Native title and the paradox of accountability

In a recent opinion piece in the Australian Financial Review, (Native Title needs reforming or more indigenous opportunities will be lost; link here) Senator Dean Smith from Western Australia, provided an exquisite example of political positioning masquerading as policy analysis.

Ostensibly, Senator Smith was making the case for review of the role and responsibilities of native title representative bodies (which represent native title holders in claims) and prescribed bodies corporate (which formally hold title on behalf of native title holders). Yet the subliminal message was that native title was a potential impediment to economic development, that this was the result of poor levels of governance and transparency within Aboriginal organisations, and by implication that it was up to Indigenous people to fix it.

Thus the article argues that the complexity of Aboriginal land ownership and the necessity for negotiation creates a system which ‘can become extremely costly and complicated’; that this can lead to ‘adversarial and opportunistic practices focussed on short term revenue raising’ in the name of claimants and native title holders; and that often ‘the lion’s share of revenue goes not to the traditional owners but the Native Title representative bodies and other native title business brokers’.

Then Senator Smith pivots to a recent ANAO audit of the Northern Land Council (NLC) which fulfils a number of roles including that of a native title representative body in the NT. Senator Smith shares the following quotation:

The report identified a ‘fundamental breakdown in in the governance framework at the NLC, resulting in serious failings in almost all aspects of the council’s administration’, including weaknesses in the NLC’s financial management, reporting ad internal management measures.

Senator Smith did qualify his point by adding the following paragraph:

Positively, the report did identify a commitment on the part of the NLC to implementing ‘a wide-ranging reform agenda covering almost all aspects of the governance and administration of the council’.  

Senator Smith then moves from the value laden and far from neutral heading ‘Opportunism rife’ to his more direct conclusion: ‘Lost Opportunities’.

He argues for review of the roles and responsibilities of native title bodies to improve their levels of governance and transparency, arguing they disadvantage both Indigenous citizens and the wider community. In Senator Smith’s view, the expansion of the Ord River Scheme and the northern cattle herd, the development of the Canning Basin onshore gas reserves, and tourism generally represent opportunities which ‘could easily be lost if we don’t call out the inefficiencies of a current native title regime that has evolved in a way that works against the long term community and economic interests of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians’.

So what’s going on here?

First, beneath the surface text which is carefully nuanced to appear objective, and which includes a number of points which are well made and with which I agree, there is nevertheless a clear propensity to attribute primary responsibility for the problems identified and for finding the solutions to Indigenous people and organisations. The glancing mention of Fortescue Metals Group as having negotiated in good faith (link here), the implication that representative bodies and advisers (‘native title business brokers’) are exploiting traditional owners, the overly simplistic reference to the ANAO report, and the framing of lost economic opportunities for the wider community and nation all reinforce this meta-message.

Second, it is worth noting that Senator Smith has been in the news lately advocating strongly for parliament to resolve the same sex marriage deadlock in our political system (link here, and here). For a Senator who is a member of the conservative wing of the Liberal Party, with a constituency being actively courted by Cory Bernardi’s Australian Conservatives Party and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, it might be timely to send out a reminder to supporters that his liberal tendencies only extend so far.

Whether intended or not, the likely impact of the opinion piece is to provide reassurance to Senator Smith’s core constituency that he remains a staunch conservative. What it also unfortunately demonstrates is that allocating blame for complex policy outcomes primarily on Indigenous interests is alive and well as a political trope in Australia today. The comparative lack of Indigenous political power in Australian society makes them vulnerable to gratuitous criticism designed to advance other political agendas.

Third, the corollary of framing the problem as one caused by Indigenous interests is that alternative analyses are implicitly ignored or ruled out. In particular, what is the role of the government in ensuring that institutional frameworks such as in native title are working effectively? This is the issue which I wish to explore more fully below.

