The ANAO has recently released a report into the management
of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s regional network which deals
overwhelmingly with Indigenous engagement issues (link
here).
For those interested in the detail of how PM&C manage
their interface with local communities and organisations, the report is worth
reading in full. It is also worth revisiting the recommendations of the 2017
ANAO performance Audit of the Indigenous Advancement Strategy (link
here).
As with many ANAO reports, the recommendations are high
level and anodyne, and few in number. See paragraph 24 on page 10 for a list of
the recommendations. The grist is in the text of the report.
I don’t propose to attempt to summarise the report, nor to
provide a comprehensive analysis. Instead, I will merely point out a few
salient issues which jumped of the page as I read the report.
The first issue
relates to Figure 1.2 on page 16 which provides an overview of PMC staffing
numbers: of PMC’s staffing complement of 2188 public servants, the Indigenous
affairs group totals 1261, or 58 percent.
Focussing just on indigenous affairs group staffing, 552 or
44 percent of Indigenous group staff are in the regional network.
Second,
paragraph 2.1 describes the restructure proposed by Minister Scullion and
agreed by Cabinet in April 2014. It includes the decision not to renew the
National Partnership on Remote Service Delivery.
Third, para
2.5 indicates that almost a year later, the Department had not implemented a
number of the design objectives required by the Government in its approval of
the new regional structure.
Fourth, table
3.1 on page 26 is extremely revealing. It shows that over the three years
between April 2015 and June 2018, the number of staff in the regional network
were cut by 17.5 percent in the regional network, compared with a cut of 8.5
percent for the Indigenous affairs group as a whole, and compared with 5.8
percent for the Department as a whole. In other words, notwithstanding all the
evidence which suggests on the ground engagement with Indigenous Australians is
crucial to the success of policies and to the effectiveness of programs, the
regional network took the brunt of the cuts imposed on the Department.
Reinforcing this tangible evidence that the regional
network is not valued is a supporting finding, which noted:
The
Network was designed to actively engage with and gather intelligence from
Indigenous communities. However, the Network has inconsistent input into
Indigenous policy and program development and the value of the Network is not
being effectively leveraged. (para 20, page 9; para 4.27,
page 45).
Fifth, the audit
provides insight into the state of the strategic planning at the regional level (refer paras 3.17 to 3.22). It reveals that the Department prepared regional
strategies in 2014 without any consultation with local interests (para 3.19).
The ANAO correctly concludes: ‘it is not clear how the department has assurance
that the strategies reflect the priorities of local communities’. These regional
strategies have been replaced by Regional Blueprints which were drafted in
February 2018, but had not been finalised by May 2018 (para 3.22).
Sixth, the
Audit identifies a number of potentially serious gaps in the Department’s
approach to risk management within the Network (paras 3.29, 3.30).
Seventh, one
of the most intriguing parts of the ANAO report relates to grant
administration. The ANAO notes at para 4.18:
The
Government’s intention when establishing the Network was that Regional Managers
would be accountable for improving Indigenous outcomes in the Government’s key
priority areas within their region and that decision-making would be devolved
to the Network. In September 2014, the Prime Minister approved the design of a
network that allowed decision-making by senior staff close to the ground who
could tailor funding to suit the local context
It then goes on to describe the actual arrangements in palace
at para 4.20, which I quote in full (emphasis added):
In practice, under the IAS
grant approval protocols the administered funds available for Network staff is
nil, except for NAIDOC
Week grants valued less than $5000, and the Regional Managers Discretionary
Fund discussed below. The department
advised that the Minister for Indigenous Affairs (the Minister) has elected to
retain decision-making authority in relation to most grant funding approvals.
In late 2015, the department requested permission for Regional Managers to have
the delegation to approve certain projects within their region up to $500,000,
but this was not approved by the Minister. The department has analysed the
Minister’s approval rate for applications from April 2016 to June 2018. The
department advised the ANAO that the Minister approved 53 per cent of all grant
applications provided to him for consideration as the decision-maker, including
grants not recommended for funding by the department.
In effect, the ANAO is describing a situation where the Minister
has retained personal control over the approval of the vast majority of discretionary
program resources in the Indigenous affairs portfolio. The major discretionary
grant program is the Indigenous Advancement Strategy which involves $1.2bn in
grants each year. The assessment of ministers’ actions is beyond the ANAO’s
remit, so they tread carefully. However, it is patently clear that there is
huge potential for these public funds to be allocated in ways which are
designed to engender political support, or disincentivise criticism from potential
grant recipients. This intense level of ministerial involvement in all facets of
grant allocation is in my experience not standard practice across the public
sector, and it does not accord with the government’s rhetoric regarding increasing
the influence of the regional network which has the most direct engagement with
Indigenous interests. In this context, it is also worth noting the first Recommendation
of the 2017 ANAO audit of the IAS, to which PMC responded “Agreed’ less than
two years ago:
Recommendation
No. 1 Paragraph 3.29
The Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet ensure that administrative arrangements for the
Indigenous Advancement Strategy provide for the regional network to work in
partnership with Indigenous communities and deliver local solutions.
There are a number of other issues of interest in the ANAO
report, including detailed descriptions of internal reporting processes, the effectiveness
of performance reporting, delays in an ongoing review of the network (‘the
recalibration project’), and the approach to continuous improvement. The report
repays close reading for those interested in the way the Indigenous affairs
portfolio operates in practice.
For me, the take out from this report is that it provides
further evidence of the mismatch between the Governments’ rhetoric about ‘working
with Indigenous people’ and the reality as demonstrated in the continued
under-resourcing of the organisational unit within government which is required
to implement that aspiration. It also provides tangible evidence to support the
view that the Minister actively plays favourites, and sees the Indigenous
policy domain in highly politicised terms. This is arguably a retrograde development
in public policy, where most Australians would prefer to see issues dealt with,
and be seen to be dealt with, purely on their merits.
Finally, I can’t resist noting that the tension between the
Auditor General’s independence and his concern not to antagonise key public
service chiefs is on full display here. If one was to read only the five
recommendations, and the response signed off by the Secretary of PMC, one would
think that the issues raised here were largely technical and anodyne: nothing
to see here! In contrast, a close reading of the report reveals a set of issues
of substantive concern.
