The ANAO on the ALC and AINT Annual Report delays: the case for radical transparency

 

To thine own self be true,

 And it must follow, as the night the day,

Thou canst not then be false to any man.

Hamlet, Act one, Scene three

 

Last week the ANAO released its Interim Report on Key Financial Controls of Major Entities (link here). In Chapter Five of the report, the ANAO provides for the first time an explanation of the delays in the finalisation and tabling of the Annual Reports of the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) and Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) and an associated Trust.

This Blog has covered these delays and the complete absence of any formal explanation in several previous posts (link here and link here). Given the technical details involved, before discussing the context and implications emerging form the explanations now provided, it is easiest if I reproduce an extract from the ANAO Report:

Anindilyakwa Land Council

5.3 The Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) was formed by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA).

2024–25 audit results

5.4 The conclusion of the 2024–25 financial statements audit was delayed due to the impact of weaknesses in ALC’s financial statements preparation process and delays in receipt of supporting documentation. At the conclusion of the audit, one finding posing a significant business or financial risk and one minor finding remained unresolved

[Table 5.3 omitted]

Unresolved significant audit finding: Addressing previously reported governance findings

5.5 A significant audit finding that remained unresolved at the conclusion of the 2024–25 audit related to ALC’s progress in addressing 15 recommendations from the Auditor-General Report No.29 2022–23 Governance of the Anindilyakwa Land Council, which was tabled on 31 May 2023. The ANAO found that while the ALC had closed all high priority findings, five findings remained open, meaning the finding category remained unchanged for 2024–25.

 

Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation

5.6 The Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) is a corporate commonwealth entity, established under section 65B of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.

2024–25 audit results

5.7 The conclusion of the 2024–25 financial statements audit was delayed due to the late notification to the ANAO of the preparation of separate financial statements for the Aboriginal Investment NT Trust. As the Auditor-General is required under the Auditor-General Act 1997 to audit subsidiary financial statements, additional audit work was required to enable reliance on the component auditor, which extended the audit timeline.

5.8 At the conclusion of the audit, one new other legislative finding was reported, and two minor audit findings remained unresolved.

Audit findings

[Table 5.4 omitted]

New moderate legislative finding: Key Management Personnel incorrect payments

5.9 A new other legislative finding relating to incorrect payments to key management personnel was raised at the conclusion of the 2024–25 audit. The ANAO found three instances of incorrect payments (two overpayments and one underpayment) to key management personnel, in breach of the remuneration tribunal determination.

 

Aboriginal Investment NT Trust

5.10 The Aboriginal Investment NT Trust (the Trust) was established on 19 December 2024 as an unlisted, unregistered managed investment trust and is wholly owned and controlled by the Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC), a corporate Commonwealth entity. The Trust was established to invest funds to provide exposure to a diversified portfolio of asset classes through investments in underlying funds.

2024–25 audit results

5.11 The conclusion of the 2024–25 financial statements audit was delayed due to the late provision of signed financial statements and late identification by the entity that the Auditor General is the mandated auditor. At the conclusion of the 2024–25 audit, one new moderate finding was identified.

Audit findings

[Table 5.5 omitted]

New moderate audit finding : Financial reporting omissions and audit arrangements

5.12 During the 2024–25 financial statements audits, the ANAO identified issues relating to the financial reporting and audit arrangements for the Trust. The Trust prepared and approved its first financial statements for the period ended 30 June 2025, which were audited by another auditor prior to engagement with the ANAO. The ANAO subsequently identified the existence of the Trust’s financial statements and that, as a subsidiary of a corporate Commonwealth entity, its financial statements fell within the Auditor-General’s audit mandate.

5.13 The originally issued financial statements did not include all disclosures required by Australian Accounting Standards. In particular, disclosures relating to the Trust’s parent entity, significant related party transactions with NTAIC—including the provision of funding of approximately $305 million and auditor remuneration—were not included. These disclosures are fundamental to users’ understanding of the Trust’s ownership structure, governance arrangements and use of public funds. The omission of this information resulted in a material misstatement of the originally issued financial statements.

5.14 The late identification of the Trust and its financial statements also affected the audit process. The ANAO was required to undertake audit procedures after the financial statements had been approved and an auditor’s report issued by another auditor, which limited the opportunity for timely audit planning and coordination with the audit of NTAIC and contributed to delays in completing both audits.

5.15 Following ANAO engagement with the Trust, the originally issued financial statements were withdrawn and replaced with revised financial statements that included the omitted disclosures. The ANAO completed the audit of the revised financial statements and issued an unmodified audit opinion, including an emphasis of matter drawing attention to the withdrawal and reissue of the financial statements. The matter highlights the importance of early identification of new subsidiary arrangements and timely engagement with the ANAO to support effective financial reporting and audit processes.

 

While the issues raised by the ANAO are not earth shattering in themselves, they do point to failures of process within both the ALC and AINT and, I would suggest, in the standards of ministerial decision-making and regulatory oversight being applied to the administration of entities established by the ALRA.

In relation to the ALC, it is difficult not to suspect that the ‘weaknesses in ALC’s financial statements preparation process and delays in receipt of supporting documentation’ identified as the reasons for the delays in finalising the audits and tabling the annual report were linked to the sudden termination of the former CEO Mr Hewitt. While the public narrative is that the ALC decided to unilaterally terminate Mr Hewitt’s services, the context surrounding the decision strongly suggests otherwise. As I documented previously (link here) ALC staff were excluded from the Council’s discussion and the only non-Council member present while the ALC considered the matter was a senior NIAA officer. Subsequently, the Minister lifted her unprecedented moratorium on approving a full year budget for the ALC and later approved (alone amongst the four NT Land Councils) a budget increase of around $2m for operational expenses over the ALC’s previous annual budget (link here). The Minister’s rationale for withholding budget approval in her media release of 29 August 2024 (link here) was that:

The full budget will only be considered when ALC has demonstrated to the NIAA that it is sufficiently prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit.

Yet the ANAO now tell us that there are still (as of May 2026) five outstanding findings from the ANAO’s 2023 audit of the ALC.

My own hypothesis is that the Minister intervened directly in the ALC’s internal affairs to ensure that the former CEO was removed from his position (link here). Her agency had previously referred unspecified matters related to the management of the ALC for investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Commission. The Minister has never provided a full explanation for this referral. If my hypothesis is correct, then the administrative issues that caused the delay in the finalisation of the audit and the tabling of the annual report were the result, at least in part, of her actions.

