Institutional mayhem: insights gleaned from the ALC Annual Report 2024-25

Away, and mock the time with fairest show;

False face must hide what the false heart doth know.

Macbeth, Act one, Scene seven

 

On 29 August 2024 Minister for Indigenous Australians Malarndirri McCathy issued an unprecedented media statement which among other things extolled the virtues and rationale of good governance (link here). She proclaimed:

Good governance is the cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and accountability. Without the trust of the Anindilyakwa people and other key stakeholders, the ALC cannot properly represent its people and achieve its mission.

“I take governance at Land Councils seriously - poor governance and decision making can have a significant and detrimental impact on social, cultural and economic wellbeing.

This post provides a summary of the ALC’s most recent Annual Report (link here). I previously posted on the topic of delays in reporting to the Parliament and the public (link here) where I mentioned that the normal deadline for tabling annual reports of Commonwealth entities was before the supplementary Budget Estimates Hearings which are normally held after October each year.

In this post, I cover a wider set of issues than I would normally, essentially because they are all raised one way or another by the most recent ALC annual report. Significant issues covered include the basis for land councils assisting local corporations, education outcomes on Groote Eylandt and remote Australia generally, criminal justice outcomes, the status of the Winchelsea mine proposal, and the Ministers decisions on land council funding across the NT. I apologise for any induced indigestion!  

The Delay in Tabling

The ALC Chair’s cover letter to the Minister is dated 18 February 2026. The financial statements were signed by the members constituting the accountable authority on 13 February 2026. The ANAO signed off the audited financial statements on 17 February without qualification. No explanation was provided by the ALC nor the ANO for the delays in finalising the audit.

The Minister tabled the annual report on 16 April 2026. The Report was initially due to be tabled around the end of October 2025, a deadline that had been extended to end of February by the Minister. There does not appear to have been any explanation provided for the delays of five and a half months beyond the due date specified in the PGPA Act rules, and which includes a period of almost two months after it had been provided to the Minister. I find it problematic that a Minister who espouses the highest standards of transparency and good governance for agencies within her portfolio appears to allow lapses in such standards in matters within her control to occur without explanation or apology. It raises the question: what is it that is being hidden and downplayed, and why is that?

The CEO

On page 13, the Report states:

During the reporting period the Chair of the ALC was Ms Cherelle Wurrawilya. The CEO position was held by Mr Mark Hewitt until 16 October 2024. Mr Colin Wakefield held the position of Interim CEO from 17 October 2024 to 28 April 2025. Mr Matthew Bonson was CEO from 29 April 2025 and resigned on 17 July 2025. Michael Trainor was appointed Interim CEO on 22 August 2025 (emphasis added).

This is one of the few references to Mr Hewitt in the Annual Report. The section on the ALC CEO (page 17) focusses entirely on Mr Bonson who was CEO for only two of the 12 months in the reporting period. There is no mention of Mr Hewitt’s termination, nor the reasons or circumstances that led to it. See my blog post The Angels Weep (link here) for the partial details of these events on the public record.

Performance Reporting

The ALC performance reporting is linked to its corporate plan. See pages 48-50 for the explanation. In relation to the community and economic development objectives of the corporate plan, there are performance measures relating to school attendance, employment, law and justice outcomes and housing.

Pages 59-61 deal with school attendance in a limited cohort of some 80 students supported by the ALC funded Groote Eylandt/ Bickerton Island Primary College Aboriginal Corporation (GEBIPCAC). Attendance rates are declining (and there are indications that wider attendance rates on Groote are similarly low and in decline). There is a long explanation of some of the local factors contributing to these outcomes, though it seems clear that more systemic factors are in play across the remote areas of the NT (link here) and probably beyond. What is demonstrably clear, and should be of critical concern to the NT Government and its Education Department, is that average attendance rates for the 80 students in the cohort being measured of less than 40 percent (see Figure 5c on page 61) are unlikely to deliver acceptable educational outcomes for the students. While the measure suggests that at least 4 out of 10 students are at school each day, the reality is that it is highly likely that virtually all students are missing some portion of each month’s schooling and thus missing key steps in their education. When this persists over time (just how long this period is I am not in a position to determine) the students reach a point where they cannot keep up with the standard curriculum…in turn this creates insurmountable gaps which make the standard curriculum inaccessible, leading either to disruptive behaviours in class, further non-attendance, and eventually permanent dropping out. This annual report is a micro window into a massive problem that is impacting remote communities across at least four jurisdictions. It should be acknowledged as a national tragedy, one that activates and enlivens the Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Australians. Instead, the response is invariably to shift responsibility: to the states, to the education portfolio, to the parents…yes they all have responsibilities, but in the circumstances we currently face, they all need to be encouraged, and activated to take those responsibilities seriously. This is a role for the Commonwealth Minister. Invariably however, what is in fact a national tragedy is merely presented as a static statistic framed as ‘low school attendance’.

On page 62, it is revealed that the employment rate of traditional owners by local organisations on Groote has fallen over the past year. In 2023-4, 307 TOs were employed, whereas in 2024-5, this had fallen to 199 (see Fig.5d on page 63). Here local factors are the cause, and particularly the drop-off in s64(3) payments arising from the cyclone damage to the wharf. This points to the urgent need for the Groote community to focus much more attention on reducing the dependency and reliance on the flow of royalty equivalents for key organisations on Groote.

Pages 64-68 record a truly exceptional improvement in justice outcomes on the Island. The report describes a range of new initiatives in recent years, and documents (using police data) substantial falls in arrest rates:

Ø  Total recorded offences dropped by 75%, from 1,041 in 2019 to 261 in 2024 (Figure 5e)

Ø  Youth offending decreased by 90% since 2019, from 267 offences to just 28 in 2024 (Figure 5f)

Ø  Arrests have declined 85% from 427 in 2018 to 61 in 2024 (Source: NTG data supplied to the ALC) These reductions are particularly notable in property damage, theft, and public order offences.

