Tuesday, 12 April 2016

Transforming Rangeland Policies: Indigenous Opportunities

In 2008, a Western Australian Parliamentary Committee, chaired by The Hon Tom Stephens MLC undertook a review into the training needs of Indigenous pastoral enterprises in WA. The review noted that of the some 520 pastoral leases across WA, some 60 were owned and operated by Indigenous interests. The review raised a multitude of issues and recommended, amongst other things greater focus on governance as a key driver of enterprise performance for Aboriginal owned pastoral leases, and an expansion of the allowed activities on pastoral leases.
In June 2015, all WA pastoral leases expired and were required to be renewed. The Department of Lands website has a page devoted to explaining the changes and the consultation process which led to the renewals. Somewhat surprisingly, 435 pastoral leases were renewed for terms of 50 years, representing 99.5 percent of the leases up for renewal. Implicit in this decision was confirmation that the renewed leases were meeting their lease conditions. Yet the reality was and is that the pastoral industry faces extensive commercial and environmental challenges across Northern Australia (notwithstanding the buoyant market conditions at present) and certainly a substantial proportion of the Aboriginal owned pastoral leases in WA are not commercially viable in their own right, and thus have trouble in meeting the lease conditions.
Substantial work was undertaken by the WA Government in the years leading up to the lease expiry date. The fact that a failure to renew a lease would mean it reverts to Crown Land, and that this would potentially lead to a native title claim by the traditional Aboriginal land owners, meant that the WA Government had a strong incentive to renew all the expiring leases whatever their actual compliance status.
It follows that the renewal of the 60 or so Aboriginal pastoral leaseholders does not resolve the ongoing challenge to find ways to sustain productive use of the lands into the future. Each pastoral lease will have its own set of unique opportunities, but overall a considerable challenge remains in front of the Aboriginal owners of WA pastoral leases.
Consequently, the recent moves by the WA Government to set in motion a reform of rangeland land use policy is to be welcomed as it will expand the range of options available to leaseholders in seeking to find ways to make productive and sustainable use of their lands. The Government has recently begun a process of consultations on a rangelands reform Bill, and released a rangelands reform Position Paper which explains the broad outline of the reforms. The rangelands cover some 87 percent of WA, and include both the pastoral estate and other land held under native title and by the Crown. I have not had a chance to undertake a close analysis of what is proposed, but on its face it seems a major improvement. The Government describes its proposals in the following way:
To increase investment in the Rangelands, the Government proposes to create a new lease type that allows for multiple and varied land uses. The lease will co-exist with native title and other interests in the land and will require land management that preserves the rangelands resource. At least one of the uses must be broad scale.

A rangelands lease enables a wide range of activities on the land, including: multiple uses – e.g. grazing livestock, horticulture, agriculture, tourism; Aboriginal economic development and land management; mining companies for environmental offsets, rehabilitation obligations or where their activities are substantially inconsistent with pastoral uses; conservation purposes; rangelands use in conjunction with off-lease activities; [and] taking advantage of future opportunities that do not currently exist.

The Government has released materials to underpin the consultations it is progressing. Of particular interest to Indigenous interests, the proposed changes will retain a reservation in favour of ongoing access for Aboriginal persons ‘to seek sustenance in their accustomed manner’. This replicates the longstanding reservation in WA’s pastoral leases. The changes will also require compliance with the Native Title Act’s future act processes to ensure that any new activities do not adversely impact any co-existing native title rights. This will generally require the negotiation of an Indigenous Land Use Agreement for new activities, and will mean that native title interests are protected.
The proposed reforms will also see the abolition of the Pastoral Lands Board with the Minister taking over decision making; but there will be a Pastoral and Rangelands Advisory Board to provide advice to the Minister on matters of general policy pertaining to the rangelands. Indigenous interest will likely be represented (along with tourism, mining, natural resource management and other expertise). Importantly, lease fees will be related to the viability of the activities undertaken on the leases, and will be reviewed regularly.  
There may well be devil in the detail which I have not identified, and I am sure that key indigenous organisations will be making submissions to the WA Government on the Bill. Nevertheless, the proposed changes appear sensible and to my non-expert eye, represent an improvement on the current regulatory regime which was essentially designed to meet the needs of a nineteenth century pastoral industry.
It seems clear that the Government is keen to push these reforms through by the end of the year, in advance of the expected state election in early 2017. There will not be much time to develop an Indigenous agenda on these issues.
On related matters, the most recent WA Department of Lands 2014-15 Annual Report includes a number of other Aboriginal related matters of interest.
These include the following three issues listed under the significant or emerging issues for the Department (p30):
The provision of access to Crown land is a significant component of the South West Native Title Settlement package between the State of Western Australia and the South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council to surrender Native Title over six registered Noongar claims in the South West region. The department will implement the identification, selection and transfer of Crown land under the South West Settlement Agreement.

The department, on behalf of the State, is responsible for risk management of over 37 percent of the State that is unallocated Crown land or unmanaged reserves. The department manages this through Memorandums of Understanding with the Department of Parks and Wildlife and with the Department of Emergency Services for Crown land within townsites.

