The rough torrent of occasion: new updates from Groote Eylandt

 

We see which way the stream of time doth run

And are enforced from our most quiet there

By the rough torrent of occasion

Henry IV Part 2, Act four, Scene one.

 

Next week will see the Additional Estimates 2025/26 Hearings. NIAA and the four NT Land Councils will appear on Monday, while the other PM&C Indigenous portfolio bodies will appear on Tuesday. The current program suggests that the NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation, otherwise known as Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) has not been called to appear.

I previously noted (link here) that neither the ALC, nor the AINT and an associated Trust entity, have lodged their 2025 Annual Reports which were due by end October 2025. I subsequently updated that earlier post to report that both entities had been granted an extension to the end of November by the Minister. That extension appears to have been further extended to the end of February. The problem appears to relate to the inability of the ANAO to finalise its audits of these entities; see the relevant correspondence from each entity dated 29 November which was then tabled in Parliament (link here and link here).

Following the early December Supplementary Senate Estimates hearings of the Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee for the Prime Minister and Cabinet portfolio, Senator David Pocock lodged a series of questions relating to the ongoing accountability vacuum surrounding Groote Eylandt and the operations of the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) and related entities in receipt of section 64(3) royalty equivalent payments sourced from the Aboriginals Benefit Account managed by NIAA.

Answers to those questions have now been tabled:

·         The first, Question # NIAA1817 related to the ALC and the termination of the former CEO (link here).

·         The second, Question # NIAA 1818 related to the financial statements of the Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC) (link here).

·         The third, Question # NIAA1819 related to Aboriginal land rights and regulatory responsibilities (link here).

I don’t propose to summarise the detailed questions nor the answers, so suggest interested readers have a look for themselves. In many respects, the significance of the information provided is in the additional context that it provides rather than in any specific revelations. They provide more pieces in the extensive and complex jigsaw puzzle that is emanating from Groote and reverberating well beyond. For these reasons, and given my longstanding interest in these issues both in their own rights, but also as a microcosm of the wider risks, flaws, and accountability gaps that exist across the Indigenous policy domain, I feel it is incumbent on me to at least point out some of the more salient implications.

In relation to Q#1817, the ALC has very helpfully provided a copy of the letter sent to the ALC Board by the then CEO on 28 September 2024. In the letter, the CEO identified the need to resolve the perceived conflict of interest issue identified in the BellchambersBarrett review (link here) which was finalised in August 2024 as the instigation for his proposal. The review noted (at page 4)

Some conflicts, perceived or actual, are unlikely to be able to be effectively managed, an example being the current dual remunerated CEO positions for ALC and Winchelsea Mining Pty Ltd, noting

·         a public official role (ALC CEO) in comparison to a commercial activity management role (Winchelsea Mining CEO),

·         time and attention needed for both roles, and

·         the ALC makes funding decisions and Winchelsea Mining Pty Ltd is a beneficiary of ALC funding decisions

One intriguing aspect of this imbroglio is that the then Chair of the ALC was in the same conflicted position as Mr Hewitt but was not identified in the Bellchambers report and appears not to have been under the same pressure to resolve his position. This gap reflects the lack of substantive independence in that report.

It is clear that the termination was not instigated by the Board, but what is less clear is whether there was informal pressure on the CEO to resolve the issues from the Minister or NIAA. Certainly, the tone of the letter is entirely equivocal on the part of the CEO. What adds to the likelihood of such an interpretation is the fact that the NIAA injected themselves into the ALC Board consideration, while leaving no trail of file notes nor written briefing for the minister or her office. The fact that the ALC board meeting occurred in the same week as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) visited Groote merely adds weight to the suggestion that there may have been a sense of panic on the part of the minister about the ongoing tenure of the CEO.

It would be useful if the Estimates Committee was to ask the Minister whether she or her representatives was involved in any communication with Mr Hewitt regarding his tenure prior to the preparation of his correspondence to the ALC in September 2024.

The answers to sub-questions (a), (b) and (c) are intriguing. They list a number of corporations which the ALC provides assistance to in accordance with section 23(1)(ea) of the ALRA, including the various service agreements put in place. However, the list does not include AAAC (which owns the majority stake in Winchelsea mining) and GHAC (which controls and owns the various developments at Little Paradise. As was previously reported to the Senate, these two corporations received $70m in s.64(3) payments directed to the preparation for the Winchelsea mine from the ALC. The former CEO and his spouse provided assistance in person to both these corporations (and it seems likely that ALC staff assisted them in multiple ways) but there appears not to have been a formal decision to assist them by the ALC. See also the last two paragraphs of the answer (page 3 of 23).

The ALC answer to the sub-question at paragraph (f) is entirely inadequate as they fail to answer the question asked and instead provide a detailed workplan (going forward) relating to the revised Finance Audit and Risk Committee. One might surmise that the previous Audit and Risk Committee (which was itself conflicted) did not undertake any oversight of the ALC’s activities under section 23(1)(ea). In relation to the issue of budget cover, while the answer confirms that the ALC received no additional section 64(1) funding form the ABA to cover the termination payment, they do not inform us whether the Minister approved the expenditure of the termination payment as was suggested might be required in a previously released NIAA document.

In relation to Q#NIAA 1818, the answer provided confirms that the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations is pursuing AAAC for its failure to lodge its financial statements in 2024 and 2025, and the corporation is due to appear in a Darwin court on 17 February ‘for failure to meet its reporting obligations’. Given that the AAAC is the owner of 70 percent of Winchelsea Mining, this seems to be a rather ominous development for the future prospects of the company and the mine. I can’t help noting that the failure to lodge financial statements overlaps substantially with the departure of Mr Hewitt and Ms Liu from their involvement on Groote. I have long held the view that the ALC exerted effective control over key organisations operating on Groote. This is further anecdotal evidence consistent with (but not irrefutable evidence of) that view. The recent decision of the Registrar to initiate a financial investigation into GHAC, while providing no information or background to that decision, serves to reinforce this perspective.

It would be useful if the Estimates Committee was to seek further information from ORIC into both these developments, including the background to and terms of reference for the GHAC review and ORIC’s strategy beyond achieving a court conviction against AAAC and its Directors.

