The Commonwealth policy pivot to Indigenous economic empowerment

  

And thus the native hue of resolution

Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought;

And enterprises of great pith and moment,

With this regard, their currents turn awry,

And lose the name of action.

Hamlet Act three, Scene one.

 

According to Senator Lidia Thorpe, the Prime Minister’s speech at Garma last week was an exercise in ‘optics” (link here). An editorial by the National Indigenous Times (link here) headed ‘Economic partnership or political theatre? Government’s Garma plan questioned amid worsening outcomes’ opined:

Yet there is reason to question whether this latest suite of announcements represents real change or another layer of process wrapped in new branding. Closing the Gap targets remain in crisis. Many indicators are worsening, particularly in the Northern Territory where Indigenous incarceration rates are among the highest in the world and child health outcomes lag far behind the national average.

The Prime Minister’s speech at Garma (link here) represents the culmination of the Government’s post referendum pivot to economic empowerment first articulated by the Prime Minister at Garma in his 2024 speech to Garma titled Economic Empowerment for Indigenous Australians (link here). In his 2024 speech he committed his government to take up the challenge to pursue a ‘comprehensive economic policy challenge for Indigenous peoples.’ He announced that the Government was creating a new First Nations economic partnership building on the work of the Coalition of Peaks and the nascent First Nations Economic Empowerment Alliance.

The recent 2025 speech was followed by a more detailed media release outlining the specific details of what is being proposed (link here). The key announcement is the release of the text of the new First Nations Economic Partnership Agreement between the Commonwealth and the Coalition of Peaks and the First Nations Economic Empowerment Alliance (link here). To be clear, this Partnership Agreement is national in scope and represents a new and complementary addition to the institutional framework established in 2020 with the establishment of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap.

There are two new elements to the structural architecture of this agreement: the first is the addition of the First Nations Economic Empowerment Alliance (FNEEA)  (link here) as a formal party to the Agreement; the second is the absence of the states and territories from the Agreement (in contrast to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap). I can see arguments both for and against having the states and territories involved, and on balance see the undoubted and direct involvement and engagement of the Commonwealth as a strong positive. There is no reason why the Commonwealth could not engage with relevant states and territories on relevant issues either through the regular meetings of the (so called) National Cabinet, through the Joint Council on Closing the Gap, or through targeted engagement with relevant states and territories as needed.

The key institutional changes foreshadowed in the PM’s speech and the associated media release were the references to making better use of capital and equity in special investment vehicles such as the North Australia Infrastructure Fund (NAIF) and the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and ‘ensuring’ these agencies ‘are delivering for First Nations communities across Australia’. Both of these foreshadowed changes remain opaque however as they are subject to detailed development by the parties to the new Partnership Agreement.

I have long been a critic of the NAIF’s failure to allocate resources to infrastructure investment in remote Indigenous communities (link here and link here). The latest review statutory review of the NAIF undertaken by former Member for Lingiari, Warren Snowdon, Dr Lisa Caffery and Professor Peter Yu was delivered two months late (link here) to the Minister for Northern Australia, Madeleine King in February this year and is yet to be publicly released (link here). One might be forgiven for thinking that the report has been warehoused to inform and feed into the new Partnership’s deliberations. On my reckoning it must be published by 1 September (the NAIF legislation requires the minister to table it within fifteen sitting days of receipt). Whether the Review’s yet to be revealed recommendations will emerge unscathed from the further prolongation of partnership review and the possible necessity for legislative amendment are moot.

A second potentially important institutional change is a proposal for the Partnership to consider ways to enhance the work of Indigenous Business Australia and the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation, two key statutory corporations in the Indigenous Australians portfolio with economic development focus. Again, it is not clear what is intended here, although there are suggestions in the publications on the website of the FNEEA that they see potential for the considerable financial assets of the ILSC’s associated Land Fund and the IBA’s very healthy balance sheet to be made more accessible for commercial investment across the Indigenous estate.

For those who wish to dig even deeper, the NIAA FOI log (link here) includes a series of detailed policy recommendations prepared in 2019 by the Indigenous Reference Group to the Ministerial Forum of Northern Australia which canvass the issues of access to capital, land tenure reform, and NAIF reform in considerable detail. In 2019, the IRG was chaired by Professor Peter Yu. I would merely note that the devil is in the detail on these types of suggestions.

In terms of financial announcements, the Prime Minister announced an intention to make available $75m in additional funding for Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs), the entities that are established to legally hold native title. I have long been an advocate of the Commonwealth moving to provide universal core funding for these bodies (link here), yet again it is unclear if the funding will be made available immediately or be delayed while the new Partnership decides on the scope of the reform of the funding model. According to data sourced from the NNTT, in August 2024 there were 280 PBCs (link here). Assuming the $75m is appropriated over three years there will be less than $90k available for each PBC each year in additional funding. This suggests that the prospect of allocating the funds equally across all PBCs will not be feasible, but the deeper take out is that the proposed funding allocation is entirely inadequate. Even were the $75m an annual appropriation, this would remain the case. The Treasurer’s comment (attached to the Prime Minister’s media release) that ‘we’re investing to equip Traditional Owners to leverage their land and sea assets to get better deals and bring jobs and wealth to First Nations communities’ is arguably factually accurate, but simultaneously an over-exaggeration of what is being provided. It will no doubt provide significant and welcome assistance to some native title groups but is not the wide-ranging reform that the Commonwealth’s media spin meisters would have us believe.

On closer examination, the Prime Minister’s announcement of $70m in Clean Energy funding refers to an Expression of Interest process which will feed into the development of a series of funding allocations to yet to be determined Clean Energy projects. The first step initiated on 4 August is to seek expressions of interest from potential project proponents. The available $70m will be allocated over three years (ie around $23m per annum) and the process by which the expressions of interest will be transformed into funding appears quite opaque (link here). What seems most likely is that the Department will allocate the available funds to projects which are already planned or underway. While the amount appears significant, and no doubt the successful applicants will appreciate the assistance, the reality is that this is a sophisticated form of virtue signalling rather than a developed strategy to drive significant impetus to expand existing energy provision frameworks.

The inarguable modesty of the Government’s funding announcements belie the Prime Minster’s rhetoric. Speaking of the significance of Garma, and framing his speech with the gravitas and aspiration accorded to the rites of serious policy contributions, the Prime Minister extolled:

this is a place for ideas, ambition – and accountability. Where we learn from the past, are honest about the present and ‘look up to the future’.