The obvious avenue for sorting out these issues is in Senate Estimates Committee Hearings, yet for a range of reasons which I do not claim to fully comprehend, neither the Government, the Opposition nor the Greens and independents appear keen to ask the obvious questions nor even to have the ALC appear at Estimates Hearings. At the most recent Estimates Hearings, only three of the four NT Land Councils were listed on the agenda, the exception being the ALC, the only Land Council whose annual report had not been tabled in time or the previous hearings. As it transpired, the Committee decided to not take evidence from any of the NT Land Councils. In my view, the Senate Estimates processes have comprehensively failed to adequately oversight the performance failures of the ALC and the regulatory failures of the NIAA and its minister. For a related discussion, see this recent post on regulatory oversight (link here).

In relation to the AINT and its associated Trust, the failure to disclose over $300m in related party transactions, while perhaps merely an administrative error rather than an indication of misfeasance, should have set the alarm bells ringing. Again, the fact that the Minister has seen fit to provide no information or explanation for these problems, and that the Senate Estimates processes appear entirely disinterested in following them up, does not bode well for the maintenance of appropriate standards of administration and probity across the complex array of financial activities undertaken under the ALRA.

I recall sitting in a Senate Estimates hearing in the early 1980s when an Opposition Senator gained national headlines and almost brought down both the then Minister and his agenda of establishing ATSIC with unsubstantiated allegations that a ‘black mafia’ existed. Anyone who thinks that this might not happen again, and that the times are now different is, in my humble option, deeply mistaken.

In a context where the political opponents of land rights and Aboriginal aspirations more generally are gaining greater traction in political debate, the apparent Government strategy of sitting on their hands and hoping that issues of maladministration or mere incompetence will eventually evaporate is in my view deeply misguided. Obfuscation merely serves to deplete the waning levels of trust in government. The better strategy is to pursue policies of radical transparency complemented by the provision of explanations for government decisions. If governments and ministers are acting in the public interest, there is no reason not to provide explanations for their decisions. Good policy is good politics.

 

29 June 2026

The institutional drivers of remote disadvantage

 

There's a divinity that shapes our ends,

Rough-hew them how we will.

Hamlet, Act five, Scene two

 

We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror.

Measure for Measure, Act two, Scene one.

 

In a recent article published in Pearls and Irritations (link here), political strategist and pollster Kos Samaras provides an insightful analysis of the reasons behind the rise of One Nation, and the structural bifurcation embedded within its base. As he says

There is an old cohort that came to Hanson on identity and a new one that came on grievance, and they do not want the same things. 

I found his argument to be persuasive, but my aim here is to repurpose his analysis to explore one element of an issue that I have previously articulated in a number of contexts (link here and link here), namely the importance of leveraging and reforming mainstream policy frameworks in seeking to address Indigenous disadvantage. More pointedly, I emphasise the risks of not engaging with mainstream policy and relying solely on the fiction that the solutions to Indigenous disadvantage can be found in greater utilisation of Indigenous specific policy approaches and/or are solely the domain of Indigenous interests.

The element of this mainstream/Indigenous specific tension that I focus on here is the related but conceptually distinct divide between remote Australia (and its remote communities) and urban and regional Australia.

In his article on One Nation, Samaras has this to say about the origins of the cohort of voters that are focussed on identity. They were people who while they owned their homes in the towns that range right across Australia’s hinterlands:

In the narrow, cash-flow sense this voter was not poor. The mortgage was gone. What had gone with it was a sense that the world they grew up in, and raised families in, had gone too: not replaced, but declined.

The paid-off home sits in a part of Australia that has been quietly stripped of institutions, industry and services. Since 2017 around 37 per cent of the country’s bank branches have closed, and in the space of three years more than 600 towns were left with no banking service at all. In the Riverina alone, 22 towns have lost their last bank, and Grenfell lost all four of the majors.

The hospital tells the same story. More than 130 rural birthing units have shut their doors, so an expectant mother now drives hours to deliver. There are about 437 full-time-equivalent doctors per 100,000 people in the big cities and roughly 264 in the very remote. Close to one in five remote Australians cannot see a local GP, around 60 per cent have no specialist within reach, and life expectancy runs up to seven years shorter than in the capitals.

And the people are leaving. The young go first, to the capitals for work and study, which has pushed the median age in the regions to 42 against 36 in the cities, with only about 30 per cent of residents outside the capitals now in the prime 20-to-44 band. Whole districts are contracting: wheatbelt towns like Northampton and Morawa shedding three and four per cent in a single year, the old mining centres of Broken Hill, Mount Isa and Port Augusta bleeding numbers, and in a growing list of places the deaths now outnumber the births.

Samaras documents, in a highly revealing graph showing the level of voter support for One Nation, that in September 2025, that support was just above 10% nationally (essentially the Party’s original identity based cohort) and grew over the succeeding four months to over 25% and in the subsequent four months to the present rate of 31% support nationally. This later growth is due to the second of Samaras cohorts, younger voters with cost-of-living grievances.

In analysing the implications of his analysis, Samaras explains why One Nation's place based cohort support base is so resilient:

If the vote is anchored in a place-formed identity rather than in the world the iPhone made, two things follow.

The first is that it will not be bought off. A budget measure can ease a mortgage. It cannot return a voter to a country that feels like the one they grew up in, because that country was partly a function of being younger in a smaller, more legible world. The grievance is real, but at root it is not fiscal, which is why fiscal answers keep sailing past it. [I don’t explore the second factor here].

I’ve quoted the Samaras analysis here, because it resonates strongly with and even parallels my own analysis of the reasons Indigenous residents of remote Australia over the past five decades have had their world upended.

If the decline of a pre-existing institutional footprint of government and the economic impacts of modern capitalism (or neoliberalism) is such that small towns become economically and socially unviable, and this in turn leads to the political earthquake of national significance we are seeing today with the rise of One Nation, is it surprising then that the failure of successive governments to invest in and establish these institutions in remote Indigenous communities for the past half century would also have major, extensive and cumulative impacts on the social and economic viability of remote communities? And is it also surprising that the subsequent demographic shifts, which have seen an increasing exodus from communities and influx into regional centres like Kununurra, Halls Creek, Tennant Creek and Alice Springs, would also bring with them the mayhem and despair of their prior world turned upside down? My point is not that the processes of remote community displacement and the hollowing of the local economies of regional Australia are equivalent, but rather to point to the fact that the loss of institutional frameworks by citizens structurally included within the Australian political settlement while earthshattering, is nevertheless overshadowed by the ongoing impact on citizens excluded from the Australian political settlement because they have never had access to the benefits of the institutional frameworks most Australians take for granted.