In relation to Q#NIAA 1819, Senator Pocock’s question in effect seeks to understand the extent to which the NIAA (and by implication the Minister) has focussed on identifying and managing the financial risks involved in the administration of the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA). The answer provided has two levels.

The first level is to seek to deflect responsibility with the statement in the first paragraph which states:

The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) does not establish a regulatory relationship between the NIAA and Land Councils established under that Act. The ALRA provides the Minister with specified powers and the NIAA supports the Minister in the exercise of these powers, including through the exercise of certain Ministerial powers and functions under delegation [emphasis added].

The first sentence verges on being misleading and the paragraph is an exercise in deflection. The reality is that the Minister has numerous decision-making responsibilities under the ALRA in relation to land councils and other matters, including approval of budgets, allocation of funding amounts, approval of the selection process of land councils, and much more besides. There are around 90 provisions in the ALRA that provide for Ministerial decisions or approvals in relation ot land council matters. The NIAA is the organisational entity within the PMC portfolio which provides technical and policy advice to the Minister in relation to those responsibilities. Further, the NIAA administers the Aboriginals Benefit Account (controlled by Minister) which is the source of virtually all funding for the NT land councils.  There is a requirement for stand alone ABA financial statements and these are published each year an appendix to the NIAA Annual Report (link here). The NIAA directly administer the ABA and itself makes decisions relating to its financial management and the investment of funds (see for example the following extract from the ABA Annual Report for 2024-25 (page 186):

The investment objective of the NIAA as administrators for the ABA is to ensure that the ABA complies with legislative obligations under the PGPA Act and the ALRA, and that the ABA maintains and preserves its capital base [emphasis added].

The claim that the NIAA has no regulatory role vis a vis the land councils, and the ALC in particular,  does not accord with the fact that the NIAA attended the ALC meeting which terminated the former CEO, commissioned the Bellchambers Review subsequent to the critical ANAO report in 2023, and has been directly involved in the implementation of the governance conditions imposed by the Minister in late 2024.

The second level of the answer is the recounting of the various minutes of the NIAA Audit and Risk Committee over the five years. These record the ARC consideration the financial statements for the ABA (as part of the broader annual finalisation process for the NIAA financial statements). These ARC considerations are high level and for the most part are formalities. The answer provides no information in relation to any discussion by the Risk and Operations Committee, and we can only assume that they have not in the last five years considered risks in relation to the ABA and the operation of land councils. The answer does mention a discussion in the ARC on 30 August 2025 where the minutes state (according to the answer provided to Senator Pocock):

The Financial Statements for ABA are audited; however, the Committee does not receive regular reports as part of the CFO report. The ABA is not an entity but is required under provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act to publish a set of financial statements. Once payments are made by the NIAA to the various Land Councils and to the Aboriginal Investment NT agency the responsibility for accountability and oversight transfers to those PGPA entities. There are some legacy grants which continue to be paid from ABA and administered by NIAA.

Again, we have the denial of responsibility discussed above. NIAA can attempt to dance on a semantic and legal pinhead, but the political and policy reality is that under the Westminster principles, the Minister is responsible, and the NIAA is the Minister’s primary adviser on her legislative and policy responsibilities. Those responsibilities include the ABA and the ALRA, and the ALC and ORIC.  

For the NIAA to assert that they have no oversight responsibilities over the land councils when the Minister clearly does have those responsibilities is not only in my view incorrect but is of itself a damning indictment of how the wide-ranging imbroglio and fiasco on Groote Eylandt was allowed to progressively emerge and run unimpeded for over five years.

 

 

6 February 2026

 

 

 

The angels weep: an update on ALC issues

 

… but man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
…
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep

Measure for Measure, Act two, Scene two

 

I previously provided an update on matters related to Groote Eylandt, the ALC and related corporations over three months ago on 27 July 2025 (link here). With the end of the year and the next Estimates Hearings fast approaching, it is worth highlighting developments that have come to light (or not!) over recent months and revisiting some older answers to Questions on Notice. This update post complements in certain respects my previous post on the ALC Corporate Plan 2025-26 (link here) which identified the apparent recent shift in the ALC strategic directions away from their previous ‘all in’ support for the development of the proposed Winchelsea mine.

Answers to Questions on Notice

Senator David Pocock placed several ALC related questions on notice last year. I don’t propose to deal with all of the questions and their answers, only those that appear to me to be particularly salient for the ongoing and unaddressed issues within the ALC.

Question NIAA 0020 (link here). Senator Pocock asked:

In relation to the ALC meeting of 16 October 2024, will the ALC provide the Committee with copies of any briefing papers it received from the Minister, NIAA Integrity Group or other government official prior to the meeting, along with the minutes of the meeting and other relevant papers considered at or following the 16 October meeting [emphasis added].

The answer provided by the ALC states:

The ALC reads this question as requesting the ALC Board meeting agenda item that dealt with the employment termination of Mr. Hewitt. The relevant sections of the ALC Board meeting minutes is provided at attachment 1. There were no briefing papers received from the Minister, NIAA Integrity Group or other government official relating to the employment termination of Mr. Hewitt. Attachment 1: Extract from ALC Board meeting minutes dated 16 and 17 October 2024. The attached extract reads as follows:

9. CEO Proposal Letter. Sean Worth NIAA

The ALC Board considered the options outlined by the NIAA attendee for the CEO’s position. The Board reviewed the risks associated with each option. The Board discussed that the option with the fastest outcome, with the lowest risk, was termination on notice and noted that this would incur a substantial payout. The payout was estimated at $500,000.00.

Board Resolution: The Board unanimously resolved to terminate, on notice, Mark Hewitts employment in line with his employment contract. 

Comment: It appears from the heading to the agenda item that there was correspondence of some kind from Mr Hewitt proposing terms for his departure. While this appears to be the case, we do not know whether the proposal was made of his own volition, or because of prior communications with the Minister or her agent. The ALC has not provided that communication notwithstanding it was clearly a relevant paper and thus fell within the terms of the question. The ALC Board Minutes (which I haven’t quoted) make clear that no ALC staff including their in-house legal adviser were present for the Board discussion, yet a senior NIAA officer was given access to that discussion. More strangely still, there is no record in the meeting minutes of the reasons for the termination nor any record of discussion around why the ALC should terminate Mr Hewitt’s employment. This parallels the absence of any reason for the termination from either the ALC Board or the Minister in their subsequent media statements. It goes without saying that within the Commonwealth, a voluntary separation would not normally be accompanied by a payout estimated to total $500k.