There are two broad arguments advanced by Senator Smith. First, that native title is not working as well as it could or should. I agree with the diagnosis, but not with Senator Smith’s analysis of the causes. Second, the NLC is suffering from a ‘fundamental breakdown’ in governance and administration. Again, this needs detailed unpicking.

As for the native title issue, my starting point is to make the obvious point that Senator Smith is a member of a Government which has been in place for almost four years, yet has delivered very little on native title. One of the Government’s first moves in this space was to reinstate provision for funding of non-native title respondents to native title claims (link here). In June 2015, the Government received a report from the Australian Law Reform Commission reviewing the Native Title Act (Connection to Country: Review of the Native Title Act 1993; link here); they have received a report from an expert Panel established by COAG to investigate Aboriginal Land Administration and Use (link here). In neither case has any substantive comprehensive reform eventuated. The recent requirement for urgent reform of the Native title Act to fix the McGlade decision in the Federal court (link here) merely serves to reinforce the ad hoc and reactive approach of the current Government to native title issues.

Thus even if one were to accept in full Senator Smith’s characterisation of the issues to be addressed (I don’t), there are strong grounds for concluding that the Government has dropped the ball on the native title reform task. It is particularly telling that Senator Smith’s article omits all reference to these reviews, and omits all reference to the role and responsibility of government to ensure that the institutional infrastructure of society is fit for purpose.

 I have previously commented on native title and land issues in earlier posts (link here and here), so will not take this discussion further at this point. My own take on the strategic challenges facing both policymakers and indigenous interests in the native title space can be found a recent Discussion Paper on the CAEPR website (link here).

Turning to the issue of the Northern Land Council (NLC) and the ANAO audit (link here) to which Senator Smith referred, and the role of government in maintaining institutional resilience, there are a number of points to make.

First, a key point to note is that while the NLC is a native title representative body, it is also (unlike most native title representative bodies) a Commonwealth statutory corporation subject to the PGPA Act, with a range of other functions, and governed by its own legislation which is the responsibility of the Minister for Indigenous Affairs.

Second, the key quotation attributed to the ANAO by Senator Smith is in fact a finding of a 2013 review by Deloittes into the NLC, not a 2017 ANAO audit. The implication is that the ‘fundamental’ issues which Senator Smith infers are of current significance are instead some four years old. 

The Deloittes report was instigated by the NLC and the Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) following a critical Department of Finance Audit of the NLC’s governance in 2009 (link here) was followed by a qualified financial statements audit from the ANAO which identified financial weaknesses, and this led to a Senate Estimates Hearing which was highly critical of the NLC, and led subsequently to the ANAO audit referenced by Senator Smith.

Third, the ANAO appear to have adopted a particularly low key approach to its formal recommendations, as a close reading of the report reveals numerous adverse findings particularly in relation to PMC oversight, and suggests that a set of much more robust recommendations, particularly in relation to the PMC oversight responsibility, was warranted.

Fourth, in relation to the NLC’s functions as a native title representative body, the ANAO audit notes (at para 2.25) that the Minister for Indigenous Affairs Senator Scullion wrote to the NLC in May 2016 that he was ‘satisfied that the NLC satisfactorily performs its existing functions as a representative body under the Act and would be able to continue to do so’. This directly contradicts the messaging in Senator Smith’s article, yet was not addressed by Senator Smith.

Fifth, while the audit identifies substantial progress by the NLC in implementing necessary reforms, it does not provide the NLC with a clean bill of health. For example, the ANAO note that the NLC’s administrative arrangements ‘do not yet effectively support the work of the council’ (page 9).

So for example, the ANAO notes (para 3.12) that prior to February 2016 ‘the NLC executive and senior staff had no visibility of the organisations allocation of resources and internal budgets (para 3.12); that as at 1 March 2017, the NLC did not have a procurement policy, and procurement practice did not meet requirements set out in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (para 3.14); that issues with the road worthiness and safety of the NLC’s vehicle fleet management procedures have been reported since 2011-12, but remain outstanding as at March 2017 (para 3.18). Apart for the questions which clearly ought to be directed to the NLC and its leadership, the obvious questions is: where was the Ministers Department and its oversight function as these problems emerged? It is not as if they were not warned!