Given this ceremonial tone and rhetorical over-reach, what are we to make of this Prime Ministerial ritual at Garma? What is its purpose? What does it mean?

Perhaps the first point to make is that I am far from alone in expressing a degree of scepticism regarding whether to take the Prime Minister’s announcements at face value. The National Indigenous Times has reported critical comments from a number of prominent Indigenous individuals. As well as Senator Lidia Thorpe, Megan Davis (link here), Wayne Bergman (link here), Katie Kiss (link here), Denise Bowden (link here), all expressed either explicit or implicit reservations about aspects of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous empowerment strategy.

My own scepticism derives from the combination of four quite separate arguments. However, before listing those arguments, it needs to be stated up front that creating the conditions that facilitate improved economic security for Indigenous citizens, especially those who reside in remote Australia must be a key policy objective of Australian Governments.

Economic security is multifaceted and can not be encompasses by focussing solely on metrics such as income, or wealth, or employment status, or wellbeing. These are all useful measures but have complex causation and varying levels of durability and utility. Absolute measures are important, but so too are comparative measures as these play into complex issues such as relative status, degrees of social and political inclusion or exclusion. Further, both absolute and comparative measures of economic wellbeing or status are impacted by the social, political and economic environment within which thy exist. To make an extreme point, a healthy bank balance is no help in a famine. Or to make the same point in a more relevant way, for so long as there is an alcohol and drug epidemic across remote Australia (and I am not referring only to Indigenous people), then the underpinnings of Indigenous economic security will be unachievable (link here).

In turn, it becomes clear that ‘economic empowerment’ may well be a useful shorthand to describe a particular policy agenda, but unless carefully defined, it runs the risk of being utilised for essentially ideological reasons. In particular, there are indications in the FNEEA publications that the implicit policy agenda being developed under this terminological carapace is designed to shift policy priorities away from so called ‘welfare’ or ‘social’ sectors and towards institutional reforms and government funding allocations designed to support and benefit Indigenous access to revenue or profits-based wealth creation activities (commercial projects). Clearly there is a place for a focus on wealth creation and enterprise in any economic strategy, but in my view not at the expense of more basic economic foundations.

The arguments which suggest that the Prime Minister’s policy pivot to Indigenous economic empowerment should not be taken entirely seriously encompass both inherent shortcomings in the strategy itself and importantly what is not there or is under-emphasised.

First, the strategy represents a shift away from focussing on improving and reforming the foundations of economic security (which I would list as comprising education, employment, health / ableness, housing and community order). Each of these five elements are under enormous pressure in remote Australia and as I have argued for almost two decades (link here) these government shortfalls mean remote Australia is approaching a point of systemic breakdown or failure. Shifting policy attention to wealth creation (or economic empowerment) while ignoring essential reforms addressing deep-seated and ongoing government failure in the underlying elements of economic security would be fundamentally flawed policy.

Second, the strategy represents a pathway which can be utilised to reframe the public debate around the closing the gap agenda (yet again) in ways that allow governments to escape the annual reminders of their unwillingness and incapacity to allocate the intellectual and political resources as well as the funding necessary to successfully and substantively close the gap. Short term tactics work in the short term but ultimately don’t deliver strategic reform. The economic empowerment agenda sounds plausible and will buy the government time, and if Treasury can find an acceptable political path forward, it may buy time for another decade. However, eventually such a policy approach will fail because it is not based on rigorous policy analysis, ignores the fundamental drivers of economic security, and is not based on a transparent dialogue with all affected interests.

Third, the strategy creates the preconditions for the systemic co-option of the Indigenous leadership. Negotiations in private, combined with the increasingly parsimonious approach to transparency by the Commonwealth and other governments means that the temptation to ‘buy’ support from the Indigenous leadership for sub-optimal policies will be difficult to resist going forward. While the FNEEA Charter (link here) includes apparently robust individual conflict of interest provisions (see clause 10.5) related to the business of the Alliance, and the Partnership Agreement (link here) similarly includes sections on managing individual conflicts of interest and transparency (see sections 66 to 70), the inherent ‘commercial’ confidentiality involved in some aspects of the Partners’ discussions, the deep-seated reluctance of the Commonwealth to engage the wider public in policy issues, and the ultimate power imbalance between the Commonwealth and the First Nations partners means that there will inevitably be a heightened risk of inappropriate influence being applied either to individuals or to the Partners as a whole. The only effective protection against this is much greater commitment to transparency. For example, all funding to the First Nations Partners should be automatically made public, and the responsible Ministers should be required to make an annual statement to Parliament detailing all significant communications with, and funding decisions taken relating to, the First Nations Economic Empowerment Partnership.

Fourth and finally, the elephant in this policy room is the failure of the Commonwealth to address in any meaningful way the existing and ongoing use, and in some cases misuse, of financial benefits flowing from resource development on Indigenous land. The challenges involved are extraordinarily complex and raise difficult ethical and philosophical questions that cannot be addressed by unilateral government fiat. At a minimum, there is a need for much more robust regulatory oversight, and much more proactive financial literacy education. Most importantly however, there is an urgent need for an ongoing and open discussion around the overarching policy frameworks guiding the use, allocation and distribution of negotiated financial benefits by Indigenous landowners, and the potential alternatives which might be considered to ensure more equitable distributions overall, and greater savings and investment by beneficiaries rather than immediate consumption. The current free-for-all around the distribution and use of financial benefits reflects extremely poorly on the Commonwealth governments of the last thirty years. Any attempt to ‘empower’ Indigenous landowners without addressing the underlying rationales and impacts of these substantial and essentially unregulated financial flows is akin to using a fuel bowser to fight a fire.

Taken together, these four arguments constitute an overwhelming case for a comprehensive reconsideration of the current policy pivot by the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, the short-term political calculus strongly favours what I would characterise as a cynical policy framework with enormous opportunity costs, substantial risks (which will be borne by current and future generations of remote Indigenous citizens) and a limited contribution to the longer term public interest.

For an alternative view, I recommend readers take a look at the submission to the upcoming Productivity Round Table by Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) (link here). IBA is a member of FNEEA.