The report claims this is the result of greater Anindilyakwa control over justice initiatives and there is undoubtedly merit in this. The youth offending statistics are extraordinary, identifying almost a vertical drop in the last year (from around 250 to 50 offences), and suggest to me that the reduction in discretionary incomes may also have had an impact. In turn this points to issues that should perhaps be taken into account in future benefits distributions. The ALC would be wise (in my humble opinion) to commission an independent research project into the drivers of these improvements, and how best to institutionalise them into the future.

Finally, the Report describes desultory progress on housing construction, but this is perhaps also in large measure a consequence of the Cyclone Megan. Hopefully progress will improve going forward, noting that much of this is out of the hands of the ALC.

Mine related activities

The performance statements include a useful section on mining, and particularly a detailed discussion of engagement with GEMCO. This seems largely on track, with the ALC engaging to ensure minor contract issues are resolved.

On the proposed Winchelsea mine, (as I have previously noted (link here) the ALC appears to have stepped back and is now treating the mine as it would any other third-party proposal. It does mention the Winchelsea exploration and mining agreements but makes no comment. There is no reference to the possibility that the agreements may be sub-optimal due to the possibility of conflicts of interest (a matter that is not acknowledged and which is arguably contested but see my previous analysis here and here). The Report notes (page 72) that

Winchelsea Mining is yet to commence production and during the period was, in ALC’s opinion, dormant. There were no activities on Winchelsea during the reporting period.

On page 77, in a section reporting performance on cultural protection, one of the corporate plan priorities, the report states (emphasis added):

Secondly, cultural sites and burial sites on Winchelsea Island were documented during cultural surveys conducted in the context of mining exploration. The protection that has been afforded to the recorded cultural sites and burial sites identified during the cultural surveys are key to addressing Traditional Owner concerns about the impact of proposed mining activities. Additional cultural surveys are planned and may identify other burial sites for protection.

This is to my knowledge the first public acknowledgement of unaddressed traditional owner concerns regarding mining on Winchelsea. It may underpin the statement I drew attention to in my November 2025 post assessing the most recent ALC Corporate Plan (link here) that

The ALC will be reviewing arrangements with Winchelsea Mining to ensure Traditional Owner's interests are met and that the principles of free, prior and informed consent are adhered to.

Ministerial Directions

The report notes at page 78 that there were no ministerial directions issued during the year.

This was notwithstanding the ostensible Ministerial displeasure with the speed of progress in implementing the ANAO /Bellchambers report which led her to deferring approval of the ALC estimates in late August 2024. In a media release dated 29 August 2024, she stated (inter alia):

I have taken the unusual decision to withhold approval for the ALC’s 2024/25 budget, instead approving an operational budget until 1 December 2024. The full budget will only be considered when ALC has demonstrated to the NIAA that it is sufficiently prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit.  (link here)

She provided the following direct quotation:

The steps I have taken today put the ALC Board and management on notice. Their failure to sufficiently respond to the recommendations of the independent review and ANAO must not continue, and they need to demonstrate their progress to the NIAA.

This may not have been a formal ministerial direction (there is no provision in the ALRA for such formal directions) but strikes me as being in effect equivalent to a substantive direction. It also strikes me as being significant enough to warrant a mention in a Commonwealth agency’s annual report, perhaps in the section on significant actions and changes (see page 78) or in relation to ANAO reports (see pages 46-47 and 79-80). Given the Minister’s public statement calling on the ALC to engage more transparently, this seems like it might have been a good place to start!

Consultants (pages 85-87).

Note the quite high legal costs, which are on top of the in-house legal expertise on the ALC payroll. Yet there is absolutely no explanation in the report nor in the ALC’s media statements on what these legal costs are for (but see the section on contingent liabilities below).

Financial Statements 2024-25.

Note: Page numbering for the financial statements begins afresh.

Employee costs used

On page 5 in the Cash Flow statement, it is revealed that employee cash used has almost halved from the 2023-24 year, down from ($13,515,798) to ($7,725,279). No reason is provided.

Audit committee costs

On page 9, audit committee costs have almost halved, from $100,241 to $52,354. This suggests that the poor value for money practices that were adopted by the ALC over the past decade in relation to its Audit Committee costs (as identified by the ANAO in 2023) has finally been addressed.

Reimbursement of Expenses.

On page 11, wages and salaries, on-charged to local corporations (funded under 64(3)) reduced in 24/25, down from $6,874,714 to $3,818,802. Superannuation costs on-charged were down from $721,462 to $423,938.

Thus, total reimbursement of expenses fell from $8,599,473 to $4,959,070. The implications of this reduction in employment totalling over $3.5m is not clearly explained in the financial statement’s notes, nor as far as I can see in the Annual Report itself. This strikes me as a noteworthy omission in reporting significant events in the Land Council’s operations over the financial year.

The note explaining this states:

The Anindilyakwa Land Council sometimes pays for services and goods on behalf of other Aboriginal Corporations to support the Corporations in pricing and availability. Under Section 27 of the Aboriginal Lands Rights (NT) Act 1976 the Land Council can supply such support when requested. The Anindilyakwa Land Council charges this on to the Corporations with no further benefit. This note reports the substance of the transaction of the goods and services and ensures a clear ability to understand the true income and expense of the financial statements by all users.

Section 27 of the ALRA states inter alia:

(1)  Subject to this Act, a Land Council may do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connexion with the performance of its functions and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may:

 (a)  employ staff; …

 (1A) A Land Council may, on the request of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation that has received an amount of money from the Council under this Act, provide administrative or other assistance to the corporation.

