Away, and mock the time with
fairest show;
False face must hide what the
false heart doth know.
Macbeth, Act one, Scene seven
On 29 August 2024 Minister for Indigenous Australians Malarndirri
McCathy issued an unprecedented media statement which among other things
extolled the virtues and rationale of good governance (link
here).
She proclaimed:
Good governance is the
cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and
accountability. Without the trust of the Anindilyakwa people and other key
stakeholders, the ALC cannot properly represent its people and achieve its
mission.
“I take governance at Land
Councils seriously - poor governance and decision making can have a significant
and detrimental impact on social, cultural and economic wellbeing.
This post provides a summary of the ALC’s most recent
Annual Report (link
here).
I previously posted on the topic of delays in reporting to the Parliament and
the public (link
here)
where I mentioned that the normal deadline for tabling annual reports of
Commonwealth entities was before the supplementary Budget Estimates Hearings
which are normally held after October each year.
In this post, I cover a wider set of issues than I would
normally, essentially because they are all raised one way or another by the most
recent ALC annual report. Significant issues covered include the basis for land
councils assisting local corporations, education outcomes on Groote Eylandt and
remote Australia generally, criminal justice outcomes, the status of the Winchelsea
mine proposal, and the Ministers decisions on land council funding across the
NT. I apologise for any induced indigestion!
The Delay in Tabling
The ALC Chair’s cover letter to the Minister is dated 18
February 2026. The financial statements were signed by the members constituting
the accountable authority on 13 February 2026. The ANAO signed off the audited
financial statements on 17 February without qualification. No explanation was
provided by the ALC nor the ANO for the delays in finalising the audit.
The Minister tabled the annual report on 16 April 2026. The
Report was initially due to be tabled around the end of October 2025, a
deadline that had been extended to end of February by the Minister. There does
not appear to have been any explanation provided for the delays of five and a
half months beyond the due date specified in the PGPA Act rules, and which
includes a period of almost two months after it had been provided to the
Minister. I find it problematic that a Minister who espouses the highest standards
of transparency and good governance for agencies within her portfolio appears to
allow lapses in such standards in matters within her control to occur without
explanation or apology. It raises the question: what is it that is being
hidden and downplayed, and why is that?
The CEO
On page 13, the Report states:
During the reporting period
the Chair of the ALC was Ms Cherelle Wurrawilya. The CEO position was held
by Mr Mark Hewitt until 16 October 2024. Mr Colin Wakefield held the
position of Interim CEO from 17 October 2024 to 28 April 2025. Mr Matthew
Bonson was CEO from 29 April 2025 and resigned on 17 July 2025. Michael Trainor
was appointed Interim CEO on 22 August 2025 (emphasis added).
This is one of the few references to Mr Hewitt in the
Annual Report. The section on the ALC CEO (page 17) focusses entirely on Mr
Bonson who was CEO for only two of the 12 months in the reporting period. There
is no mention of Mr Hewitt’s termination, nor the reasons or circumstances that
led to it. See my blog post The Angels Weep (link
here)
for the partial details of these events on the public record.
Performance Reporting
The ALC performance reporting is linked to its corporate
plan. See pages 48-50 for the explanation. In relation to the community and
economic development objectives of the corporate plan, there are performance
measures relating to school attendance, employment, law and justice outcomes
and housing.