Conclusion

The Albanese Government pivot to Indigenous economic empowerment is in my view deeply flawed policy. It is not based on the rigorous policy analysis necessary to underpin a major shift in policy and political focus. The pivot will raise expectations but not deliver except for a minority of commercially and politically astute Indigenous entrepreneurs. Because institutional reform is so hard, it risks devolving into a focus on picking a slew of individual projects where Indigenous involvement can be facilitated and subsidised. Picking winners is fine until you begin picking losers. The pivot will steal oxygen from the policy discussions necessary to reform the underlying policies constraining the sustainable delivery of the real elements of economic security and thereby avoid the hard discussions with the states and territories who control many of those policy levers. The substantive import of the flawed logic appears to be: why argue about reforming housing provision, education, disability reform, employment, alcohol harm or hyper incarceration when the prospect of universal wealth is within our grasp. Additionally, the pivot portends the overhaul of the closing the gap policy framework by creating a plausible and intuitively attractive alternative policy framework.

The fundamental problem with this policy pivot by the Albanese Government is its role in allowing the Commonwealth to avoid the fundamental and necessary reform challenges in those crucial policy sectors that ensure economic security especially in remote Australia where Australia’s most disadvantaged citizens reside. It is an economic policy in name only; like Rumpelstiltskin, it promises to spin straw into gold.

 

6 August 2025

                                                                                                                                                                

A counter-intuitive proposal to expand rooftop solar in the bush

 

The self-same sun that shines upon his court

Hides not his visage from our cottage but

Looks on all alike.

The Winter’s Tale Act four, Scene four.

 

My previous post was essentially a high-level review of an excellent book titled Guide to Housing and Infrastructure Standards in Town Camps (link here). I recommend readers peruse that post before reading this post.

In this post, I delve a bit deeper into just one of the thirty essential services issues addressed by the Guide — the under-reliance on rooftop solar power in remote communities — and make a high-level policy proposal to break the current structural deadlock that contributes to energy insecurity, poor health, and the sheer liveability of remote community housing infrastructure.  

The Guide’s analysis of rooftop solar

The Guide (section 2.28 on pp. 148 – 151) identifies solar energy as one of the thirty issues it deals with. The Problem is identified as energy insecurity. The combination of temperature extremes, poor housing design, associated high demand for electricity, in a context of high reliance on prepayment meters amongst town camp residents leads to high levels of energy insecurity. The Guide references academic research to report on extraordinary rates of multiple power disconnection events affecting 91 percent of prepayment meter households across the NT (link here). Under Regulations, the Guide notes inter alia that the payback term for installed rooftop systems is often less than five years, and suggests that the introduction of rooftop solar systems could be the key to climate proofing homes in Aboriginal Town Camps (link here). Under Solutions, the Guide points out that while the upfront costs of incorporating solar energy systems into community and housing infrastructure has often been used as an excuse for not installing them, it calculates for one town camp that the payback period from installation would be four years, and points to the additional benefit of reduced health costs arising from avoiding the adverse implications of temperature extremes.

The Guide backs up this analysis with an aerial photo of a town camp showing nine houses, with no obvious solar alignment, and with no use of solar panels: the heading is Roof-top Solar Panels are not often used in Town Camps. On the facing page is an aerial photo of 23 houses in Alice Springs, of which 16 appear to be utilising solar panels. Furthermore, it is striking that the houses are all solar aligned to maximise the benefits of solar radiation in winter and minimise costs and radiation in summer. The Heading is Roof-top Solar Panels and Solar Oriented Houses in Alice Springs.

Subsequent sections in the Guide deal with the related issues of Passive Cooling and Heating, and the use of Outdoor Rooms and Courtyards.

In a rapidly warming world, the importance of addressing these issues is inarguable. Yet very few people would be aware or conscious of the fact that there are systemic disparities between the way mainstream and Aboriginal communities are designed and operate in relation to these issues. The consequences for communities are both real and deeply unfair. The degree of unfairness is magnified when it is recognised that over the past decade there have been substantial subsidies available to homeowners designed to encourage the take up of rooftop solar infrastructure, but that social housing ‘owners’ (ie governments) have not seen fit to invest in installation of rooftop solar on public housing in the NT — and I suspect elsewhere. The levels of recognition amongst policymakers and the informed public of the degree of inequity and unfairness in solar provision appears to be close to zero.

Again, as pointed out in my previous post, the policy context is complex, but it is not beyond the technical capacity of governments to address. It does however appear to be beyond their political and policy capacity, even in circumstances where addressing the issues would harvest both financial and social benefits for disadvantaged First Nations communities and for society as a whole.

Given the lack of proactivity from governments on the issue of energy insecurity for remote community residents, it struck me that an alternative approach might pay dividends (so to speak).

A strategic reform proposal

The relatively new NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) which has adopted the name Aboriginal Investment NT: (link here).  I have opted to use the name used in the legislation that establishes the entity. NTAIC is a Commonwealth statutory corporation established to administer a proportion of ABA funds. I was one of a number of critics of the design of this entity when it was first proposed in late 2021 (link here). While I am yet to be persuaded that I was wrong, the establishment of NTAIC provides a degree of Indigenous agency over the allocation of significant ABA funds which are broadly designated as being for the benefit of Aboriginal people across the Northern Territory.

My proposal (for the NT) is that NTAIC should consider initiating negotiations with the NT Government based on an offer to assist in accelerating the take up of roof top solar across remote community housing in the NT. Almost all remote community housing is social housing managed by the NTG. While arguably the responsibility for rolling out roof-top solar across remote communities belongs to the NTG, it is a responsibility that is patently not being implemented. Moreover, due to the systemic incentives in play which shape the allocation of scarce government funding, the NTG is unlikely to unilaterally initiate the roll out of roof top solar over remote community housing anytime soon.

Given this context, the NTAIC might offer to fund a significant proportion (or even all) of the capital costs of a multi-year roof-top solar installation program on the condition that the NTG commits to the ongoing maintenance of the infrastructure along with the associated repairs and maintenance of the social housing assets. A second and crucial component of any such deal would be a commitment that the financial benefits in terms of lower power costs of the installation of rooftop solar would accrue to the householder and the local community. Such an arrangement would appear to fit squarely within the statutory functions of NTAIC as laid out in section 65BB of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (link here). While it is not entirely clear to me whether this fits within the NTAIC current Strategic Investment Plan (link here), this need not be an absolute barrier to initiating good and common sense ideas.