The department is continuing the ongoing development of State land policy in relation to the interaction of mining, petroleum and geothermal interests and consent under section 16 (3) of the Mining Act 1978, with the extinguishment of Native Title for exclusive possession land tenure grants and the operation of section 24 MD (3) Native Title Act 1993.

In relation to the South West Native Title Settlement, the Report also reports on progress towards finalising the land transfers involved:
The $1.3 billion native title settlement between the State Government and Noongar people is the first of its kind in Australia. In exchange for the surrender of Native Title rights and interests, the State has offered a package of benefits including up to 320,000 hectares of land. The department’s role is to identify land that is primarily stocks of unallocated Crown land and unmanaged reserves and transfer up to 20,000 hectares in freehold and up to 300,000 hectares as reserve to the Noongar Land Trust. Up to 30 June 2015, over 28,000 hectares of land was identified by the department and selected by the South West Land and Sea Council. A further 20,000 hectares is currently under assessment.

In relation to the unallocated Crown lands and the unmanaged reserves, the policy issue which jumps off the page here is the unfulfilled potential for Indigenous involvement in the management of these lands (notwithstanding the substantial growth in highly successful Indigenous Ranger Programs over the past two decades) and the apparently relaxed attitude to non-management of large parts of the state. As the process of native title claims are progressed, this management responsibility will flow to native title holders, as will the financial costs and potential liabilities. This is a huge issue for remote Australia, for native title holders and ultimately for the nation. For all the attention we allocate to managing our borders, it seems more than ironic that we are prepared to under-invest in managing the extensive land areas which comprise our sovereign domain.
The Annual Report also includes reference (p 78) to a number of contingent liabilities related to the extinguishment of native title land post 1975 when the Racial Discrimination Act was passed and which thus requires any compulsory acquisition of native title to be on just terms. The report notes that it is not possible to quantify the liabilities at this stage given the lack of judicial guidance on how to determine such amounts. There is currently a case underway based on in the Federal Court which will throw light on these issues. The case concerns the extinguishment of native title in the township of Timber Creek in the NT. Here is a recent legal analysis of the issues at stake.
Implications
I have spent some time outlining a number of the key Indigenous related issues relating to WA’s rangelands not because I wish to delve into the intricacies of the proposed reforms, but rather to give greater prominence to the policymaking activities which are currently underway. The Indigenous groups and organisations which will inevitably be affected either positively or negatively are quite diverse and geographically dispersed, and include land councils, PBCs or Registered Native Title Bodies, groups managing ranger groups and other conservation activities, and a relatively large number of Aboriginal owned pastoral properties.
There is a particular and pressing need for Indigenous pastoral leaseholders both to work together and to work with other Indigenous advocacy groups such as native title groups to advance their commercial perspectives and promulgate their policy aspirations. As Government brings more coherence to rangelands policy, encompassing a wider range of activities, Indigenous interests must also bring more coherence to their lobbying capacities across the breadth of rangelands issues.
Moreover, the fact that the policy framework for the rangelands is finally likely to be brought into the twenty first century means that Indigenous pastoral lessees in particular must also ensure that their management approaches and their capacity to influence government policy is also modernised. At present, there appears to me to be substantial strategic gaps in Indigenous policy influencing capacities across the rangelands. While my comments have focussed on Western Australia, I suspect that the implications are just as valid for the NT and North Queensland.
Aboriginal interests have over the past two decades come an enormous distance in strengthening their economic, social and cultural position in Australia’s rangelands. However, in the mainstream there is a major economic transformation underway as a result of the rise in Asia’s middle class, and this is driving major change to mainstream rangelands policy. Indigenous interests will need to continue to strengthen their footprint on the ground, think strategically about economies of scale (most individual pastoral leases are not sustainably viable on their own), and build more effective lobbying voices in Perth, Darwin, Brisbane and Canberra if they are not to fall by the wayside as the policy and economic changes currently in train in across rangelands in agriculture, aquaculture, water management, tourism, and carbon farming (to name just a few) roll out.
The opportunities for Indigenous interests are huge, but they require a coordinated and sustained investment in building capacity to manage and take advantage of the opportunities inherent in the transformational changes currently underway across Australia’s rangelands. The cost of getting it wrong will set Indigenous interests back for generations to come.

Friday, 8 April 2016

The Arcane Arts of Fiscal Equalisation: some implications for remote Australia.


The Commonwealth Grants Commission has released its 2016 Update Report on GST relativities.

The NT Government published a media release reporting on the outcome for the Northern Territory. The headline commentary was as follows:

The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) has recommended a reduction in the Northern Territory’s share of total Australian GST revenue from 5.7% in 2015-16 to 5.4% in 2016-17.

Treasurer David Tollner said the recommendations contained in the CGC’s Report on GST Revenue Sharing Relativities 2016, released today, will result in a significant decline in GST revenue from 2016-17 ongoing.

