m in term deposits and $226.3m in cash awaiting investment. This suggests that $182m was invested. The Community Ready Fund delivered 4.9% return against its more modest target of CPI plus 1%. Its balance on 30 June was not stated, but the report notes that the fund ‘was fully invested with $120.6m deployed…’ While the investment returns are useful, without knowing the quantum of the funds invested, readers have little idea of their real significance.

Somewhat confusingly, the section on Financial Results (pages 68-69) refers to the commencement of investment activities through the AINT Unit Trust, a controlled entity established to manage long term investments. The AINT financial statements provide just a single column which consolidates the operations of both the AINT and the Unit Trust. A more transparent approach would be to do as the ILSC did before the recent sale of Voyages and list both the ILSC and the consolidated financials in separate columns. The Notes to the Financial Statements (Note 11) refer to the expenditure of $305m to purchase units in the Unit Trust during 2024-25, but this figure cannot be tracked into the financial statements themselves. The AINT Unit Trust presumably holds the $182m invested in the Future Fund and the $120.6m ‘deployed’ by the Community Ready Fund, which totals $302.6m.

Apart from Note 11 to the Financial Statements which lists fees of $717k in 2024-25 to advisory firms CIML and JANA paid from the Unit Trust, there is no reference in the Annual Report to the management fees and investment advice fees that underpin the Unit Trust arrangements. However the Senate Entity Contracts Listing for 2024-25 published on the AINT website lists contracted management fees for CIML over five years to 2029 as $19.24m and for JANA for investment advice over the five years as $1.9m. Combined, these two contracted firms will cost an average of $4.2m per annum for the next five years to manage the AINT investments within the AINT Unit Trust.

Not only is the Annual Report’s description of the relationship between the AINT Unit Trust and the two Funds operated by AINT opaque and indeed, confusing, but it is also unclear just how the AINT exercises its control over the Trustees as the Trust Deed between AINT and CIML does not appear to have been published or summarised in any public documentation. What is clear is that the AINT Investment Committee and in particular its Chair Peeyush Gupta and member Richard Brandweiner (both of whom come from finance backgrounds) play crucial roles in managing the Future Fund, and the Unit Trust investments. These two were the only Investment Committee members to attend all 7 meetings of the Committee during the financial year (see page 51 of the Annual Report).

Given the potential complexities involved I asked my AI research assistant Claude for its view on the rationale for using such a structure. Given the tax-free status of the AINT, it responded inter alia as follows:

Compliance and reputational signalling arguably becomes the dominant remaining rationale. A [tax free] charitable entity established by Commonwealth legislation faces heightened scrutiny — from the ACNC, from its enabling legislation's oversight mechanisms, and potentially from parliamentary accountability processes. Holding investments through a formally constituted unit trust with a corporate trustee, a trust deed, and defined investment mandates demonstrates structured stewardship of assets in a way that direct holding does not. It creates a paper trail and governance architecture that can withstand external scrutiny.

The candid assessment is that for a sole-owner tax-exempt charitable entity, the unit trust structure offers relatively thin functional advantages compared to direct investment or a subsidiary company. The structure makes most sense if the trust deed itself — through its investment mandate and distribution rules — serves a constraining or accountability function, or if there is a genuine prospect of admitting other investors in future. If neither applies, the administrative overhead of maintaining a separate trustee, trust deed, and unit register may outweigh the residual benefits. [emphasis added]

The question worth asking in this context is whether the structure was chosen for sound governance reasons at the outset, or whether it persists as inherited architecture that has never been critically examined against the entity's actual circumstances.

These are more substantive questions that the AINT has not, so far, envisaged being asked, let alone answering. In my view, the AINT would be well advised to consider reframing future statutory reports to provide clearer and more transparent information about its investment operations.

A critique of the AINT Investment Strategy

 I should begin by noting that I was (amongst many others) a critic of the legislation establishing AINT for several reasons. My post from November 2021 titled Opportunities and Risks (link here) provides a high level critique of the proposed legislation (as it then was) establishing NTAIC (now AINT). For those interested in exploring the issues raised in more detail there is a link to the various submissions to the Legislation Committee considering the Bill and unsurprisingly I recommend reading my submission. It takes a wider lens than just the proposed corporation, and deals with the systemic conflicts that I suggested would inevitably emerge. I don’t propose to focus on this wider picture here but instead will focus on the potential alternative investment strategies available to NTAIC.

