Showing posts with label ARR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ARR. Show all posts

Friday, 6 March 2026

Pause for thought: the ILSC sale of the Ayers Rock Resort


                               [Go] Wisely and slow; they stumble that run fast

Romeo and Juliet, Act two, Scene three

 

The ILSC has now finalised the sale of the Ayers Rock Resort (ARR). According to this week’s media release (link here):

The Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation (“ILSC”) is pleased to announce, the successful completion of the sale of its subsidiary, Voyages Indigenous Tourism Australia Pty Ltd (“Voyages”), operator of Ayers Rock Resort at Yulara and Mossman Gorge Cultural Centre (MGCC) in Far North Queensland to Journey Beyond, effective 27 February 2026.

The ILSC announced the agreement for the sale in December 2025. The media release (link here) outlines the broad structure of the sale agreement that has now been finalised and is worth reading in full. The purchaser, Journey Beyond, issued a shorter media release at the same time (link here). The sale encompasses two separate Voyages operations / assets, the ARR and the Mossman Gorge Cultural Centre (MGCC) in North Queensland. This post focusses on the ARR which is the largest element of the transaction.

The key elements of the transaction are laid out in the ILSC media release announcing the sale. I recommend reading the full media release, but key elements include:

[The agreement] …is to be completed by the sale of the shares in Voyages currently held by the ILSC and is the first in a series of transactions that will, once completed, formalise the transfer of land and buildings at both sites for the benefit of the respective Traditional Owners;  Anangu  Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara of Yulara and the Kuku Yalanji of Mossman Gorge.

The new partnerships between the Traditional Owners and Journey Beyond will bring significant ongoing economic benefits to Indigenous communities at Yulara and Mossman Gorge. Later, following the transfer of land to the Community corporations, both communities will be paid rent from Journey Beyond’s leasing of the sites under 90 and 10 year leases respectively….

… The sale agreement between the ILSC and Journey Beyond will only pass control of the operational assets of Voyages to Journey Beyond. Land and buildings at Yulara and Mossman Gorge will ultimately be transferred to the appropriate Community corporations representative of the relevant Traditional Owners. The ultimate transfer at Yulara will mark the largest single return of land to Traditional Owners in the ILSC’s history in terms of both value and area.

For those interested in understanding of the detail involved in the transaction, the discussion in the Senate Estimates Committee hearing on 10 February 2026 is essential reading (link here). The ILSC discussion is at pages 12 to 18. It is, in my view, one of the best examples I’ve seen in recent years of how an Estimates Committee discussion can add value. I should also add that the design and structure of the transaction is clearly commercially sophisticated, highly innovative and in some respects counterintuitive. For those interested in reading my own comparatively simplistic 2021 prospective analysis, I refer you to this previous post (link here).

The Estimates Hearing transcript covers issues such whether the ARR transaction clears the outstanding ILSC debt (it does); the transition process before finalisation of the divestment of the underlying land, infrastructure obligations after divestment, the impact of ongoing native title claims, the future of the National Indigenous Training Academy that operates from Yulara (it will continue), the cost of the consultants used in the transaction, and the major achievements of the ILSC over its almost thirty year history. On this latter point, the ILSC CEO Joe Morrison noted the size and significance of the Yulara divestments and pointed to a recently released web summary (link here). The media release celebrating the 30th anniversary noted that the ILSC had over its history  invested more than $1.48 billion through 323 acquisition projects and 1,052 management projects which delivered cultural revitalisation, economic development, environmental stewardship, and social connections (link here).  

There is absolutely no doubt that over its thirty-year lifespan the ILSC has much to celebrate, and much has been achieved.

As Mr Morrison suggests in his Senate Estimates evidence, the ARR transaction and its concomitant divestment represents an enormous outcome for the traditional owners insofar as they and their descendants will gain ownership over land which they failed to obtain in an earlier native title claim and yet is of enormous significance to them.

Balanced against this and not mentioned in any of the discussions of the sale has been the enormous costs of the initial decision to purchase the ARR in 2010.