In response to the 2015 issues the Minister requested the NLC develop a plan that outlines its approach to addressing concerns about its performance. The ANAO states that ‘while many of the actions in the plan have been completed and others are underway, the NLC has not provided progress reports on outcomes against the plan, although agreeing to do so’ (para3.65). Where was the Department as this emerged?

In Chapter Four of its report, the ANAO consider in detail the NLC’s planning and budget processes, and in particular examine the relationship between the NLC and the Minister’s Department in relation to budget issues.

The ANAO find that there is a need for better alignment between the NLC’s performance and planning frameworks and the Commonwealth’s performance framework set out in the PGPA Act 2013. The ANAO examines in some detail the role of PMC in setting the budgets for the NLC. It recounts in some detail the process followed in the 2015-16 and 2016-17 budget discussions, which involved a formal written requirement by the minister to implement a zero-based review of all budget bids and items. The ANAO notes that PMC held meetings to discuss the changed approach, and in a telling point, noted that:

No records of these meetings were kept, and there was no evidence as to the outcomes of the discussions and if they met their stated aims. There was no documented advice or guidance provided to Land Councils on the new approach (para 4.21).

In a classic example of audit understatement, the ANAO conclude:

Broadly, there are shortcomings in the process for providing funds to the NLC under s64(1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act. There was little evidence that zero based approach and application of the funding principles had been followed by the NLC in submitting bids or by PMC in assessing the bids, and a lack of transparency of the basis for the funding decisions. (Emphasis added).

It is difficult to interpret or understand this mutual dynamic of inconsistent formal rhetoric of good budget practice and informal reality of total lack of process as anything but a cynical ploy to avoid accountability for decisions. It is inconceivable to me that the department would subvert the written requirements of the minister without his implicit consent. The ANAO finding goes to the heart of ministerial responsibility, and (assuming the minister is not incompetent) leads to the inevitable conclusion that good process was being deliberately subverted. To what ends we can only guess.

The ANAO went on to footnote the Full Federal Court decision which overruled the Ministers attempt to overturn a decision made by his predecessor in relation to a grant to the MJD Foundation (link here), a clear example of ministerial over-reach consistent with the lack of transparency in his decision-making around land council budgets and it is worth noting the billion dollar Indigenous Advancement Strategy program (link here). As if to reinforce the point to the cognoscenti, the ANAO goes on to list the advice from PMC over a number of years for more rigorous budget processes (see paras 4.24-25), advice which appears to have been ignored or dismissed by the Minister. In reading this report, it needs to be remembered that the ANAO is not authorised to examine the actions of ministers, and its remit is focussed on the actions of agencies. It is no surprise then that it appears to hold back.

So the sixth point to make is that PMC and its responsible Minister appear to have comprehensively failed to establish and maintain an effective process of regulatory oversight of the NLC (and by implication) the other NT land councils. The ANAO specifically note that their report (footnote 3, page 7) may be relevant to other land councils.

Given the sustained absence of effective regulatory oversight of statutory corporations by the responsible minister, his or her department, and the Department of Finance which has responsibility for the PGPA Act 2013, attempts to criticise the statutory corporation for alleged misdeeds will always be highly problematic.

Senator Smith’s sideways slap at the NCL based as it was on a fundamental misreading of the currency and time frames of the issues he raised, and complete absence of any analysis of the role of the Minister for Indigenous Affairs in ensuring that agencies such as the NLC in his portfolio are operating effectively, falls squarely within this set of problematic critiques. While we should not be surprised when politicians pursue political agendas, it does seem important that we hold them to a level of accountability in relation t the factual accuracy of their claims, both in terms of what they say, and what they omit to say.