A suggestion in the NIAA briefing notes for Estimates made public in response to an earlier FOI request noted that the Minister may be required to approve additional section 64(1) payments in relation to the CEO’s termination (notwithstanding that land councils have the ability to expend up to 20 percent above approved estimates). This suggests that the Minister or NIAA may have initiated or supported the proposal to terminate Mr Hewitt since if the termination was done at the request of the Minister, the ALC Board may have requested that any termination costs would be additional to current budget approvals. The rationale provided in the Board minute regarding speed of execution and minimising risk make no sense in the absence of any reasons being provided.

Of course, the Minister has considerable leverage over land councils by virtue of her responsibilities under the legislation and had already provided only partial approval for the ALC 2024-25 budget. If the real reason for the termination was that the Minister wanted the CEO to be terminated before the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) finalises the as yet unreleased report into its ALC related investigation (this is only my surmise), then the ALC Board may have felt that they had no option but to accede to the request. This would be a problematic scenario for many reasons, not least because it would almost certainly have required the provision of separate incentives or assurances to Mr Hewitt. It may also be relevant to note that released ALC Board papers also confirm that Mr Hewitt’s performance was rated as excellent at the end of 2023, and there were expressions of full support by the Board in early 2024. It is unclear what transpired to change that assessment by the ALC Board.To be clear, there is no evidence that the Minister did initiate the termination, merely evidence that doesn’t rule it out.

Question NIAA 0026 (link here)

In this question, Senator Pocock asked about the total amounts of section 64(3) royalty equivalents distributed by the ALC over the past 5 years, and the amounts directed to supporting the Winchelsea mine.

The answer identified total distributions by the ALC to associated corporations between 2020-21 and 2024-25 of $204 million. Of this $19.34 million was allocated to the Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC) for the development of the mine, while $39.94 million was allocated to Groote Holdings Aboriginal Corporation (GHAC) for infrastructure that benefitted the proposed mine. Total payments over the five years linked to the development of the Winchelsea mine thus totalled $59.28 million.

Question NIAA222 (link here)

This question asks a slightly different question: in essence for a breakdown of all funds and the value of in-kind support provided by the ALC for direct or indirect assistance to the Winchelsea mine.

The answers provided (which unhelpfully are not summed) go from 2018 through to June 2024 and include amounts totalling $6,985,093 sourced from NT Economic Stimulus Package funding (which was provided via NIAA). The amounts provided are split between direct support through AAAC totalling $27,532,850 and indirect support through GHAC totalling $43,737,577. The combined total is $71,270,427 in assistance to the Winchelsea mine from 2014 to June 2024.

Comment: The ALC answer fails to include any contributions from the Anindilyakwa Royalites Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC) (which early on provided a loan for the mine development itself sourced from 64(3) funds). This loan remains unpaid by Winchelsea and is listed in ARAC’s 2024 financial statements as a $4.2m asset (see note 13). Nor does it include the indirect in-kind support provided by the land council which admittedly would be difficult to estimate but should be acknowledged as it was likely considerable. The Aboriginal community on Groote has thus contributed at least $75 million to the development of the mine as all the payments directed to the mine would otherwise have been required to be directed to other beneficial purposes on Groote. It is unclear whether AUS China International Mining Pty Ltd (AusChina), the owners of 30 percent of the mine have contributed a pro-rata amount to the mines development (though it seems unlikely). In February 2024, Mr Hewitt advised the Senate Estimates Committee that AusChina had contributed $11m to the establishment of the mine.

If this hypothesis is in fact the case, then the following analysis applies: A core function of the Land Council is to protect traditional owner interests, and thus the internal commercial arrangements between AAAC and AusChina become highly relevant. The Land Council had considerable leverage to obtain information from AAAC by virtue of its processes for determining payments of s.64(3) funding to AAAC in support of the mine. In practice, the mining agreement negotiated by the ALC was entirely and fundamentally conflicted. The mining agreement was negotiated between the Land Council and Winchelsea in circumstances where the ALC Chair and CEO were also senior officers in Winchelsea Mining. In these extraordinary circumstances, the ministerial consent required under the ALRA, and provided by a former Minister, will prima facie have struggled to ensure that the Land Council exercised its powers in a way consistent with protecting traditional owner interests. In approving this commercial agreement, the Commonwealth has ventured chest deep into a quagmire of its own making.

However, we do not need to consider hypothetical scenarios to confirm that the Land Council was not protecting traditional owner interests. Even if AusChina made pro-rata contributions alongside AAAC, the funds provided to GHAC for logistical and infrastructure support related to the mine were not matched by AusChina. Such investments are normally made by the resource developers. Instead, the ALC established a separate entity (GHAC) which was provided funding by the ALC to undertake this work thus in effect subsidising the development of the mine infrastructure. Neither AAAC nor AusChina were required to contribute. This represents a clear transfer of funds allocated for the benefit of traditional owners to the owners of AusChina. It is difficult to see this as being consistent with the statutory function of the land council in section 23 of the ALRA to ‘protect the interests of traditional Aboriginal owners of, and other Aboriginals interested in, Aboriginal land in the area of the Land Council’. Section 23AA (3) makes clear that protecting traditional owner interests must be a priority for the land council. In my view, the section 64(3) payments to GHAC in support of the proposed mine are likely ultra vires and inconsistent with the legislation. In turn, this raises the question: where was the regulator while this was occurring?

Question NIAA221 (link here)

In this question, Senator Pocock requested a list of the remunerated roles of Mr Hewitt and Ms Sophie Liu (his spouse) at the ALC and associated entities over the terms of their engagement.

The answer provides three tables identifying the roles and remuneration of these two individuals at the ALC going back to 2012-13 in the case of Mr Hewitt and then two separate tables identifying respective roles for each of them in associated entities. For Hewitt, these included GHAC and Winchelsea Mining. For Liu, she worked with several entities from 2014 onwards. For simplicity, I analysed the figures for both individuals from 2018-19 when the Winchelsea mine proposal began to obtain traction. In that period Liu worked for GHAC and Winchelsea Mining (simultaneously) as well as in the ALC Royalty Development Unit full time till 2022 and part time till 2024.  Hewitt worked for the ALC, for GHAC (pro bono) and as a Director of Winchelsea Mining simultaneously.

