Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great
argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in
a straw
When honour's at the stake.
Hamlet Act four, Scene four.
For reasons that will become apparent, the following post
focusses primarily on economic development issues, and particularly the
proposed development of the Winchelsea Mine on Aboriginal land in the Groote
Eylandt archipelago. I have added bolded text to extracts from the
Corporate Plan and elsewhere for emphasis.
The Anindilyakwa Land Council
Corporate Plan 2025-26 (link here) identifies
five key activities: Caring for country; Economic and community development; Monitor
mining and mine closure; Preserving culture; and Governance. I will focus here
on just one: economic and community development.
In relation to economic and community development, the plan identifies (page 7) the following activities:
Work collaboratively to pursue commercial and community development outcomes that builds a prosperous future for the Traditional Owners of the Groote Archipelago.1. Distribute mining royalties to support the growth of a culturally informed, diversified and sustainable post mining economy in line with the wishes of TOs.
2. Support the implementation of the Local Decision Making Agreement (LDMA) across housing, education, economic development, law, justice and rehabilitation, health and wellbeing, and local government to achieve self-determination.
3. Provide appropriate support structures including the operation of the Finance Committee and the Royalty Development Unit to build capability and capacity of Anindilyakwa-led Aboriginal Corporations.
4. Work in partnership with Aboriginal Corporations to strengthen Traditional Owner led commercial and community development activities.
5. Work with stakeholders to build the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust (AMT) investment to support a perpetual future Groote Archipelago cultural economy.
6. Deliver a community support program to improve Traditional Owners wellbeing, address community needs and to work collaboratively with community service providers.
7. Build Anindilyakwa data sovereignty to support informed and evidence based local decision making.
In relation to the ALC’s operating context, the Corporate
Plan notes (page 12) the following developments in relation to the oversight of
section 64(3) payments of royalty equivalents to Aboriginal corporations
representing TOs and affected communities:
The ALC has appointed a
Finance Committee under ALRA section 29(A) to review matters pursuant to ALRA
section 35(2), 35(4), 35, 35B and/or 35C and where applicable, make
recommendations to the ALC Board.
It also notes that the ALC does not have any subsidiaries.
Under Economic Transformation (page 13), the Corporate
Plan refers to enterprise developments focussed on seafood exports but makes
no mention of the Winchelsea mine. In relation to infrastructure there is
mention of the Little Paradise developments, but without mentioning their
linkage to the proposed mine. Also mentioned is that the ALC has a service
agreement in place with Anindilyakwa Royalties Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC) to
project manage and support delivery of some infrastructure projects on the
Groote Archipelago.
In a section headed Significant agreements- Mining and
Exploration, which deals primarily with South32’s GEMCO mine, the Corporate
Plan adds a short paragraph:
Winchelsea Mining. The ALC will be
reviewing arrangements with Winchelsea Mining to ensure Traditional Owner's
interests are met and that the principles of free, prior and informed
consent are adhered to.
There is no reference to the fact that Anindilyakwa
Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC) owns 70 percent of Winchelsea Mining,
nor any reason provided for initiating the review. The substantial previous allocations
to AAAC and GHAC in support of the mine are not mentioned. AAAC and GHAC are
both corporations to which activity 4 above refers.
In a section headed Cooperation (page 21), the Corporate
Plan states:
Aboriginal Corporations
operating on the Groote Archipelago are the recipients of ALC's ALRA section
64(3) royalty distributions and play a crucial role in supporting ALC's purpose
to invest in the present to build a self-sufficient future for Traditional
Owners. The ALC works closely with local Aboriginal Corporations to implement
the LDMA to transfer the control of services and assets to Traditional Owners
in the areas of economic development, education, housing, health, law, justice
and rehabilitation and local government. The ALC offers support services to
Aboriginal Corporations and enterprises to enhance governance and business
management. A services deed is in place with ARAC, for the ALC to provide
business administration services, project management and program delivery.
Implicit in the text of the recent Corporate Plan is a significant
shift in emphasis and presumably strategic intent away from framing the
proposed Winchelsea mine as the mechanism for creating a self-sustaining Fund
which will underpin the economic and social development of Groote in
perpetuity. The salience of this shift
is evident when the previous ALC Corporate Plan (2023-24) is
compared.