While colonisation and the expansion of settlement across the nation was violent, and extremely traumatic for Indigenous societies, with the establishment of the pastoral industry across the northern savannahs, missions in the most geographically remote areas, and various Aboriginal reserves in desert and other non-pastoral areas, a social and economic equilibrium was established that created widespread stability within remote communities. It was an equilibrium built on access to rations, seasonal employment on pastoral stations for both men and women, and in many respects was an accommodation which averted the ongoing violence and economic cost for both sides of continuing frontier violence, but also had embedded within it mutual misunderstanding of what the accommodation involved and where it might lead in the future. See my brief discussion of Tim Rowse’s insightful book White Flour, White Power in this earlier post (link here). Historian Shannyn Palmer has also written persuasively on the reasons for the demographic shift from the deserts to remote communities in central Australia prior to World War Two, emphasising the role of Indigenous agency in the choices Aboriginal people made.

In my assessment, the equilibrium established was neither just nor institutionally inclusive. This led in turn to a decades long project by progressive Australians and increasingly Aboriginal advocates for civil rights, human rights and land rights. On one metric, the extent of legally acknowledged Aboriginal land ownership, that struggle has been extraordinarily successful. The land rights movement has seen the establishment of a complex array of institutional reforms leading to acknowledged Aboriginal land ownership of one form or another rising from effectively zero to some 58% of the Australian land mass being either owned, managed or subject to special rights (link here) in 2024.

Yet despite those successes, and the associated policy shifts away from assimilation, and towards self-management, and later self-determination, the social and economic equilibrium in place across remote Australia in the 1970s has seriously fractured. Perhaps the most significant shift was the well-intentioned decision in 1967 to force the pastoral industry to pay Aboriginal workers equal wages. It led to an immediate and significant loss of Aboriginal pastoral employment, which in turn led in many cases to the eviction of Aboriginal people from access to their country. Simultaneously, Government ration stations were closed, mission funding began to dry up and most closed or took a back seat as the Commonwealth stepped in to fund self-managing communities. These settlements were in locations where state government and local government services were not provided since they were structured around servicing ratepayers (who often were paying only nominal fees). Over subsequent decades, the Commonwealth (through DAA first, and later ATSIC) put significant pressure on states and territories to lift their game and support Indigenous citizens. In recent years, the Commonwealth has pre-emptively pulled away from the provision of comprehensive support to remote communities even in circumstances where the states and territories were not locked into the provision of sustained funding arrangements.

The situation of First Nations citizens in urban and regional Australia is also fraught but has different manifestations and thus requires different policy approaches (in my view). I do not address those issues here.

The drivers of the political shifts that underlie the accelerating loss of political and social equilibrium across remote Australia are not well understood. My own diagnosis is that the dominant coalition of the most influential economic and social interests in Australian society is itself in a perpetual process of internal bargaining and ongoing pressure on governments over the institutional frameworks which comprise the national political settlement, and that these interest-focussed processes structurally ignore, and where feasible exclude, weaker interests, including remote Indigenous interests. For a detailed discussion, see the Policy Insights Paper titled Overcoming Indigenous Exclusion which I co-authored with Neil Westbury in 2019 (link here).

Whatever the reasons, the reality of the breakdown of the social equilibrium that was established in the 1970s across remote Indigenous communities is beyond question. I have written extensively about social and economic dysfunction in remote communities in this blog. For example, I list 16 former posts in this omnibus post from August 2025 (link here). This is why the Samaras analysis of the disenchantment of mainstream voters across regional towns struck a chord with me,  and why his account of the economic and social decline due to the withdrawal of private and public sector services reminded me of the argument I made (with Neil Westbury) in our 2007 book Beyond Humbug (link here).

We argued not that key institutions had been present and were now being withdrawn across remote communities, but rather that governments had failed to pursue policies that ensured that the institutional footprint of government was ever established in those communities. That missing institutional footprint includes not just economic frameworks that encourage and incentivize commercial activity (e.g. banks, surveyed residential land titles, and the like) but the public sector footprint that ensures there are effective properly funded and staffed schools, access to specialist health care such as dentists and optometrists, aged persons care, disability services aligned with the service delivery models being pursued at state and federal levels, properly regulated social housing systems, and so on.

From time to time, it is argued that geographic remoteness goes hand in glove with the absence of economic viability, and that this undercuts the rationale for any support for remote communities. Indeed, a decade of so ago, the West Australian Government openly canvassed options for closing some or all remote communities. Ultimately, they backed down in the face of sustained outrage and opposition from Indigenous land councils and wider interests and the Commonwealth.

My own view is that framing policy reform opportunities in terms of remoteness/viability issues quickly become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Long term under-investment erodes the institutional viability of communities, and the residents ultimately vote with their feet (albeit in directions that governments do not anticipate). Yet, for example, governments do not decide where to locate military infrastructure across the north based on an assessment of the economic viability of the locations under consideration. They determine that the defence of the nation is in the national interest and then invest accordingly. While an under-appreciated proposition, I take the view that keeping people on country across the north is a key component of the national interest, is also in the public interest, as well as being something that the Aboriginal people of the north see as important. With land ownership goes responsibilities for land management. Without land and coastal management, important biosecurity issues will be ignored and will create risks for the nation that extend beyond the lands in question. There are strategic benefits in ensuring the north remains populated not just along the coast, but inland.  If I am correct, then policies that incentivise residents of remote communities to leave their communities and move to regional urban centres are ultimately counterproductive to advancing that national interest.

It is incontrovertible that there are economic costs to the budget of building social and economic footprint of government in remote and northern Australia. Similarly, there are costs to building infrastructure designed to contribute to the defence of the nation. While governments do have fiscal constraints, if something is in the national interest, it deserves to be funded at some level over a sustained period.

Moreover, there are strong arguments in support of strengthening the institutional footprint in remote Australia, ranging from normative/ethical ones to more practical arguments based on the benefits of not creating a permanent class of citizens that are structurally excluded from the benefits (and responsibilities) of effective citizenship. The economic and social costs of the current levels of community dysfunction across remote Australia are not listed in the annual budget papers, but they are substantial and growing. More importantly, the opportunity costs of that ongoing dysfunction on communities and families, but also on the nation are considerable.