“For 2016-17 the decline is estimated at around $145 million, compared to the 2016-17 estimate at the time of the 2015-16 Mid-year Report” he said.

The release went on to contextualise the decision, pointing out it related to a slowing in NT population growth rates relative to other jurisdictions, and somewhat counter-intuitively given the slowing in population growth, above average growth in the NT’s capacity to collect payroll tax, driven by robust employment growth, which reduced its assessed requirement for GST revenue.

The CGC explained the recommendations like this:

The Northern Territory remains the State with the lowest fiscal capacity; however, its share of GST in 2016-17 has fallen from 5.7% to 5.4%. This is primarily due to a significant decline in the Territory’s share of national population growth which reduced its need to invest in new infrastructure. To a lesser extent, the fall was due to an improvement in its payroll tax capacity. While the Northern Territory’s increased fiscal capacity will see its GST share fall, its GST entitlement in 2016-17 will rise by $5 million, or 0.2%, due to growth in the pool.

It is worth making a couple of high level points about the implications for the NT of this decision.

The NT is consistently assessed as the jurisdiction with the lowest fiscal capacity and thus in proportionate or per capita terms, it receives the highest level of subsidy. According to the CGC, the NT’s fiscal capacity is ‘primarily due to its above average assessed expenses which arise from of its above average shares of a range of population groups, but in particular it has exceptionally high proportions of Indigenous people and people in remote areas. This is compounded by the greatest diseconomies of small scale in administration of all States’.

The NT Treasurer made no mention of the admittedly small growth of $5m in the funds available this year to the NT in his media release.

In terms of the financial extent of the changes for the NT, see Table 27 of the CGC report. The changes in relative population growth had an impact of $115m, the payroll tax growth was $25m. However, not far behind driving a reduction of $19m was a decline nationally in outer regional and remote community health service use and an increase in non-State sector service provision in the Northern Territory between 2011-12 and 2014-15 has reduced the Northern Territory’s assessed community health spending and thus its GST share. Interestingly, there was an increase of $15m arising from new child protection data which resulted in upward revisions to the measured share of substantiations attributed to remote Indigenous children. The NT’s revenue increase was due to its high proportion of remote Indigenous children. While these latter two changes virtually cancel each other out, they point to the ongoing impact of the Commonwealth’s Stronger Futures National Partnership and legislation in driving change on the ground which then flows through into broader fiscal relativities.

A further interesting issue in the CGC Report is at paragraphs 89-91 and Table 2-5. It reports on the treatment of Commonwealth Own Purpose Expenditure for Indigenous affairs (in essence, the Indigenous Advancement Strategy). It shows that of $64m in grants to state government instrumentalities, some $49m was included in the relativity assessment process, in effect reducing the revenue of the jurisdictions receiving that $49m (while not reducing the overall pool available to jurisdictions). It does open up the question of why the Commonwealth would fund state government instrumentalities under the IAS.

Paragraphs 92-97 dealt with the $1.08bn in payments to non-government entities for Indigenous advancement by the Commonwealth under the IAS. The Commission decided that it would not assess these grants as part of the relativity assessment process, though this was more because of data issues than a substantive conceptual reason.

The NT Treasurer’s media release included an interesting statement:

The reduction of the GST revenue has been slightly offset by the partial exclusion of Commonwealth payments under the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing.

Paragraphs 98 – 134 of the Report include an extended assessment of the potential treatment of NPARIH payments. The issues involved are complex and can’t be adequately dealt with in this post. They go in part to the notion that the Grants Commission assesses relativities in relation to capacities of jurisdictions to meet their recurrent provision of services, and do not relate to capital expenditures of jurisdictions. I will return to NPARIH in a subsequent post.

It is worth noting however that the existence of longstanding and severe capital investment deficits in remote communities is a fundamental structural problem which the CGC and fiscal equalisation processes do not address.

Notwithstanding the salience of remote and indigenous issues in the fiscal equalisation process, it remains the case that it says nothing about how jurisdictions actually spend the funds which are recommended and paid from the pool of GST revenues. The internal allocation by states and territories of funds to remote communities and Indigenous populations remains largely determined by political processes which are quite separate to the arcane arts of fiscal equalisation.

Tuesday, 29 March 2016

Shakespeare on the Provocations of Drink


MacDuff




MacDuff






Macbeth Act Two, Scene Two

Alcohol Regulation in Remote NT Communities


There is a broad consensus across the political spectrum that alcohol consumption is a major issue in remote Australia.

All Australian jurisdictions have a regulatory framework which licences the sale of liquor and which restricts the consumption of alcohol in certain locations and contexts. This post focusses largely on the NT, as it has a relatively complex regulatory regime designed specifically to encompass remote areas and it involves regulation by both the NT Government and the Commonwealth.

The NT’s policy framework is set out at a high level on the web site of the NT Department of Business. It provides links to historical data on alcohol sales in the NT, mentions the Commonwealth’s Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 which imposes minimum standards for Alcohol Management Plans (AMPs), lists the AMPs for regional centres, and indicates that AMPs are in place or under development for remote communities, but without providing a list of those communities and the current status of the development of the AMP.