In 2020, in an academic volume focussed on Indigenous self-determination (link here), I wrote about the challenges facing the ILC (as it then was) and inter alia identified the ARR acquisition as one of two major strategic mistakes made by the ILC over its life (the other was its retreat from assisting pastoral enterprises across northern Australia):

  the architects of the ILC’s initial and amended legislation intended that any subsidiaries would work in partnership with Indigenous groups of landowners.

 The most egregious example of the ILC’s misplaced confidence in operating unilaterally via its subsidiaries has been the $300m acquisition of the ARR. The ILC paid a price above commercial valuation for this asset and borrowed significant sums to finance the acquisition. Servicing this debt has effectively crippled the ILC’s ability to fulfil its primary legislative remit. Even if the ARR eventually becomes commercially successful, and the ILC’s outstanding bank borrowings are repaid, there will have been an effective 20-year hiatus in land acquisition and management across the nation, with all the opportunity costs which that entails.

I do not have the space to recount the details of the political and policy conflicts that emerged following the original acquisition, but this article (link here) from The Saturday Paper in August 2015 titled Fresh calls for inquiry into Ayers Rock Resort purchase provides a sense of the issues in play.

A Question on Notice from Senator David Pocock following an Estimates Hearing in December 2025 requested advice on the sale price negotiated with Journey Beyond and information on the accumulated net profit of loss arising form ownership of the ARR from 2011 through to the present, as well as the accumulated capital expenditure invested in the asset over the same period.

The answers provided (QoN 1820: link here) are eye watering. The answer does provide several caveats that aim to dissuade those inclined to make simplistic comparisons, and argues such comparisons are problematic. For example, the current transaction is for the shareholding in Voyages held by the ILSC and not the asset per se, some existing loan liabilities remain in Voyages and are taken into account in the sale process, and of course the price paid by Journey Beyond excludes any freehold land acquired by Voyages which the ILSC note has been independently valued at $215m; a valuation that I find questionable, but which is somewhat moot insofar as the land will likely never be sold as it will be transferred to the traditional owners when the land is divested.

The answer goes on to provide the information requested. The purchase price payable to the ILSC by Journey Beyond for Voyages is $123.5m. This will allow the ILSC to repay external debt currently recorded at $122.4m. The ILSC is left with $1.1m cash in hand.

The accumulated net loss over the fifteen years of ILSC ownership was just under $101m, and the accumulated capital expenditure on the asset over the period was $250.5m. Much if not most of this capital expenditure was sourced from the ILSC. These are nominal figures and thus do not reflect the real value of the losses and expenditures in 2026 dollars. It is unclear whether the costs of negotiating the transaction are included in these figures; in an answer to a Question on Notice from Senator Liddle, (QoN NIAA 1766: link here), the ILSC advise that the total costs of negotiating the transaction were $15m, including $13m for consultants and professional costs.

The bottom line here is that over the 16 years since the ARR was acquired, the ILC put up $300m; lost a further $100m, expended $250m in capital expenditure and has been left with $1m in the bank. The net cost of the acquisition to the ILSC over the sixteen years was $650m but is likely closer to $700m in 2026 dollars.

While the enormous financial costs of this investment will be offset by the divestment of the land involved to its traditional owners, this is not what drove the initial decision in 2010, and nor would the ILSC today likely make a similar investment for any other First Nations community. The valuation of $215m for the land involved is a benefit for the APY traditional owners but does not mitigate the financial losses (and concomitant constraints on new activities) carried by the ILSC.

We can contextualise this by remembering the Land Fund was established by the Keating Government following the passage of the Native Title Act in recognition of the fact that based on the High Court decision in Mabo No.2, much of settled Australia would not be subject to claim given that native title would have been extinguished by grants from the Crown. The fund was appropriated on ten years and totalled $1.4bn. The Fund has since grown to $2.43bn, and under a legislated formula a varying amount (initially designed to maintain the Fund in perpetuity) currently provides for a drawdown of around $65m per annum to fund the operations of the ILSC. In other words, the losses involved in the ARR acquisition amount to almost one third of the total amount set aside nationally in perpetuity as a compensatory mechanism to acknowledge the limits of the High Court’s decision in Mabo.

