How oft the sight of means to
do ill deeds
Makes deeds ill done
King John Act 4, scene 2.
The ILSC Annual Report 2020-21 released on 27 October 2021
(link
here) includes some interesting information on the state of play with the
Ayers Rock Resort (ARR), owned and managed by ILSC subsidiary Voyages Indigenous
Tourism Australia Pty Ltd.
ARR was purchased by the ILC in 2010/2011 for $300 million
in contentious circumstances. According to the RBA inflation calculator (link here),
$300m in 2010 equates to $360m in 2020. The then Board’s vision in pursuing the
purchase was ostensibly to provide Indigenous interests with an iconic business
asset at the symbolic heart of the continent. The ARR and its associated town
infrastructure of Yulara had been established some decades before with
substantial financial assistance from the then NT Government. The ARR’s
location, control of the Yulara airstrip, and effective control over
development activities within Yulara provide ARR with monopolistic commercial leverage
over tourist access to Uluru.
While the strategic insight had merit, the issues in
contention revolved around whether the substantial price paid by the ILC was
excessive, and whether the ILC had the financial capacity to undertake the
acquisition. There were also questions of alignment between the ILC’s
objectives and the actual aspirations of the Anangu traditional owners (TOs) of
the Yulara land. At a more fundamental level, there is an as yet unresolved
question over whether a single purpose large scale commercial enterprise located
remote from developed infrastructure and significant surrounding economic
activity will ever have the robustness and resilience to develop into a long term
sustainable and commercially viable enterprise. This is the question that has
been at the heart of the aspirations for ‘northern development’ for well over a
century.
My own view is that the price paid was excessive and the
ILC did not have the financial capacity to fund the purchase. Over the decade
since, the financial commitments arising from the purchase have imposed a
significant constraint on the ILC’s ability to undertake its core statutory
remit. That is, to acquire land for dispossessed Indigenous groups, and to
provide assistance in land management for those with access to land through the
multiple land rights and native title mechanisms in place across the nation. On
the question of TO aspirations, it is a complex and evolving issue that I am
not in a position to ascertain. My intuition however is that TOs have mixed
feelings, appreciating the jobs and commercial opportunities arising from the
influx of tourists, while not valuing the social and cultural impacts of tourists
on their country. As for the fundamental question related to northern
development, the answer so far has been that without substantial government subsidies,
sustainable commercial survival is most often a chimera.
In 2010, the then ILC Board decided to proceed with the
purchase of ARR against the wishes of the two Ministers responsible for the ILC
legislation, the then Ministers for Finance Penny Wong and Indigenous Affairs
Jenny Macklin. At the time, the ARR had been on the market for some time, and
the former owners had allowed it to run down. The ILC funded the purchase through
substantial borrowings. The purchase also involved a commitment by the ILC to
offer 7 percent equity in the ARR to a local Aboriginal corporation, Wunu
Unkatja (WU) after ten years. WU are currently considering whether to take up the
offer. The ILC’s purchase was strongly supported by the then Opposition Shadow
Minister Nigel Scullion (he was a Senator for the NT), and once he became Minister
in 2013, he strongly resisted the attempts of the new ILC Board to review and
address the implications of the previous Board’s decision to acquire ARR. Since
the ILSC is a statutory corporation, the Commonwealth Government’s status as
the ARR’s effective owner and ‘funder of last resort’ along with its ‘head in
the sand’ approach since 2013 means it cannot avoid responsibility for future
outcomes.
Ten years on and the ILSC’s ownership of ARR has been demanding
on a number of fronts, most recently arising from the impact of Covid 19. The 2020-21
financial statements for the ILSC value the ARR at $390 million although the
ANAO auditor went out of his way to point out that this valuation is highly
sensitive to the assumption of a return to pre-covid occupancy levels and room
rates within two years. Over the past decade, the ILSC has invested at least $100m
and probably closer to $150m in capital upgrades to the airport and all of the
individual hotels that comprise ARR (see list below). The most recent Annual Report
notes the completion of a number of major refurbishments (page 88). The size
and age of the ARR’s infrastructure makes it inevitable that a process of ongoing
and significant capital investment will be required for as long as the asset operates.
The ILSC continues to carry $102.5m in debt related to the original purchase, and
some $27m from the NAIF (link
here) ostensibly related to the upgrade of the Connellan airport. Last
financial year the ARR operated at an underlying loss, offset by Covid related
subsidies. Voyages net loss for 2020-21
was $7.6m (page 87).