The same model might be explored across WA, QLD, SA, and indeed the NT by Indigenous Business Australia (IBA), or in the NT potentially by NTAIC and IBA jointly. I acknowledge that the negotiation of a pure funding transfer with state and territory jurisdictions may not fall directly within the remit of IBA (see sections 147/148 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005: link here). However, if developed along with arrangements for the utilisation of Indigenous firms to install and maintain infrastructure on behalf of these jurisdictions, the proposal could be easily brought within he IBA remit. This constraint would not apply to NTAIC in the NT, but would nevertheless be worth considering in any case.

I understand that this idea is counterintuitive insofar as it lacks a commercial rationale and may also appear to undermine the responsibilities of the relevant governments to provide and pay for social housing. However, when governments are not delivering on their responsibilities, and thus failing in their raison d’etre, and as a consequence Indigenous people are worse off than they should be, it seems to me that there is a case for Indigenous leaders appointed to roles on boards such as NTAIC and IBA to take action. While there is not a commercial return to the potential funders under my proposal (ie NTAIC and/or IBA), there is clearly a strong economic rationale.

The findings of the Guide discussed above that roof-top solar effectively pays for itself within 3 to 5 years (let’s say five years for simplicity) in effect tells us that there is a rate of return on the investment of at least 20 percent. I venture to say that NTAIC and IBA would struggle to identify any other broad scale placed base initiative across remote Australia that could match this return on investment.

The sticking point will be the definition of ‘investment’. It turns upon the difference between a commercial return (where the financial returns accrue to the investor) and an economic return where the financial returns accrue to the householder. Bearing in mind that both NTAIC and IBA are Commonwealth corporations utilising what are effectively public funds to operate, it strikes me that they should decide whether they exist merely  to beef up their own bottom lines, or to address the financial exclusion of a swathe of disadvantaged Indigenous communities. My point is strengthened when we take into account the positive externalities of addressing energy insecurity earlier rather than later, in terms of improved health, improved food security, and poverty mitigation.  

The proposal I have made has the potential to drive tangible increases in real incomes for remote families and thus deliver myriad financial and health benefits for thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents of the north. Moreover, the adoption of my proposal by NTAIC and/or IBA would mean that action is initiated much sooner on what would necessarily be a multiyear effort and would ensure that governments would eventually accept that they had the responsibility to replace roof top solar infrastructure as it reached its end of life as a normal part of social housing provision.

Of course, a potential argument against my proposal is that it implicitly means that other opportunities will not be funded. If so, I suggest that the responsibility falls to NTAIC and IBA to identify just what those higher priorities are. One way of mitigating this consequence, and simultaneously driving further strategic change aimed at underming structural inequity, would be for the NTAIC and/or IBA to seek to have the NAIF provide concessional finance to assist in financing their contributions. See my recnt post on the NAIF (link here).

Conclusion

We hear a lot about self-determination, and Indigenous leadership as the prerequisite for effective policy outcomes. It strikes me that the opportunity to drive a major upgrade of rooftop solar across remote communities presents the boards of NTAIC and of the IBA with a once in a generation fork in the road: they either take the initiative to drive strategic change or they accept that failing governments should be left to continue to fail remote Indigenous communities.

The evidence of egregious and myriad policy exclusion by governments is inexorably accumulating. It is incontrovertible that remote communities have unequal access to essential services and are at greater risk arising from energy insecurity in a warming world. Governments, and our system of politics and policy development, have failed because they design and implement exclusionary policy frameworks which treat remote community and town camp residents worse than the residents of major urban centres. In these circumstances, the NTAIC and the IBA should step up and use their undoubted financial leverage to drive strategic policy reform.

 

Further reading:

Longden, T., Quilty, S., Riley, B. et al. Energy insecurity during temperature extremes in remote Australia. Nat Energy 7, 43–54 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00942-  (link here).

 

Solar solutions could be the key to climate-proofing homes in Aboriginal town camps By Stephanie Boltje, The Drum  (link here).

 

18 December 2024

 

The 2024 NAIF review: the case for addressing systemic exclusion

 

For that’s an article within our law

As dangerous as the rest

Pericles Act one, Scene one.

 

The Government announced a review of the North Australia Infrastructure Facility on 19 August 2024 (link here). The Ministers media statement noted, inter alia:

The review is a requirement under the Act and will make recommendations to Government including on how to best continue to support investment that delivers economic and community benefits to northern Australia.

NAIF is a development financier that provides financial assistance to infrastructure projects in northern Australia to drive public benefit, economic and population growth, as well as materially improve the lives of First Nations people.

I have previously published a number of posts dealing with NAIF on this blog (link here; link here; link here; and link here). While not essential reading, for those interested in some of the dubious history of the NAIF’s involvement, and lack of involvement, in relation to Indigenous interests in northern Australia, they are worth a look. I should note that the NAIF legislation, and associated Investment Mandate have been amended since some of the posts were published.

Set out below is my submission to the current review. It does not include hyperlinks to key assertions, but most of the information and data I cite can be found on the NAIF website (link here).

 

Submission to the 2024 Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility Statutory Review

 

The following submission is predicated on my view that the NAIF has significant potential to contribute to the ongoing development of northern Australia. I wish to acknowledge that since the quite critical 2019 ANAO performance audit, NAIF appears to have strengthened its governance and systems considerably, and for this it should be commended.

I would note however that as with any public sector institution, the risks of progressive degradation of the requisite internal culture on governance and effectiveness issues always exists, and thus there is a strong public interest in ensuring that the appropriate checks and balances exist and are strengthened. I am a strong advocate of transparency in the public sector as a primary mechanism for ensuing that public benefit is always at the forefront of organisational priorities (including the informal priorities that inevitably exist in any complex organisation). Accordingly, I would encourage the review to proactively consider what opportunities exist for greater transparency in NAIF’s operations.

For example, it seems to me important that the legislative protections in favour of Board independence be maintained and perhaps strengthened. While it is also important that portfolio Ministers retain the right to veto Board decisions, this should be based on timely publication of their decision and the reasons.