In relation to the operations of the Community Ready Fund, I don’t wish to say too much. It is clearly the ‘front of house’ for the AINT, and until recently there has clearly been a legacy of approved grants that had to be processed and finalised. In the discussion in the Strategi Plan of its objectives, there are four separate areas of focus, plus a vague commitment to focus on sector-based activities. The four foci are (i) grants, (ii) collective impact initiatives, (iii) place-based investments, and (iv) strategic investment. Areas (iii) and (iv) together encompass so called nation building investment. This strikes me as on over-engineered attempt to make the grants process look coherent and rational. To my mind it is both too all-encompassing (‘everything is a potential focus and priority’) and thus easily subverted for political or other reasons.

I will make two high level conceptual points that in my view the AINT should consider seriously. First, there is much greater impact in supporting high quality grass roots organisations with positive track records which deliver valuable services on the ground. It would be particularly valuable to identify elements of their activities that governments are not prepared to fund and/or elements that build organisational resilience. Second, for small Indigenous businesses, I would suggest that instead of grants that the AINT consider experimenting with low value interest free loans that are repayable once the business meets particular revenue or profit thresholds and are written off after a set period (say ten years) if those thresholds are not met.

In relation to the Future Fund, I have more serious reservations about the utility of the strategy that has been adopted. The current investment corpus appears to total around $500m to $600m. Taking $500m as the base, if the investment target is met, and there were zero distributions the Future Fund will compound each year and grow to $672m in current dollars over ten years. If the 3% growth ($15m pa) is fully distributed, the fund will continue to be valued at $500m over the decade. If say half of the growth was distributed each year ($7.5m) then the fund would grow to $581m over the decade. It is unclear if the target growth rate is net of management fees, but at $4m per annum that either cuts into the available funds for distribution or adds an effective premium of 0.7% to the target (i.e. it must actually return CPI plus 3.7% to allow $15m pa to be distributed on average). A long-term investment return of around $15m per annum will not sustainably fund the projected level of grant expenditure of $40m. Such a spend rate will either require additional injections of capital or lead to a reduction in the AINT investment corpus over time.

Given the passive nature of the Fund at present, and the current level of advisory fees, there may be merit in considering whether it would be more cost effective to utilise the Commonwealth Future Fund as a fund manager. This is the course adopted by the Commonwealth to manage the Land Fund which provides the annual revenue base for the ILSC.

The bottom line here is that the AINT has established what is effectively an endowment fund and without further injections of capital, and effective and serious constraints on transfers to the Community Ready Fund (which would lead to a loss of political support for AINT within the NT Indigenous community), it is unlikely to grow substantially beyond its current size. Even were a Commonwealth minister to inject further funds into the Future Fund from the ABA, say to double it to $1bn, the annual funds available for distribution would only be around $30m in current dollars. This does have the potential (if targeted and sustained) to make some difference in selected areas or sectors, but it is not going to ‘build intergenerational wealth’ for anywhere near the majority of Indigenous Territorians. This is the objective of the Future Fund as laid out in the AINT Strategic Plan, yet the rhetoric does not match the reality.

What then is the alternative?

My strong suggestion would be to adopt an entirely different approach aimed at leveraging the available capital to invest directly in a select number of sectors and enterprises in the NT that for one reason or another have not attracted either government or private sector investment in the past and which are also of direct relevance and significance to either remote communities and/or the Aboriginal community writ large. Sectors that are crying out for such a ‘social impact investment’ approach include establishing community housing entity to operate across the Territory, building a Territory wide disability coalition or service providing disability services funded by accessing mainstream funds from the NDIS, building an expanded territory wide mobile dental service, taking up an equity position across multiple Aboriginal owned building companies thus allowing them to access more capital both directly and indirectly. There are numerous other opportunities of a similar kind (see the link to the Centrecorp Foundation below). My assumption is that the AINT investments must be commercially based (i.e. designed not to lose money) and should actively seek to leverage their capital and Indigenous access to find commercial partners to take up influential stakes in commercial opportunities which directly provide benefits for Indigenous Territorians. I accept that this approach appears high risk but doing nothing (or a bare minimum) with available capital while persuading yourself that you are building wealth delivers certain failure. It will require sustained and strong governance, a disciplined approach to strategy, and strong commercial acumen, but these are not an unthinkable aspiration for Indigenous interests.