In real terms, and using
conservative estimates, over the past decade the ILSC has spent at least $460m and
still owes a further $127m on ARR, an asset worth $390m today. In round
figures, the ILSC is at least $200m out of pocket (albeit this is a loss
that remains uncrystallised). Moreover, it is quite clear that the ARR will
continue to be a challenging and expensive asset to manage going forward.
These challenges are complicated by the statutory
requirement in section 191D of the ILSC’s legislation (link
here) that limits its acquisition functions to purchasing land for granting
to Aboriginal corporations, and where circumstance require the ILSC to acquire
the land directly, it is required to divest the land within a reasonable
period. So, as the ILSC annual report (page 90) notes:
The ILSC’s commitment to its
mandate of divesting acquired and improved land will see continued efforts to
rebuild the value and financial sustainability of Voyages’ assets in readiness
for future granting. The subsidiary will continue to focus on infrastructure
improvements, operational efficiencies and Indigenous benefits.
The frank admission that the ‘value and financial
sustainability’ of ARR requires rebuilding is significant and worth contemplating.
Having now held direct title over the ARR for ten years, the question arises
whether continued delay in divestment of the asset (which looks more like a
liability) accords with the statutory requirement to divest within a reasonable
period. There have been calls for early divestment for a number of years. See for
example this 2015 Guardian article citing calls by Mick Dodson, and confirming that
the ILC and the Central Land Council had been in discussion over the issue (link
here).
While the genesis of this problem can be traced back to the
original flawed decision-making by the ILC Board in 2010, finding a solution
falls squarely on the current Directors, as well as the responsible Ministers. As
explained below, the pressures to find a solution are likely to grow over the
coming years.
The recent ILSC Annual Report contains (to my knowledge)
the first formal indication that the ILSC Board is now focussed on the divestment
issue. The Annual Report notes rather flatly (page 107) that the Board had established
the ‘Project Aurora Steering Committee’:
The Project Aurora Steering
Committee supports the ILSC in developing a pathway to divestment for the Ayers
Rock Resort, land and business assets, including providing guidance on
engagement with traditional owners. The Committee was established by resolution
of the ILSC Board on 14 April 2021.
One very real constraint going forward – beyond Covid – will
be the impact of Australia’s cooling strategic relations with China and the
resulting likely fall off in the previously significant and growing Chinese tourism
market, where over 50 percent of all Chinese tourist to the NT visited ARR. (link
here).
Another constraint, perhaps the most significant, is finding
a potential Aboriginal corporation with the skills, capability and financial resources
to take over the ARR. At the moment, the only potential recipient would be
Centrecorp, a development corporation closely associated with the CLC (link here). The risk for
Centrecorp would be the uncertain, but potentially significant ongoing capital
costs associated with running the ARR whether or not it is making a profit or a
loss.
The ILSC Annual Reports and other corporate documents provide
very little information on the strategic options being considered. Accordingly,
it might be of use if I – in my role as an experienced soothsayer – have a go at listing the options.
Options for solving the ARR divestment issue
Option one: sell the ARR asset. The advantage
would be to cut the ILSC’s losses, which are likely to take many years to
recover, and in some potential scenarios may worsen. The political reality however
is that there would be strident opposition from a range of sources to relinquishing
the Indigenous branded asset in such an iconic location. No Minister will want to
oversee its sale to non-Indigenous owners.
Option two: reduce the ILSC equity exposure. This
is similar to option one, with the added complication of adding complexity to
future management, but without reducing the likely political reactions.
Option three: move to divest the ARR to an
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation. The
challenge is to find a corporation with access to the financial resources and management
capabilities to take on what is an extremely complex business, subject to
multiple risks, and revenue variability. Most importantly, given the ARR’s ANZ
loan (with an outstanding balance of $100m) will fall due in 2025, and on
current projections will need to be rolled over. Any recipient Aboriginal
Corporation will need to be prepared to take on what is a very significant
liability along with a highly risky asset, as well as having the capacity to
manage relations with the local TOs who will expect to be involved as co-owners
and co-managers.