While the answers provided are not summed, I have calculated the total remuneration for each of them over the six-year period to June 2024.

For Mr Hewitt, his ALC remuneration over the six-year period from 2018 to 2024 was $2,721,553 and from Winchelsea Mining was $1,522,224. His total remuneration over the period was thus $4,243,777. This equates to an average annual total remuneration of $707,297 over the period.

For Sophie Liu, her ALC remuneration over the period was $587,006. Her GHAC remuneration was $494, 826 and her Winchelsea remuneration was $543,189. Her total remuneration over the period was $1,625,021. This equates to an annual average of $270,837.

Over the six years, Mr Hewitt and his spouse together earned $5,868,798.

Comment: there are numerous issues raised by these arrangements that require deeper investigation than I can bring to bear. Issues that occur to me include the following:

·         While clearly the ALC CEO had much wider responsibilities than the implementation of the Winchelsea mine, it is also clear that a substantial element of the joint remuneration of Hewitt and Liu was tied up in the mine proposal proceeding. It is unclear to me whether the ALC Board were apprised of the extent of these payments and in effect gave informed consent.

·         Nor is it clear whether the NIAA and Ministers had a line of sight to these issues (ie the doubling up of remunerated employment, and the potential facilitation of conflicts of interest). However, the link between the quite significant joint incomes of Hewitt and Liu (and indeed several of the ALC Board members) and their reliance on the mine proposal progressing whether or not it was commercially viable created a deeper and wider systemic conflict of interest that went beyond particular decisions. It strikes me that the NIAA and perhaps Ministers had a blind spot in relation to this level of systemic conflict and given their regulatory and ministerial responsibilities should not have allowed it to occur let alone continue for six years.

·         Whether the assistance envisaged by section 23(ea) of the ALRA which has been used to justify the CEO working for GHAC (pro bono) and Winchelsea Mining (a subsidiary of AAAC) is legally justified when that assistance involves remunerated work that involves a systemic conflict of interest that undermines the ALC core function that is the rationale for the assistance. After all, a core ALC function is to protect the interest of traditional owners, yet if the ALC assistance is the mechanism that facilitates a conflict of interest that undermines that protection, then it seems unlikely that such assistance can be a valid exercise of land council power. Of course, if I am correct, where was the NIAA regulator as this occurred?

It also seems possible that there may have been other sources of income for Lui related to the Anindilyakwa Shoppa Warehouse (ASW) retail outlet on Groote. In the past, there were reports that ASW sourced whitegoods from China. As I have previously written about (link here), the royalty distribution arrangements on Groote injected a bias towards the use of the royalty shoppa card at selected retail outlets on the Island and elsewhere. I strongly recommend readers look at that post. I have no information on the ownership and financial arrangements of the various retail outlets on Groote, but this is an issue that deserves closer regulatory scrutiny.

Finally, the answer to the question reveals that Ms Lui was employed within the ALC Royalty Development Unit (RDU) from 2016-17 to 2024, with her last two years part time. This is significant as this position would have been crucial in managing the allocation, distribution and bookkeeping associated with the distribution of section 64(3) payments for funded corporations. I have long argued that there appears to be elements of the exercise of effective control by the ALC over key funded corporations (see the Royalty Shoppa post referred to above). The RDU would be a crucial cog in the wheel were such control being exercised by the ALC. The answer also confirms that Ms Lui was in a key position which will have overseen the accounting arrangements that managed the ARAC finances. Readers may recall an earlier post (link here) which analysed the payment of $41m from the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust to ARAC, and which does not appear to have been recorded as received in the ARAC financial statements. A convincing explanation as to the treatment or whereabouts of those funds has never been provided. Again, I recommend interested readers re-read that post.

To be clear I am not making any allegations against Ms Lui in relation to either the Royalty Shoppa arrangements or the AMT payment to ARAC as there is no evidence of impropriety on her part; my point is merely to identifying potential mechanisms that could skew the allocation of financial resources at the margins of the ALC. In my view, these risks underpin the need for a detailed and public forensic audit of the ALC and its associated entities over the past decade. The Commonwealth reluctance to initiate such a forensic audit is to my mind both inexplicable and irresponsible.

AAAC financial reporting

In my previous ALC update post I noted that Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC) which owns 70 percent of Winchelsea Mining had not published its financial statements for 2024 and due to the delay appeared to be in breach of CATSI Act requirements. This remains the case. Of course, the deadline for publishing the 2025 financial statements is also fast approaching. It is still unclear whether the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations has taken any action.

Concluding comment

The value of this update post is not so much in new revelations as in the documentation of the ongoing and synergistic accretion of multiple issues of concern. If the Winchelsea mine does not proceed in the manner previously planned, the investment of over $75m in funds appropriated by the Commonwealth (s.64(3) royalty equivalents and NIAA economic stimulus funding) will likely turn out to have been substantially wasted. The continued failure to identify what transpired in relation to the payment of $41m paid by the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust (AMT) to ARAC is inexplicable. Together these represent well over $100m in potential losses arising essentially from systemic conflicts of interest that successive ministers and the NIAA have known about since the ANAO report in 2023, and probably before, and yet appear incapable of addressing.

One might reasonably ask: how many tens of millions of dollars intended to benefit Aboriginal people on Groote can in effect go missing or be negligently misallocated over an extended period before the probity of those formally responsible for regulating the safeguarding of those funds is called into question? Over this period, there may well have been transgressions by individuals on the ALC Board, or in the employ of the ALC, and if so, they should be held to account through due process. Without an independent forensic audit of the ALC and its associated entities this will never be possible in any comprehensive form.

Ultimately however, it will be the wider Aboriginal community on Groote who bear the cost. Not only the financial costs, but the opportunity cost of forsaken policy initiatives that might have (inter alia) improved life opportunities for children, contributed to strengthening education and health services, and strengthened cultural resilience. Given the prima facie existence of serious and ongoing regulatory failure, the appropriate remedy for the ongoing  imposition of these costs will not be found by pursuing individuals who are alleged to have transgressed, but requires ministers and the bureaucracy to take responsibility and find ways to ensure that their regulatory failures are reversed, that the funds that have been misallocated on their watch are reinstated, and that reforms are made to ensure what has transpired and developed on Groote cannot re-occur.