Finally, my own take on the rather sorry saga of which the NLC audit was culmination of almost a decade of poor administrative and governance performance is that that the cross cultural nature of organisations such as the NLC and other native title bodies makes them extremely vulnerable to governance challenges which have the potential to disadvantage their constituents and Indigenous citizens more broadly. The solutions lie in the promotion and support of leadership within these organisations by all who engage with them (whether they are commercial partners, philanthropics, governments or individuals) and in the establishment by government of robust regulatory and governance frameworks which adopt high expectations and hold Indigenous organisations to the highest standards of accountability on a sustained basis. Noel Pearson’s concept of the ‘soft bigotry of low expectations’ (link here) is particularly apposite in this context

The paradox of course is that our own political system appears incapable of holding ministers to account for ongoing and systemic shortfalls in regulatory performance. I am unaware of any academic or media reporting of this NLC audit which examines the shortfalls identified on the government side of the ledger, let alone any concern or criticism of the supposedly responsible minister for the identified shortfalls of his department.

For those who wish to drive substantive and sustained positive change for native title outcomes, rather than see native title as an impediment to economic development and a problem caused by Indigenous citizens, they might encourage governments to focus on improving the regulatory oversight of native title bodies, building their capacity, and strengthening the support offered by governments to ensure native title institutions work effectively and Indigenous organisations involved contribute to the delivery of sustained outcomes for all Australians. 

Closing the Gap on Indigenous incarceration

When sorrows come, they come not single spies
But in battalions.

Hamlet Act 4, scene 5.

A recent blog post from NACCHO, the peak body for the Community controlled health organisations brought to my attention that research published in 2011 had found that 94 percent of Indigenous prisoners in the Northern Territory suffered from hearing loss. 94 percent!

Here is a link to the ABC news story earlier this month. Here is a link to an article in the Indigenous Law Bulletin in 2012 reporting the research.

Apart from the obvious issues related to the administration of justice which arise from this level of disability, and which are discussed in the articles linked above, it strikes me as a terrific – or terrible  -  example of how in the Indigenous policy domain, and more saliently for Indigenous people themselves, challenges come ‘in battalions’, not as ‘single spies’.

We all know intuitively that one problem contributes to another. Poor housing, poor sanitation, poor access to fresh fruit and vegetables, poor diet, and poor education and literacy leads to poor health, particularly for vulnerable children. Poor environmental conditions and poor health, particularly amongst children, leads to ongoing chronic disease, and lifelong conditions such as diabetes, kidney disease, eye nose and throat conditions, and hearing loss. Hearing loss leads to learning difficulties, frustration, and ultimately to a loss of interest in attending school. Dispossession leads to social and cultural trauma, and constrains economic opportunity; impacts which are increasingly recognised as having intergenerational impacts. Lack of economic opportunity, poor education and skill deficits lead to loss of self-esteem, boredom, mental health issues, and potentially anti-social behaviour including alcohol, drug and substance abuse. In turn, these conditions can lead to widespread Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FASD), which in turn limit educational options, predispose individuals to mental health issues and potentially suicide, and adversely affect life opportunities across the economic, social and cultural domains.

I set out this admittedly anecdotal and random snapshot merely to illustrate the overwhelming magnitude of the challenges facing many individuals and the concomitant complexity of the policy challenge which aims to remediate or reverse disadvantage.

One of the consequences of deep seated individual and societal disadvantage is that many individuals breach social and cultural norms, and end up in the justice system. The extent of that problem is enormous, particularly in remote Australia.

An April 2016 post on the Parliamentary Library blog Flag Post (link here), assessing progress over the 25 years since the landmark Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, reported mixed results: in those 25 years, the absolute numbers of Indigenous deaths in custody were less than the 1991 benchmark in only one year. Encouragingly, rates of Indigenous deaths in custody had declined by more than half, from a high of around 0.45 per 100 prisoners in some years to around 0.1 per 100 prisoners in the most recent statistics, a rate which was below the non-Indigenous rate. This suggests that determined policy action backed by political will is able to make a positive difference.