There is no mention of reimbursement in this provision. The risk of utilising a reimbursement mechanism is that it creates a danger that a land council might use the mechanism to in effect fund itself especially if it can exercise influence or control over the local corporations being ‘assisted’. I have previously argued (and the ANAO pointed to the elements that allow this in its 2023 performance report) that the ALC exercises such influence over several corporations it has funded under section 64(3).

Also relevant to the rationale for the provision of ‘assistance’ is s.23(1)(ea) of the ALRA which deals with assistance for commercial activities of the corporations, and which states:

(1)  The functions of a Land Council are [inter alia]:

(ea)  to assist Aboriginals in the area of the Land Council to carry out commercial activities (including resource development, the provision of tourist facilities and agricultural activities), in any manner that will not cause the Land Council to incur financial liability or enable it to receive financial benefit; …

In my view, the reimbursement of expenses mechanism as it has been utilised by the ALC can easily slide into arrangements that would be in breach of the terms of the legislation, and create opportunities for maladministration (and in a worst case fraud) that require much greater transparency than has been the case to date. The NIAA (including its Audit and Risk Committee) in my view also has responsibilities to advise the Minister of the risks involved in these processes. The fact that these arrangements have been in place for an extended period without any public indication that such warnings have been raised should be a major concern to oversight agencies such as the ANAO and ORIC. See my previous discussion of these issues in my November 2025 analysis of the ALC Corporate Plan (link here).

Contingent Liabilities

On page 29, there is mention of the litigation between the ALC and GEAT. It is not mentioned elsewhere in any ALC public documents. Nor has there been an explanation of the issues in play.

Note 11: Contingent Assets and Liabilities. On 19 June 2024, Groote Eylandt Mining Company Pty Ltd (GEMCO) served a writ to commence legal proceedings and seek a determination in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory concerning a dispute as to the proper division of mining royalties as between ALC and the Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust in respect of the 2016 Eastern Leases Mining Agreement signed under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The matter was listed for mention on 1 May 2025 was vacated and relisted for 12 June 2025. The matter remains 'on foot' in the court until the position between Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust (GEAT) and GEMCO is resolved. The parties through formal negotiation are close to finalising a 'Variation Agreement'. Legal costs are unknown at this moment.

Assets held in Trust

Within Note 15 on page 34, there is a table showing the financial flows through the Royalty Shoppa card system. Some $14m was lodged on Royalty shoppa cards in 2025, and $12m of that was spent. See this post (link here) where I discussed a range of concerns with the operation of the Royalty Shoppa card system. It seems clear that the scheme is still operational and widely used. Its current effectiveness and fitness for purpose is unknown.

ALC Income for operating costs under s.64(1)

The Minister approves operational costs for land councils under section 64(1) of the ALRA. It is the source of core operational funding for all four land councils in the NT.

In 2024-25, the Tiwi Land Council s.64(1) funding dropped by around 20 percent and the CLC funding dropped by around 5 percent. The NLC received an increase in funding of some $38.7m, with section 64(1) funding rising from $69.5m in 2023-24 to $108.2m in 2024-25 or just over 50 percent (see page 116 of the NLC Annual report 2024-25). A footnote on page 120 identifies capital expenditure of $39.5m for ongoing costs of the construction of office precincts in Darwin and Katherine. When adjusted to take account of this, the operational funding for the NLC fell from $69.55m in 2023-24 to $68.7m.

[Short digression: there is a slight discrepancy between the section 64(1) allocations for the NLC in the ABA financial statements appended to the NIAA Annual report (see page 178) and the NLC Annual Report financial statements (see page 116). It is a comparatively small amount, and I don’t consider it materially affects the substance of the argument I am making here. The same ANAO delegate signed both audit statements two days apart in September 2025.]

Thus, in 2024-25, the Minister approved funding providing for reductions in operational funding for three of the four land councils in the NT.

In contrast to the TLC, the CLC and the NLC, the ALC financial statements disclose an annual increase in section 64(1) funding of $2.59m, representing a 20 percent increase over the previous year’s approved allocation of section 64(1) funding. See Note 3F on page 15 which discloses that Section 64(1) revenue in 2024-25 was $13,702,683 and in 2023-24 was $11,105,777.

Somewhat extraordinarily, in a year when, and in which she had issued a media release on 29 August of the financial year announcing an unprecedented decision to publicly withhold approval of funding until December based on generic and unspecified concerns that the ALC was not ‘sufficiently prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit’, the only land council to be granted an increased section 64(1) operational budget by the Minister was the ALC.

Any suggestion that the ALC had somehow demonstrated that it was suddenly ‘sufficiently prioritising the implementation of these reviews and audits is undercut by the ANAO Financial Statements Audit Report issued on 6 February 2025 (link here) which noted in relation to the ALC, inter alia:

4.14.58 The status of the recommendations made by the ANAO, and the minister’s action to withhold funding, have heightened concerns about the ALC’s progress in addressing the governance findings. 

4.14.59 In view of the reduced available funding highlighted above, further audit work was required by the ANAO to understand ALC’s ongoing financial feasibility….

….

4.14.62 The ANAO concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the preparation of the 2023–24 financial statements on a going concern basis, and the action taken by ALC to address the performance audit recommendations will be revisited by the ANAO in the 2024–25 audit. (emphasis added)

In other words, the ANAO would not be able to formally conclude that the ALC was sufficiently implementing its recommendations until the finalisation of the 2024-25 Financial Audit. While this assessment may not have been published before the Minister approved the full year budget, it does raise questions as to how the Minister might have reached a view that increased funding was warranted.

It is perhaps worth asking the question, what changed for the ALC between 29 August 2024 when the Minister announced the funding freeze and December 2024 when she likely approved the full year budget? The answer of course is the information that neither the Minister nor the ALC wishes to discuss.  