A first step would be to review the ALRA legislation in the light of contemporary policy needs, identify necessary legislative reforms, and to put in place an independent and robust regulatory mechanism at arm’s length from ministerial interference to oversight the key ALRA institutions including the ABA, the land councils, and the recently established Aboriginal Investment NT(AINT).

If some version of this roadmap for the future is not implemented, the likelihood of future litigation against the Commonwealth either at Groote Eylandt, or elsewhere, built around some version of fiduciary duty will be virtually inevitable. In the meantime, the angels will continue to weep.

 

 

14 November 2025

The Missing $41m payment from AMT to ARAC: a trust deficit

 

Round and round the cauldron go;

In the poisoned entrails throw….

Sweltered venom, sleeping got,

Boil thou first i’th’ charmed pot.

Macbeth, Act four, Scene one.

 

In my previous post (link here), I provided commentary on a number of the Questions on Notice asked by Senator David Pocock. I mentioned in that post that I would deal with this question in a separate post. Unfortunately, it involves both a convoluted narrative of events and some accounting issues. The bottom line however is much simpler: a Senator asked a question in good faith based on allegations made in correspondence from residents of Groote Eylandt, and received a dismissive, misleading and probably substantively incorrect response from the NIAA which we must presume had the endorsement of the Minister which raises more questions than answers.

Here is the question and answer provided:

Senator David Pocock’s Question #8

In an article dated 20 July 2024, The Saturday Paper referred to correspondence to your predecessor signed by dozens of Groote residents which alleged that an amount of $41m was paid from the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust (AMT) to the Anindilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC) but which has not been accounted for. A recent review of the relevant publicly available financial statements pertaining to ARAC appears to confirm this. There is also explicit evidence that the ALC effectively controls ARAC and has a direct role in managing ARAC finances. Is the Minister/NIAA aware of the $41m payment and if so has the matter been investigated? If not, will the Minister instruct the NIAA or ORIC to advise her regarding the $41m payment and the circumstances of its payment by the AMT and receipt/utilisation by ARAC?

NIAA Answer #8

The NIAA has made enquiries regarding the recognition of payments made from the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust (AMT) to the Anindilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC) and has been informed that reporting differences arose because of the entities recognising these transactions in different financial years. The NIAA notes that the accounting records of both entities are subject to independent audit. Detailed questions regarding the recognition of financial transactions of the ALC and associated entities should be directed to the ALC.

Below I set out my detailed commentary on the answers to the question and various related issues:

Comment mcd #8

I have previously posted contextual comments on this issue in three posts. The posts were titled Royalties, flawed governance and non-transparency: a potent brew (link here) dated 26 July 2024; The Anindilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation: micro accountabilities; macro policy implications (link here) dated 3 August 2024; and Annual Reports on Groote: an unconventional assessment (link here) dated 18 January 2025. I strongly recommend that readers keen to understand the context within which the AMT, ARAC and the ALC operate read these posts, especially the first two.

In the light of the NIAA answer provided above I sought to revisit the financial statements for the relevant periods. I was surprised to find that the 2022 Audited Financial statements for ARAC had been removed from the ORIC website without explanation. I find this somewhat strange especially given its relevance to the issues raised by the correspondents form Groote referred to in the Saturday Paper article. I requested a copy and was provided one, but as of 24 February 2025 it has not been published on the website. Financial statements for the previous years which I had obtained from ORIC in 2024 have still not been published on the ORIC website. Given that section 35(2) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 requires land councils to distribute section 64(3) royalty equivalent payments on to CATSI corporations, there would seem to be substantial merit in the Registrar ensuring that the financial statements of CATSI corporations in receipt of such payments are published on the ORIC website. In any case, should readers wish to read the relevant financial statements I cite below, I suggest you contact ORIC direct.  

The basic facts are as follows.

The 2022 AMT financial report lists under the heading Grants a payment to ARAC of $41,324,957.

The 2022 audited financial statement for ARAC under the heading Revenue records a s.64(4) grant from the ABA of $9.6million (which would have been approved by the Minister) and a grant of $14.3m in s.35 payments from the ALC (the equivalent amount in 2021 was $34.8m). Total income is listed as $23.0m. There is no record of any grant being received from the AMT.

The 2023 audited financial statements for ARAC identify a series of grants and other revenue, including $31.9m in section 64(3) payments from the ALC.  Total income for 2023 is $40.2m. In addition, an amount of $8.1m in investment income is recorded. There is no record of a grant or payment for $41.3m being banked in the 2023 year.

In neither ARAC financial report is there a line item showing a payment of $41,324,957. The explanation provided to the Senate by NIAA that the payment was recognised in a different financial year is thus prima facie incorrect. Moreover, it has the effect of misleading the Senate and the wider community. That is not to say there may not be a perfectly appropriate explanation, but without a forensic audit that identifies the bank account(s) into which the AMT payment was deposited, we will never know.

The comment in the NIAA answer about the financial affairs of the relevant entities being independently audited reeks of either naïveté or an attempt at gaslighting. Auditors can make errors or be provided with incorrect information.

As pointed out in my previous post on ARAC (link here) and extracted in the Appendix below, the ARAC 2022 financial statements identify the cancellation of an infrastructure debt commitment (for $39m) from AMT to ARAC. Whether the auditor was misinformed or failed to follow up the issue, it is clear that the $41m was not deposited in the 2022 year (and not in a later year) and that this is reflected in black and white text in the 2022 financial statement. This reinforces the conclusion that the unidentified person who the NIAA consulted regarding the transaction has misled them; they in turn have misled the Minister and she in turn has misled the Senate (given that Ministers approve or are responsible for answers to Questions on Notice).