Another example where greater transparency is required in my view relates to the publication of aggregate data on NAIF operations rather than (or in addition to) the current approach of publishing disaggregated information at the project level. For a specific example, while there is a degree of high-level public relations content relating to the required Indigenous engagement strategy for each project, I was unable to discern either on the NAIF website nor in key NAIF documents any summary assessment (let alone a rigorous evaluation) of the overall benefits arising from this requirement. NAIF could for example begin by reporting some core data metrics such as the levels of Indigenous employment derived from NAIFs project contributions.

Or to take another example, while the headline figure of $7bn in available finance is always front and centre, there is very little accessible data available on the annual net cost of NAIF to the Commonwealth and nor is there accessible data on the annual projected revenue returns to the Commonwealth as interest on loans is repaid. NIAF and its portfolio agency could do much better on these fronts than they have to date.

In this context, I would also suggest that the Review Panel should look behind NAIF’s (perhaps understandable) public relations gloss and focus on the direct impacts of NAIF financing in relation to jobs created (including Indigenous jobs) and seek to ascertain and understand the terms of that employment. Clearly a full-time five-year job is not the same as a three-month casual part-time job. But NAIF’s public relations unhelpfully conflates these data. Moreover, (perhaps understandably from a public relations perspective) NAIF invariably cites the projected public benefit of the whole project, and the numbers of jobs to be created by the whole project which are never wholly funded by NAIF loans or investments.

These statistical leaps of imagination implicitly assume that the projects funded by NAIF would never go ahead without NAIF funding. This is in my view not a realistic assumption. The overall effect of these statistical sleights of hand is to undermine the credibility of all NAIF’s data efforts. Yet a realistic assessment is important to understand the real impact and outcomes of the Commonwealth’s investment in NAIF. If the Review reaches the view that they haven’t the time or resources to undertake such an exercise, then I suggest that you consider recommending an independent impact evaluation of NAIFs operations given that we are approaching the ten-year anniversary of its existence.

In relation to the mandatory Indigenous Engagement Strategy which proponents are required to prepare, there are in my view significant limitations on the potential for this requirement to make a real difference to the social and economic status of Indigenous communities and people in northern Australia. Not only are the outcomes of marginal significance when put beside the overall quantum of investments in projects, but there is a serious risk that the very existence of this requirement is implicitly used by NAIF, and the indeed the Commonwealth, as a rationale for ignoring the significant systemic bias in NAIF’s legislative and operating framework against delivering benefits for northern Australian remote communities.

A case in point is the public relations spiel on NAIF’s projects page regarding the upgrade of Connellan Airport at Yulara. The website page lists the project as social infrastructure whereas the upgrades of the NT airports’ infrastructure and the Townsville airport infrastructure projects are all listed as ‘transport and logistics infrastructure’. The real benefit of the airport upgrade was to the NT tourism industry, not to Aboriginal interests. The Indigenous Engagement Strategy for Connellan relates in its entirely to the ongoing operation of Yulara by Voyages (and not to the NAIF loan), and most if not all of the ‘commitments’ listed relate to initiatives which were already in place and underway prior to the airport upgrade being initiated. I know this as I was employed by the ILC in the period before the airstrip loan was approved. What we don’t get in the project summary is any information on is how many Indigenous workers Downer Constructions (the contractor used in the airport upgrade) employed, and whether Downer utilised any Indigenous procurement in the upgrade. They may have, and I hope they did, but NAIF do not appear to be providing realistic information regarding the actual project that they funded. How can we trust the rest of NAIF’s data and performance metrics in relation to the Indigenous Engagement Strategy requirement? Has there been an independent evaluation of the Indigenous Engagement Strategy requirement? If not, perhaps the review should recommend one.

I am not arguing against the requirement for NAIF projects to have developed an Indigenous Engagement Strategy, but I am deeply sceptical that as presently formulated and implemented, it is anything more than window dressing. By all means retain the requirement, and ensure that it is focussed and substantive, but it is more important (indeed essential) to fix the systemic bias built into NAIF’s legislative and operating framework.

The systemic bias I am referring to emanates from the legislated focus of the NAIF on economic infrastructure. Over time, the legislation and investment mandate have been broadened to include social infrastructure, but there is a problem. The majority of NAIF’s loan portfolio is driven by private sector project proponents seeking access to either concessional finance or a higher loan to equity ratio than the banks are prepared to support. While NAIF’s remit has been slowly broadened to allow NAIF to invest in or lend to social infrastructure projects, the reality is that it is state and territory governments which have responsibility for social infrastructure, and who thus must be the applicant for NAIF finance. Unlike commercial firms, these governments are oversighting hundreds of projects, and their most influential constituencies are dominated by mainstream interest groups. The result is that they have competing financial priorities which limit their interest in accessing NAIF to fund social infrastructure. The unfortunate reality is that the states and the NT have failed to even look for a NAIF contribution to addressing these infrastructure deficits. Just because those jurisdictions lack the imagination to seek policy solutions to these policy deficits is no reason for the Review, nor indeed for the Commonwealth, to follow suit.

After eight years of operation, NAIF’s website lists, on my count, nine social infrastructure projects totalling ‘up to’ approximately $606m and three of the six are relatively recent investments). Only two of the nine projects are in the NT, and none are in Western Australia. With committed loans currently totalling $4.7 bn, the proportion of approved NAIF funds allocated to social infrastructure is thirteen percent of that amount. Undoubtedly, some Indigenous citizens will benefit from these projects as they are overwhelmingly mainstream health and education related projects in Queensland which provide access to all citizens whether Indigenous or not. Yet only one of these projects is directed to Indigenous controlled or Indigenous specific projects and even that single project — the Connellan airport upgrade — is arguably not directed to benefitting Indigenous community members (see above). NAIF’s record in terms of allocating project funding towards benefitting Indigenous interests is extraordinary in its myopic narrow-mindedness, not least because infrastructure provision is such a crucial driver of poverty, inequality and arguably social dysfunction.

The most serious infrastructure deficit in northern Australia is undoubtedly in the social housing sector. These deficits are particularly serious in remote communities where the associated community infrastructure (water, power, sewerage) required to make housing viable is invariably degraded or non-existent. The most recent report of the Economic Inclusion Advisory Committee which advises the Government on budget priorities included a detailed report on remote housing (link here). Remote communities comprise some of the most socially and economically disadvantaged Australians, yet after eight years operation, NAIF, the major policy initiative directed at northern Australian infrastructure, has not made a dent in the outstanding housing and essential services needs of those communities.