The web site also outlines the framework which controls the licencing and sale of liquor, including arrangements for restricted areas, and for individual revocable permits to allow liquor to be purchased and consumed within a restricted area. However the web site does not provide detail on the NT’s detailed administration of alcohol management arrangements (except in the regional centre AMPs) and nor is there an overarching statement of strategic intent.

The Commonwealth Government’s involvement in the regulation of alcohol derives from the legislation introduced in 2007 to implement the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (NTER), and in particular to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol in prescribed areas (which essentially included the majority of Aboriginal settlements and townships across the NT). The effect of this legislation was to modify and toughen the operation of the Northern Territory’s alcohol regulatory scheme in relation to Aboriginal land and townships, and to preclude the NT Parliament from making laws inconsistent with the Commonwealth legislation.

The NTER legislation, which had a five year sunset, was replaced in 2012 by the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012. The Stronger Futures legislation prohibits the sale, possession or consumption of alcohol in an ‘alcohol protected area’, provides that these areas operate as if they were ‘restricted areas’ under the NT Liquor Act, includes provisions which allow the Commonwealth Minister to initiate an assessment of particular licenced premises (anywhere in the NT) if she considers the sale of alcohol by the premises is causing substantial alcohol related harm to the community, and establishes a process for the development of AMPs by communities which must meet five standards promulgated in rules by the Commonwealth Minister, and which then replace the blanket restrictions established by the legislation in that alcohol protected area.

The AMP provisions were incorporated in part to strengthen the Commonwealth’s claim that the alcohol (and other) measures are special measures and thus while they are specifically targeted in large measure at Indigenous citizens, they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act. The 2007 NTER legislation had explicitly over-ridden the RDA whereas the Stronger Futures legislation removed that provision.

Recently, the NT Government has released the latest Alcohol Management Plan for the Central Australian town of Alice Springs which is focussed on a strategy termed Point of Sale Intervention at take-away outlets. The Guardian has reported that the plan leaves open the possibility of a return to the ALP’s previous policy of a Banned Drinker Register. The Point of Sale Intervention policy is similar to a scheme in Katherine termed Temporary Beat Locations (TBL) which relies on the police to check identification documents of persons buying takeaway liquor.

The ABC recently reported on the NT Chief Minister’s comments that itinerants in Darwin should just ‘piss off and go home’ and the response of Indigenous leaders that these were unprofessional comments.

The ABC reported last year critical comments from the head of the NT Police Association, Vince Kelly, who argued that it was inappropriate that police resources were being tied up managing alcohol sales, and criticised both sides of politics as being constrained by their acceptance of political donations from the alcohol industry:

Nothing is really going to change because both sides of politics are beholden to the liquor industry because they accept so much money off them in terms of political donations.

An admittedly cursory check of the NT Electoral Commission’s web site which lists political donations to parties and candidates does not appear to bear this out, though both parties appear to have access to funding from intermediaries, and the NT business sector is quite small, and both parties certainly work hard not to antagonise business interests. And of course there is extensive academic research documenting the extraordinarily powerful influence of the alcohol industry on public policy both nationally and internationally.

On 16 September 2015, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet released a copy of the independent review of the alcohol provisions of the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 undertaken by law firm MinterEllison. The legislation, which has a ten year sunset provision, mandated an independent review of the alcohol provisions along with the associated NT legislation within five years of its enactment. Interestingly, the Review’s Terms of Reference (which are set out in the Review report) provide that ‘The review will be conducted by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with the Northern Territory Department of Business’; hardly an independent basis for the review, notwithstanding that PMC then subcontracted MinterEllison to undertake the review.

MinterEllison concluded that although ‘alcohol misuse has and continues to cause considerable harm to Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory, we have been unable to determine with any precision whether there has been a reduction , or otherwise, in alcohol related harm to Aboriginal people…’

The reviewers went on to conclude ‘that the scheme established by the Liquor Act and provisions of the Stronger Futures Act provide an effective framework for the regulation of supply of alcohol in the Northern Territory, and that regulation of supply is a necessary but not sufficient means (in and of itself) of addressing alcohol misuse that causes harm to Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory’ (emphasis added).

The elephant in the room (on which the review was entirely silent) is why the Commonwealth continues to over-ride the Northern Territory’s legislative remit in relation to alcohol (and other matters specified in Stronger Futures), and what are the merits and demerits of doing so. This is an issue which would require a separate post to do it justice.

A couple of notable points were canvassed by the MinterEllison review. It notes for example the NT Government’s submission to a recent House of Representatives Standing Committee Inquiry into the Harmful Use of Alcohol in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities titled Alcohol, Hurting People and Harming Communities identified the under-representation of Indigenous people in national data sets measuring drinking patters, and called for ‘a comprehensive longitudinal study of drinking patters of Aboriginal people…’ (p29).