Yet while rates of indigenous deaths in custody have declined, rates of Indigenous incarceration have increased. In fact, the Parliamentary Library cites data indicating Indigenous prisoners as a proportion of the overall prison population have doubled since the Royal Commission from14 percent to 28 percent of all prisoners.

Under the heading ‘What next?’ the Parliamentary Library concluded with the following assessment:

In the wake of this dramatic increase in incarceration, some have argued that the recommendations of the Royal Commission, particularly on prosecution for minor offences and steps to Indigenous self-determination, were never adequately implemented. Others argue that the Royal Commission did not correctly prioritise the causes of high crime and therefore incarceration rates: substance (abuse, and childhood deprivation, abuse and neglect. The Change the Record Coalition, the Australian Medical Association, the Australian Red Cross, and Save the Children agree that alcohol and drug abuse and poor childhood outcomes are driving Indigenous incarceration, and Indigenous-led programs practicing ‘justice reinvestment’ are needed.

Many stakeholders have called for a new Closing the Gap target to be created for incarceration rates. Introduction of a ‘justice target’ was a recommendation of the 2011 House of Representatives Committee inquiry Doing Time - Time For Doing: Indigenous youth in the criminal justice system. In 2013 setting this target was part of the ALP’s Federal Election Indigenous policy. Minister for Indigenous Affairs Nigel Scullion stated in 2014 that the Government would prioritise acting on Indigenous incarceration through the existing Closing the Gap targets.

A recent May 2017 report by PwC and four partners titled Indigenous incarceration: Unlock the facts (link here, also available at www.pwc.com.au) outlines in a highly accessible format the extraordinary levels of over-representation of Indigenous Australians in prison. The report notes that Indigenous men are imprisoned at 11 times the rate of the general male population; Indigenous women at 15 times the rate of the general female population; and Indigenous youth are imprisoned at 25 times the rate of non-Indigenous youth. In remote regions such as the Kimberley, Indigenous people are 40 times more likely to be incarcerated than the non-Indigenous population (Kimberley Development Commission Regional Investment Blueprint p 40: link here).

The PwC report helpfully identifies and discusses the key drivers of Indigenous incarceration, estimates the substantial cost to the Australian economy of Indigenous incarceration ($8bn) and thus the potential reform dividend available if reform is successful.

Finally, the report goes on to recommend a reform approach involving a suite of five broad policy components which they argue are essential for lasting reform. The five components are:

1.    Self-determination;

2.    System reform;

3.    Law reform;

4.    Increased community awareness; and

5.    Specific initiatives and programmatic responses, particularly Indigenous controlled and led.

It was at this point that I baulked. Reform in complex policy areas requires more than the identification of the problem, and more than an implicit diagnosis of causality. The Parliamentary Library identified a range of diagnoses (albeit embedded in the links to their final paragraphs). But unsurprisingly they stopped short of advocating specific policy interventions. The PwC report, in listing the five elements of lasting reform, implicitly merges their diagnoses with policy prescription: a lack of community ownership and control of policy responses; the continuing persistence of deepseated disadvantage, unspecified reforms to laws; a lack of community support for reform, and an absence or continuing need for specific programs. As policy prescription, this essentially amounts to an exercise in tautology.

PwC do however use the continuing existence of disadvantage to promote one specific policy initiative, the introduction of a ‘justice target as part of the Closing the Gap targets.

The advantage of such a target would be that it would focus policymakers’ attention, both in Canberra and the states and territories, on the issue of Indigenous incarceration and incentivise them to explore a wide suite of initiatives, large and small, which would hopefully drive changes to reduce the rate and levels of incarceration.