This framing also suggests that the Land Fund corpus, notwithstanding being very substantial and historically unprecedented, was fundamentally inadequate from the start, but that is a subject for a different discussion.

The real cost of the acquisition of the ARR however is not the financial losses, but the opportunity costs which fell (and continues to fall) directly upon numerous — unknowing — Indigenous groups which meant that very many land acquisition and land management projects across the nation were unable to be funded. Or to put it another way, the very considerable achievements of the ILSC over the past thirty years, and particularly the last 15 years, would have been considerably and tangibly greater had the then ILC Board not decided to ignore the written warnings of then Ministers Wong and Macklin, and locked in a decision to proceed with the purchase of the asset in the lead up to an election that many expected the Labor Government to lose.

The ILC decision in 2010 benefited the former owners of the Ayers Rock Resort (as it dug them out of a hole with a premium price), and indirectly the NT Government which had invested millions in Yulara. It solved an expected problem for the NT Senator who expected to be Minister for Indigenous Affairs within months and was contemplating the potential insolvency of the most significant tourism enterprise in his electorate.

The current ILSC Board and staff have in my view pulled off a major achievement in finalising this transaction. They deserve all the accolades that come their way. I am not at all critical of the choices and decisions that they have made. They have drawn a line that staunches ongoing losses, and in effect have achieved a positive (or perhaps least negative) outcome from a potentially disastrous starting position not of their making.

However, while I understand the desire to place the most positive spin on this possible, there are serious lessons that should be considered and remembered. Foremost among them is the Government’s comparatively recent pivot towards Indigenous economic empowerment (link here) thus legitimising widely held expectations that commercial investments are the panacea for Indigenous disadvantage.

The ILC Board which decided to purchase the ARR in October 2010 was not short of commercial acumen and expertise, but they allowed hubris and perhaps encouragement from political quarters in the Northern Territory to blind them to the risks involved. And the risks of any commercial investments are always considerable and often enormous. Some investments succeed, some spectacularly, but many fail. The ARR acquisition failed spectacularly. Strong governance, strong risk management, and an ability to identify challenges as well as opportunities are the key to sustained commercial success. Moreover, every decision to invest in a commercial opportunity represents not just a decision not to invest in an alternative commercial opportunity, but a decision not to invest in a social or cultural investment such as improved healthcare, improved education, or language maintenance. In my view, particularly when legitimised by government, these lessons too often run the risk of being ignored or underappreciated.

For Commonwealth Ministers, and their bureaucratic advisers in Treasury, Finance, NIAA and PMC, and the Opposition Shadow Ministers who aspire to one day sit on the Treasury benches, and indeed anyone else inclined to uncritically promote Indigenous economic empowerment as a policy panacea, the history of the acquisition, operation and sale of the Ayers Rock Resort should give pause for thought.

 

6 March 2026

 

Declaration of interest: I was an officer in PMC involved in oversight of the drafting of the ILC legislation in 1994-5; an adviser to Minister Macklin in 2010 when the ARR was purchased by the ILC; and was the CEO of the ILC for a number of years in the period 2013-2015.

Thursday, 4 April 2024

ANAO 2024/25 draft work program

 

And how his audit stands who knows save heaven?

Hamlet Act three, Scene three.

 

The ANAO has released its draft work program for next financial year’s performance audits (link here). Dan Holmes from the Mandarin provides a succinct whole of government overview (link here).

 

This post focusses on the Indigenous policy related performance audits, which fall under the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) portfolio. OF course, many of the proposed mainstream performance audits will have a bearing on services delivered to Indigenous citizens. These include (to a greater or lesser extent) proposed performance audits of DSS’s programs Assisting the Long term Unemployed; a follow-on performance audit of the Management of funding of projects by the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF) in the Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts portfolio; and perhaps even Board Governance at the National Disability Insurance Agency.