I venture to say that the current pipeline of loan applications to NAIF is similarly bereft of any focus on these needs. It might be claimed by some that social housing is just that, a purely social priority. I disagree; basic housing (and education and healthcare) are core drivers of economic development and thus crucial to addressing deep-seated disadvantage. Without access to housing, education, and good health, economic development is a chimera. Further, investment in these social infrastructure priorities has substantial and ongoing commercial benefits. The Aboriginal residents of northern Australia are permanent residents, whereas many (perhaps even a majority) of non-Indigenous residents will not remain in residence beyond ten years. The economic development of the north will never succeed for as long as the Indigenous population is systemically excluded from access to core societal infrastructure.

One ostensibly persuasive argument against extending NAIFs operations into financing remote social housing and essential services infrastructure is that the level of need exceeds NAIFs potential capability to contribute by several orders of magnitude. My response to such a critique would be two-fold:

• first, a relatively modest NAIF contribution sustained over time would eventually have a significant impact; and
• second, there are potential ‘niche’ sectors which NAIF could focus on such as the ongoing shortage of adequate staff housing in remote communities, or aspects of the renewable energy transition. These types of niche investments have the potential to have outsized impact.

It would be a tragedy if the potential embedded within the NAIF model to drive positive and long-lasting change in remote Indigenous communities across northern Australia was overlooked based on a lack of imagination and innovation by policymakers.

One solution to this systemic exclusion of social infrastructure, particularly Indigenous social infrastructure, in relation to NAIF’s remit is to adopt an alternative and proactive investment approach. It would require NAIF (or some other government agency) to undertake a high-level needs analysis, and for NAIF to then set aside a proportion of its available capital for investment in that particular social infrastructure need. The Commonwealth in its latest Ministerial Statement of Expectations (which requested NAIF to set aside $500m for critical minerals projects) has established a precedent for identifying priority areas of focus within NAIF’s remit. The NAIF could then approach state and territory governments and negotiate (or even auction) access to the concessional loans directed to the determined social infrastructure needs. NAIF has demonstrated with its approval of the project Territory Infrastructure Loans (which allows the NTG to on-lend funds to smaller infrastructure projects) that it is possible to allocate funds for infrastructure projects that are primarily state and territory responsibilities.

If the solution proposed above is not attractive to NAIF, an alternative solution would be to amend the legislation to allow Indigenous Business Australia and perhaps the ILC (both Commonwealth statutory corporations) to access up to say $2bn in NAIF funds as an agent of NAIF (thus maintaining all of the NAIF project assessment criteria and administrative processes), with an additional requirement that any loans or investments must involve significant benefit to Indigenous communities in the north.

It is clear that the current outcomes do not need to persist. There is no insurmountable obstacle to the Commonwealth taking the action required to address the systemic exclusion of Indigenous interests from accessing the NAIF. Indigenous communities have the greatest social and economic infrastructure deficits, yet the Commonwealth has to date preferred to allocate concessional loans to commercial interests while allowing the Indigenous community infrastructure deficits to continue. It is not a matter of one priority over the other. There are sound economic social and political rationales for addressing both social infrastructure and other infrastructure priorities simultaneously. Not doing so would amount to maintain ongoing systemic and structural discrimination against the most disadvantaged members of the Australian community.  

While it may be feasible for the first approach I proposed to be implemented administratively, I strongly suggest that the Review Panel recommend legislative adjustments to the NAIF legislation to make clear that proactive investments in remote infrastructure needs are both necessary and desirable.

Finally, it is my view that the unless the systemic exclusion of Indigenous social exclusion within NAIF’s remit is addressed, then the case for extending NAIF’s investment sunset would not be made out.

In summary, I suggest the Review Panel make the following recommendations:

First and most importantly, ensure that going forward the Commonwealth and NAIF jointly eliminate the systemic exclusion of remote community infrastructure from the NAIF remit and importantly, from its operations. This would ensure the NAIF contributes to addressing the social housing and essential services infrastructure deficits across remote Australia.

Second, address the shortcomings evident in the way NAIF performance and data, and particularly the data related to the Indigenous Engagement Strategy requirement on proponents, is measured and reported upon. There appears to be strong grounds for an independent evaluation to undertaken.

Third, recommend an independent impact evaluation of NAIF’s operations over the eight years since its inception.

Fourth, recommend that NAIF (and the Commonwealth) take appropriate action to strengthen the independence of the NAIF Board and pay much greater attention to the transparency of NAIF operations not just in relation to internal government accountabilities, but in relation to the wider public.

Finally thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the Review. I am happy for this submission to be made public.

 

M C Dillon

27 September 2024

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The ongoing remote housing debacle

 

They say this town is full of cozenage:
As nimble jugglers that deceive the eye,
Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind,
Soul-killing witches that deform the body,
Disguised cheaters, prating mountebanks,
And many such-like liberties of sin.

The Comedy of Errors, Act 1, Scene 2.

 

On 28 February, the front page of The Australian published a story and graphic photograph (link here behind paywall and Sky News link here) of a family from Utopia who had been living on a concrete slab fifteen minutes’ walk from the Alice Springs CBD for two years (‘Invisible, yet they live in plain sight’). The Australian also published an editorial (‘It’s time to change the picture’) arguing that what it termed ‘housing failure’ is yet another wake-up call from remote Australia.

 

The news stories quote South Australian Senator Kerryn Liddle raising the plight of the family, mentioning nine children, and asking why no-one has done anything over the past two years. The family had come to Alice Springs to access dialysis treatment for a family member. Graphic proof of the human cost housing crisis not just in Alice Springs, not just in the NT, but across remote Australia.

 

This blog has given the housing crisis in remote Australia significant attention over the past five years (link here and link here and link here and link here and link here and link here and link here and link here and link here) but the issue continues to bedevil the nation. In those posts I have documented how the Rudd Government allocated $5.5bn to the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Housing (NPARIH) in 2008, how the end of program review orchestrated by then Minister Scullion was deeply flawed, and characterised by an inability to come clean about the real agenda, how then Minister Scullion oversaw cuts of a couple of hundred million for Repairs and Maintenance (as it would not adversely impact statistics on new house builds), and eventually allowed NPARIH to lapse across all jurisdictions except the NT where the Commonwealth is the landlord for 5230 housing dwellings across 72 town camps and remote communities (PC 2022:429 link here).