Examples of this broad approach include Indigenous Business Australia in Canberra, and the extraordinarily impressive Centrecorp Foundation in Alice Springs (link here) which manages a portfolio of assets valued at around $250m. Centrecorp has invested in core commercial real estate in the Alice Springs CBD, Darwin, and a number of other regional centres, some residential housing opportunities in Central Australia, and is a substantial owner of the major Toyota supplier in Central Australia and a major hire car business. These businesses operate across the Indigenous / non-Indigenous commercial domains and have been very successful in building credibility for Indigenous interests within the commercial circles in Central Australia. One consequence of such a strategy, if executed successfully, would be to build real political influence for Indigenous interests within the NT.

Confusion abounds

The confusion related to the delayed finalisation of the audited financial statements and the stop/go/stop imbroglio with the 2025 Annual Report are in the scheme of things of minor import. The early missteps over conflict-of-interest processes identified by the ANAO are easily rectified.

The confusion arising from the opaque relationship between the two strategic funds and the AINT Unit Trust is more significant as it reflects a degree of transparency failure which works against clear and rational thinking about the substantive reality and constraints facing AINT and its current investment strategy. The most significant consequence of portraying transparently the limited opportunities built into the AINT are the lost opportunities that nevertheless might be harnessed from the not inconsiderable quantum of financial assets under AINT management.

A major driver of these lost opportunities is the lack of clarity in the AINT’s various governance reports around the serious limitations in the outcomes negotiated by the Commonwealth and the Land Councils in 2021, which in turn arise from the systemic and structural conflicts of interest between the land councils and the wider Indigenous community in the NT, and the separate desire of the Commonwealth to respond to the longstanding demand from Indigenous interests for greater control over the ABA, while off-loading admin costs for grant management yet retaining substantive control. For an explanation of these in more detail, I refer readers (again) to my submission (#4) to the Legislation Committee in considering the legislation that established AINT in2021 (link here). That lack of clarity around the reality of the limitations of the legislation and thus the AINT, suggests that the confusion which pervades the AINT’s operations is in fact built into its institutional architecture.

For AINT, the most important factor in its ultimate success or failure will be whether it develops the capacity to think strategically about the opportunity matrix it faces and the capacity to act decisively to execute a cogent and considered plan. Confusion is the enemy of both prerequisites. Or as Mark Twain is reputed to have said:

It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.

 

7 April 2026

Formidable Challenges Part Two: the pervasive conflicted interests permeating the Winchelsea mine development process

  

Oh, I have ta’en too little care of this.

King Lear, Act three, Scene four

The issues discussed here comprise a critique of the adequacy of the approval processes for the proposed Winchelsea mine (which are laid out in Part One of this Formidable Challenges post) and are in many respects merely an extension and reinforcement of the analysis included in my previous posts on this Blog, in particular my November 2025 post The Angels Weep (link here), my January 2026 post ANAO financial audits and the case for ALRA reform (link here), and my February 2026 post, The rough torrent of occasion (link here).

A central issue raised in the documents listed in Part One of Formidable Challenges relates to the potential for conflict-of-interest arising from the fact that the exploration and mining agreements required by Commonwealth and NT legislation involved negotiation between two parties, the ALC and Winchelsea Mining. The Chair of the ALC was Tony Wurramarrba (now deceased) and the ALC CEO was Mark Hewitt (now terminated). Two of the four Directors of Winchelsea Mining were Tony Wurramarrba and Mark Hewitt ostensibly representing the majority shareholder, the Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC). In other words, the Groote based senior officeholders in both the ALC and Winchelsea Mining were identical. The ALC, whose core statutory function under the ALRA is to protect the interests of traditional owners is required to negotiate the terms of any mining on Anindilyakwa Aboriginal land. Thus, in the negotiations between the ALC and Winchelsea Mining, the two senior officeholders on both sides of the metaphorical negotiating table were Tony Wurramarrba and Mark Hewitt. I have referred to this situation in Part One as the ‘dual roles’ of the two office holders.