The soothsayer’s prognostications
Clearly, there is no good option available. Ideally, the
ILSC would paydown the outstanding loan before divestment. However, doing so would
likely require the best part of another decade of ILSC ownership, financial uncertainty,
and serious financial impact on ILSC core activities. As I pointed out in a recent
academic article, (Unmet
Potential, esp. pages 113-4 in Rademaker & Rowse (eds) Indigenous
Self-Determination in Australia, ANU Press, link
here), the ILSC has funded much of its ongoing operations through selling down
its previously substantial cattle herd. This is a strategy that is both short-sighted
and which will not be available forever. Without pre-emptive action, the day is
drawing close when the ILSC and importantly the Commonwealth Government will
confront the reality that retaining ARR within the ILSC will drastically cut
back its capacity to fulfill the ILSC’s core statutory remit.
Given this background, it seems more than a coincidence
that the Commonwealth has recently introduced legislation to establish a
Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) as the key part of
a suite of amendments to the NT Aboriginal Land Rights Act. The amendments have
been codesigned with the NT land councils, and are, in my view, conceptually
flawed. In a separate post, I will link to key submissions to the Senate Committee
when they become available.
While it is unclear whether the land councils have been
appraised of, or have considered, the possibility that the NTAIC will be asked
to take over the ARR, it is inconceivable to me that the Commonwealth has not
given this option serious consideration. The advantage for the Commonwealth
would be to shift the ownership to a subsidiary of the NTAIC comprised potentially
of an assemblage of smaller TO corporations with minority holdings. Importantly,
while technically it would remain under Commonwealth control and ultimate
ownership, any future financial recourse required to ensure the ongoing
viability of the ARR would be made from pre-existing appropriations made to the
ABA rather than from new appropriations. This would reduce the Commonwealth’s
overall contingent liability. Conceivably, the Minister could also use ABA
funds to pay off the ANZ loan either before or as part of the divestment
transaction.
The apparent advantage to NTAIC (and the land councils) would
be that at face value, the NTAIC would increase its capital base by around $400m,
with the potential to grow significantly over the coming decade. On the
downside, that potential comes with very substantial commercial uncertainties
and risk, and may well diminish further the funds available to NTAIC for distribution
to thousands of potential beneficiaries across the NT. And it may also come
with a net reduction in ABA funds available for distribution ot Aboriginal
Territorians into the future.
If correct, these prognostications suggest a reason for the
secrecy and haste surrounding the current legislative process. They also add weight
to the case for much more rigorous scrutiny of the Government’s NTAIC proposals.
Appendix: Incomplete list of selected capital
costs since 2011
$43m 2012 Refurbishment
of Sails in the Desert and Uluru Meeting Place (link here).
$7m 2017 Tjintu solar
field: (link here);
$27m 2019 Connellan airport
upgrade (link
here);
$? 2021 completion
Sails in the Desert bathroom refurbishment (228 rooms) Ann. Rpt. p.88
$? 2021 final
refurbishment and upgrade of five campground amenity blocks Ann. Rpt. p.88
$? 2021 refurb Connellan
airport amenities; expansion security screening area Ann. Rpt. p.88
This list is the basis for my assessment that at least
$100m has been spent on capital upgrades at ARR since its acquisition by the ILSC
in 2010/11.
Mike thanks for your astute review and prognosis. If I may make a few comments, historical, contemporary and contextual. Historically, the Anangu traditional owners of Uluru vehemently opposed Yulara when it was built without their consent. I am sure that at least some still maintain that sentiment. When I worked at Mutitjulu in 1985 and 1986 some would not even go to Yulara in protest. I think that there are two contemporary issues that come to mind. First tourism is a risky business. In Kakadu traditional owners learnt that with the pilots strike in 1989; and now both Yulara and Kakadu are suffering from COVID-related downturns that dramatically impact on the bottom line. Tourism is also risky in remote climatically challenging places like Kakadu in the tropics and Uluru in the desert because physical infrastructure deteriorates fast and needs constant expensive repair and maintenance: these are not easy places to make a profit even though they are popular destinations. Second is that difficult issue that you raise of divestment, to whom can such massive investments be divested especially as the emphasis has to be on traditional owner groups or JVs where traditional owners hold a majority. This is an issue that needs to be thoughtfully addressed prior to purchase not after the horse has bolted. Finally there is the very chilling contemporary observation that you make, that the government and opposition are hell bent on passing the Economic Empowerment Bill as quickly as possible without due consultation process. I sincerely hope that this is not a cynical move to see ABA mining royalty equivalents transferred to the proposed NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation that will then be 'encouraged' by the Minister to 'invest' in Yulara to free the ILSC of this crippling financial burden: hand-passing this liability from one Indigenous statutory authority to another seems neither fair nor a productive way to solve a historical financial legacy from over a decade ago.
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