The review also referred to the Tackling Alcohol Abuse Implementation Plan of the National Partnership Agreement on Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory and noted that the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory had agreed in this plan that ‘communities will be encouraged and supported to develop local alcohol management plans that meet the regulated minimum standards under the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012’. The report also noted that the Partnership Agreement is being renegotiated and that the alcohol provisions under the new agreement are currently being negotiated as part of this process’ (footnote 15, p25).

Finally, the review while noting the Standing Committee’s observation of strong support for the introduction of a volumetric tax on alcohol as well as a minimum flor price, quoted the Prime Minister and Cabinet submission to the Standing Committee:

International price controls have been found to be the most effective intervention of this type [restricting supply]. However, the Australian Government does not support policies that increase alcohol prices….as they do not target heavy and binge drinkers. These drinkers are less responsive to price than the general population, so higher prices may have a limited health benefit and hurt consumers who enjoy alcohol responsibly.

On 2 December 2015, the Department posted the Commonwealth Government’s response to the Standing Committee report on the harmful use of alcohol in Indigenous communities on its web site. As is standard practice with reports of this kind, the Department in a response presumably approved by the Minister commented on each of the Standing Committee’s 23 recommendations, agreeing, agreeing in principle, noting or not agreeing.

The Department gave no joy to the calls for better national data, nor to the NT Government’s call for a longitudinal study (refer comments on recommendation 1).

The Department also noted that work is underway on developing the next version of the whole of Government National Alcohol Strategy for 2016-21, and the National Drug Strategy, which has a component directed to Indigenous peoples.

In relation to the Standing Committee’s most significant recommendation for the introduction of a national minimum floor price, and that prompt consideration be given to the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review on volumetric tax, the Department could only note the recommendation, commenting vaguely on the Government’s commitment to an unspecified tax reform process!

Interestingly, in relation to recommendation 7  on prioritising community driven strategies to reduce alcohol harm, and a comment from the Standing Committee that the current backlog of AMPs in the Department of PMC need to be cleared by January 2016, the Department  vehemently disagreed, denying a backlog existed. The Department noted:

Eight AMPs have been submitted for approval to the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Senator he Hon Nigel Scullion, in accordance with the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory act 2012. To date, the Minister has approved one AMP, in May 2014, covering Titjikala community. Between January and April 2015, the Minister declined to approve the remaining seven AMPs in part because they had the potential to increase alcohol related harm.

The Department provided a range of other comments and information, including in relation to IAS funding for alcohol treatment, and commentary on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome issues.

On 6 December 2015, the Department also published a comprehensive paper from the National Drug Research Institute titled Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs Treatment Service Sector: Harnessing Good Intentions. The paper was dated August 2014, some fifteen months earlier, and does not appear to have been utilised in assessing the Stronger Futures alcohol regime in the NT, nor in developing the Commonwealth response to the Standing Committee report.

I don’t propose to summarise it closely, but note a few salient issues which emerge. The report identifies that the level of demand for treatment services amongst Indigenous citizens is more than is currently available. Data of sufficient quality to precisely quantify levels of need or the demand for alcohol, tobacco and other drug (ATOD) services are not available, but available data suggests ATOD related problems are at least twice as prevalent amongst Indigenous citizens as in the mainstream. Gaps in treatment provision are unevenly distributed, and service provision planning is deficient. The report identifies alcohol as the most harmful drug of concern (p5). The report is critical of the transfer of funding for treatment of ATOD harms from the Health Department to PMC in 2013 and concludes that the ‘current system for the provision of ATOD services is fractured’. The report has useful and constructive suggestions for improving the funding models utilised by government, and notes the absence of an Indigenous peak body for ATOD services.

Conclusions

What are we to make of the information placed on the public record by PMC in these reports?

First of all, it is notable that the Minister left it to the Department to publish these reports, without fanfare, on its website.

Alcohol harm continues to a major issue for the Australian community, but it is particularly so for Indigenous citizens. Notwithstanding the focussed attention allocated to alcohol harm by Governments, there remains an evidence base deficit, whereby the commitment to collecting and analysing the data required to understand the scale and depth of the problem is absent, and the most effective policy instruments are ignored.

Given the Commonwealth’s fifteen year legislative foray into NT alcohol issues, and its broader concerns about the downstream costs and consequences of alcohol abuse across remote Australia, the lack of commitment to developing better analytical base is difficult to understand.

The arguments advanced against moving towards a volumetric tax on alcohol, against all the evidence, do not stand up to scrutiny. The argument advanced by PMC (and rejected by the Standing Committee) that the appropriate policy action must specifically target binge drinkers, and measures which don’t are not appropriate, amounts to a pathetically weak rationalisation for a policy position which is deeply entrenched, extremely costly in both human and economic terms, and clearly aligned with alcohol industry advocacy. Even accepting the flawed premise of the Department’s rationale, one of the benefits of a volumetric tax is to remove the incentive for excessive drinkers to find and consume cheaper sources of alcohol such as cask wine.