Pages 59-61 deal with school
attendance in a limited cohort of some 80 students supported by the ALC
funded Groote Eylandt/ Bickerton Island Primary College Aboriginal Corporation
(GEBIPCAC). Attendance rates are declining (and there are indications that
wider attendance rates on Groote are similarly low and in decline). There is a
long explanation of some of the local factors contributing to these outcomes,
though it seems clear that more systemic factors are in play across the remote
areas of the NT (link
here)
and probably beyond. What is demonstrably clear, and should be of critical
concern to the NT Government and its Education Department, is that average attendance
rates for the 80 students in the cohort being measured of less than 40 percent
(see Figure 5c on page 61) are unlikely to deliver acceptable educational
outcomes for the students. While the measure suggests that at least 4 out of 10
students are at school each day, the reality is that it is highly likely that
virtually all students are missing some portion of each month’s schooling and
thus missing key steps in their education. When this persists over time (just
how long this period is I am not in a position to determine) the students reach
a point where they cannot keep up with the standard curriculum…in turn this
creates insurmountable gaps which make the standard curriculum inaccessible,
leading either to disruptive behaviours in class, further non-attendance, and
eventually permanent dropping out. This annual report is a micro window into a
massive problem that is impacting remote communities across at least four
jurisdictions. It should be acknowledged as a national tragedy, one that
activates and enlivens the Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Australians. Instead,
the response is invariably to shift responsibility: to the states, to the
education portfolio, to the parents…yes they all have responsibilities, but in
the circumstances we currently face, they all need to be encouraged, and activated
to take those responsibilities seriously. This is a role for the Commonwealth
Minister. Invariably however, what is in fact a national tragedy is merely
presented as a static statistic framed as ‘low school attendance’.
On page 62, it is revealed that
the employment rate of traditional owners by local organisations on
Groote has fallen over the past year. In 2023-4, 307 TOs were employed, whereas
in 2024-5, this had fallen to 199 (see Fig.5d on page 63). Here local factors
are the cause, and particularly the drop-off in s64(3) payments arising from
the cyclone damage to the wharf. This points to the urgent need for the Groote
community to focus much more attention on reducing the dependency and reliance on
the flow of royalty equivalents for key organisations on Groote.
Pages 64-68 record a truly
exceptional improvement in justice outcomes on the Island. The report
describes a range of new initiatives in recent years, and documents (using
police data) substantial falls in arrest rates:
Ø Total
recorded offences dropped by 75%, from 1,041 in 2019 to 261 in 2024 (Figure 5e)
Ø Youth
offending decreased by 90% since 2019, from 267 offences to just 28 in 2024
(Figure 5f)
Ø Arrests
have declined 85% from 427 in 2018 to 61 in 2024 (Source: NTG data supplied to
the ALC) These reductions are particularly notable in property damage, theft,
and public order offences.
The report claims this is the result of greater
Anindilyakwa control over justice initiatives and there is undoubtedly merit in
this. The youth offending statistics are extraordinary, identifying almost a
vertical drop in the last year (from around 250 to 50 offences), and suggest to
me that the reduction in discretionary incomes may also have had an impact. In
turn this points to issues that should perhaps be taken into account in future
benefits distributions. The ALC would be wise (in my humble opinion) to
commission an independent research project into the drivers of these
improvements, and how best to institutionalise them into the future.
Finally, the Report describes desultory progress on housing
construction, but this is perhaps also in large measure a consequence of
the Cyclone Megan. Hopefully progress will improve going forward, noting that
much of this is out of the hands of the ALC.
Mine related activities
The performance statements include a useful section on
mining, and particularly a detailed discussion of engagement with GEMCO. This
seems largely on track, with the ALC engaging to ensure minor contract issues
are resolved.
On the proposed Winchelsea mine, (as I have previously
noted (link
here)
the ALC appears to have stepped back and is now treating the mine as it would
any other third-party proposal. It does mention the Winchelsea exploration and
mining agreements but makes no comment. There is no reference to the
possibility that the agreements may be sub-optimal due to the possibility of
conflicts of interest (a matter that is not acknowledged and which is arguably
contested but see my previous analysis here and here). The
Report notes (page 72) that
Winchelsea Mining is yet to
commence production and during the period was, in ALC’s opinion, dormant. There
were no activities on Winchelsea during the reporting period.
On page 77, in a section reporting performance on cultural
protection, one of the corporate plan priorities, the report states (emphasis
added):
Secondly, cultural sites and
burial sites on Winchelsea Island were documented during cultural surveys
conducted in the context of mining exploration. The protection that has been
afforded to the recorded cultural sites and burial sites identified during the
cultural surveys are key to addressing Traditional Owner concerns about the
impact of proposed mining activities. Additional cultural surveys are
planned and may identify other burial sites for protection.