Rather than focussing on the independence of auditors while providing incorrect information, NIAA should perhaps focus on the persons who do have the requisite knowledge, namely, the Directors of ARAC. The Directors of AMT and of ARAC were identical and apart from independent Directors were also ALC Board members (see the discussion in my earlier post ‘a potent brew’ (link here). Both the AMT and ARAC Boards considered and formally resolved to approve and certify as true and correct the financial statements for the respective entities in the 2022 year. Prima facie (even on a hypothetical assumption that the NIAA explanation is correct) there appears to have been a failure of the ARAC Board to identify the absence of the $41m grant in ARAC’s revenue for 2022 and 2023. Has the Minister or NIAA requested the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations to investigate this prima facie error? In this context, see the comments in my recent post on annual reports (link here) related to the ARAC Board’s decision to purchase at considerable cost (sourced from funds notionally provided for the benefits of traditional owners) personal liability insurance for the Directors. Did this decision raise any concerns with the Registrar or the NIAA when it was reported in the ARAC financial statements? And if not, why not?

The assumption that in the face of allegations of a missing $41m, that NIAA, the ALC’s regulator, would ask a person they fail to identify for an explanation and then accept that explanation without being taken through the detailed figures that would allow the allegation to be put to rest, seems at best naïve and incompetent. The fact that this explanation is confidently provided to the Senate as if there is nothing to see here is extraordinary. It reeks in my view of indifference, deliberate disregard, obfuscation and disrespect.

The whole purpose of the Estimates process is to allow Senators to obtain an explanation from the Executive arm of the activities of agencies and corporations within a legislative framework that is entirely the responsibility of the Minister. If the NIAA can’t provide the assurance the Senate seeks, they should themselves take the action necessary to obtain it for Senate. ARAC is not an entity that appears before the Estimates Committee and is incorporated under the CATSI Act that comes within the Minister’s portfolio. The ALC which appears to exercise effective control over ARAC and assists with its bookkeeping and preparation of financial statements is within the Minister’s portfolio. The former CEO oversighting ARAC’s bookkeeping has been dismissed by the ALC at a meeting attended by the NIAA on grounds which the Minister has seen fit not to make public. The former CEO’s spouse (who has not been mentioned in any of the public statements related to the termination the CEO by the ALC and the Minister) was at various times an employee of the ALC working in the Royalty Development Unit that assisted corporations such as ARAC with their finances and operations.

Conclusion

Given the complex web of potential and actual conflicts of interest in play, and the fact that there is a missing $41m also in play, the Minister and the NIAA have an obligation in my view to do much better than they have with this answer and the others discussed in my previous post.

Indeed, given the extraordinary refusal to agree to commission an independent forensic investigation (bearing in mind that not all malfeasance will necessarily be corrupt or criminally illegal), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Minister and NIAA are, through their inaction and deliberate obfuscation, contributing to the social and economic harm that will inevitably emerge once the full ramifications of the maladministration on Groote becomes apparent.

The Minister and her agency are accruing a substantial trust deficit through her unwillingness to be transparent on what has transpired within the ALC and its associated entities. Given the standard of answers provided to the Senate in response to Senator Pocock’s questions, that trust deficit will inevitably continue to grow unless decisive action is taken. My recommendation is that the Minister should immediately request the ANAO to undertake or commission a comprehensive and independent forensic audit of the operations of the ALC and its associated entities over the past seven years.

Without such decisive action, the levels of distrust will at some point reach a tipping point where wider political consequences will take hold and potentially destroy the current institutional framework of land rights as we know it. In the meantime, the fallout will inevitably have adverse impact not just on the constituents of the NT land councils, but on those nominal servants of the public interest who have been prepared to look away while the cauldron of distrust boils over.

 

Appendix

The following text is taken from my previous posts and provides more contextual detail on the information above. It has been lightly edited.

Extract from Royalties, flawed governance and non-transparency: a potent brew

The AMT/ARAC financial transactions

The notes to the 2016 Financial statements for the AMT which are available on the on the ACNC website (link here) include the following text:

12 Commitments During the year ended 30 June 2016, Anindilyakwa Mining Trust committed to contributing $3,500,000 to the Economic Development Unit (which has been established by the Anindilyakwa Land Council) on or prior to 30 June 2018. The first instalment of $500,000 was made during the 2016 financial year. 

The notes to the 2017 AMT Financial Statements state that the first instalment of $500,000 was made during the 2016 financial year and the second instalment for the first year of $500,000 and the first instalment for the second year of $750,000 was made during the 2017 year.

The notes to the AMT 2018 financial statements comment:

12 Commitments During the year ended 30 June 2016, Anindilyakwa Mining Trust committed to contributing $3,500,000 to the Economic Development Unit (which had been established by the Anindilyakwa Land Council) of which $1,000,000 was paid during the 2016 financial year and $750,000 was paid during the 2017 financial year. During the 2018 financial year, an instalment was made for $1,250,000. Therefore, as of 30 June 2018, the Trust has a $500,000 outstanding commitment.

During the year ended 30 June 2017, Anindilyakwa Mining Trust committed to contributing $51,122,311 to Anindilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC) for costs associated with the purchase of infrastructure and funding of the operational budget. During the year, $6,000,000 was paid to ARAC. Therefore, as of 30 June 2018, the Trust has a $45,122,311 outstanding commitment. [mcd comment 24 Feb 2025: it is worth noting that the payment of $6m from AMT to ARAC was transparently listed in ARAC’s revenue for the 2018 FY. A clear contrast with 2022 and 2023.]

The 2019 AMT financial report included a note indicating in relation to the 2016 commitment, a further instalment of $500,000 had been paid thus meeting that initial commitment. The note also states that in relation to the 2017 commitment, the AMT had paid an instalment in the 2019 FY of $5,975,000, thus leaving an outstanding balance to be paid of $39,147,311.

The 2020 and 2021`AMT financial reports note that no payments had been made and the outstanding commitment remained at $39,147,311. The Notes to the 2021 AMT financial report note that the outstanding amount was paid in FY 2022; this suggests the payment was made in the first half of the financial year. The 2022 AMT financial report lists under the heading Grants a payment to ARAC of $41,324,957. No rationale is provided for why the amount has increased from $39m to $41m.

There are no further payments reported in the 2023 AMT financial report.

The 2022 financial statement for ARAC was previously available on the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations website. It has been taken down (link here). Under revenue, it records a s.64(4) grant from the ABA of $9.6million (which would have been approved by the Minister) and a grant of $14.3m in s.35 payments from the ALC (the equivalent amount in 2021 was $34.8m). Total income is listed as $23.0m. There is no record of any grant being received from the AMT. Nor is there any record of such a grant being banked in the following financial year.