In the light of the intransigent opposition to the most effective policy instrument available to counter social and individual harm, the extraordinary conclusions of both the MinterEllison report and the National Drug Research Institute that the data does not exist to precisely determine the extent of harm from alcohol in the Indigenous community suggests that the Government’s opposition to a full longitudinal analysis of the nature of alcohol harm is motivated by a determination not to understand the full extent of the harm involved.

The decisions by the Minister to reject seven AMPs are curious. We do not have access to the details which would allow a full assessment, and it is the case that some potentially influential groups within remote communities have an incentive to press for potentially harmful levels of alcohol availability. Yet the policy intent in the Stronger Futures Implementation Plan (and it is also replicated in Minister Macklin’s promulgation of rules relating to AMPs) is for the Department to work with communities to develop AMPs.

When confronted by an unacceptable proposed AMP, it was envisaged that the Minister and his Department would not just decline to approve it, but would engage with the community to assist them to understand what an acceptable AMP would look like.

It seems however that there has been a changed approach, and that notwithstanding earlier comments (and here) to the contrary, the Minister may now be more inclined to leave the NTER/ Stronger Futures prohibitions in place in most locations. There appears to have been no policy announcement or explanation made explaining the Minister’s current approach to these matters, which is less than desirable.

In the absence of such an explanation, one might conclude that the Minister is more inclined to adopt a ‘tough on grog’ policy line, notwithstanding that it is important for communities to ultimately transition to models of responsible drinking, and AMPs are eminently suitable mechanisms for assisting in this transition. A cynic would note that such a tough policy line in commercially insignificant areas provides a measure of political protection against calls for the imposition of taxes or price based incentives against alcohol consumption.

Moreover, the AMPs are key elements in justifying the alcohol restrictions as ‘special measures’, and a move away from them will increase the risk of a court striking down the whole Stronger Futures scheme as racially discriminatory, and almost certainly undermine Indigenous support for the regulatory regime in place.

The suggestion, in a footnote to the Commonwealth Response to the Standing Committee Report, that the Stronger Futures National Partnership Agreement, implementation plan, and alcohol measures are being renegotiated is significant. The National Partnership provides for significant funding in a policy framework which makes it less vulnerable to budget cuts and the implementation plan is by definition a key reflection of policy. There would be merit in the Minister outlining in broad terms his strategic approach to alcohol regulation in remote Australia, and in the Northern Territory in particular.

The adverse consequences of alcohol abuse in remote communities are devastating – for individuals, families, children, unborn foetuses, and whole residential communities. Alcohol abuse negatively impacts individuals’ physical health, cognitive ability, mental health, education, employment, safety, and overall well-being. It has broader social consequences for community cohesion, community governance, and social and economic stability, and even economic development. The opportunity cost of failing to effectively regulate alcohol consumption and failing to minimise alcohol induced harm is enormous, and while those costs fall most severely on Indigenous citizens, the costs also extend to all taxpayers, including those who happen to drink alcohol responsibly.


Sunday, 20 March 2016

Shakespeare on Carelessness


There is a sickness 
Which puts some of us in distemper, but 
I cannot name the disease; and it is caught 
Of you that yet are well.

The Winter’s Tale Act One, Scene Two.

Carelessness Abounds: Double Jeopardy for Remote Disabled Citizens


The National Disability Insurance Scheme involving a major reconceptualisation of the delivery of support to disabled citizens is currently being rolled out nationally.

The 2011 National Disability Strategy noted that the proportion of Indigenous Australians 15 years or older reporting they lived with a disability or long term health condition was 37 percent, twice the rate in the general population. The proportion was similar in both remote and non-remote regions, and did not include psychological disability.

The Minister for Social Security Christian Porter recently noted that bilateral agreements with all states and territories except WA and the NT had been finalised, and that in the case of the two outstanding jurisdictions, discussions were progressing.

Reflecting an appreciation that remote regions may have particular issues to address, the Commonwealth and NT Governments agreed in 2013 to establish a trial site in the Barkly region centred on the regional centre of Tennant Creek.

The NDIS released a rather brief and uninformative progress report on the trial in the Barkly region in October 2015.

The Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on the National Disability Insurance Scheme published a progress report in November 2015, which included an assessment of progress in the Barkly trial site: refer paragraphs 2.74 – 2.86 for progress on the Barkly Trial site and paragraphs 4.56 – 4.80 for a discussion of various issues relating to Indigenous clients and the challenges of implementing the scheme in remote areas.

On the challenges of delivering services in remote locations, the Joint Standing Committee made the following comments:

Challenges in the Barkly trial site

2.84 As outlined earlier, it is anticipated that the Barkly trial will provide valuable experience and understanding in delivering the NDIS in remote areas, which will inform the roll-out across the rest of the NT and other remote parts of Australia. Apart from dealing with the direct challenge of the high rate of disability among Indigenous Australians compared to the general Australian population, the implementation of the Barkly trial presents a number of specific challenges:

• low numbers of Indigenous Australians with disability accessing the disability service system—a contributing factor is the reluctance of Indigenous people with disability to identify as a person with disability. This presents a significant barrier to the successful implementation of the NDIS in this region;

• experience of Indigenous Australians when using services—a lack of confidence in dealing with, and a mistrust of, government agencies and service providers;

 • differences in cultural backgrounds and understanding between service providers and Indigenous Australians—this can form an impediment to effective delivery of support services; and 

• access to services—lack of available and appropriate services due to the remote location.