My June 2025 post ‘FOI Updates on ALC and Groote Eylandt’ (link here) confirms that in July 2024 the NIAA (undoubtedly with the Ministers knowledge) referred the ALC CEO to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Within a month, the Minister issued her media release announcing a funding halt for the ALC. In October, the ALC Board met with no staff present and a single NIAA senior officer in attendance and decided to terminate on notice the former CEO (i.e. with a termination payment) with immediate effect. Within months, the full year funding for the ALC had been restored, and we now learn (alone among the four NT Land Councils) with additional funding of $2.5m, a 20 percent increase in operational funding. No public announcement was made notwithstanding the previous announcement of the funding halt. While a replacement CEO was not appointed until 29 April 2025, the appointee Mr Bonson resigned some months later. A new CEO has only recently taken up duty.

Readers and this author alike are left with the conundrum: what involvement did the Minister have in deciding it was time for the former CEO of the ALC to depart? Was there any effort made to encourage the ALC to terminate the CEO? Why might the Minister have thought it useful or necessary to provide the ALC with an unexplained 20 percent increase in the Land Council’s operational budget in the months after the CEO’s departure and before a permanent CEO had been recruited? And what does the Minister know about the causes of the institutional mayhem on Groote over the last decade that she is not telling us?

At the beginning of this post, I quoted the Minister’s statement that:

Good governance is the cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and accountability…

For my part, I would reverse the order and suggest that trust and transparency are the indispensable prerequisite of good governance. Unfortunately, trust and transparency are in short supply in both Groote Eylandt and Canberra.

 

4 May 2026

The broken Closing the Gap machine

 

The time is out of joint. O cursèd spite

That ever I was born to set it right!

Nay, come, let’s go together.

Hamlet, Act one, Scene five.

 

Ten days ago (on 12 February 2026) Prime Minister Albanese delivered the annual Statement to Parliament on Closing the Gap (link here). Simultaneously the NIAA released the Commonwealth Closing the Gap 2025 Annual Report and 2026 Implementation Plan (link here). I urge interested readers to take the time to have a look at both documents as I cannot give either the justice they deserve.

It would be churlish not to acknowledge that both documents make a strong case for a range of positive initiatives which will make tangible differences to the lives of many Indigenous Australians. These include initiatives related to housing, food security, hospitals and Indigenous health, remote employment, and clean water infrastructure in remote communities, and increased funding for PBCs, the corporate entities that hold native title on behalf of native title owners. 

The Prime Minister’s speech is a well-crafted list of achievements and ongoing work, albeit without key details and history that would provide adequate contextualisation to enable a critical assessment of the Government’s performance in addressing this policy agenda. For example, the inclusion of the section recounting the important and creditable investments in water infrastructure omits both the salient fact that this was previously announced in 2023 by Minister Burney (link here) and that it is part of the funding operations of the National Water Grid Authority (link here) and is in effect a carve out of normal and ongoing mainstream funding, and thus may not involve additional fiscal effort. The data point cited by the Prime Minister (40 clean water projects delivering for around 34,000 people in 110 communities) is not available on the National Water Grid Authority web site or fact sheet (link here) on First Nations projects, though the fact sheet does mention that the initiative will contribute to target 9b under Closing the Gap. The Productivity Commission dashboard (link here) indicates however that there is no data source currently available which includes all required data elements to enable reporting against this target (a larger problem than just data on clean water provision).

He also includes a sophisticated argument about the inter-connectedness of socio-economic life as well as the potential life changing implications of a single event or action:

… one lifeline, one moment when someone recognises your potential and backs it, can change everything. Sometimes when we talk about Closing the Gap, we can be guilty of focusing on that first idea [the interconnectedness of everything] at the expense of the second. The challenges facing us are significant, complex and connected, with causes that reach back generations. But that does not render us powerless - it makes each act of change powerful. It means progress towards one target, will drive improvement in others.

This analysis is of course correct, but in the real world it can operate both positively or negatively, for better and for worse. Yet the Prime Minister wishes to focus only on the former and not the latter.

The Prime Minister’s speech includes a pre-emptive defence against nay sayers and critics built on that partial analysis and is reinforced by a Panglossian reliance on the psychology of positivity and optimism and interlaced with a generous dose of conceptual conflation. Excellent rhetoric, poor analysis. For example, I was struck by this segment of the speech:

We are now 5 years away from most of the target deadlines. We are clear about where there is more to do. We must also guard against talk of failure. Because talk of failure dismisses the aspirations and achievements of Indigenous Australians. It ignores the leaders and communities who are changing lives. Failure is a word for those who have stopped trying - or given up listening. I make this clear today: I am not contemplating failure. Our Government is not contemplating failure. We are determined to succeed. The Closing the Gap targets are a measure of our national progress. And there is real progress.

I too do not wish to contemplate failure, but I fundamentally disagree with the Prime Minister. The targets themselves are not ‘a measure of our national progress’, but if well designed and structured can be a way to measure progress or lack of it. Success in policy formulation and implementation is never guaranteed. It requires hardheaded analysis, a sense of realism, the establishment of a framework that does not raise expectations beyond the capacity to deliver, and balancing of available resources (financial, intellectual and human), the development of a workable and politically attuned strategy, and a commitment to staying the course. Indeed, it requires a real determination to succeed, and such determination can be strengthened and sustained by contemplating the consequences of failure. Importantly, success requires a preparedness to assess progress, to identify and acknowledge both successes and failures, and then a preparedness to refine — as necessary — the strategy, the resources, the implementation plan, the time frame, or all of the above. Unfortunately, neither this Government nor its predecessors have been prepared to be open and honest with the wider community and with First Nations. Instead, they have adopted the unstated and arguably deliberately dishonest strategy of deciding to muddle through, while avoiding being held to account.