That a payment of $41m appears to have disappeared is somewhat strange. It is even stranger when one considers that the AMT has no staff and its administration appears to be undertaken by Mutual Trust, an established and highly experienced financial services firm, that ARAC has no staff (see the 2022 ARAC General Report) and its office is at 58-62 Macleod Street Cairns, the same address where the Commonwealth transparency portal lists ALC’s Finance and Royalty Development Unit (RDU) employees being located. The staff servicing ARAC Board meetings and probably implementing Board decisions (including managing income and payments) are likely part of the ALC’s Royalty Development Unit, a small team in Cairns. Clearly a forensic audit is required to determine the reason for the apparent disappearance of these funds. I should acknowledge that I was alerted to the issues around the missing $41m by the recent story in the Saturday Paper (link here).

 

Extract from The Anandilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation: micro accountabilities; macro policy implications

Each of the six ARAC financial reports from 2017 to 2022 inclusive include a statement, signed by two Directors and resolved by the Board, outlining the corporation’s purpose as follows:

The Corporation's operations purpose [in its first year] has been, to hold assets and manage statutory royalty equivalents and negotiated royalties in such manners as determined by the Anindilyakwa Land Council, consistent with its goals for effective, responsible and sustainable use of such royalty flows [emphasis added].

This statement appears to make plain that the ALC exercises direct control over the operations of ARAC….

… In my previous post I noted that the payment of $41m from the AMT to ARAC did not appear to be accounted for in the ARAC 2022 financial statements. With the availability of the previous year’s reports, it was possible to track the recording of an amount of $39,147,311 as an ‘AMT infrastructure debtor’ in the ARAC 2020 and 2021 financial reports. In 2022, the year that the AMT paid ARAC $41,324,957, there was no record in ARAC’s Financial statements of any such grant being received. However, there was a line item now called Payment in Advance (whereas it was previously termed AMT Infrastructure Debtor) which showed an outstanding debt of $39,147,311 in the previous year, but nil in the current 2022 FY. Rather than resolving the problem, this treatment of the outstanding commitment, whether intentional or not, obscures the recipient of the payment while acknowledging that the commitment no longer applies. [The discrepancy between the amount of $39m and $41m appears to be related to differing CPI treatments of the original commitment by the AMT and the ALC].

 

24 February 2025

Nothing to See Here: NIAA’s answers to recent Senate Questions related to Groote

Let’s talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs,

Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes

Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth.

Richard II, Act three, Scene two.

The NIAA has provided answers to a series of Questions on Notice lodged By Senator David Pocock following the last Estimates Hearings in November 2024 (link here). The questions related to the ongoing situation on Groote Eylandt, the status of various issues within the Anindilyakwa Land Council and the NIAA’s actions throughout this rather sorry and complex saga.

Given that there appears to be few external parties taking an interest in these issues (apart of course from the ongoing NACC investigation which may not report for months), I feel it is incumbent upon me to provide some commentary if only for the record. For the larger context, I recommend readers look at my previous post and in particular, the article I co-authored with Bill Gray in the Mandarin (link here).

In this post, I have focussed on those answers which I consider to be inadequate. In a subsequent post, I will address the issues raised by the answer to Question #8.

I have italicised the questions and the NIAA answers and indented my comments in relation to each answer.

 

Senator Pocock Question #1

Will the Minister initiate an independent, comprehensive, forensic audit into the administration and operations of the ALC and of those Aboriginal Corporations that received funding determined by the ALC, so that the new Board of the ALC can move ahead in confidence to regain the trust of the Anindilyakwa community and other key stakeholders, and achieve the standard of governance that will ensure the ALC can properly represent its people and achieve its mission? If not, why not?

NIAA Answer #1

The former Minister for Indigenous Australians, the Hon Linda Burney MP referred concerns regarding Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) governance and operations to the National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA) for review and action as required. In response, the NIAA commissioned an independent review of the ALC’s responses to the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) governance audit and has subsequently been overseeing the ALC’s actions to improve its governance, transparency and accountability.

The NIAA has and will continue to refer all relevant matters to law enforcement and other agencies as required. 

Comment mcd #1

A preliminary and more general point: The NIAA is under the direct control of the Minister. Both she and her agency have regulatory responsibility for the ALC (and for the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations who is the regulator for CATSI Corporations who are the beneficiaries of section 64(3) payments). Any shortcomings of the NIAA are ultimately the responsibility of the Minister. Any failure to answer questions asked are a failure of the Minister as well as her agency.

The Minister/NIAA have not answered the question regarding the forensic audit. The so-called ‘independent’ review commissioned from BellchambersBarrett was constrained in its terms of reference and focussed only on the formal ANAO recommendations and not on the wider issues which were identified by the ANAO in its fine-grained analysis. The NIAA and the ALC were involved in finalising the BellchambersBarrett Report, and for this reason it was clearly not independent. The answer refuses to contemplate an independent forensic review and fails to provide any assurance that this is covered off in some other way. The deeper question this raises is why? Why won’t the Minister initiate the action required to get to the bottom of what has transpired on Groote? Why doesn’t she want to the public to know?

Senator Pocock Question #3

Can the Minister confirm that the conflicts of interest identified by the ANAO in May 2023 and again more recently in the BellchambersBarrett review of August 2024, have now been addressed to the satisfaction of the Minister and NIAA?  If not, what are the issues still outstanding?

NIAA Answer #3

The ALC has developed a schedule of activity to address the ANAO and Bellchambers Barrett recommendations, including those associated with conflicts of interest management. The NIAA has been overseeing the ALC’s performance of those activities and is satisfied that implementation of acceptable arrangements for conflict of interest management will be progressive over the forthcoming months. The conflicts of interest noted in relation to the former ALC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) have been resolved following the termination of Mr Hewitt and his removal from positions in all associated entities. The current ALC Board Chair does not hold any of the positions that gave rise to the conflict of interest concerns in relation to the former Board Chair.

Comment mcd #3

The question has not been answered. The answer makes clear that the Minister is not yet in a position to be satisfied (“acceptable arrangements for conflict-of-interest management will be progressive…”), yet they have not gone on to identify the issues that remain in progress.