 

I also documented reports by Infrastructure Australia that initially excluded housing as social infrastructure, then included it, and how it was then directed by the former Government to exclude it from their analysis (link here and link here and link here and link here). Those posts also demonstrated that NPARIH had a tangible and positive impact on reducing overcrowding, but that there remained an outstanding need (see below). In a more academic context (link here), I have documented how these changes were part of a deliberate and more comprehensive effort to reduce Commonwealth expenditures on Closing the Gap, and to shift funding and policy responsibility for outcomes to the states and territories. To repeat, my research documented how these strategies were intentional, and have in large measure been successful in shifting funding responsibility (and thus political responsibility) away from the Commonwealth, and to the states and territories.  

 

The effective removal of virtually all funding for remote housing, relying on the fig leaf that mainstream programs will somehow fill the void, will have already ensured declines in the quality and number of housing assets across remote Australia, and concomitant increases in overcrowding. These entirely predictable consequences (and their less predictable ramifications) will continue to play out for at least five years and probably a decade even were governments to initiate a major investment effort today. The likelihood of such a policy reversal occurring seems highly unlikely anytime soon.

 

So what is the current state of play?

 

In this post, I can only address the most salient developments and point to the relevant reports and processes that are influencing current policy developments.

 

In August 2022, the Productivity Commission published its Study Report on the mainstream National Housing and Homelessness Agreement (NHHA) (link here). Its headline finding was

The National Housing and Homelessness Agreement — intended to improve access to affordable, safe and sustainable housing — is ineffective. It does not foster collaboration between governments or hold governments to account. It is a funding contract, not a blueprint for reform…

The focus of the next Agreement should be on improving the affordability of the private rental market and the targeting of housing assistance. Improving the capacity of low-income renters to pay for housing and removing constraints on new housing supply are key to making housing more affordable… … State and Territory Governments should commit to firm targets for new housing supply, facilitated by planning reforms and better co-ordination of infrastructure…. The $16 billion governments spend each year on direct housing assistance could achieve more if it was better targeted to people in greatest need...

 

The Study Report includes a chapter which provides a comprehensive overview of the state of Indigenous housing policy nationally, sets out a persuasive case for reform and makes a series of largely sensible recommendations. To highlight just one data point amongst many, the report notes (page 33) that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, compared with other Australians are 16 times more likely to live in severely overcrowded dwellings. One of the crucial issues with adopting a mainstream approach in remote Australia is that the interplay of Aboriginal tenures and the housing system means that there is very little affordable and private housing provision. Social housing is the predominant mode of housing provision. A further point noted in the Study Report, but perhaps not given adequate emphasis is that housing (and essential services) are crucial social determinants of health, including mental health, and thus play into a much wider policy domain than the mere supply of accommodation (important as that is).

 

The next National Housing Agreement is currently being negotiated between the Commonwealth and the States and territories. Accompanying this are major changes to the mainstream policy architecture including a legislated $10 billion Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF) designed to assist in financing 30,000 new housing units nationally over five years, a new statutory Housing Supply and Affordability Council, and a new National Housing and Homelessness Plan. When first announced, the Greens criticised the 30, 000 new houses commitment as inadequate (link here). In her media release announcing passage of the HAFF legislation through the lower house, Minister Collins announced that $200m of the investment returns from the Fund would be allocated to repair and maintenance of housing in remote communities (link here). While welcome, it is not clear what the national quantum of necessary maintenance investment is in existing and projected remote community housing stock. It is thus impossible to determine whether this is in fact a significant investment or mere tokenism. In particular, were the Government to provide greater national context this would indicate whether this investment can or will be used to leverage increased investment from the states and territories.

 

The Indigenous Australians Minister has recently released the Commonwealth Closing the Gap Implementation Plan 2023 (link here). It lays out the Commonwealth strategy in relation to Outcome 9a and 9b which relate to reducing overcrowded housing and the provision of essential services in discrete communities. The Implementation Plan lists Minister Julie Collins (whose portfolio is situated within the Treasury portfolio) as responsible for target 9a and Ministers Catherine King (Infrastructure) and Assistant Minister Anthony Chisolm (Regional Development) as responsible for target 9b.

 

Target 9a is specified in the following terms: By 2031, increase the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people living in appropriately sized (not overcrowded) housing to 88 percent. This is a national target that, in theory, can be fully met without necessarily addressing the deep housing needs across remote Australia. There is thus an imperative for explicit policy focus on allocating resources based on levels of need.

 

The ABS estimates that in 2031, there will be 1.1 million Indigenous Australians. If the target is met but not exceeded, that will leave 12 percent (or 132, 000 people) in overcrowded housing. The highest levels of Indigenous overcrowding are in remote Australia including the NT, the Kimberley and north Queensland.

 

The new target 9b is specified as follows: By 2031, all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander households: # within discrete Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities receive essential services that meet or exceed the relevant jurisdictional standard; # in or near to a town receive essential services that meet or exceed the same standard as applies generally within the town (including if the household might be classified for other purposes as a part of a discrete settlement such as a “town camp” or “town based reserve”.) There is considerable devil in the detail of this target, for example, just what are the ‘relevant jurisdictional standards’. I don’t have space to explore these issues here.

 

The Implementation Plan for targets 9a and 9b might best be described as establishing a holding pattern rather than a clear plan for achieving the target. The Plan highlights a small number of funding packages ($200 million from the HAFF; $100 million to the NT Government for homelands housing possibly from the ABA; and $150 million from the National Water Grid Fund for regional and remote water infrastructure projects). The major risk to meeting these two targets is that the sum total of resources from all sources will not be adequate. The Implementation Plan makes no effort to cross-reference or identify the levels of housing and essential services related investment in the remote state and territory jurisdictions, so there is no way that readers of the Plan can make their own assessment of risk related to targets 9a and 9b. Should any readers be inclined to go seeking this information in the state and territory Implementation Plans, they would find that they are for one year only, and comprise a bewildering array of process issues and minor funding commitments, but no accessible information assisting in understanding how the implementation process is progressing.