The NIAA Annual Report is a highly sophisticated version of a classic glossy public relations product replete with good news stories. One must read through to page 78 (Appendix C) of the eighty-page document to get a high-level account of the progress against the 20 formal targets. There is no mention of the Priority Reforms, but the Productivity Commission dashboard tells us that no data is currently available to assess progress on these. Of the 20 socioeconomic targets, 4 are improving and on track, 7 are improving but not on track, 4 are worsening and not on track, 1is no change, and 4 have no assessment available. Note the embedded ambiguity: 11 are improving, with 9 not improving or unable to be determined; but only 4 are on track to meet their target with the balance not on track or unable to be determined. These are national level statistics. There is substantial variation across the states and territories, and of more significance, an analysis of the same targets for remote regions would be much more dire (but demonstrating this comprehensively is an exercise for another day).

Here is my high-level critique of the current strategy for closing the gap which to be fair to the current Labor Government, was negotiated and put in place by its LNP predecessor with the negotiation of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap in 2020. It has however been continued without change by the Albanese Government.

It was not based on an explicit strategic analysis and fudges the demographic and policy relevant data. The original impetus for the strategy was to close the socio-economic gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, but the framework chosen by successive governments was never clear on why various socio-economic indicators were chosen as targets, and whether they were meant to be the primary areas for policy attention, or merely signposts or indicators of progress or lack of it in relation to wider policies addressing much broader socio-economic disadvantage. If the former, there was no comprehensive strategy employed to reach the targets. If the latter, it was not articulated. Of more significance however was the decision to not choose certain key social indicators, and no reasons for these omissions were given apart from vague statements about the desirability of relying on ‘strength based’ approaches and avoiding ‘deficit discourse’.

Moreover, in relation to most targets, the denominator is the relevant Indigenous population. In recent decades it has become increasingly apparent that the Indigenous population is demographically fluid, and the structural composition of the Indigenous population has been changing rapidly. This is an issue that raises fundamental questions regarding the conceptual underpinnings of the Closing the Gap policy and strategy; questions that are never asked, let alone answered.

Since the establishment of Closing the Gap in 2008, what has always been hidden in plain sight is that there is no alignment between the targets and programs designed to reach them. In a very real sense, the targets have always been aspirational, and governments have continued to do what they always do, devise and implement programs willy nilly to assuage the concerns and pressure of various constituencies. Government rhetoric has always emphasised that Closing the Gap is directed at meeting the needs and expectations of Indigenous interests. My own (admittedly heterodox) view is that this has always been disingenuous; in reality, for governments, Closing the Gap is fundamentally about assuaging the vague and intuitive concerns of the wider community that we as a nation have mistreated Indigenous peoples. In response, governments do just enough to demonstrate that they are acting/trying while not doing so much that scarce fiscal resources are wasted on regions or programs that are not electorally efficient in harnessing or maintaining votes.

The chosen targets have invariably been framed as partial: even if all targets were to be met by say 2031, the actual and real gap in socio-economic outcomes would still not be closed. The wider community does not understand this. I understand why governments may wish to be cautious in making commitments, but the partial nature of the Closing the Gap policy framework guarantees a day of reckoning when the wider community will realise the present strategy is not assuaging their diffuse concerns about giving all citizens a fair go, and yet the gap continues, and a populist consensus will emerge to try something else.  

The complexity of the Closing the Gap framework is mind boggling. I challenge anyone to have a close look at the Productivity Commission dashboard (link here) and not step away confounded. There are four priority reforms that are effectively treated as targets (I have argued elsewhere that seeking to measure them like targets is a mistake), 17 targets or outcome areas, three of which have two elements. In total, the nation is seeking to measure and assess progress against 24 effective targets.

The bulk of the targets relate to policy and program sectors that are traditionally state or territory responsibilities. So, for each target we have eight separate jurisdictional outcomes (changing year to year depending on data availability) plus the national outcome. Conceptually, anyone seeking to assess progress overall must consider a matrix with dimensions of 24(targets) by 9 (jurisdictions), a total of 216 separate cells each year. Each cell is further elaborated by a suite of varying supporting categories of disaggregated data. For example, target 3 related to early childhood education includes disaggregated data by sex, by remoteness area (five separate categories), by Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD) quintile, and finally by disability status.

Further, each target is measured using multiple data sources for both the numerator and denominator. The targets were chosen without first assessing whether the data to measure them is available, and in fact, in many cases it is not. Data is often unavailable, and/or collected only every five years in the census (link here).

The responsibility for collection of the temporal year by year performance data comprising what becomes a multi-dimensional matrix is the responsibility of multiple agencies across multiple jurisdictions, with the only high-level oversight being a sub-committee of the Joint Council which oversees the implementation of the National Agreement (see Appendix B to the NIAA Annual Report).   

Jurisdictional implementation plans are not consistent utilising different templates and often read more like lists of every Indigenous related activity a jurisdiction is undertaking and have little or no obvious link to the data being collected for each target (See Appendixes E, F & G for the Commonwealth’s current approach to reporting on implementation). Assessing all implementation plans for any one year would involve reading and comprehending hundreds if not thousands of pages of often unsourced initiatives described in bureaucratese (a language few Australians speak or understand).

The overall CtG framework was devised by senior and experienced bureaucrats, and therefore we can confidently assert the complexity was clearly deliberate; the result is a deep-seated avoidance of accountability. The Productivity Commission which oversights the data dashboard is also responsible for one of the regular reviews of the Closing the Gap process (and thus arguably has a conflict of interest in relation to some aspects of the National Agreements implementation), but Indigenous interests insisted that they too should commission a regular review. These reviews are the product of seemingly unending consultation and ‘co-design’ and end up being long and unwieldy documents spanning hundreds of pages which inevitably sink without trace and without any apparent political or policy impact apart from ephemeral mentions upon their initial publication in the daily media cycle (But see Appendix D of the NIAA Annual Report for the exception that proves the rule).

