A sceptre snatched with an
unruly hand
Must be as boisterously
maintained as gained
King John, Act 3, scene 3.
Yunupingu on behalf of the Gumatj Clan or
Estate Group v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCAFC 75, Judgment of:
Mortimer CJ, Moshinsky And Banks-Smith JJ. Date of judgment: 22 May 2023 (link
here).
Today’s Federal Court Decision is momentous insofar as it decides
that the native title holders of the Gove Peninsula will be entitled to
compensation for any native title mineral rights they held prior to the grant
of mineral leases, pastoral leases and a mission lease. This arises form the
Court’s finding (against the arguments of the Commonwealth) that any native
title mineral rights which existed (and which are yet to be determined) were
not extinguished by the grants of pastoral leases and mineral leases over the relevant
land on the Gove Peninsula, and that the requirement for the Commonwealth to
pay just terms compensation for such extinguished native title rights continues
in the Northern Territory.
The judgement, reflecting the arguments put by the parties, is highly technical and complex, particularly for non-lawyers such as myself. I don’t propose to attempt a detailed summary, nor a discussion of the legal implications of the judgment itself. I am sure that there will be a number of detailed summaries published over the coming weeks. I have included at the end of this post an appendix which sets out the Federal Court’s own high level summary of the case for those interested.
It is as yet unclear whether this decision will be appealed to the High Court.
There was however one paragraph in the judgment that caught my attention, not for its legal import in relation to Gove, but because it plays into the particular policy responsibilities of the Commonwealth in relation to the Territories, and in particular the Northern Territory, both generally, but for present purposes for Indigenous policy.
Paragraph 471 states (emphasis added) :
471. Further, we do not
accept the Commonwealth’s contention that when it exercised sovereign power
in the Northern Territory it did so not as a national government in a
federal system; rather it was “essentially performing the role of a State
(as is illustrated by the fact that, in the case of the Northern Territory, the
Commonwealth “stepped into the shoes” of the South Australian government)”. The
NT Administration Act was an exercise of power under s 122 of the Constitution.
It was subject to s 51(xxxi). There is a clear distinction between the kind of legislative
power exercised over the Northern Territory as between the Commonwealth and South
Australia.
It strikes me that the Commonwealth has over the last
decade increasingly sought to position itself on Indigenous policy issues as of
equivalent status as the states (and territories) in an effort to shift policy responsibility
to the states and territories across the board. The issue that came before the Court
is just one example of this. Another is the way in which the Commonwealth has
been administering the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, and in
particular, its passive approach to the quality of compliance by the states on
issues such as the quality of implementation plans required under that National
Agreement.
The fact that the Federal Court has called the Commonwealth
out on the particular issues raised in this litigation is important, but should
serve as an impetus for the Commonwealth to take stock and reconsider its wider
positioning across the Indigenous policy domain. Afterall, the 1967 Referendum,
passed with the support of over 90 percent of voters, gave the Commonwealth powers
to legislate in relation to Aboriginal affairs for a reason.
Appendix
The Catchwords (or high level summary of the issues and decisions)
to this judgment are set out by the Federal Court as follows (emphasis added):
NATIVE TITLE –
claim for compensation under Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA) – where the
applicant, on behalf of the Gumatj Clan or Estate Group, contends that, in
the period from 1911 to 1978, a number of grants or legislative acts took place
in the Northern Territory which, if valid, would have been inconsistent with
the continued existence of the claimants’ non-exclusive native title rights,
and would have extinguished those non-exclusive native title rights at common
law – where the applicant contends that the grants or acts purported to
effect an acquisition of property within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the
Constitution, and that they did not provide just terms within the meaning of
that provision – where the applicant contends that, the NTA apart, the
grants or acts were invalid by reason of the failure to provide just terms as
required by s 51(xxxi) – where the applicant contends that each of the
grants or acts falls within the definition of a “past act” in the NTA – where
the applicant contends that, by operation of the NTA, the grant or act was
effective to grant or vest the rights that it purported to grant or vest, and
the claimants are entitled to compensation under the NTA in respect of the
acquisition of property – where the Commonwealth contended that the
applicant’s claim should fail on a number of bases – where separate
questions considered and determined by a Full Court in the exercise of the
Court’s original jurisdiction.
NATIVE TITLE –
extinguishment – pastoral leases granted between 1886 and 1903 – reservations
of minerals – where the Commonwealth contended that the effect of those
reservations was to vest title to minerals in the Crown and thereby to
extinguish the claimants’ native title mineral rights (if established) – held:
any native title mineral rights not extinguished
NATIVE TITLE –
extinguishment – Mission Lease granted in 1938 – where the Commonwealth
contended that the grant of the Mission Lease extinguished (or purported to
extinguish) any native title rights in the claim area that then subsisted –
where the Commonwealth contended that the legislative instrument provided for
the grant of a common law lease and thus the lease conferred exclusive
possession on the lessee – where the Commonwealth contended in the alternative
that the Mission Lease was a statutory lease that granted rights that were
inconsistent with the claimed non-exclusive native title rights – held: the
Mission Lease did not extinguish or purport to extinguish the claimants’
claimed non-exclusive native title rights
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – s
51(xxxi) of the Constitution – acquisition of property on just terms – where
the Commonwealth contended that the just terms requirement contained in s
51(xxxi) does not apply to laws enacted pursuant to s 122 of the Constitution –
where the Commonwealth submitted that Teori Tau v Commonwealth [1969] HCA 62;
119 CLR 564 is the binding authority on this question – where the Commonwealth
submitted that Wurridjal v Commonwealth [2009] HCA 2; 237 CLR 309 did not
overrule Teori Tau – held: Wurridjal did overrule Teori Tau and the just
terms requirement contained in s 51(xxxi) does apply to laws enacted pursuant
to s 122
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – s
51(xxxi) of the Constitution – acquisition of property on just terms – where
the Commonwealth contended that the relevant grants and acts were not capable
of amounting to an acquisition of property within the meaning of s 51(xxxi)
because native title was inherently susceptible to extinguishment by a valid
exercise of the Crown’s sovereign power to grant interests in land and to
appropriate to itself unalienated land – held: native title rights and
interests are proprietary in nature and constitute “property” for the purposes
of s 51(xxxi) – held: a grant or act that extinguishes native title rights
and interests is capable of amounting to an acquisition of property within the
meaning of s 51(xxxi)
A very astute observation Mike. And in particular about para 471's
ReplyDeleterelevance to the CtG Implementation Plans.
NIce point MIke - thanks for drawing that out for attention!
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