 

For ease of access, I have included slightly edited summary extracts of proposed Indigenous specific performance audits from the PMC portfolio below:

Delivery of community-led justice reinvestment initiatives

This audit would assess the design and governance underpinning the National Indigenous Australians Agency and the Attorney-General’s Department’s joint establishment of an independent National Justice Reinvestment Unit and examine the effectiveness of the early delivery of up to 30 community-led justice reinvestment initiatives.

Around $100m was announced for investments in community-led justice reinvestment initiatives and First Nations-led legal assistance services in the October 2022 budget…

Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation’s management of non-financial assets

This audit would assess the effectiveness of the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation’s (ILSC’s) management of non-financial assets.

The ILSC is a corporate Commonwealth entity established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (the Act). One function of the ILSC is to acquire land to grant to Indigenous corporations. Under section 191D of the Act, the ILSC must make a grant for an interest in land acquired for that purpose within a reasonable time after its acquisition. At 30 June 2023, the ILSC and subsidiary corporations held the Ayers Rock Resort valued at $435 million, other properties valued at $66 million, and livestock on properties valued at $6 million. While the ILSC holds properties, it is responsible for maintenance, statutory costs and the operation of related businesses. The audit would examine the ILSC’s asset management strategy and practices, including those related to the divestment of properties…

Management of the regional network - Follow on

The audit would assess the effectiveness of the National Indigenous Australians Agency’s (NIAA’s) management of the regional network, including whether the regional network is achieving its objectives…

…Auditor-General Report No. 7 of 2018-19 Management of the Regional Network found that management of the regional network was mixed, with the full potential of the network to facilitate the design and delivery of local solutions to local problems not being maximized.

Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations’ management of non-compliance

This audit would assess the effectiveness of the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations’ (ORIC’s) management of non-compliance with the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (CATSI Act)…

…In 2021, the NIAA released a final report of a review into the CATSI Act that recommended enhancements to the regulatory powers available to the Registrar under the Act. An amendment bill to the CATSI Act passed the House of Representatives in 2021 but lapsed at the end of the 46th Parliament. This audit would examine the use of the Registrar’s powers and functions to manage non-compliance with the CATSI Act.

The effectiveness of coordination of Closing the Gap target implementation

The audit would examine the effectiveness of the National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA’s) coordination activities.

The 2020 National Agreement on Closing the Gap (National Agreement) is a strategy that aims to improve the life outcomes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The National Agreement marks a shift in the approach to the Closing the Gap Strategy, with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people determining what is important to them. The Closing the Gap Implementation Plan includes actions, the responsible minister and the delivery timeframe. The NIAA is responsible for leading and coordinating the development and implementation of Australia’s Closing the Gap targets in partnership with Indigenous Australians.

The Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC)’s administration of grants

This audit would assess the effectiveness of the governance of the NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) and its governance and decision-making processes for allocating grants funding.

NTAIC was established as a corporate Commonwealth entity in November 2022. NTAIC’s purpose is to work with Aboriginal Territorians to achieve economic, social and cultural impact through innovative approaches to investments, beneficial payments and other financial assistance. It has initial grant funding of $180 million and an investment corpus of $500 million. Its Aboriginal-controlled board makes decisions to invest Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA) funding, which was previously administered through the National Indigenous Australians Agency. The ABA receives monies from the Commonwealth based on the value of royalties generated from mining on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory…

 

Commentary

The ANAO is an important, and in my view under-rated element in the array of checks and balances that comprise the architecture for government initiatives and actions. It is the financial auditor for all major government agencies, certifying that agencies financial accounts are compliant with the applicable accounting standards and fairly present the financial position of the entity at the audit date. Its performance audits are separate to its financial audits and in effect focus on the performance of agencies in delivering specific initiatives and programs. The span of performance audits is not comprehensive, and thus the selection of audit subjects is inherently a strategic choice.

 

In 1985, I published an article (link here) arguing that the shift to embracing what were then termed ‘efficiency audits’  — the equivalent of the ANAO’s performance audits —  should be extended to embrace effectiveness audits. ‘Efficiency’ refers to the ability to accomplish something competently with the minimum level of resources and effort. ‘Effectiveness’ refers to the degree to which desired or positive outcomes are achieved. In my view the argument I made then still has merit.