2.85 The fundamental principle of the NDIS is individual choice and control. Enabling Indigenous Australians to exercise such choice and control may be difficult where the absence of service providers in remote areas precludes meaningful choice.

2.86 The evidence that the committee heard in Darwin regarding the Barkly trial confirms the incredible difficultly in delivering high quality services to regional and remote areas of Australia and as such represents one of the biggest challenges to the Scheme.

Later in the Report, the Committee reported and assessed some of the structural issues underlying these challenges:

4.78 The NT Government's Minister for Disability argued that for some types of allied health services, and in some areas, there is no other option but to restrict the service delivery to only the NT Government:

The experience to date has highlighted gaps in the NDIA service delivery model in particular and around the coordination of disability supports and allied health services. There is no provision in a participant support plan for coordination of allied health supports. The Office of Disability has provided this coordination of allied health services for the trial due to the small numbers; however, it is not feasible on a larger scale. Under the NDIA model, a client may receive allied health services from three different providers, further exacerbating the fragmentation of services and required coordination. In addition to the implementation of a participant's plan is the reliance on a service provider to coordinate the disability supports for an individual. In the Barkly it has been difficult to identify service providers to provide this service.

4.79 According to the NT Government's Office of Disability, service providers 'are inconsistent in their availability to provide services', which leaves the responsibility of coordinating services with the NT Government.  The Minister continued with the conclusion that the unfortunate consequence of thin markets in remote areas is that the principle of choice and control that may be evident elsewhere will have to be sacrificed to ensure access and equity of services:

Whilst the principle of choice and control is supported by the Northern Territory it is not going to be feasible in thin and non-existent markets. In many instances the focus in remote areas needs to be on access and equity as a first step.



The Committee recommended that the Government ‘through the Disability Reform Council, make all haste with the finalisation [of] all the bilateral agreements for the transition phase of the National Disability Insurance Scheme’ (para 5.13).

In an as yet unpublished submission to the Joint Committee, the MJD Foundation (a small organisation based in North East Arnhem Land servicing around 500 people either suffering from or at risk of MJD, a neuro-degenerative disease similar to Huntington’s Disease) pointed to a series of deficiencies in current service provision for disabled citizens in the Northern Territory:

In the experience of the MJDF the following evidence provided at the [previous Committee] hearing reflects the current practice in non-trial sites areas where the MJDF operates (and in the Barkly prior to the trial commencing):

·         Wait times for mobility and other specialist disability equipment are frequently in excess of 6 months.

·         Disability specific transport is a significant an issue in every community and this is compounded by the unavailability of public transport or private transport/taxi options.

·         Services are provider driven, where cost restrictions, maintaining personnel and remote infrastructure challenges heavily impact on the scope of services available.  There is exceptionally limited access to therapeutic intervention and a high reliance on home based programs and family support (where programs are developed), and inadequate support for families to implement them.

·         FIFO/DIDO models are problematic because there are difficulties with getting and maintaining accurate personal information in real time and establishing appropriate relationships conducive to providing specialist disability support services. This is compounded, and demonstrated, by the very high turnover experienced in government provided services.

·         In the compilation of the Disability Audit, MJDF staff identified several people with disabilities in NE Arnhem Land who had previously not been identified or were not receiving services. 

·         There are very high levels of disability creating chronic disease and these comorbidities create a complex interface between primary health care and disability services that is not comprehensively addressed.  There is a siloed approach to the provision of disability care and primary health care, complicated by a delivery model that includes both Aboriginal Medical Service (AMS) and NT Department of Health provision.  See appendix A.

·         Current government provision has not enhanced local capital and capacity, for example there are no partnerships with local communities and other services for repairs and maintenance and equipment provision which would benefit consumers and communities alike.

There are accessibility modification needs across the NT, for infrastructure and public facility access, which will not be addressed through individualised packages.

COAG had originally scheduled the finalisation of the bilateral agreements for July-August 2015. Yet progress in finalising all the bilaterals has been slow, and as mentioned above two remain outstanding, including the agreement to establish the scheme in the NT.

The Commonwealth has made much of the alleged funding gap in supporting the full roll out of the scheme, recently announcing the establishment of a special fund to assist in financing the scheme. While not my main focus here, the rationale for such an account appears rather thin, but it does serve as a useful prop in making the political argument for the existence of a financing gap. What is relevant however is that the scheme involves joint commonwealth/state financial support, and the NT Government is chronically reluctant to commit to a demand driven funding model which it will not control and which will inevitably flow in large measure to the bush.