In that document, the section headed Significant
agreements (page 14) stated (inter alia):
As mine closure approaches in 2030-31, … Working
groups have been established to provide focus on a range of considerations
including … opportunities for Winchelsea Mining Operations.
Winchelsea Mining is a joint
venture that is majority owned by the Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal
Corporation and that has been purposefully established as a future Groote
enabling project with a core vision to raise enough revenue to support the economic
and social future of the TOs of the Groote Archipelago. Capital construction of
the Winchelsea mine is expected to commence in 2025. The mining venture will
provide annual fixed payments to impacted clans, provide guaranteed payments
into the AMT and surplus profits will be reinvested into major projects for the
benefit of TOs. It is proposed that the Winchelsea mine closure plan will
include re-purposing the mine site to scale up aquaculture operations post
mining.
The ALC Strategic Plan 2023-33 issued in January 2024 was
even more explicit regarding the ALC involvement in driving the Winchelsea
mine. The overview stated (page 5):
By taking a strategic holistic
perspective captured within the Strategic Plan 2023-33 the ALC enhances the
administration and decision making relating to the distribution of ALRA S64(3)
royalty monies which forms a significant function of the ALC. The Strategic
Plan 2023-33 seeks to maximise the economic opportunities available while
mining is taking place on the Groote Archipelago by resource companies South32
and Winchelsea Mining Pty Ltd, and to utilise the royalties received to
stimulate and grow a diversified, culturally informed, and environmentally
sustainable post-mining economy.
On page 26, the Strategic plan states:
The ALC actively
advocates for an economic development landscape that
is diversified and that stimulates establishing and running enterprises that
meet the principles listed above. The ALC provides Aboriginal Corporations on
the Groote Archipelago with support to build capability, governance and
viability to operate enterprises that achieves positive outcomes for their
businesses and the Groote Archipelago communities.
It goes on to describe the activities of Groote Holdings
Aboriginal Corporation (GHAC):
In February 2021, Groote
Holdings Aboriginal Corporation (GHAC) commenced operations and will play a
significant role in the delivery of the Economic Development Implementation
Plan. GHAC has been established to benefit all clans of the Groote Archipelago
and structured to facilitate the delivery of major projects and to hold
assets and infrastructure that benefits the Groote Archipelago. GHAC’s main
area of focus is on the Little Paradise Development which includes a
suite of projects pursued by TOs on their land to support their future economic
prosperity.
The document identifies the Little Paradise hub as
(inter alia) the logistics and base camp for Winchelsea mine operations and
workers accommodation.
At pages 34-36, the Strategic plan outlines the proposed
operations of the Winchelsea mine. Selected extracts include:
The role of the ALC in
relation to Winchelsea mining is to carry out the ALC’s functions under ALRA
S23(ea) and to support TOs of the Groote Archipelago to pursue commercial
activities, which includes resource development. The ALC’s role has been to
consult with TOs and to support TOs to pursue the commercial opportunity in
line with their wishes, to distribute royalty monies to support standing up the
project, to support TOs to establish the commercial arrangements, regulatory
and government approvals and enter into the ALC and Winchelsea Mining
Agreement. Winchelsea Mining Company is a joint venture between Anindilyakwa
Advancement Aboriginal Corporation (AAAC) and AUS China International Mining
Pty Ltd, with AAAC holding a large majority (70%) of the interest in the joint
venture. While TOs have long held the position that mining on the Groote
Archipelago should not and will not last forever, there is an acceptance of the
economic benefits that extracting the resources held on their lands can
provide.
Winchelsea mine is
positioned as a future Groote enabling project with a core vision to raise
enough revenue to permanently support the economic and social future of the TOs
of the Groote Archipelago. A 30-year mining lease was
granted by the NT Government for the Winchelsea mining operations in March
2022. Once the mine goes into production it is expected to be operational for
at least 10 years. A significant milestone was achieved in March 2023 with the
completion of the Winchelsea Joint Ore Reserves Committee Reserve Statement
(Winchelsea Mining Pty Ltd, 2023) which provides an independent sign-off, of
the environmental reports, geology, ore reserves, purchasing agreements and
other pertinent factors and which is a requirement before obtaining approval to
mine. The mining venture will provide annual fixed payments to impacted
clans, provide guaranteed payments into the Anindilyakwa Mining Trust and
surplus profits will be reinvested into major projects for the benefit of TOs….