A key implication of this analysis is that it is for governments to expand the footprint of mainstream institutional frameworks to remote regions and communities. That is not to say that the mode of implementation ought not to take into account local and cultural concerns and aspirations, but fundamentally it is not an Indigenous specific responsibility, but a task that falls to mainstream government.  Moreover, it is both intellectually (and politically) lazy and fundamentally incorrect to ‘blame the victim’ for persistent social dysfunction. Just as the planning and construction of roads and highways is governed by generalised algorithms and policy approaches, other institutional frameworks should also be provided nationally and not be artificially constrained in their application by structural and systemic biases that are built upon the structural exclusion of Indigenous interests. The risk of seeing the challenges of remote Indigenous communities solely through the lens of Indigenous specific policy frameworks is that it can contribute to leaving longstanding and enduring structural exclusion in place and ultimately may lead to the premature or unnecessary depopulation of those communities, and the concomitant influx of remote migrants into regional towns.

The bigger risk is that by not investing in the institutional frameworks necessary to include remote populations within the mainstream institutional architecture of the nation, thus ensuring that these places and populations are governed as part of the nation, we are creating the conditions where systemic exclusion metastasises beyond remote communities and ultimately in ways that both rebound on Indigenous people and corrupt the wider body politic.

The bottom line is that remote disadvantage is primarily a function of systemic exclusion, and as Kos Samaras points out (in the context of analysing the grievances underpinning the rise of One Nation) the solution is not merely one of allocating more funding (however necessary that might be) but expanding the governance and institutional footprint (both public and private) of the nation’s governance to the whole expanse of the nation.

 

15 June 2026

ERRATUM

Contrary to my statment above, the Equal Wages decision for Aboriginal pastoral workers was handed down in 1966, but the Commission agreed to a phased implementation timetable which meant it was not implemented in the NT until December 1968. There were some variations in this timetable in the other states. See this informative talk by Sally Skyring from 2009 at the National Museum focussed on the Kimberley implementation of equal wages (link here).

 16 June 2026

Regulatory oversight: the missing element in effective public policy

 

O, it is excellent to have a giant's strength,

but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant.

Measure for Measure, Act two, Scene two

 

Two weeks ago, the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee held estimates Hearings where inter alia the NIAA, the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC) and three of the four NT land councils were called to give evidence. The ALC was not called to appear (for reasons that seem difficult to comprehend given the extraordinary delay in the tabling of its annual report (link here) and other unresolved issues that I will endeavour to address in the coming weeks).

However, the high-level issue I wish to explore here relates to the comparative effectiveness of the two primary mechanisms in our system of democratic accountability which are designed to keep the Executive arm of government up to the mark. The first is the Parliament, and in particular the system of Senate Estimates Committee hearings which convene three times a year. The second mechanism is the performance audit function of the ANAO.  The case study which has presented itself to us relates to the effectiveness of NIAA’s and ORIC’s regulatory oversight of the obligations of corporations established and incorporated under the CATSI Act.

These corporations are a major conduit for the delivery of many government programs across the Indigenous policy domain, and are also mandated entities under the NT land rights Act for the distribution of royalty equivalents (under s.64(3), and are the mandated incorporation mechanism for Prescribed Bodies Corporate, the land holding entities which must be established to hold native title on behalf of native title holders. The implicit rationale for these mandates to is to ensure that oversight and regulation is both culturally informed and able to be fine-tuned to meet emerging contingencies and policy needs.

The ORIC website (link here) provides an accessible overview of the numbers and financial significance of CATSI corporations nationally in the regularly updated State of the Sector reports.

Senate Estimates and ORIC

The following extracts are taken from the transcript of the Hearings held by the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee on 26 May 2026 (pages 40 to 44) (link here). I have added bold text and cut out irrelevant material indicated by ellipses. Ms Tricia Stroud is the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, a statutory officeholder within the NIAA portfolio.

Senator NAMPIJINPA PRICE: Given that there are obviously large sums involved when it comes to royalties and compensation, do you think that governance risks are significant in this space? Do you think the act captures all the risk that is involved?

Ms Stroud: I think the basis of our regulatory posture is that corporations, including PBCs, are member owned and controlled. … The two fundamental accountability requirements which we have a focus on and have gone hard on is annual general meetings and annual reporting. That is because the annual reporting is the opportunity each year for members to ask questions, hold their directors to account and understand the finances of their corporation. They can make their own member informed decision about whether they still have trust and confidence in those directors or whether they wish to remove them. That is why we have gone hard on prosecuting corporations that don't hold AGMs and do not lodge reports. Financial reports is where members and common law holders can understand the health of their corporation and how their money is being managed.

….

Senator NAMPIJINPA PRICE: I will go back to you, Tricia. If a corporation does not meet its AGM and annual reporting obligations, which you say you've gone hard on, is it still eligible to receive Commonwealth grants or be successful in tendering for Commonwealth contracts?

Ms Stroud: That would be a question for each of the individual funding agencies. Under the C(ATSI) Act, there's not a direct relationship between non-lodgement of annual reports and non-holding of AGMs with funding. Some funding bodies would have requirements or conditions in their funding contracts that a corporation has to be compliant with its regulator, be it ASIC or ORIC. We encourage funding bodies to always look at the public register when undertaking due diligence of corporations. We publish corporations that have been prosecuted for failing to hold AGMs. There have been two of them in recent years. And there are corporations that have failed to lodge their reports. There have been over 60 of them in the last couple of years. They are published on the website. Funders and donors as well as members and the general public are encouraged to look for those corporation details to see signs that things are not well with corporations that they might fund as well as corporations that we are deregistering. We've recently deregistered 25. This week, we issued notices to over 600 corporations that we intend to deregister them. Again, funding bodies are constantly reminded that the public register of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations is the single source of truth in terms of regulatory action and the standards and compliance of a corporation when they are making decisions about funding them.

Senator NAMPIJINPA PRICE: What powers exist for ORIC or the Commonwealth to intervene where there are allegations of serious governance failures, misuse of funds, conflicts of interest, breaches of director duties or failure to comply with C(ATSI) Act obligations?