 

In its wisdom, the ANAO has preferred the safe harbour of focussing on efficiency (effectiveness risks straying into the realm of politics) leaving issues of effectiveness to ad hoc evaluations. For their part, successive governments have avoided reforms that would ensure evaluations are undertaken independently, are always published, and are pitched at a level that ensures they are strategically relevant. Proposals for an evaluator general (link here and link here) have been studiously ignored. The point of this brief foray into history is to highlight that notwithstanding their considerable usefulness and benefits in opening a window onto the activities of government, ANAO performance audits are invariably limited and focussed more on process than outcomes. Perhaps it is time that that the ANAO commissioned an independent evaluation of its own operations!

 

Turning to the proposed audits listed above, I propose to make a series of brief comments aimed at highlighting specific issues of potential significance or salience. Due to limitations on length, I don’t propose to comment on the proposed performance audit of the NIAA regional network, nor the proposed audit of the Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations. I note however that both organisational units are crucial elements in the architecture of Indigenous policy and deserve constructive scrutiny.

 

Delivery of community-led justice reinvestment initiatives: While this program is jointly shared between NIAA and the Attorney Generals Department, there is no information on the NIAA website. The AG’s website lists a basic description of the program (link here) and includes a program design document drafted by Jumbunna Institute ‘to inform the design of the grants process and grant opportunity guidelines’ (link here). The design document is well constructed but is itself strongly focussed on process (particularly community control) rather than providing a targeted conceptual framework for reducing incarceration and interactions with the justice system.  While this is deliberate, the very flexibility of the program is likely to lead to questions regarding its efficacy and purpose, especially in the context of outbreaks of public violence such as recently occurred in Alise Springs.

 

At a more strategic level, the Commonwealth is essentially investing in a slogan as there appears to be no mechanism for operationalising the ‘reinvestment’ element of the program. To do this would necessarily involve robust engagement with the states and territories to shift resources away from activist policing, aggressive prosecutorial strategies and carceral options, something the Commonwealth is loathe to undertake. Of course, notwithstanding an extra $10m being allocated to Central Australia under this program in the 2023 budget, the reality is that governments’ actions (such as those announced after recent riots in Alice including a curfew and a decision to appoint 200 more police) are not in fact aligned with the justice reinvestment ethos, and they appear unwilling to advocate for such a strategy to the wider population. The bottom line is that even if the investments involved were effective, the investment of $100m nationally is unlikely to be adequate to turn around the worsening incarceration status of First Nations (link here). The fundamental question then for the ANAO is not whether individual grants are making a positive impact, but whether governments are merely engaged in an exercise of signalling concern (and buying political support) rather than aiming to address the substantive issues involved.

 

Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation’s management of non-financial assets: this proposed performance audit is timely and will no doubt raise several important issues. The elephant in the room is the ILSC’s ownership of the Ayers Rock Resort and the implications for its balance sheet of the current efforts (link here) to divest the resort to a new owner. I published a post on this issue some years ago (link here) and note that the issue has been raised in each of the last two estimates hearings. There was a sustained discussion at the February 2024 Hearings (pages 57 to 60) of the significant contingent liability carried by the ILSC in relation to ARR, and the actions being taken by the ILSC to divest the land to an Indigenous corporation and the operation of the resort to a commercial operator. I was particularly struck by Senator Liddle’s statement in the most recent Estimates hearing that ‘we all know that there was far too much paid for that investment at that particular time’ given that this proposition was vehemently rejected by Minister Scullion when the subsequent Dawn Casey led Board sought to unpack what had transpired and have the decision reviewed (link here).

 

The effectiveness of coordination of Closing the Gap target implementation: this proposed performance audit addresses issues that are crucial to the future effectiveness of the closing the gap process. This element of NIAA’s management of the process is in dire need of reform. There are two elements to coordination of the implementation task. The first is across the Commonwealth: my informal understanding is that the NIAA does not see itself as taking the primary role in leading the implementation of the Priority Reforms under the National Agreement, but rather sees itself as a policy influencer. Of course, NIAA requires ministerial support to engage forthrightly, but it is painfully clear that the NIAA is effectively mute on many if not most of the issues that will make a difference to the ultimate success or failure of closing the gap.