The reality is that where policy challenges are characterised by complex causality, it is most often the case that no single initiative or intervention will of itself be decisive in driving positive change. Moreover, policymakers act within contexts and environments which are constrained: by policy capability, by politics, by resources, and so on. The real world policy challenge is to design a set of incentive structures which encourage policymakers across jurisdictions, and at all levels within jurisdictions, to work on a sustained basis toward the desired outcome.

One such innovation was reported on in The Australian last week: ‘Home detention to keep indigenous offenders out of jail’ (link here). While not a panacea, it seems clear that greater use of home detention and community corrections orders offers many advantages apart from the obvious metric of keeping individuals out of prison. The Victorian Auditor General (link here) recently identified significant cost savings from the use of community corrections orders, along with reduced recidivism rates compared to prisoners. He was however also critical of the levels of support which were allocated to supporting community corrections orders, suggesting that implementing such a policy is not necessarily simple.

There will be many other similar opportunities, large and small, across the nation which could assist in lowering Indigenous incarceration rates. Perhaps an innovative policymaker in the NT will devise a way to reduce juvenile hearing loss in an effort to address a key precursor to youth offending!

A new justice target in the Closing the Gap targets would appear on its face to assist in driving desired policy innovation and reform. Of course, the target needs to be well crafted and able to be measured clearly, and needs to be ambitious enough to drive sustained action.

There are strong indications that the Government is prepared to reverse its previous antipathy and consider such a justice target as part of the current review by COAG of the Closing the Gap targets. See this ABC story from March this year (link here).

The ongoing failure to gain traction in what are in most cases relatively modest aspirations appear to have caused a rethink of the current Closing the Gap targets. COAG at its June 2017 meeting (link here) noted:

COAG leaders welcomed the work to refresh the Closing the Gap agenda, focussing on a strength-based approach that supports Indigenous advancement, working in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This work will inform efforts to develop a refreshed agenda and targets over the remainder of 2017, implementation principles, as well as advice to COAG’s second meeting of 2017 on an approach for the next phase of Closing the Gap.

A refreshed set of targets would open an opportunity to strengthen the whole of government focus on Indigenous incarceration.

If policymakers responding to a national target design interventions which incentivise the police, the courts, and indeed the community appropriately, there is a prospect that solutions to the crisis in Indigenous incarceration might emerge over time, and progressively reduce the ‘sorrows’ embedded in the current policy settings. That would be a good outcome.

Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment in Indigenous Australia: some policy questions

The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare has just released its report: Alcohol and other drug treatment services in Australia 2015–16 (link here). The report is worth reading as it presents a window into the substantive impact of licit and illicit drugs on society, including Aboriginal society.

In this post, I focus on issues related to Indigenous citizens presented in the report, and then make a number of policy related observations.

Here is a high level extract of its findings from its Executive Summary:

Alcohol and other drug (AOD) treatment services across Australia provide a broad range of treatment services and support to people using drugs, and to their families and friends. This report presents information for 2015–16 about publicly funded AOD treatment service agencies, the people they treat, and the treatment provided.

An estimated 134,000 clients received treatment in 2015–16, an 11% rise since 2013–14 (119,000). This equates to a rate of 650 clients per 100,000 people, or about 1 in 180 people. About two-thirds of clients were male (67%), and half were aged 20–39 (55%).

Despite only comprising 2.6% of the population, 1 in 7 (14%) clients were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. This is a rate of 3,400 clients per 100,000 Indigenous Australians, compared with 540 clients per 100,000 non-Indigenous Australians.

Treatment agencies provided about 207,000 treatment episodes in 2015–16—an average of 1.5 episodes per client—and 4 in 5 (79%) episodes ended within 3 months. Of those clients who received treatment in 2015–16, 11% also received treatment in 2013–14 and 2014–15.

The report makes clear that it is focussed on information for 2015–16 about publicly funded AOD treatment service agencies, the people they treat, and the treatment provided. It does not encompass all AOD treatments provided by agencies and professionals beyond the 796 agencies covered by the data set used. The report notes that most Indigenous primary health care organisations, and the treatments they provide, are not included in the data set analysed in the report (page 4). In other words, around 18,000 Indigenous people receiving on average 1.5 treatments per annum represent a subset of the Indigenous population seeking drug related treatment. Not all people are seeking treatment for themselves; it may relate to a family member.