The unqualified assertion that the termination of Mr Hewitt and the election of a new Chair addresses the conflicts of the past is problematic. It ignores the complex web of influence previously exercised by the former CEO and his spouse, and the inevitable expectations on Groote that the benefits flowing form those prior arrangements will continue. The current status and oversight of the various positions and financial interests previously held by Mr Hewitt’s spouse remain completely obscure.

One important but unintentional revelation of this answer is the reference to Mr Hewitt’s ‘removal from positions in all associated entities.’ How was this achieved? Did the Minister and NIAA give Mr Hewitt and his spouse some kind of ultimatum to resign (and if so what was the quid pro quo) or did the ALC direct the ‘associated entities’ to dismiss him, thus confirming that they in fact exercise control over these entities? The public interest requires that clarification and answers to these questions be provided.

Senator Pocock Question #4

Has the Minister/NIAA approved any arrangements for the management of the conflicts of interest that were identified in the ANAO and Bellchambers Barrett reports? If so, will the Minister please table those arrangements.

NIAA Answer #4

Formal approval of the ALC’s conflict of interest arrangements is the responsibility of the ALC Board in consultation with the ALC Audit Committee and ALC management.

Comment mcd #4

The implication is that the Minister and NIAA have not approved any arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest. The ALC has been riven with actual and potential conflicts of interest for at least six years; this Blog has previously identified and discussed many of them. Without ministerial engagement and approval of the actions being put in place, there is no guiderail in place to prevent the re-emergence of conflicted influence over decision-making in the future. Moreover, without a forensic audit, it is unclear whether the pre-existing conflicts of interest led to misallocation of funding and resources (with detrimental impacts on individuals and corporations on Groote), and whether there is remedial action required to rectify such misallocations. The laissez-faire approach of the Minister and NIAA is patently inadequate and represents in my view a serious lapse of ministerial responsibility. The minister has numerous and far-reaching powers under ALRA to play a direct role in the ALC’s administration for however long it takes to establish a new set of watertight operational procedures.

Senator Pocock Question #5

Can the Minister confirm that the Aboriginal residents of Groote Eylandt have not been subject to predatory commercial behaviour and financial losses arising from the actions of the former CEO, his spouse and the former Chairman of the ALC? If not, what action is she taking to ascertain the extent of the potential losses to the community?

NIAA Answer #5

As previously noted, the former Minister referred concerns regarding ALC to the NIAA for review and action as required. The NIAA has and will continue to refer all relevant matters to law enforcement and other agencies as required.

Comment mcd #5

One obvious problem with this answer is that not all commercially predatory behaviour will be illegal or corrupt. If it is the case that legal and non-corrupt predatory behaviour has occurred, the question becomes: is the Minister prepared to allow the officers and staff of agencies within her portfolio to engage in such behaviour, and more directly, why was she not prepared to take action within her regulatory powers when she became aware of such activities rather than hiding behind the convoluted and time-consuming processes of law enforcement agencies?

Given the deliberate policy of minimising the disclosure of relevant information, we do not know if the issue of potential predatory commercial behaviour was even of concern to the Minister or her predecessors, nor whether it is of concern to her today.

What were the concerns that she referred to the NIAA and onwards to law enforcement? When were those concerns formally referred to the various agencies? Which agencies received referral? How long transpired between the Minister and her agency becoming aware of the concerns and referrals being made? Why won’t she indicate the general nature of those concerns? I am sure the people who are the subject of any investigations understand that investigations are underway. Why keep the public in the dark? What has the Government got to hide?

The bottom line is that the answer to this question is deliberately designed to hide crucial accountability information. This is not in the public interest.

Senator Pocock Question #6

According to the ALC website, in the period 2019 – 2023, the ALC distributed $361m of s64(3) monies to various corporations and organisations on Groote Eylandt. Can the Minister/NIAA confirm that these distributions were determined by the ALC in compliance with the provisions of the ALRA, including s23(3) & s23 AA of the Act?

NIAA Answer #6

Distributions were determined by the ALC in compliance with the provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA).

Comment mcd #6

This answer exudes unwarranted confidence. In my view it is both misleading and wrong. Section 23AA requires the ALC to undertake its functions inter alia, in a fair manner. The ANAO identified a series of payments to corporations where the ALC CEO played a major role in the application and/or was on the Board or had a conflict. The obverse of this favouritism is unfairness to the traditional owners who might otherwise have been beneficiaries.

The ALC’s effective control of associated corporations (in my view implicitly acknowledged in the actions taken by the NIAA to have Mr Hewitt vacate all his positions on associated entities) is itself an effective breach of the legislative requirement that land councils pay 64(3) payments to (independent) corporations and not to an entity it controls.

The provision (s.23(1)(ea)) that allows land councils to assist local corporations has a rider that such assistance must not cause the land council ‘to incur financial liability or enable it to receive financial benefit’. The ANAO found instances where the ALC could not demonstrate that this was the case. More substantively, where a land council effectively controls a corporation, then the liabilities of the corporation are those of the land council. This inevitably leads to a breach of section 23(1)(ea).

In a grave error of judgment, the NIAA and Minister appear to have lost sight of both the first and second Laws of Holes (link here). They should stop digging, and the Aboriginal citizens on Groote are still in a deep hole.

Conclusion

The answers to the questions above are in my view deliberately obfuscatory, are incomplete and by failing to provide the full story have the effect of misleading the Senate. In some cases, they are just wrong. This is a continuation of the approach adopted from the first day the ANAO tabled its performance audit in May 2023, which is best described as a policy of ‘nothing to see here!’ At best, this involves putting the political interests of the Government above the public interest. At its worst, it is much more serious than that. It erodes trust in Government and diminishes the quality of our democracy.

The failure to get to the bottom of what has transpired on Groote (not all of which will necessarily meet the definition of corruption, or criminal behaviour) will lead to ongoing and deep-seated disadvantage to the Aboriginal population of Groote Eylandt and may have wider implications for the viability of the core institutions established by the Commonwealth’s NT land rights legislation. These disadvantages will certainly be political, and financial, but most importantly they will also have social consequences for the fabric of community life on Groote. This is the tragedy that is unfolding.

 

21 February 2025