Ms Stroud: There are a number of powers available to us under the C(ATSI) Act and which we use regularly. They are just basic lines of inquiry when we get a report or concern from a member, a funding body or a member of the public about suspected breaches of the C(ATSI) Act or failings in a corporation. We might make lines of inquiry, noting that we rely on some level of evidence when those sorts of allegations are levelled. Second, we can issue a corporation a notice to produce in which they are required to provide us with documents that might help inform our inquiries around allegations. We can conduct examinations. The final one before there might be regulatory action taken, including special administration, is an examination of the corporation. That is an examination of the corporation's books, which is examining the governance standards and health as well as the financial standards and health of a corporation. There are other powers. There are compliance notices, which isn't always out of an examination. It might be where we have significant evidence that a corporation is not doing the right thing. We issue them with a compliance notice. There is also a power used to call a general meeting. It is a registrar initiated general meeting, where I use my own initiative and powers under the C(ATSI) Act to call a meeting of the members to pass resolutions or to resolve particular issues in a corporation. They are usually around the board and instability or minimum numbers of directors where a corporation is not being governed appropriately.

……

Senator NAMPIJINPA PRICE: Thank you. What safeguards exist to ensure royalty and compensation funds are being used consistently with community developed and economic participation objectives?

Ms Stroud: There's a line between what is a C(ATSI) Act matter and what is a matter under the Native Title Act. Not all native titleholders are members of their PBC. Not being a member of a PBC does not remove your native titleholder rights and interests and obligations on the PBC to make native title decisions largely around compensation funds and your country. A PBC has obligations to native titleholders regardless of whether they are members. Native title consultation and consent processes and native title decisions are not matters which are regulated under the C(ATSI) Act.

The fundamental message here is that ORIC is ‘going hard’ and that by and large, everything is under control. The Registrar has issued notices to over 600 corporations threatening deregistration. We should all sleep soundly at night.

The ANAO and ORIC

This week, the ANAO published Auditor-General Report No.37 2025–26 Performance Audit: Support and Regulation of Indigenous Corporations (link here).

I don’t propose to attempt a summary nor to delve into every detail and revelation in the audit report. Interested readers should peruse it at their leisure. 

One salient set of conclusions struck a chord with me, not just for what they say about ORIC and/or NIAA’s regulatory oversight of CATSI corporations, but for what the conclusions say about the regulatory performance overall of the Indigenous Australians portfolio, and the fact that successive ministers appear to have consistently failed to take their portfolio oversight and management responsibilities seriously.

Here are extracts from three paragraphs in the report dealing with the quality of regulatory oversight, and its obverse, the extraordinary levels of decline in compliance with reporting obligations under the CATSI Act by CATSI corporations since 2015.

To flesh out the text below, I recommend interested readers look at Figure 4.3 on page 74 (of the 76 page) audit report. The graph shows that since 2015/16, there has been a dramatic fall in compliance levels for all corporations from just over 75% to under 30% in 2024/25. For the subset of large corporations, the compliance levels have fallen from over 90% in 2015/16 to around an estimated 65% in 2024/25. This is an astounding decline in overall compliance with the core accountability requirements of the CATSI legislation; the substantial size and sustained trend line revealed within the data points to a systemic and sustained failure in regulatory performance by ORIC, NIAA and successive Ministers.

Below I have pasted an extract from the audit report where the ANAO discusses these shortfalls. As we have come to expect from the ANAO, it is succinct, neutral, anodyne and emotionless. More problematically (in my humble opinion) there is a brief mention, but no real sense of understanding of the real-world implications of the wider disadvantage to Indigenous individuals, families and communities that flow from poor corporate performance. Readers are expected to draw their own conclusions. In addition to the unquantified (and arguably unquantifiable) direct disadvantage to their members arising from poor governance and compliance by corporations, the absence of legislated reporting compliance presumably reflects to an extent the substantive capabilities of the corporations which are failing to comply.

I have deleted footnotes and added emphasis.

24. ORIC undertakes a range of activities that seek to deter non-compliance. Despite these activities, compliance with reporting requirements has steadily declined over ten years for small, medium and large corporations. Fewer than 30 per cent of corporations overall were compliant with requirements to lodge 2024–25 reports by 31 December 2025. Non-compliance with reporting requirements reduces transparency and information for corporation members, communities, creditors, investors and government agencies as well as for ORIC. There is a general lack of evaluation to identify the key drivers of non-compliance to inform risk-based targeted compliance activities and to understand harm caused by non-compliance. ORIC developed a project plan in January 2026 aimed at increasing small corporations’ compliance with reporting obligations. (See paragraphs 4.39 to 4.46)

….

4.41 …. Annual reporting compliance for all corporations when measured as the lodgement of all required reports by 31 December has been in decline since 2015–16 (Figure 4.3). In 2023, ORIC attributed declines in reporting compliance to the COVID-19 pandemic, with an expectation that as business returned to normal corporations would meet their reporting obligations.

4.42 ….. The ANAO estimated the ten-year trend in annual report lodgement rates by size. Figure 4.3 shows that the decline in lodgement has been greater for small and medium-sized corporations, however this occurs for all size types…

….

4.45 Failure to deregister inactive corporations, regardless of whether they hold assets, may create opportunity costs for Indigenous communities as assets are not available for repurposing or continued effective use or may be accruing debt. Failure to deregister may also create an uneven playing field for corporations that comply with CATSI Act requirements.

4.46 Resource Management Guide 128 Regulator Performance states that regulators should embed methodologies to understand the costs, impact and outcomes of regulation and collect evidence of this at a system-wide level, using insights to support and drive improved outcomes. ORIC does not have an evaluation strategy or program to understand whether the appropriate interventions are being used effectively or to understand the relative impact of its activities.

 

Concluding comments

The contrast in the two narratives is striking. The Registrar’s response to the ANAO audit report (see pages 79-82) was unusually robust, pushing back against myriad assessments embedded within the report. Interestingly, it was signed the same day as the Estimates Hearing. While there may be merit in some of the points made, I do not think that the Registrar’s argument that the ANAO assessment based on a ‘linear or formulaic approach to compliance’ is not the appropriate basis for assessing regulatory performance because ORIC ‘considers the unique circumstances of each corporation to determine the appropriate regulatory action’ … I would argue that the Registrar’s argument is flawed insofar as it implicitly ignores the wider impacts such as the signals being sent to other corporations, the expectations in other corporations that are lowered; the precedents set which lower the bar on corporate performance, and the impacts on the regulatory culture within ORIC which makes taking tough decisions harder.