The National Agreement on Closing the Gap which was a truly innovative step forward in many respects (link here) involves the Coalition of Peaks, and the Coalition’s Secretariat is funded by NIAA. It appears that its staffing is about the size of a single branch in a large government agency. These limited policy capabilities are arrayed against the combined bureaucratic and policy heft of nine governments and span virtually the entire extent of government activity. If they are to have any substantive influence with government policy development, the Coalition of Peaks (and their state and territory components) must be experts on virtually every facet of government; an extraordinary ask for an impossible task. See Appendix E for a stocktake of the 50 odd partnerships that ostensibly operate in refutation of my assertions. I would merely note that while they give Indigenous participants the sense of interacting with government decisionmakers, in a complex and process-dominated policy environment, the power imbalance is huge. There is no line of sight which allows th effectiveness of these processes to be independently assessed.

Finally, notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s constitutional powers in relation to Indigenous matters, the Commonwealth refuses to step up and take a leadership or coordination role in relation to the implementation of the National Agreement. In a December 2025 Estimates Hearing, Senator Barbara Pocock asked Minister McCarthy a follow up question related to previous claims she had publicly made that she would consider aligning funding to the states and territories with progress on Closing the Gap targets (link here). Notwithstanding her recent comments (link here), the answer provided on notice (NIAA1743) is a lesson in bureaucratic fudging. The Minister’s idea (which was directed at assuaging concerns in the Indigenous community) will disappear without trace.

A cynic might think that the Closing the Gap framework is a machine designed to achieve the minimum necessary while giving the appearance of action. They would be wrong: for the machine does not work perfectly. Every component of the machine’s operations is subject to failure, and a single component failure can bring the machine to a halt. Bureaucratic delay, complexity, data constraints, inter-agency conflicts, and the myriad opportunities for implementation failure mean that this machine in terms of its ostensible aims is entirely ineffective. Any positive outcomes (and there have been a few) are the results of a rising demographic tide, th operation of pre-existing institutional frameworks such as exists for native title, and the innovation, experience and determination of a very few individuals within the system (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) who find ways to produce outcomes despite the machine’s built-in design constraints.

This critique is arguably too abstract to be persuasive. To address that deficiency, I will point to just one of the areas of egregious policy failure that the Closing the Gap machine fails to address: remote school attendance.

According to the agency charged with measuring national school attendance,  ACARA (link here):

In Australia in 2025:

• The attendance rate for [all] students in Years 1–10 was 88.8% …

• Attendance rates:

v  were higher among students in major cities than in remote areas;

v  were lower among students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds than for non-Indigenous students.  

According to ACARA (link here), the attendance rate for the NT in 2025 was 76.9%, a full 11 % below the national average.

The NT Education Department recently released attendance data for public schools across the NT (link here). It shows (Table 3) that in very remote areas, there were 6881enrolled Aboriginal students and 7886 non-Aboriginal students. The attendance rates for Aboriginal students averaged 40% compared to 80 % for non-Aboriginal students. In some of the larger remote communities, attendance rates dipped well below 40%.

The Closing the Gap framework has no target related to school attendance. The bottom line: school attendance rates in the NT are well below the rest of Australia and Aboriginal student attendance is extraordinarily low. In very remote NT regions, the school attendance rate for Aboriginal children is catastrophic. Given that low school attendance has been a problem for decades, and will not be turned around overnight, it is safe to assert that we as a nation are allowing a generation of children numbered in the tens of thousands to reach adulthood without the basic numeracy and literacy skills that will allow them to engage with the modern world they will live in. In a recent media release (link here) the NT Minister for Education promised to continue to crack down on low attendance through the use of truancy officers and making parents responsible, but gave no indication that she understood that there was a major crisis ongoing in her portfolio.

The takeout from this example is that governments are deliberately ignoring the hard problems, and that the very hardest problems are in remote Australia. I have been banging this drum for a couple of decades with little success. It has been a consistent theme of this blog (for example: link here, link here, link here, and link here). If change for the better is to occur, clearly governments must do something different.

Reform options for Closing the Gap

Clearly the challenges facing the nation in terms of Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage are enormous and seemingly intractable. I do not consider them to be intractable, rather the evidence suggests that while the problems are complex, and not all the solutions are within the capacities or remit of government, the reality is that governments have not been prepared to put their shoulder to the wheel in ways that make a difference. Worse still, they have adopted a strategy of pretending to be concerned and pretending to act because the politics of being honest with the Australian community and with First Nations is too difficult.

There are ways forward, and there is no single lever to pull which will solve the policy challenges or even ensure we are on the right path. I do have some suggestions for how governments should proceed. Here are five broad suggestions that would be a good start.

First, acknowledge that the Closing the Gap machine is broken. It is too complex; it is too focussed on process. It lacks effective political leadership. It needs reform (not abolition, not disposal, not starting afresh). Reform would necessarily involve a radical rethink based on a critical assessment of the conceptual underpinnings. It would require a radical simplification to focus on what is important, to identify a limited number of strategically significant priorities (I would nominate education, employment, incarceration, housing and health; cross cutting priorities would include alcohol reform and disability access). It would require the ditching of the political correctness that fails to recognise that Closing the Gap is as much about the nature of mainstream Australia as it is about the future of First Nations interests.

Second, I would suggest that the National Agreement on Closing the Gap be reconstituted into two separate agreements: one for urban and regional Australia, and another for remote Australia. Indigenous Australians living in both domains have significant challenges to be included within the institutions that frame the daily lives of mainstream Australians, but they are fundamentally different in nature across a considerable number of domains.

Third, given:

·       the increasing political polarisation in modern liberal democracies;

·       the seeming intractability of the issues in play; and

·       the poor understanding of the experience and realities of life for many First Australians; and (frankly)

·       the policy illiteracy of most Australians based on the rise of social media and the complexity of modern government in a rapidly changing global world;

there is a pressing need for an innovative approach to the governance of the oversight of this policy domain. My suggestion is that key elements of its governance should be placed at arm’s length from Executive Government in recognition of the ongoing failure of Executive governments across the partisan divide to turn these issues around (while acknowledging that ultimately governments are elected to make final policy determinations). My suggestion is to build into the governance of a new Closing the Gap model scope for the extensive use of deliberative democracy and citizens juries to deal with major policy challenges (like remote education, and the regular oversight reviews of the process).