The attachments to Document B1 (a DPMC brief to Minister Scullion dated 18 September 2018) include the correspondence from the ALC Chair and ALC CEO dated 15 August 2018 to the Minister outlining inter alia their proposed strategy for managing this potential conflict (paragraphs 16 to 18). Documents A4, a submission from the ALC dated 14 September and appended to the ALC correspondence to the Minister of 14 September and attached to the DPMC brief in Document A1 relate to the consultation processes for the exploration licence application agreement. These various documents contain a detailed account of the arrangements put in place by the ALC ostensibly aimed at ensuring that the ALC Chair and CEO played no role in influencing the ALC’s strategy in negotiating the two agreements, and there are formal statements indicating that the ALC Board was explicitly advised that Mr Wurramarrba and Mr Hewitt represented, and should be treated as representing, Winchelsea Mining in all discussions.

The DPMC brief largely describes in a factual manner the proposed disclosure and non-participation arrangements in relation to the mine consultation processes to be followed by the ALC Chair and CEO laid out in the ALC correspondence. It notes that the ALC engaged external legal advice from Arnold Bloch Liebler (ABL), noted that the ALC had reduced the CEO’s remuneration package (to be reviewed in 12 months) and that the ALC Mining and Environment Manager would assume administrative responsibility of ALC matters related to Winchelsea Mining.  It seems probable that ABL were engaged very late in the consultation process, though neither ALC nor PMC made this clear in their advice to the Minister. The Department expressed a minor concern that it appeared that the ALC had not confirmed that they had been advised of the proposed remuneration the Chair and CEO would receive from Winchelsea Mining and provided suggested correspondence seeking clarification. There was no general expression of concern as to the workability nor the wisdom of the conflict mitigation arrangements proposed by the ALC. As noted in Part One, the released documents do not include the signed copy of the brief nor a copy of the signed letter if it exists. The letter attached to the brief was (inappropriately in my view) excluded from the FOI release on the basis that it was a draft. The fact that the final letter has not been identified or released in response to the FOI request, and nor has a version of the ministerial submission with his annotations suggests that the Minister never sent the letter expressing the PMC concern to the ALC. In turn, this decision suggests that the Minister did not wish to ask for advice that he knew would reveal and document (and thus record his knowledge of) the extent of the financial benefits flowing to the two senior ALC officers from their dual roles.

Part of the implicit justification for the existence of these arrangements (see paragraphs 4 to 8 of the PMC brief) was that the AAAC Rule Book provides for the representation of the ALC Chair and CEO on the Winchelsea Board. This glosses over the fact that the ALC (or at least its key officeholders including Mr Hewitt and perhaps Mr Wurramarrba) assisted in the incorporation of AAAC in December 2017 with the specific purpose of taking over the extant exploration licence applications on Winchelsea Island and surrounding areas. Those officers included this provision in the AAAC Rule Book, thus establishing the potential conflict which they then ostensibly sought to mitigate.

Up until the death of the former Chair and the termination of Mr Hewitt in 2024, the two clans who are the traditional owners of Winchelsea Island and provide the entirety of the Directors of AAAC had no representation on the Winchelsea Mining Board of Directors notwithstanding that the AAAC theoretically controls Winchelsea through its 70 percent majority shareholding. This is yet another instance of the ALC exerting potential (and thus effective) control over a local corporation to which it has also provided s64(3) funding at its discretion.

The ALRA provides that once an exploration agreement is approved, the traditional owners cannot refuse to provide their consent to mining. However, it does require a mining agreement be negotiated by a land council and then approved by the Minister, but his/her ability to refuse consent at the mining lease stage is limited to a determination of inconsistency between the terms of the licence and proposed lease, and/or that the national interest requires refusal (refer s47(3) of ALRA). It follows that the consideration of the application for an Exploration License is in many respects much more consequential than the ministerial consideration of the proposed mining lease.

In the Brief to Minister Scullion in relation to the approval of the Exploration Licence agreement (Document A1, para 9) the Department fails to alert Minister Scullion to the implications of section 47 of ALRA. The brief states

The material provided by the ALC supports the assertion it has complied with its statutory obligations in these matters and the Department recommends you give the consent and approval requested.