It must be said that the Registrar came into the role in 2022, and clearly inherited responsibility for a regulatory system under serious challenge. While ORIC clearly faces serious problems, they are not all down to the current Registrar.

But at the end of the day, when only 30 percent of corporations are submitting statutorily required reports on time, and the trendline (see Figure 4.3 in the ANAO Report) continues to be downward, the regulator has a problem. In a world where ministerial responsibility means something, so too would the NIAA and the Minister have a problem. Yet apart from a lot of to-ing and fro-ing, ORIC emerged from the latest Estimates hearing largely unscathed. This says more about the effectiveness of the Senate Estimates process than the effectiveness of ORIC.

Of course, regulatory failure is ubiquitous in modern societies. Think of the numbers of speeding drivers who drive irresponsibly and seemingly without an incentive to comply with the road laws. Or the lack of enforcement and low penalties that apply to the sale of black-market tobacco. But over time, without effective regulation, the adverse impacts accumulate and undermine trust in government generally. Arguably, across remote Australia at least, we are approaching a point where the footprint of government is seen as either non-existent or ineffective, or both. I have previously pointed to the low levels of electoral engagement in the NT (link here), another signpost along the highway to a democratic implosion that continues apace across northern and remote Australia, and which perhaps we are now seeing nationally.   

At the end of the day, and notwithstanding its reticence and reluctance to draw conclusions in its reports, the ANAO is far and away a better mechanism for holding agencies (and indirectly ministers) to account. The structural problem with Estimates in my view is that the Government controls the agenda both formally and informally through a range of mechanisms (timetables, a government chair, the ability to distract attention, the ability to hide behind the bureaucracy, and the intellectual chaos that pervades each hearing). If I wasn’t an optimist, my diagnosis would be that Senate Estimates as a mechanism to hold governments to account is in terminal decline and should be put down.

There is an urgent need for a reform agenda focussed on strengthening the arm of the Parliament vis avis the Executive, and as part of this, for a rejuvenation and revamping of Senate Estimates. This would involve, at a minimum, tighter agendas focussed on a smaller number of high-profile issues, the preparation of position papers by a new parliamentary research office, and perhaps even the adoption of a ‘counsel assisting’ to ensure that agencies are truly tested as to their priorities, and the substance of their performance. Institutions such as the ANAO and the NACC should be brought within the ambit of parliamentary control rather than executive control, and funding for such institutions should similarly be proposed and determined by the Parliament and not the Executive.

The fact that ideas such as these have a snowflakes chance in hell of coming to fruition anytime soon tells us all we need to know about the true state of our democracy.

 

10 June 2026

Wilya Janta’s remote housing reform agenda

Our doubts are traitors,

And make us lose the good we oft might win,

By fearing to attempt."

Measure for Measure, Act one, Scene four

 

We know what we are, but know not what we may be.

Hamlet, Act four, Scene five.

 

Last Sunday, ABC Radio National aired an interview (link here) with Norman Frank Jupurrurla and Dr Simon Quilty, two of the founders of Wilya Janta, a Tennant Creek based Aboriginal owned cultural consultancy focussed on the importance of housing in contributing to community wellbeing in remote communities (link here). Dr Quilty was also interviewed on ABC Breakfast on Monday 25 May (link here) discussing a range of issues related to Indigenous health and its relationship with housing. I recommend readers listen to one or both interviews; I guarantee you will learn something new.

Although I already knew of the contributions made by the interviewees to remote housing and energy infrastructure policy and had read some of their academic research (link here), I found the account to their joint history in establishing Wilya Janta particularly engaging and persuasive.

The interview in turn led me to their web site (link here) which I strongly recommend to readers for both perusal and potentially for a deeper dive.

My own deeper dive on the Wilya Janta web site led me to the commissioned research report from economic consultants SGS Economics and Planning titled Culturally Safe and Healthy Aboriginal Housing: Business Case. This paper seeks to lay out in a rigorous manner the broad principles that lie at the core of Wilya Janta’s approach to remote housing for Aboriginal communities. In very large measure, the SGS Paper succeeds in making the case for a new and much more innovative approach to designing and constructing remote community houses.

Here are some selected quotes I have cherry picked from the paper:

For generations, Indigenous people in Australia have been living in government housing that fails to acknowledge their historic and ongoing colonial displacement. Despite policy shifts through assimilation, integration and reconciliation, remote housing in the NT continues to be delivered through a centralised, top-down approach that lacks meaningful engagement with community, resulting in Eurocentric housing that fails to reflect cultural values or climatic and environmental realities.

This generates a suite of interconnected problems across design, delivery and maintenance of remote housing. These problems are summarised as: 1. Inappropriately designed housing fails to meet residents’ environmental, physical, cultural and social needs, leading to poor health and wellbeing outcomes. 2. Poor engagement with local decision makers reduces community participation and ownership, resulting in higher delivery and maintenance costs.

Addressing these problems has the potential to deliver substantial benefits, not only improving the wellbeing of residents but also contributing to broader social and economic outcomes for remote communities and Territorians. These benefits include: 1. Improved resident health and wellbeing in Aboriginal communities 2. Improved housing asset performance and sustainability in Aboriginal communities 3. Improved local participation, capability and economic opportunity in Aboriginal communities….

… Despite commitments under the national Closing the Gap Strategy (2020) and recent efforts by the NT Government to facilitate greater local control of government-funded service delivery, existing approaches to housing design and construction continue to offer limited flexibility. This approach limits the ability to deliver housing that reflects Aboriginal aspirations and lived realities, leading to a range of negative outcomes for households, communities and ultimately, all Territorians.

The SGS paper represents an attempt to translate into accessible terminology the importance of culture in the lived lives of remote communities, the unique ‘social order’ that holds these communities together and makes them who they are.  It describes the strategic approach of Wilya Janta which is based on developing tangible examples of appropriate housing and seeking to use these as the platform to persuade governments, and especially the NT Government, which has responsibility for the construction and ongoing maintenance of social housing in remote communities, to fundamentally change its approach to design and construction going forward. While the argument is based primarily on the benefits of cultural alignment, there is also a strong theme built upon the urgent need for changes to housing infrastructure to facilitate better access to solar power, and to better insulate the housing from the impending climate changes that are likely to substantially change the underlying conditions of life in these locations.