The report notes that the social costs of inappropriate licit and illicit drug use in Australia are substantial, with financial impacts estimated by some researchers as $56bn. Publicly funded drug treatment increased by 11% in the two years leading up to 2015-16. 

The report notes that despite only comprising 2.6% of the Australian population, 14% of all clients were Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people aged 10 and over in 2015–16. This varied by client type—about 1 in 7 (14%) clients receiving treatment for their own drug use, and 11% of clients receiving support for someone else’s drug use were Indigenous. The main drugs that led clients to seek treatment were alcohol, amphetamines, cannabis, and heroin. This was consistent for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous clients (page 9).

In terms of the geographic spread of AOD treatment agencies, over half (54% or 432) of the treatment agencies were located in major cities and nearly one-quarter (24%) in Inner regional areas. Relatively few agencies were located in Remote or Very remote areas (both 4%). This pattern was similar across most states and territories, except for Northern Territory where 35% of agencies were located in Remote or Very remote (22%) areas (page 12). Section 5.2 of the report (pages 48-52) includes some highly informative maps outlining the intensity of treatment provision across the nation. The data suggests that alcohol is a particular problem in remote areas, cannabis also a serious issue in some remote areas, while amphetamines and heroin are more serious issues in urban Australia.

I have not done justice to the wealth of data and information in the report, and recommend readers examine it for themselves. Nevertheless, there is enough here to raise a number of policy questions in relation to Indigenous service provision, and Indigenous policy generally.

First, given the over-representation of Indigenous citizens in the treatment data set (and the knowledge that many other Indigenous citizens are being treated by primary health care organisations outside the data set), are we doing enough both in the proactive prevention space and the treatment space itself to assist Indigenous drug users?

Second, is there an argument for allocating greater weight to remote services within the resource allocation arrangements for AOD services?

Third, the figure of 18,000 clients suggests that at a minimum somewhere around 2% of the Indigenous population seek treatment for drug and alcohol issues each year. Yet the interconnected structure of most Indigenous families suggests that the impact of drug issues will extend to a much larger cohort, including children. What then are the social cost implications of drug misuse within Indigenous Australia? Where do those costs fall, and what do those costs mean for individuals, their families, and the life opportunities of all involved?

Fourth, it seems clear that licit drugs (alcohol, nicotine, and I would include sugar) are more problematic than illicit drugs in terms of the social damage and costs they inflict, particularly for Indigenous citizens. While illicit drugs are by definition banned, licit drugs are subject to strong interest group lobbying over the nature and extent of the regulatory oversight put in place by government. One consequence of the ‘pressure’ exerted within our political systems by commercial interests is that governments explore and too often implement alternative (and potentially less effective) policy mechanisms to regulate individual behaviour (for example income management designed inter alia to address alcohol misuse). There is a case for much more comprehensive and holistic analysis of alternative policy mechanisms aimed at regulating licit drug use, and in particular, explicit assessment of the comparative efficacy of price based mechanisms and other supply restrictions designed to minimise the social and individual harm licit drugs cause.

In recent years, many advocates within the Indigenous policy world have argued against what they term ‘deficit discourse’. They are in my view at most only partially correct. We cannot afford to ignore the over-representation of Indigenous people in social indicators of wellbeing, not least because to do so would remove the already limited focus on the ‘policy deficit’ which governments appear willing to accept and live with, with significant adverse flow on impacts on the life opportunities of thousands of Australian citizens. 

Overcoming and removing Indigenous disadvantage will require systemic changes including a focus on building individual responsibility, but also a stronger preparedness by government to explicitly focussing on closing the ‘policy deficit’ gap; a gap which can only be closed through leadership by governments.