 

The second essential element of successful coordination is for the Commonwealth to step up and provide a much greater degree of policy and even administrative leadership vis a vis the states and territories. The previous Government hid behind the convenient fig leaf that the Commonwealth was merely an equal partner in the intergovernmental National Agreement on Closing the Gap, but there was no necessity for the Labor Government to meekly and supinely follow suit. The Minister for Indigenous Australians must bear ultimate responsibility for this positioning, but NIAA and its leadership could have done much more to persuade the Minister to adopt a more robust and proactive stance.

I published a post on this and related issues in early March (link here) which I strongly recommend to readers.

 

The Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC)’s administration of grants: while this would be a marginally useful exercise given that NTAIC has been operating for less than two years, it strikes me that this proposed performance audit misses a much more strategically important issue, namely the efficacy (and ideally effectiveness) of the overall allocation of royalty equivalents to the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA), of which NTAIC grants are just one comparatively minor part. I was a critic of the NTAIC proposal as being a sleight of hand: it professed to shift control to Aboriginal interests in the NT, but in fact ensured that the Minister retained unilateral control over a significant element of royalty equivalents (managed by NIAA) without any Aboriginal oversight and with much less transparency that previously obtained (link here). Of course, the NTAIC is now a reality; I am not suggesting it be unwound. I am merely pointing to the fact that there is much more to the ABA than the slice that the NTAIC controls.

 

The most recent NIAA Annual Report (link here) incorporates the financial statements for the ABA which disclose that in 2023 it held financial assets totalling $1.47 billion, offset by liabilities (including provisions for establishment funds to transfer to NTAIC) of $625 million leaving net assets of $845 million. Annual appropriations to the ABA totalled $378 million. These funds are then allocated in a range of ways, including to fund the operations of the four land councils in the NT ($109 million in 2023), to fund the distribution of payments to corporations representing traditional owners affected by mining ($113 million), to fund the NTAIC (at the discretion of the Minister) and to make grants (usually approved by the Minister) for community purposes to residents of the NT ($62 million).  

 

In my view there is a much stronger case for assessing the performance of the whole ABA system including the grants that are not made by the NTAIC from a performance (and I would argue effectiveness) perspective than for assessing the comparatively small grants program currently operated by NTAIC. My recent posts in relation to Groote (link here and link here) are infused with a swirling whirlwind  of ABA funds. It is well past time that an independent oversight body undertook a close look at the operations of the ABA with the aim of ensuring the funding it distributes is meeting the statutory remit laid down in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.

 

Concluding Comment

The ANAO is to be commended for seeking comment on its proposed work program though I suspect that it may not attract much attention. In thinking about why and how these proposed performance audits were chosen, it struck me that there is no indication of the decision criteria, nor the process involved in setting the program. Further, given the interaction between efficiency (performance) and effectiveness, an ideal decision process would also consider the proposed evaluation program in each portfolio. These decisions are important because they fill a crucial gap in transparency and accountability in the current approach to public sector accountability.

 

Finally, one would have to assume that the ANAO (and perhaps also the Parliament) is beginning to consider how the developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) might best be applied to assisting the development of more comprehensive and useful performance audit work program. As agencies increasingly adopt AI algorithms to drive their operations, it will be necessary for the ANAO to keep pace. A request to Chat GPT provided ten existing AI driven capabilities that could assist in improving the efficiency effectiveness of the ANAO’s performance audit system including Predictive Analytics for Risk Assessment; Automated Data Extraction and Analysis; Natural Language Processing (NLP) for Document Analysis; and Dynamic Audit Planning and Resource Allocation. It seems like the time is approaching when the ANAO will need to look very hard at how and why it does what it does. More importantly, Governments too will also need to begin consideration of how they might use these new capabilities to improve levels of transparency and accountability across the entire span of public policy.

 

4 April 2024