At pages 41-42, the Strategic Plan states in relation to
the role of GHAC:
GHAC has been established to
purchase and own major assets to facilitate transportation and access to major
economic development locations. By utilising economic stimulus funding from
NIAA, GHAC has purchased vessels and provides services (at cost) to support
major economic development projects by providing transportation of goods and
personnel to support the construction of the Boarding School on Bickerton
Island, the Winchelsea mining operations, and the Little Paradise Development.
GHAC was also funded
from the economic stimulus package to extend the jetty at Winchelsea Island,
establish a new jetty at Little Paradise and
to establish a new ramp on Bickerton Island. The jetties and ramps are
critical to the commencement of mining at Winchelsea Island, the Little
Paradise Development, and the construction of the Boarding School on
Bickerton Island, respectively.
Not only was the ALC driving the development of the
Winchelsea mine, but NIAA COVID era economic stimulus funding was utilised for
the development of the jetties on Winchelsea Island and at Little Paradise.
Comment
The key take out from the latest Corporate Plan is the
significant shift away from the centrality of the Winchelsea mine as the potential
future cornerstone of economic development on Groote. The latest corporate
plan does not rule out future support by the ALC (via section 64(3)
allocations) for the mine, but neither does it suggest that such support will
be automatically forthcoming.
While it is a much more coherent and sensible approach than
previously in place, it suffers from the same lack of underlying explanation
and rationale that infected the previous strategic documents. In short, there
is a disturbing lack of transparency in the failure to explain why the ALC has
shifted direction. It is unclear whether the ALC has undertaken new analysis
that it is not prepared to reveal, or whether the ALC’s shift is based on
external factors it is not prepared to reveal.
This gap is of concern, because without being transparent
about why the shift in strategic direction was required, and what are the specific
issues which have led to this significant change of strategic direction, the
ALC Board is effectively announcing that it is prepared to continue to pursue
strategic pathways based primarily on the degree to which they meet the political
imperatives of the moment. In turn, this severs the link between developing a
culture of hardheaded analysis of the risks they are facing, the opportunities
that might be pursued, and the costs of the alternative choices available to
the ALC in the pursuit of those opportunities. In other words, while the new
strategic directions appear to be an improvement on the past choices made by
the ALC, there is no guarantee that the new choices will be the best strategic
choices available, and nor is there a guarantee that the ALC will not revert to
the poor decision making practices that have led them to the (belated)
realisation that a change of strategic direction is required.
Of course, if the ALC now understands that the Winchelsea
mine will not provide the post manganese mining sustainable economic future that
was the putative rationale for ALC support, does the ALC have an alternative
pathway in mind to such a future? Or does the ALC recognise that such an aspiration
is (and arguably always was) a chimera? If the former, the ALC owes it to its constituents
to lay out that pathway backed by rigorous analysis and data. If the latter, it
owes its constituents both an apology and as much advance warning as possible
of the impending cessation in the almost fifty-year flow of royalties and
royalty equivalents to Aboriginal people on Groote.
A second take out which is graphically demonstrated by the
involvement of NIAA in funding infrastructure directly related to the proposed
Winchelsea mine through the economic stimulus funding provided by NIAA during
the COVID epidemic is that the NIAA has dropped the ball and is both conflicted
in terms of its regulatory responsibilities, and unwisely implicated in implicitly
encouraging implementation of the previous strategic approach that the
ALC has now determined requires drastic revision or perhaps complete disposal. Whatever
the failings of the ALC in pursuing what appear to have been deeply flawed
strategic objectives, the responsibility for those failing is shared with the
NIAA, and arguably, the NIAA should be held to a higher level of responsibility.
This insight begins to make transparent just one of the potentially multiple
reasons the Commonwealth and its agency the NIAA have adopted a position of
radical secrecy over all that has transpired on Groote Eylandt over the past
decade.
My next post will provide an update on information that has
recently come to my attention regarding the management and strategies of the
ALC in recent years and in addition (and of most relevance to the issues
discussed in this post) an indicative assessment of the direct and indirect costs
incurred to date on the old, and apparently discarded strategy of shaping the
ALC strategic agenda around the Winchelsea mine proposal.
12 November 2025
No comments:
Post a Comment