 

For example, the first (undated) NT Closing the Gap Implementation Plan finalised in August 2021 (link here) focusses only on the Priority Reforms, and provides no information on how the NT proposes to meet specific targets. It does mention (p.4) that 61.6% of NT Aboriginal people live in overcrowded housing. The 2021/2022 Closing the Gap Implementation Plan Annual Report (link here) provides more data on households (not individuals) (p.16) which indicates a reduction of 2.3% in remote community public household overcrowding between 2019 and 2022 — from 57% to 54.6%. This data is accompanied by a footnote warning of potential undercounting of occupancy figures. Again, there is no information on how the NT is seeking to reduce overcrowding.

 

The Commonwealth Implementation plan appears to have been developed independently of any hard headed assessment of the adequacy and projected funding from the states and territories, and perhaps more importantly, of the adequacy of the strategies adopted by the states and territories. This reflects and continues the former Government’s approach under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap of positioning the Commonwealth as (a lesser) one among equals, rather than a first among equals, or more appropriately, as the ringmaster oversighting the performance of the state and territory circus. A similar issue applies across the Commonwealth: the Implementation Plan gives primary responsibility to relevant Ministers (often multiple) yet nowhere does it state that the Minister for Indigenous Australians has an overarching remit and the authority to pull together, coordinate and in the ultimate resort to ensure compliance with the various cross agency responsibilities. Without such an explicit and formal remit, the coordination task across the Commonwealth will inevitably slide into a miasma of process.

 

Finally, the Commonwealth Implementation Plan mentions the National Housing and Homelessness Plan, but fails to commit to adopting the Productivity Commission Study Report recommendations (it will merely take them into account), in particular regarding needs based funding allocations. In my view, this is a major gap in the Implementation Plan.

 

So Where to from Here?

 

In 2018, in an article for Inside Story (‘Tactics versus Strategy in Indigenous Housing’) (link here), I identified a remote housing funding shortfall of $9 billion over the decade to 2028 if the then levels of overcrowding were to be effectively addressed. In the event, the Commonwealth walked away from the national remote housing program reducing its outlays to approximately $110 million pa focussed solely on the NT where the Commonwealth has direct landlord responsibilities for 5230 dwellings in town camps and remote communities.

 

Notwithstanding the demonstrable levels of need, the current Commonwealth Government shows no signs of reversing the previous Governments cuts. Not only will this ensure that current levels of deep disadvantage across remote Australia continue for at least a decade, it will constrain improvements in health and social well-being and likely exacerbate existing demographic shifts towards urban centres. While adequate and maintained housing is not the entire solution to the appalling conditions in many remote communities, and needs to be complemented by other infrastructure such as clean water, sewerage, power, it is a prerequisite for sustained improvements in health, employment, education, and for reductions in alcohol and drug abuse and family violence. Unfortunately, our political system is finely attuned to meeting the needs of the best organised interests and the broader electorate, within a zero-sum budgetary envelope. In these circumstances, it is worth considering what options there might be with a more constrained budgetary impact.

 

The following suggestions are high level and thus involve a degree of devil in the detail. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on advocates for improved housing, and indeed the current Government to think more laterally about such options if the option of increased investment is not feasible.

 

First, in my Inside Story article, I canvassed the idea of a Government owned corporation being established (which might joint venture with Indigenous corporations) with access to an effective Commonwealth guarantee and the capacity to borrow funds from private sector sources to build, own and rent out housing in remote communities. Such an initiative would tackle the shortage of housing, and of staff housing, in remote communities (which acts as a disincentive to attract and retain both locally engaged and external staff) and would open up new sources of private-sector capital for investment in remote locations.

 

Second, in a new environment where the majority of housing investment must be sourced from either mainstream Commonwealth programs, and / or state and territory programs, it is incumbent on the Commonwealth to adopt a much more focussed and robust approach to ensuring that these sources of investment are responding to the needs of remote communities. So for example, this would suggest that the Commonwealth Indigenous Affairs portfolio should step up and take a much more active role in encouraging states and territories to maximise their investments in remote housing, and take a much more robust  ‘coordination’ role vis a vis relevant Commonwealth agencies and programs such as the National Housing and Homelessness Agreement, and the operations of the Housing Australia Future Fund. Similarly with the operations of the Infrastructure portfolio. There is a case for looking much more closely at the operations of the North Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF), and whether there are any operational changes that might be made to increase investment in one of the major infrastructure assets across northern Australia, the totality of the remote housing and community infrastructure asset base.

 

Third, it is time the Commonwealth established a truly independent and forward looking review of the remote housing challenge the nation faces. The 2017 NPARIH Review (link here unfortunately without a link to the actual report) was fundamentally flawed (link here), and even so was then ignored. It was backward looking, whereas what is now required is a review that sets out the extent and parameters of the challenge, assesses the likely demographic changes and implications of various scenarios, identifies emerging risks arising from climate change and other societal trends, and examines in detail options for the most effective architecture of the remote housing sector (social housing, community housing, or both?) as well as innovative financing of remote housing. In proposing such a review, I am seeking to focus on the systemic and structural drivers of housing exclusion and disadvantage rather than the lived experience that flows from those systemic constraints. While there is an argument that such an independent review should be given a broader remit, the risk of a deeper crisis in the narrow housing sector emerging in the coming decade are such that I would suggest a narrow focus would be best at this point. That is not to downplay the broader challenges facing remote Australia, though I would argue that they are in most respects amenable to clear sighted policy development by policymakers.

 

Fourth, the poorly conceptualised and drafted Closing the Gap housing and essential services targets 9a and 9b need to be revised to ensure that government focus on closing the full gap, not part of the gap. The Implementation plans that have been adopted to date are next to useless and require a major overhaul. They need to be strategically focussed on the targets identified and list proposed actions. Not data, not miniscule funding grants, not good intentions, not more process. Housing and essential services are tangible and susceptible to clear measurement. Five yearly updates in the census will not cut it. Nor will national data sets that are not broken down at least into urban, regional and remote.

 

In conclusion, the policy choices made over the past five years in relation to remote housing are retrograde and will have very real consequences: for taxpayers, for the population of remote Australia, both Indigenous  and non-Indigenous, and most importantly for the residents of these overcrowded and under-maintained houses across remote Australia. Over fifty percent of those individuals are under 25 and the overcrowding will have lifelong consequences for the opportunities that are within their reach. These issues are just one part of the wider cataclysm (link here) impacting remote Australia. I am certain that within a very few decades, Australians across the political spectrum will pass an extremely negative judgment on these decisions, and the decisionmakers that shaped them.