Fourth, while the states and territories have been and will continue to be substantial players in the Indigenous policy domain, the nation requires the Commonwealth to step up and ensure that these issues are considered from a national perspective. The 1967 Referendum passed with an overwhelming majority and gave the Commonwealth the power to legislate in relation to Indigenous affairs. The decision by Commonwealth governments over the past decade to step back and abdicate control and authority by effectively leaving responsibility for Closing the Gap outcomes with the states and territories has been both a gross dereliction and a policy disaster.

Fifth, the focus of reform efforts must be on institutional reform, not greater access to benefits for selected constituencies within the current framework. One example of institutional reform would be a comprehensive shift to ensure the greater use of needs-based allocations across the board thus ensuring that constituencies where disadvantaged Indigenous citizens are over-represented are allocated greater attention without framing the policy as an indigenous specific program. If implemented widely, this would do much to undercut the potential for populist backlash which has been a major constraint on Indigenous policy reform over recent decades.

Conclusion

The Closing the Gap machine is broken. It requires reform, not jettisoning or discarding. There are pathways forward. Unfortunately, I see little prospect that a critical mass of concern presently exists that might lead to such reform. From governments, all we get are words, words, words.

In remote Australia, largely out of sight of mainstream Australia, we are building another machine which is efficiently producing ongoing illiteracy, innumeracy, dysfunction, crime and hyper-incarceration. Tens of thousands of Australian citizens are being relegated to live shortened lives, often shaped by violence, family tragedy and despair. It is easy for some to blame the victims. Overwhelmingly, they are not responsible for the life choices available to them.

In 2007, I co-authored a book with Neil Westbury where we argued that remote Australia is in effect a failed state. The institutional frameworks that we take granted in non-remote Australia were under-developed and/or non-existent. The following two decades have seen some improvements, but in many respects, not much has changed. How can we accept a school system where for tens of thousands of students the attendance rate is forty percent. How can we accept a culture where alcohol and substance abuse are rampant, and governments fail to rein in the ability of liquor retailers to sell alcohol to vulnerable people (of all backgrounds) while they know that alcohol is an underlying cause of widespread health issues. The causes of state failure are complex and the solutions are complicated. But an absolute pre-requisite is for governments to do their job, acting in the public interest, and not at the behest of private interests. An essential part of the job for our political leaders is to focus on what matters for all Australians, not just some Australians, and certainly the job is not to deliberately obscure what matters.

The Closing the Gap machine is failing. Our leaders have stopped trying…and listening.

The times are certainly out of joint.

 

22 February 2026

The ongoing attendance crisis in remote schools

 

… when we are sick in fortune—often the surfeit of our own behaviour—we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars, as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion…

King Lear, Act one, Scene two.

 

Recent media articles have pointed to a continuing decline in school attendance in remote primary schools and the secondary high schools in the Kimberley. Yet this has been an issue for decades.

A 28 June 2017 ABC news article (link here), headlined WA schools hardest hit by remote disadvantage, nationwide study finds reported on a Curtin University study which found, inter alia, that:

just 40 per cent of children in disadvantaged areas [ of WA] were attending the benchmark 15 hours of preschool per week, compared to almost 70 per cent nationally.

In July 2022, the ABC published an article (link here) with the headline WA government accused of failing at-risk Kimberley students over plans to address school truancy. The article stated inter alia that the Kimberley is in crisis, and that:

A 2019 coronial inquest had found poor school attendance to be a common factor in the deaths of the children, who died between 2012 and 2016. Two of the deaths were in Halls Creek, where truancy is chronic.

That article interviews a mother who complains about the lack of follow up by the Department in relation to an attendance plan for her son but fails to acknowledge or focus on the apparent incapacity of the parent to ensure the son attends school. While mainstream Australia largely sees parents as having an overarching responsibility for their adolescent children, it is apparent that parents from traditional backgrounds do not share this perspective. They consequently place the entire responsibility for ensuring children attend whitefella schools onto governments.

A March 2023 article (link here), headlined Kimberley student attendance drops again as 95 percent of public schools record significant falls, flags the ongoing crisis. In a box titled Key Points, the article states:

21 out of 22 public schools in the Kimberley have seen a decline in attendance over the past two years. Some schools' attendance rates have been below 50 per cent. Community leaders say the Department of Education needs to do more to engage students.

While the governments have significant responsibilities, not least because the range of likely causes go much wider than anything parents can do, it does seem clear that community leaders must have a role in finding solutions and shifting community views on the roles of parents.

A more recent article dated 6 September 2024 and headlined Fewer than half of students in WA’s Kimberely attend secondary school (link here). The key points box states:

In short: Newly-released statistics show primary and secondary school attendance rates dropped significantly in the Kimberley for 2023. Secondary school attendance was 41.6 per cent, while primary school attendance was 62 per cent.

What's next? The Kimberley region's education chief concedes school attendance is "an ongoing challenge".

It seems clear that there is has been a long-standing crisis in school attendance in remote communities in the Kimberely and WA, and there is strong evidence that these issues also have traction on other remote settings, including the NT and South Australia (link here).

Having identified the attendance problem as one particularly prevalent in remote settings, there is a need for caution insofar as there is increasing evidence of an anxiety epidemic amongst young people correlated strongly with the ubiquity of social media. A recent article in the UK Guardian (link here) addresses the issue of school attendance (without ascribing causes beyond peer bullying) and argues against any policy moves to exercise punitive measures on parents or children. The article cites the following official data for a recent week of schooling across the UK (link here):

The attendance rate (proportion of possible sessions attended) was 89.8% across all schools in the week commencing 15 July 2024. The absence rate was, therefore, 10.2% across all schools…

… Across the academic year 2023/24, 20.7% of pupil enrolments missed 10% or more of their possible sessions and are therefore identified as persistently absent.