Note the ambiguity in this sentence revolving around the words ‘supports the assertion’. The ALC supporting material outlines a rather bizarre consultation/negotiation process, outlining extensive meetings over six months or so in 2017 (see para 7.15) culminating in a majority (and perhaps unanimous) vote by a group of traditional owners of Winchelsea Island approving terms of a proposed exploration licence agreement to be negotiated with Winchelsea Mining which was yet to be established (see para 7.10; the nature of the vote has inexplicably been redacted on personal privacy grounds. This redaction may be intended to hide the small number of traditional owners who provided their consent). This was followed by a confirmatory meeting to confirm the decision of traditional owners at a meeting on 14 September 2018 attended by an un-named PMC officer and un-named Winchelsea Mining representatives (para 7.14). Whoever the Winchelsea representative was, there is no record of any constraint operating to prevent them subsequently identifying to the Chair and to Mr Hewitt any traditional owner who argued against the proposal. This is a significant flaw in the process. The ALC formally approved the exploration agreement on 10 September 2018, eleven months later. The extent to which the Winchelsea traditional owners were ‘as a group’ consulted on the final agreement is left unclear. The Chair and CEO absented themselves from the part of the ALC  meeting which considered the mining agreement and did not vote (see para 4.4). There is no indication that they had been absent from the consultations throughout 2017, and no indication that they had not been involved in Winchelsea’s framing the proposed approach to exploration (a matter that in theory may have been of concern to Winchelsea shareholders).

The issue of the addressing the potential conflict of interest of the ALC Chair and CEO by requiring that they not participate in the final meeting of the whole process has all the markings of being an afterthought. What is clear is that Minister Scullion in providing his approval for the exploration agreement implicitly confirms that he accepted the dual roles of the Chair and CEO on both the ALC and Winchelsea Mining. The Department, by virtue of recommending his approval without raising substantive concerns, did the same. The brief was copied to the Secretary and senior echelons of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and to the Prime Minister’s Office. Based on my experience at senior levels of government over 30 years, I find it difficult to comprehend how in these circumstances such a brief could have been prepared and provided to a Minister, and inconceivable that a Minister who took his responsibilities seriously could have approved it.

The approval of the proposed mining agreement by Minister Wyatt was based on two briefs provided by NIAA in June and July 2021. They were based on consultations undertaken by the ALC extending from November 2020 through to March 2021. Documents B2, B3 and A10 refer.

The issue of conflict of interest (in contrast to the Exploration Agreement process discussed above) is dealt with in detail in the equivalent summary of the consultations outlined in Document A10. See the detailed processes put in place presumably on legal advice (see section 5). While those processes were orders of magnitude more comprehensive than what occurred at the Exploration Agreement phase, they did not relate to the provision of consent, and more importantly were to my mind seriously flawed and inadequate for the following reasons. All of these reasons also operate to undermine the legitimacy and probity of the decision processes on the exploration lease agreement.

First, their effective operation is limited to the formal engagements of the Chair and the CEO of the ALC with issues related to the proposed Winchelsea mine. Second, I understand that the then Chair’s spouse was on the Board of the ALC, and privy to all discussions about the agreement. Third, from 2018 through to 2024, the CEO’s spouse Sophie Liu was employed in the ALC Royalty Development Unit as well as Groote Holdings Aboriginal Corporation and Winchelsea Mining (link here) and was likely privy to agreement related information either formally or informally. Fourth, it seems highly likely that up to three AAAC Directors were also Directors of the ALC during the relevant period yet were not required to declare a potential conflict of interest. ALC Directors in March 2021 included Archie Jaragba, Lionel Jaragba, and Silas Bara all of whom had involvement in AAAC as members and Directors and were also potentially conflicted.

Adding some further heft to my critique, it is worth noting that the ANAO in its May 2023 Performance Audit (link here) was critical of some elements of the consultation processes related to the mine (see paras 3.74-3.76), including poor information on risks, poor record keeping and inadequate processes for updating traditional owners on changes subsequent to their approval. Consistent with its narrow focus on its remit, the ANAO did not consider let alone form a conclusion on the matters I have raised above and below.

Like Minister Scullion, Minister Wyatt implicitly acknowledged and accepted the dual roles for both the ALC Chair and CEO. As with Minister Scullion’s decision, it is difficult to conceive how a Minister charged with the responsibility to be satisfied that the land council has complied with its statutory responsibilities to protect the interests of traditional owners could approve a formal agreement infected with so many potential conflicts.

In relation to both Minister Scullion’s and Minister Wyatt’s approval processes the most fundamental potential conflict of interest went unacknowledged. The mitigations proposed in both cases to deal with the dual roles of the two statutory officeholders, inadequate as they were, applied only to the negotiations of the two agreements which required ministerial approvals. Yet the potential conflicts arising from their dual roles extended well beyond those processes, including to the subsequent approval of section 64(3) payments to Aboriginal corporations directed to mine related investments.