This is to my knowledge the first public acknowledgement of
unaddressed traditional owner concerns regarding mining on Winchelsea. It may
underpin the statement I drew attention to in my November 2025 post assessing
the most recent ALC Corporate Plan (link
here)
that
The ALC will be reviewing
arrangements with Winchelsea Mining to ensure Traditional Owner's interests
are met and that the principles of free, prior and informed consent
are adhered to.
Ministerial Directions
The report notes at page 78 that there were no ministerial
directions issued during the year.
This was notwithstanding the ostensible Ministerial
displeasure with the speed of progress in implementing the ANAO /Bellchambers
report which led her to deferring approval of the ALC estimates in late August
2024. In a media release dated 29 August 2024, she stated (inter alia):
I have taken the unusual
decision to withhold approval for the ALC’s 2024/25 budget, instead approving
an operational budget until 1 December 2024. The full budget will only be
considered when ALC has demonstrated to the NIAA that it is sufficiently prioritising
and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit. (link
here)
She provided the following direct quotation:
The steps I have taken today
put the ALC Board and management on notice. Their failure to sufficiently
respond to the recommendations of the independent review and ANAO must not
continue, and they need to demonstrate their progress to the NIAA.
This may not have been a formal ministerial direction
(there is no provision in the ALRA for such formal directions) but strikes me
as being in effect equivalent to a substantive direction. It also strikes me as
being significant enough to warrant a mention in a Commonwealth agency’s annual
report, perhaps in the section on significant actions and changes (see page 78)
or in relation to ANAO reports (see pages 46-47 and 79-80). Given the Minister’s
public statement calling on the ALC to engage more transparently, this seems
like it might have been a good place to start!
Consultants (pages 85-87).
Note the quite high legal costs, which are on top of the
in-house legal expertise on the ALC payroll. Yet there is absolutely no
explanation in the report nor in the ALC’s media statements on what these legal
costs are for (but see the section on contingent liabilities below).
Financial Statements 2024-25.
Note: Page numbering for the financial statements begins
afresh.
Employee costs used
On page 5 in the Cash Flow statement, it is revealed that employee
cash used has almost halved from the 2023-24 year, down from ($13,515,798)
to ($7,725,279). No reason is provided.
Audit committee costs
On page 9, audit committee costs have almost halved, from $100,241
to $52,354. This suggests that the poor value for money practices that were
adopted by the ALC over the past decade in relation to its Audit Committee
costs (as identified by the ANAO in 2023) has finally been addressed.
Reimbursement of Expenses.
On page 11, wages and salaries, on-charged to local
corporations (funded under 64(3)) reduced in 24/25, down from $6,874,714 to $3,818,802.
Superannuation costs on-charged were down from $721,462 to $423,938.
Thus, total reimbursement of expenses fell from $8,599,473
to $4,959,070. The implications of this reduction in employment totalling over
$3.5m is not clearly explained in the financial statement’s notes, nor as far
as I can see in the Annual Report itself. This strikes me as a noteworthy omission
in reporting significant events in the Land Council’s operations over the
financial year.
The note explaining this states:
The Anindilyakwa Land Council
sometimes pays for services and goods on behalf of other Aboriginal
Corporations to support the Corporations in pricing and availability. Under
Section 27 of the Aboriginal Lands Rights (NT) Act 1976 the Land Council can
supply such support when requested. The Anindilyakwa Land Council charges this
on to the Corporations with no further benefit. This note reports the substance
of the transaction of the goods and services and ensures a clear ability to
understand the true income and expense of the financial statements by all
users.
Section 27 of the ALRA states inter alia:
(1) Subject to this
Act, a Land Council may do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or
in connexion with the performance of its functions and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, may:
(1A) A
Land Council may, on the request of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
corporation that has received an amount of money from the Council under this
Act, provide administrative or other assistance to the corporation.