This suggests that whatever the causes and contributors to low remote community school attendance rates, there may also be much deeper systemic issues in play with a global reach and impact. As an aside, the access to live data in the UK is virtually unknown in Australian contexts. We shouldn’t think that we always do better than the poms!

The consequences of limited education for individuals are dire and include severely constrained life opportunities especially in more modern and cross-cultural contexts, reduced lifetime earnings, and predispositions to alcohol and drug abuse, and perhaps domestic violence and criminal offending. While tragic for individuals, there are macro impacts on the wider Aboriginal communities where school attendance issues are entrenched, and broader impacts on communities affected by youth violence. These impacts are beginning to seep into the larger towns and cities adjacent to remote Australia and thus the consequences of poor school attendance are structurally and systemically both economically significant and politically challenging for the relevant state and territory governments.

These outcomes are not a surprise to me ( I have been warning of the consequences of policy neglect across remote Australia since at least 2007 when with Neil Westbury we published our book Beyond Humbug (link here). Those warnings were largely not heeded by governments, and the result is that we now confront a widespread and worsening catastrophe across remote Australia (link here). Notwithstanding some welcome additional funding for remote housing in the NT, the outstanding needs across remote Australia continue to outweigh the efforts of governments (link here). The appalling unemployment situation across remote Australia and the Commonwealth Government’s entirely inadequate response raises for individuals the unanswerable question: what is the point of an education if the future involves a working lifetime spent on social security arising from the structurally determined absence of employment opportunities -see the comments on CDP reform in this recent post (link here).  

The policy vacuum in relation to remote Australia has become endemic, deep-seated and is long-standing. The political implications are clear: the recent NT election rout for the NT ALP, notwithstanding its strong focus on law and order and advocacy of more punitive policies, are an obvious outcome. Nothing proposed by either party in the NT would have or will come close to addressing the deep systemic issues in play. In short, neither side of politics in the NT is offering a solution. And yet, the Commonwealth too has vacated the policy arena.

What is required?

I will keep this brief. In relation to remote attendance, there is a need for the Commonwealth to step up and acknowledge it for the national crisis it is. There will be a need first and foremost to acknowledge the crisis and devise a robust and proactive strategy that goes well beyond the local band-aids that have been the unthinking default approach to date (and yes I am referring to the current Federal Government’s response to the Alice Springs situation).

The Commonwealth should work with the states cooperatively on these issues, but devise incentive-based payments to the states and territories rather than indulging in the politically driven negotiation that currently predominate. Robust support to Indigenous community leaders aimed at encouraging and assisting them to raise expectations of parental involvement within their communities are essential. But so too are getting financial resource allocations for schools better targeted, and if necessary increased. Rewarding effective teachers much better and ensuring that the curriculum is focussed on the needs of the least capable cohort of students are both — to use a colloquial expression — ‘no brainers’. This suggests that the adoption of curriculum methodologies (such as Direct Learning) that do not allow any student to fall behind must be a priority.

The bottom line is that there must be a quantum leap in the levels of governmental concern and policy engagement. There may well be a case too for a return to the use of proactive truancy officers designed to ensure no child can avoid attending without a truancy officer engaging with the child and his/her parental guardians though I am not advocating a punitive policy approach.

Reforms to the education system alone in remote Australia will neither be enough nor adequate. The structural drivers of low attendance must also be addressed. While there may be some impact from the Commonwealth Government’s proposed legislation to constrain access to social media for adolescents under 16, my intuition tells me that whatever its impact in mainstream contexts, there will be a more muted impact in remote community contexts merely because of the existence of other drivers of low attendance.

Those drivers include the poor state of housing, the low levels of employment, and the all too ready access to cheap alcohol and drugs. It follows that there must be a sustained increase in investment in remote housing supply, and in adopting management approaches focussed on high quality housing asset management.

And perhaps most importantly, the government must move beyond its paltry commitment to reform of the CDP program, and substantially expand the number of jobs it is fully funding across remote Australia. The trick here will be to devise delivery models that focus on productive and culturally informed employment: caring for country; devising ways to employ community members as disability service providers in association with the NDIS and state provided foundational supports; aged care employment; employment in schools teaching languages, providing infrastructure support, and perhaps as teachers’ aides and ultimately local teachers. All these roles are real jobs often funded by government, but there has been a lack of vision to ensure that they are delivered through culturally informed organisational models.

Intuitively, an expansion of housing investment and infrastructure across remote communities and of socially valuable employment will have a constraining impact on anti-social behaviour such as drug and alcohol abuse, which in turn are prime drivers of the sorts of behaviours that lead to incarceration and community violence. Governments should also focus attention on regulating and controlling the supply of drugs and alcohol in remote communities and regional centres.

The experience of the last decade has been that neither the ALP nor the LNP at a federal level have the political will nor the policy vision to deliver on such an admittedly ambitious agenda. However, there is increasing talk of a minority government scenario post the forthcoming election, and it seems likely that whatever the outcome the Teals and Independents will have greater influence. They are well placed to drive such a policy agenda if only they have the vision and energy to take on what will inevitably be a challenging, but nationally significant reform agenda.

The absence of any policy discussion regarding such an agenda, and the absence of the agenda itself, reflect the lack of a national vision amongst our political elites. They are also the source of ongoing economic and social costs imposed directly on First Nations remote communities, but inexorably leaking across to mainstream fiscal contexts. These social and financial costs represent a substantial (and presently underappreciated) risk to our aspirations to be a cohesive, inclusive and socially mature nation.

 

10 September 2024