Neither Minister Scullion nor Minister Wyatt appeared to have given any consideration to the ongoing risks involved in these processes. It is unclear if the Department/NIAA ever provided advice to the two Ministers about this matter, but to date there has been no document released which suggested that they did. In any case, it was the Ministers who were ultimately responsible, and who failed to take the remedial action that would have prevented the apparent misallocation of those funds.

In my previous post The Angels Weep, I recounted advice to the Estimates Committee that suggests that in excess of $70m may have been misallocated by the ALC in supporting the proposed mine. The ANAO in its May 2023 Performance Audit of the ALC (link here) identified the risks of actual conflicts of interest arising from these dual roles as being high. It documents funding decisions by the ALC which overtly favoured applications sponsored by the CEO on behalf of GHAC and AAAC, corporations in which he was involved either directly or indirectly and which were focussed on supporting the proposed mine. See paras 4.45-4.50. But the ANAO stepped back from overt criticism of the CEO in relation to those risks perhaps in deference to the fact that both ministers had implicitly approved the dual role arrangements. The ANAO also documented the excessive costs and the potential conflicts of the Chair of the ALC Audit and Risk Committee but stepped back from overt criticism of either the accounting firm involved or the ALC CEO who oversaw the appointments and the apparently excessive payments involved. In my view the ANAO was unduly cautious; it identified the dots, but declined to connect them, an approach that allowed the Minister and NIAA to fudge the import of the ANAO report and thus facilitate the persistence of the status quo ante within the ALC for over a year.

Following the ANAO audit, one might have expected Minister Burney to reconsider the approach adopted by her two predecessors and initiate robust action to improve governance oversight of the ALC. Instead, as documented in many of my previous posts, she prevaricated and fudged the issues and so has Minister McCarthy (who was an Assistant Minister in the portfolio during Minister Burney’s tenure). In my recent post ANAO financial audits and the case for ALRA reform, I suggested the existence of

a deeper malaise characterised by ongoing and increasing financial risk, and the possibility of wider social consequences that are not visible through the lenses used by governments and their bureaucracies. In my view, that malaise extends to the absence of effective regulation by successive ministers and their agency, NIAA. 

The documents now released under FOI serve to reinforce these conclusions, and make crystal clear that former Ministers have made egregiously poor policy decisions that appear at best to amount to maladministration and which are at the root of the governance failures which have pervaded the ALC. The evidence embedded in the documents released so far suggest that PMC and NIAA failed dismally in providing Ministers with both forthright and high-quality advice. It was only after a scathing media story based on information from an ALC whistleblower identified an attempt by Mr Hewitt to be granted a substantial equity share in Winchelsea Mining, that the NIAA (presumably instructed by the Minister) referred the matter to the NACC for investigation. Since October 2024 when Mr Hewitt was terminated, there has been a revolving cascade of changes at the senior levels of the ALC.

As I write this, the ALC Annual Report for 2025 due at the end of October 2025 is not yet available, the AAAC financial reports for 2024 and 2025 have not been published as required by the CATSI Act, and there have been no filings to ASIC by Winchelsea Mining Pty Ltd since 2024. ORIC have an investigation underway into GHAC but have not provided any reasons for why they are taking this action. The ALC appear to have stepped away from their commitment to assist these corporations representing traditional owners and which was the rationale they provided to Senate Estimates to justify their intense involvement in the Winchelsea mine proposal. And of course, some two years since complaints were first made to it, the National Anti-Corruption Commission is still considering whether to issue a report in relation to matters related to the operation of the ALC on Groote. Notwithstanding all this, the last two Senate Estimates Hearings have allocated negligible time to ALC issues. 