It is worth making the point that while there is a bipartisan commitment at the Commonwealth level to funding the full costs of the NDIS, the States, and for present purposes, particularly the NT have failed to make similar commitments, and have taken no action to transparently identify the funding to be allocated to the NDIS.

Unsurprisingly then, the Territory Government appears to be delaying signing up to the NDIS. It will be holding out for a greater share of Commonwealth funding (leveraging off its comparatively small scale) and is also arguing that it should control service provision rather than independent service providers. The irony of a political party normally associated with advocating market based policy frameworks which are underpinned by consumer choice and autonomy emerging as a proponent of increased government control and consequential reductions in opportunities for private sector development is remarkable.

If agreed by the Commonwealth, the risk will be that government controlled provider arrangements will increase the likelihood of ‘nickel and diming’ in the provision of individual services, particularly in remote regions. Moreover, the near-absence of advocacy organisations for disabled citizens in remote will minimise the opportunities for holding a government controlled provider arrangement to account.

A recent (unpublished) newsletter from an advocacy group on disability in the NT noted:

1 JULY FAST APPROACHING

Last week on Daryl Manzie’s morning program Minister Elferink was talking about the various “sticking points” there are in relation to the NDIS.  Pleasingly he did say it was not a case of if but when the NT Government will sign the Bilateral Agreement.  However according to the Minister, it will not be on the 1 July like most other States and the ACT.  Unfortunately in trying to justify the delay he firstly said the rollout was due to commence in 2017 not 2016, he failed to use the most recent stats available from the Barkly Trial, in relation to the number of participants, which stood at 127 not 109 and amongst other things he talked about equity and the fact that many people would now not be eligible for the scheme.  Minister it was never envisaged that everyone would be eligible, either because of age or not meeting certain criteria.  It was always going to be the case that State and Territory Governments’ will still have a responsibility to continue to provide services to those people.  Yes we know the Territory is both unique and remote, which does pose some very special challenges when it comes to service delivery, but surely we know enough now as a result of the Barkly Trial to sign the Agreement. Two things we know for certain, 1. There will always be issues regardless of how long we wait and 2. The trial has already been very successful and a real boost to business in Tennant Creek.  Planes are once again flying in and out, the town is very much alive and well and the Territory economy overall is set to continue to improve….

In contrast to the reported comments of the NT Minister, the NT Health Department web site indicates that the NDIS will commence in the NT in July 2016.

The NT Government’s approach to disability support has been opaque to say the least. The delay in signing up to the NDIS displays all the hallmarks of a strategy aimed at persuading the Commonwealth to just hand control of NDIS funding to the NT Government.

The argument outlined above that the provider market is thin in remote regions is accurate. The solution however is to build that market. The experience of the Aboriginal Controlled Medical Services is instructive in this respect. They were originally introduced to address exactly the same type of market failure: GPs were virtually non-existent in remote regions. Government action over a sustained period has essentially filled that gap, and built a network of medical services that while focussed primarily on treating Indigenous patients, increasingly provide services across the whole community in the areas where they operate. Moreover, the economic benefits of building a service provider capability in remote regions will be considerable.

Indeed, there would appear to be a potential social and economic opportunity here for Aboriginal Medical Services to expand their service delivery footprint into disability services as a contribution to building a market in these services in remote regions.

In the event that the Commonwealth caves in to the Territory Government’s hard ball bargaining, the outcomes for Indigenous Territorians living with a disability would be placed at risk given the Territory Government’s structural imperative to over-service (across the breadth of government services) its small and highly demanding urban electorates and the consequential poor record of service delivery to bush communities and in particular to the largely invisible (in political terms at least) disabled people in the bush.

It is time that the both the Territory and Commonwealth Governments got serious about remote Indigenous disability. There is a need for much greater transparency at the state and territory levels on the funding allocations for the NDIS. The Commonwealth should be insisting on a fully transparent model both to ensure accountability and to facilitate future adjustments to the model aimed at improving its effectiveness and efficiency.

The Commonwealth should also be supporting the development of provider capacity in remote regions, primarily because there are strong policy arguments against the establishment of a government monopoly in this service, but also because of the economic development potential in such a strategy.

Finally, consistent with the recommendation of the Joint Committee, the Commonwealth needs to stand up to the Territory, and ensure that an agreement to implement the NDIS across the whole of the NT is reached quickly. The terms of that agreement should ensure that the Territory Government delivers on its responsibilities to its remote citizens, and should provide for the transparency and provider capacity development which will ensure that the NDIS fulfils its potential in remote Australia.

The numbers of remote citizens living with disability may not be large in an absolute sense, however they and their families and carers face enormous challenges and yet they end up being doubly penalised: first as victims of disability itself and second as victims of government neglect and carelessness, in the sense that governments do not appear to care less about ‘invisible’ interests in the bush.

After all, it can hardly just be a matter of chance that the jurisdiction with the largest proportion of the most disadvantaged disabled citizenry is the jurisdiction which is slowest off the blocks in implementing the changes which offer the promise of transformative change.