There is no mention of reimbursement in this provision. The
risk of utilising a reimbursement mechanism is that it creates a danger that a
land council might use the mechanism to in effect fund itself especially if it
can exercise influence or control over the local corporations being ‘assisted’.
I have previously argued (and the ANAO pointed to the elements that allow this
in its 2023 performance report) that the ALC exercises such influence over several
corporations it has funded under section 64(3).
Also relevant to the rationale for the provision of
‘assistance’ is s.23(1)(ea) of the ALRA which deals with assistance for
commercial activities of the corporations, and which states:
(1) The functions
of a Land Council are [inter alia]:
(ea) to assist
Aboriginals in the area of the Land Council to carry out commercial activities
(including resource development, the provision of tourist facilities and
agricultural activities), in any manner that will not cause the Land Council to
incur financial liability or enable it to receive financial benefit; …
In my view, the reimbursement of expenses mechanism as it
has been utilised by the ALC can easily slide into arrangements that would be
in breach of the terms of the legislation, and create opportunities for
maladministration (and in a worst case fraud) that require much greater
transparency than has been the case to date. The NIAA (including its Audit and
Risk Committee) in my view also has responsibilities to advise the Minister of
the risks involved in these processes. The fact that these arrangements have
been in place for an extended period without any public indication that such
warnings have been raised should be a major concern to oversight agencies such
as the ANAO and ORIC. See my previous discussion of these issues in my November
2025 analysis of the ALC Corporate Plan (link
here).
Contingent Liabilities
On page 29, there is mention of the litigation between the
ALC and GEAT. It is not mentioned elsewhere in any ALC public documents. Nor
has there been an explanation of the issues in play.
Note 11: Contingent Assets and
Liabilities. On 19 June 2024, Groote Eylandt Mining
Company Pty Ltd (GEMCO) served a writ to commence legal proceedings and seek a
determination in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory concerning a
dispute as to the proper division of mining royalties as between ALC and the
Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust in respect of the 2016 Eastern Leases Mining
Agreement signed under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976. The matter was listed for mention on 1 May 2025 was vacated and relisted
for 12 June 2025. The matter remains 'on foot' in the court until the position
between Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust (GEAT) and GEMCO is resolved. The
parties through formal negotiation are close to finalising a 'Variation
Agreement'. Legal costs are unknown at this moment.
Assets held in Trust
Within Note 15 on page 34, there is a table showing
the financial flows through the Royalty Shoppa card system. Some $14m
was lodged on Royalty shoppa cards in 2025, and $12m of that was spent. See
this post (link
here)
where I discussed a range of concerns with the operation of the Royalty Shoppa
card system. It seems clear that the scheme is still operational and widely
used. Its current effectiveness and fitness for purpose is unknown.
ALC Income for operating costs under s.64(1)
The Minister approves operational costs for land councils
under section 64(1) of the ALRA. It is the source of core operational funding
for all four land councils in the NT.
In 2024-25, the Tiwi Land Council s.64(1) funding dropped
by around 20 percent and the CLC funding dropped by around 5 percent. The NLC
received an increase in funding of some $38.7m, with section 64(1) funding
rising from $69.5m in 2023-24 to $108.2m in 2024-25 or just over 50 percent (see
page 116 of the NLC Annual report 2024-25). A footnote on page 120 identifies
capital expenditure of $39.5m for ongoing costs of the construction of office
precincts in Darwin and Katherine. When adjusted to take account of this, the
operational funding for the NLC fell from $69.55m in 2023-24 to $68.7m.
[Short digression: there is a slight
discrepancy between the section 64(1) allocations for the NLC in the ABA
financial statements appended to the NIAA Annual report (see page 178) and the
NLC Annual Report financial statements (see page 116). It is a comparatively
small amount, and I don’t consider it materially affects the substance of the argument
I am making here. The same ANAO delegate signed both audit statements two days
apart in September 2025.]