I strongly support the policy directions being advocated by Wilya Janta and many others engaged with improving the quality of infrastructure in remote communities. What given me hope that the Wilya Janta agenda will succeed is that it is built from the bottom up, it has a community focus, appears committed to a transparent engagement on the issues, and is not solely reliant on government for the progress made to date.

Nevertheless, the apparent inability of governments over decades to even acknowledge let alone solve these issues suggests that there are wider forces at play. It strikes me that I should at least mention these not, to undermine the Wilya Janta agenda, but to provide a sense of realism as to just how steep the climb ahead will be.

Challenges

The major challenges to the wider spread and acceptance of the Wilya Janta reform agenda include:

Demographic pressures, especially Aboriginal mobility into towns from communities and out of towns back to communities. Aboriginal people in remote communities and town camps are highly mobile, and this can mean that in situations where housing infrastructure is finite and kinship relationships extend well beyond the nuclear family, there are extremely high levels of demand for accommodation over extended periods. Even the best designed houses will be subjected to high levels of stress.

The design of governments. Government agencies are staffed by public servants with multiple roles and responsibilities, across significant geographical ranges. Talented public servants whether they work for the Commonwealth or a state/territory government, are incentivised to build their careers at the centre and not in the regions. Governmetn agencies are invariably subject to high staff turnover and often carry an ongoing cultural and geographic knowledge deficit. In other words, there are systemic constraints which work against the likelihood that many public servants will build local knowledge and still retain influence in the central office.

Persuading governments to change course and ensuring that future ministers or changes of bureaucratic personnel will not reverse course when budget pressures or unforeseen political pressures arise is almost impossible. It requires at the very least the development of sustained advocacy capability amongst those who support the original reform. The unfortunate reality is that many so-called reforms are adopted by government because they have short time horizons and they know that if circumstances change, they can change or reverse course. Moreover, the persuasion of government to adopt reforms is more difficult when the up-front costs are high and the long-term benefits accrue beyond the politically relevant time horizon. This is especially so where the substantive reforms under consideration are inherently innovative. The design and quality flaws in the existing stock of remote housing units across the north is a direct reflection of this dynamic; governments have limited budgets and prefer to spread available resources very thin even while they know that they will evaporate within a short period. The decision to abolish the National Partnership on Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH) when its initial ten-year span expired in 2018 is perhaps the most egregious example of this dynamic in play (link here).

Scaling up. Even where governments can be convinced that a reform or change is worth adopting, they have strong incentives to pursue pilots and other less than comprehensive changes. One of the specific challenges the Wilya Janta reforms would face in being scaled up is that the model requires close and careful design consultations in each region. These consultations cannot be done by public servants who do not have specialist backgrounds, so will be expensive and slow to develop. How to maintain ministerial interest and political commitment over a sustained period is a real constraint.

The centrality of repairs and maintenance.  The reality is that remote housing is subject to extraordinary external and internal pressures: from climate, from overcrowding, from volatile domestic relationships which can easily descend into violence, and from lack of clarity on what is expected of tenants. While data is virtually non-existent, the asset life span of most remote housing is much shorter than housing in non-remote Australia. Better design will ameliorate some of these issues, but not all. In addition, governments themselves, who retain responsibility for managing repairs and maintenance of social housing, already struggle to (a) allocate adequate resources to maintaining the housing asset base, and (b) struggle to implement their maintenance programs effectively and at scale across vast distances.

In relation to the issue of housing asset lifespans, I requested AI Claude (Sonnet 4.6) to tell me if there was any data on asset life spans across remote Australia. Here is its conclusion:

Bottom line for your purposes

The honest answer is that the sector has not produced the comparative lifespan data you're asking about in a usable form — partly because lifecycle costing has been systematically absent from remote Indigenous housing policy, and partly because the political incentive has been to report on new dwellings built rather than on asset condition over time. The ANAO's 2022 audit of remote NT housing confirmed that data collection and asset management systems remain inadequate. This lack of data undermines the effectiveness of any future asset management strategy by either government or community housing providers. It is also an impediment to any transition of housing to Aboriginal community control.

If you're building a policy argument around this, the most defensible framing is probably that the gap between accounting life (what governments assume for depreciation purposes) and functional life (what the physical evidence shows) represents a hidden subsidy failure — governments are writing down assets over 40–50 years while providing maintenance funding consistent with structures that are effectively exhausted in a fraction of that time.

In other words, state and territory governments are systemically under-investing in making sustainable provision for the ongoing maintenance of remote housing, and the costs are falling on the Aboriginal tenants through accelerated loss of amenity. Governments (and historically particularly the NT) then turn around and request the Commonwealth to periodically step in and rescue them. The Commonwealth has itself been short-sighted over an extensive period, preferring to deal with current problems rather than systemic ones. The poor record of independent and rigorous evaluation by the Commonwealth of remote housing, an issue which is hugely significant in adversely impacting Indigenous health outcomes, suggests that the Commonwealth is also complicit in this systemic and largely invisible discrimination against remote housing occupants.

Conclusion

I list these challenges not to argue against the Wilya Janta reform agenda, but to provide a sense of reality as the scale of the challenge involved, and to identify the need for more thinking and research on how best to implement the Wilya Janta reform agenda at scale.

My own provisional view, based more on intuition than science, is that reliance on government to pursue these reforms is a potential dead end. Instead, Indigenous interests would, in my humble opinion, be better advised to explore the development of specialist sui generis organisational approaches that are committed to scaling up the reform agenda yet are not reliant on, and indeed are insulated from, the overt influence of government. The place to start might be the development of community housing models that access Rent Assistance (a needs-tested mainstream program available to low-income renters) as a primary source of operational funding. There may be other alternatives which have not occurred to me.

Given the extraordinarily strong links between housing and the social determinants of health, and the substantial and ongoing shortage of remote community housing across the North, it would be a major policy mistake were the nation to avert its gaze from these issues. The Wilya Janta model has much to recommend it: it is innovative, it involves community from the ground up, and it meets the increasing pressure of rapid climate change. I wonder however whether Governments are up to the task of pursuing the public interest. It seems to me that the solution to that problem is for Wilya Janta and its allies in the public at large to set out independently of government and to pursue their own interest utilising innovative institutional design as well as innovative housing design.

[Apology: the original post included a number of typographical errors, and some inaccurate syntax. I have attempted to correct all these errors in the current version. No change to the substantive meaning of the text has been made.]