There are two elephants in the room which no-one with formal oversight responsibilities wishes to acknowledge, let alone discuss. The first is that the problems emanating from the potential conflicts of interest involved not just Mr Hewitt, but the former Chair Mr Wurramarrba, and potentially extended to numerous other individuals beyond those two. Moreover, in terms of their formal decisions, the ALC Board were fully supportive of the strategies being pursued by the Chair and the CEO from the beginning until Mr Hewitt decided, a month before his termination from all roles on the Groote Eylandt, to offer to resign as CEO to allow him to focus on the operations of Winchelsea Mining. In this respect, there are logically two possibilities: that the ALC Board members were effectively manipulated by the architects of the Winchelsea mine proposal to provide the ongoing formal support required; or, the ALC Board was fully committed to the strategy of developing the mine based on their independent and considered assessment, a strategy that they suddenly reversed without explanation at a potential cost in excess of $70m to the traditional owners of Groote. Neither option is attractive to contemplate, but it requires contemplation and consideration if the reforms necessary to ensure the current problems and recent mistakes will not be repeated and the necessary reforms are identified and put in place. My basic point is that the responsibility for whatever adverse findings and adverse outcomes emerge over the next few years cannot be laid solely at the feet of one individual, the former CEO Mr Hewitt. The issues within the ALC extend beyond one individual.

The second, and more significant elephant in the room is that successive Ministers have made egregious policy errors which in my view amount at best to maladministration and which have led to disastrous outcomes for the residents and traditional owners of Groote Eylandt. Again, whether the Ministers were merely incompetent and poorly advised, or were disposed to prioritise political advantage over the public interest is unclear. Without full transparency, concerned citizens and taxpayers cannot form a judgment. Whichever reason applies, citizens and the traditional owners of Groote Eylandt (as well as the wider Australian public) have a right to expect better.

It is significant that it has taken eight years for the documentary evidence of direct ministerial involvement in, and knowledge of, these conflicted roles within a Commonwealth statutory corporation to emerge into the public domain. Remember, this is a statutory corporation with responsibilities for the protection of traditional owner interests and the allocation of millions of dollars in compensatory financial benefits related to existing mining operations. Throughout this period, and continuing to the present day, ministers and governments have deliberately attempted to obfuscate and distract attention. The continuation of efforts to avoid transparency merely serve to raise further questions about what drove the initial decisions and continues to drive the inability to lay myriad unanswered questions to rest.

In my view, the Commonwealth has both an obligation and a long-term incentive to establish a necessarily independent and wide-rangeing investigation process that will allow such a comprehensive consideration to occur. While determining whether corrupt conduct has taken place is important, it is not necessarily the remit of the NACC to expiscate the broader systemic issues that have allowed the significant misallocation of funds appropriated by the Parliament for the benefit of traditional owners, and they may well decide not to do so. If that occurs, at least three years will have been wasted. The establishment and subsequent handling by NIAA of the previous investigation undertaken by Bellchambers Barrett avoided the issues related to the potential misallocation of funds and gave no consideration to the conduct of agencies and ministers; consequently, it was deliberately designed as a diversion, and has undermined the credibility of the recent ministers within the Indigenous Australians portfolio.

In any case, the ongoing failure to address the underlying causes of the myriad policy challenges facing the ALC will mean that the responsibility for the egregious policy errors that have torn the ALC apart and set back the aspirations and life-opportunities available to the Anindilyakwa people will continue to taint the operation of the ALRA, and the legitimacy of governments and their officials.  

The ALC have recently appointed their fourth acting or permanent CEO in less than two years. Without reflecting in any way on the new CEO’s capacity and ability, I believe the structural forces that have been in play, and which likely continue to operate, are such as to make the prospects of him delivering or oversighting sustained reform well-nigh impossible.

For the Commonwealth, and in particular the Minister for Finance who has responsibility for the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA), the continuing challenges facing the ALC represent a test case for the robustness and effectiveness of the whole system of Commonwealth public sector administration. If the ALC were a local government in any jurisdiction in Australia, it would be facing the prospect of an Administrator being appointed. In my view, strong grounds exist for the Prime Minister to request the Minister for Finance to step in and make arrangements for the direct oversight the operations of the ALC for the next three years or so to ensure that there is a sustained return to complete compliance with the ALRA and the PGPA. Such a step would have the additional benefit of providing the Government with an independent perspective on desirable systemic reforms to the financial architecture underpinning the ALRA more generally and create the foundations to underpin the reforms that are required to ensure that the ALRA survives another fifty years. Without robust and decisive action by Canberra, the prospects of the ALC avoiding a governance meltdown over the coming five years will be close to zero. If this occurs, the reputation and legitimacy of the Commonwealth public sector will suffer yet a further body blow.

Whichever course is chosen, the challenges ahead for both the people of Groote Eylandt and the Commonwealth public sector will be formidable.

 

29 March 2026