Thus, in 2024-25, the Minister approved funding providing
for reductions in operational funding for three of the four land councils
in the NT.
In contrast to the TLC, the CLC and the NLC, the ALC
financial statements disclose an annual increase in section 64(1) funding of
$2.59m, representing a 20 percent increase over the previous year’s
approved allocation of section 64(1) funding. See Note 3F on page 15 which
discloses that Section 64(1) revenue in 2024-25 was $13,702,683 and in
2023-24 was $11,105,777.
Somewhat extraordinarily, in a year when, and in which she
had issued a media release on 29 August of the financial year announcing an
unprecedented decision to publicly withhold approval of funding until December
based on generic and unspecified concerns that the ALC was not ‘sufficiently
prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO
audit’, the only land council to be granted an increased section 64(1) operational
budget by the Minister was the ALC.
Any suggestion that the ALC had somehow demonstrated that
it was suddenly ‘sufficiently prioritising the implementation of these reviews
and audits is undercut by the ANAO Financial Statements Audit Report issued
on 6 February 2025 (link
here)
which noted in relation to the ALC, inter alia:
4.14.58 The status of the
recommendations made by the ANAO, and the minister’s action to withhold
funding, have heightened concerns about the ALC’s progress in addressing the
governance findings.
4.14.59 In view of the reduced
available funding highlighted above, further audit work was required by the
ANAO to understand ALC’s ongoing financial feasibility….
….
4.14.62 The ANAO concluded
that there is sufficient evidence to support the preparation of the 2023–24
financial statements on a going concern basis, and the action taken by ALC to
address the performance audit recommendations will be revisited by the ANAO
in the 2024–25 audit. (emphasis
added)
In other words, the ANAO would not be able to formally
conclude that the ALC was sufficiently implementing its recommendations until
the finalisation of the 2024-25 Financial Audit. While this assessment may not
have been published before the Minister approved the full year budget, it
does raise questions as to how the Minister might have reached a view that
increased funding was warranted.
It is perhaps worth asking the question, what changed for
the ALC between 29 August 2024 when the Minister announced the funding freeze
and December 2024 when she likely approved the full year budget? The answer
of course is the information that neither the Minister nor the ALC wishes to
discuss.
My June 2025 post ‘FOI Updates on ALC and Groote Eylandt’
(link
here)
confirms that in July 2024 the NIAA (undoubtedly with the Ministers knowledge) referred
the ALC CEO to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Within a month,
the Minister issued her media release announcing a funding halt for the ALC. In
October, the ALC Board met with no staff present and a single NIAA senior
officer in attendance and decided to terminate on notice the former CEO (i.e.
with a termination payment) with immediate effect. Within months, the full year
funding for the ALC had been restored, and we now learn (alone among the
four NT Land Councils) with additional funding of $2.5m, a 20 percent increase
in operational funding. No public announcement was made notwithstanding the
previous announcement of the funding halt. While a replacement CEO was not
appointed until 29 April 2025, the appointee Mr Bonson resigned some months
later. A new CEO has only recently taken up duty.
Readers and this author alike are left with the conundrum: what
involvement did the Minister have in deciding it was time for the former CEO of
the ALC to depart? Was there any effort made to encourage the ALC to terminate the
CEO? Why might the Minister have thought it useful or necessary to provide the
ALC with an unexplained 20 percent increase in the Land Council’s operational
budget in the months after the CEO’s departure and before a permanent CEO had
been recruited? And what does the Minister know about the causes of the
institutional mayhem on Groote over the last decade that she is not telling us?
At the beginning of this post, I quoted the Minister’s
statement that:
Good governance is the
cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and
accountability…
For my part, I would reverse the order and suggest that trust
and transparency are the indispensable prerequisite of good governance. Unfortunately,
trust and transparency are in short supply in both Groote Eylandt and Canberra.
4 May 2026