 

25 May 2026

 

The Victorian Treaty: prospects and strategies

 

This above all: to thine own self be true,

 And it must follow, as the night the day,

 Thou can’st not then be false to any man.

Hamlet, Act one, Scene three.

 

The Victorian Treaty process has had a long gestation and is slowly coming into being. For background on the years’ long process, see the document titled Journey to Gellung Warl (link here) published by the First Peoples' Assembly of Victoria in 2025. Here is the summary of the Report:

Since 2019, the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria has been yarning with Community across the state. This report outlines how these ideas were brought to the negotiating table and ensured progress for communities by having self-determination at the heart of Australia’s first ever Treaty. The report presents the building of the First Peoples' Assembly of Victoria, the treatymaking ecosystem, working with community to identify priorities for the first statewide treaty, negotiating treaty and getting treaty done. It concludes with an outline of what is in the statewide Treaty.

Following the unsuccessful national referendum proposing the establishment of a Voice to Parliament, it is unsurprising that the issue of a Victorian Treaty and the recent election to establish the First Peoples’ Assembly and its two subsidiary bodies is both contentious in some quarters and the subject of political debate and conflict. This political debate and tensions are likely to become more prominent in the lead up to the November Victorian election.

Wikipedia (link here) suggests that the two-party preferred vote between the Labor and Liberal parties is currently vacillating around 50%, making predictions of the ultimate winner of the November election difficult. For a deeper dive, Roy Morgan polling at the end of April (link here) provides a four-way split but also suggests that on current polling results a hung parliament is likely. Ominously for Labor, the Liberal Opposition Leader Jess Wilson has a higher approval rating than Premier Allan by a sizeable margin. Not being a psephologist, I don’t propose to chance my arm on predicting the ultimate result but mention these figures to make the point that a change of Government is possible, and that underlying shifts in sentiment across the wider electorate may mean there could be significant shifts in policy going forward whichever party emerges as the government after the November election.

This recent ABC news article (link here) provides a good assessment of the state of play and the current positioning of both the Victorian Labor Government and the Opposition in relation to the future of the Treaty.

My blog post from July 2025 on the Yoorrook Commission (link here) explores some of the strategic issues confronting both the Victorian and Commonwealth Governments as well as First Nations interests in Victoria. I recommend readers refer to it for an analysis of the deeper context in relation to the road ahead in Victoria.

With six months to the state election, the performance of the First Peoples’ Assembly and its two subsidiary bodies, Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna and Nginma Ngainga Wara will be both closely scrutinised and may well shape future policy choices of the incoming government.

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna is designed to facilitate ongoing truth telling and healing regarding the history of Victoria’s First Peoples. Nginma Ngainga Wara is an accountability and oversight body which will be able to hold hearings and conduct inquiries in relation to the performance of government programs’ It will also have a role in monitoring Victoria's performance in relation to Closing the Gap.

What then are the prospects for the Victorian Treaty arrangements going forward?

My assessment is that whichever Government emerges in Victoria post the November election, the challenges and risks for First Nations interests are considerable.

If Labor wins, the risk is that the First Peoples Assembly and its subsidiary bodies get bogged down in process and micromanagement. The Closing the Gap process is fundamentally problematic from a range of perspectives (link here and link here). The reality that mainstream programs are key determinants of Indigenous well-being and interact with Indigenous specific institutions and policies in complex ways suggests that access to professional expertise and a focus on a wide range of mainstream programs will be crucial in ensuring that interactions with government and its bureaucracy are effective in driving positive outcomes for First Nations interests.

If a Liberal Government emerges, the risk is that the institutional framework negotiated meticulously over an extended period will be either dismantled or progressively degraded so as to take First Nations interests back to their starting point seven years ago.

What then is the appropriate strategy for First Nations interests?

In my view, the flaw in the strategy adopted to date by both the Victorian Labor Government and First Nations interests has been to emulate the strategies adopted by most mainstream interest groups which see governments as the source of virtually all power and authority. Consequently, the aim has (ostensibly on the part of the government) been to build a strategy around creating institutional mechanisms which facilitate the transfer or delegation of power, influence and control from government to First Peoples.

While there is always a place for a focus on persuading government to meet their commitments and act consistently with their rhetoric, for First Peoples, a more hardheaded approach is more likely to be effective in the long term. The approach I would suggest involves at a minimum (a) building internal capability and cohesion; (b) accessing non-government sources of financial and other assistance including internal resources; (c) building alliances with like-minded mainstream community interests; and (d) getting on with building a mosaic of overlapping and inter-woven Indigenous institutions focussed on providing community benefits and operating outside the direct reach of government influence.

In other words, building institutions and organisations that are based on community control, or self-determination, independently of governments, and the insidious influence they can exert through control of funding and policy. The stronger and more self-sufficient community controlled and self-determining organizations can become, the more effective they will be in advocating for and protecting First Peoples interests, and as a side-effect, the more capacity they will have to bend governments to their will rather than the reverse as is the case at present.

Autonomy and real self-determination are not to be found in the benevolence and generosity of governments however well-intentioned they appear to be. Real influence and freedom of action require internal cohesion and the capability to engage over a sustained period with all and sundry (including governments) from a position of strength.

To be clear, I am not arguing that First Peoples in Victoria should walk away from the significant political and institutional gains they have made to date, but there is a very high risk that they will need a fallback strategy within a very few years, and perhaps sooner. In todays world, only a naïve optimist can adopt the Panglossian assumption that governments will invariably pursue the public interest and deliver on their rhetoric and commitments.

The strategy I am suggesting would, in a best-case scenario, strengthen the influence of Indigenous interests within the current treaty framework, and in the worst case, where the current framework is dismantled, provide a means to maximise their medium- and long-term interests even so.

My argument can perhaps be summarised as follows.

In discussions regarding self-determination, one often hears the slogan ‘Nothing about us without us’. The slogan’s internal echo is rhetorically and intuitively effective. However, in most cases its use implicitly assumes that governments are in the driver’s seat and are shaping and determining outcomes. Such an assumption is a concession that undermines real autonomy.

In my humble opinion, a better formulation of an appropriate slogan — to repurpose a classical Chinese saying on leadership (after Laozi, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 17) — would be:

Of a great achievement, people say, we did this ourselves.

The corollary of course is that if you wish to be certain of achieving self-determination, there is no point in relying on governments.

 

14 May 2026