Thursday, 1 June 2023

Typographical errors: ANAO audits of the Tiwi and Anindilyakwa Land Councils

 

Here are a few of the unpleasant’st words

That ever blotted paper.

Merchant of Venice Act 3, scene 2.

 

There are four land councils established in the NT under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA): the Tiwi Land Council (TLC), the Northern Land Council (NLC), the Central Land Council (CLC), and the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC).

 

In the last fortnight, the ANAO has published two important audit reports on the smaller two land councils, the TLC (link here) and the ALC (link here). Land Councils are Commonwealth statutory corporations albeit with a range of unique elements relating to the appointment of members, their funding, and their linkages with other Indigenous institutions in the Northern Territory. They are also native title representative bodies under the NTA. Over and above their narrow legislative roles, they have developed into important Indigenous institutions in both the NT and nationally.

 

The ANAO notes that the rationale for these audits is provide independent assurance to Parliament that the Land Councils’ governance arrangements are effective in meeting legislative obligations under the ALRA, the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) and the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). The ANAO has indicated that an audit of the CLC will shortly be published and an audit of the NLC is expected to be published in a couple of months.

 

I don’t have the space here to provide a comprehensive summary of each of these reports, and will instead cherry pick a small number of issues that appear to me to have significant governance implications both for the individual land councils and the broader institutional framework they operate under.

 

The ANAO is to be congratulated on the quality and accessibility of its analysis given the innate complexity of these institutions, including their cross cultural responsibilities. Nevertheless, as I have previously noted on this blog, the ANAO has a propensity to cloak its findings in heavily qualified bureaucratic prose and extreme understatement. The result is that an ANAO report reads like a novel written in a foreign language. Those proficient in bureaucratese know exactly what is being said while those unfamiliar with the language (eg in the media and the general public) are left largely untroubled and unaware of the significance of what has been said.


Tiwi Land Council Audit

 

The ANAO headline findings for the TLC were:

The Tiwi Land Council's (TLC) governance arrangements under the ALRA and the PGPA Act are partly effective….The TLC’s arrangements to promote the proper use and management of resources under the PGPA Act are largely inappropriate. (page 5).

 

The ANAO notes that in 2021-22the TLC budget was $4.3m, and it distributed $5.9m in land use payments to Traditional owners (TOs). These are not particularly large amounts, but will add to around $100m over the span of a decade.

 

In para 2.9, the ANAO noted that its analysis of Management Committee and Council meeting minutes identified multiple instances where the Management Committee made decisions without delegation between 2008 and 2020.  

 

A core statutory function of the land councils is to consult Traditional owners and ascertain their consent to proposed activities on their land. The ANAO identified significant shortfalls in the TLC’s approach to exercising this function:

3.64 The ALRA determines that, in carrying out its functions, a Land Council shall have regard to the interests of, and shall consult with, the Traditional Aboriginal Owners of the land in its area and any other Aboriginal people interested in the land. The ALRA further specifies that a Land Council shall not take any action unless it is satisfied that: •the Traditional Owners of that land understand the nature and purpose of the proposed action and, as a group, consent to it; and •any Aboriginal community or group that may be affected by the proposed action has been consulted and has had adequate opportunity to express its view to the Land Council…

…3.66 The TLC subcontracts the organisation and conduct of the clan meetings to Tiwi Resources, an Aboriginal corporation owned by the eight clans. The TLC presents at these meetings, however does not take minutes, and does not request the minutes from Tiwi Resources. The TLC was unable to provide information to the ANAO about the discussions or decisions made at clan meetings and cannot demonstrate it has conducted effective clan consultations. 

 

In the summary at the start of Chapter Four, the ANAO note (page 51):

The TLC’s arrangements to promote the proper use and management of resources are largely inappropriate. The TLC’s policy framework and arrangements for risk management, fraud control and managing conflicts of interest are incomplete, not appropriately established, and inconsistently implemented. The TLC’s corporate plan and annual report, including performance statements, are not fully consistent with legislative requirements.

 

Finally, in what I took to be a damning indictment of the level of engagement of the National Indigenous Australians Agency, the ANAO laid out the functions of the NIAA set out in the formal order which established it (see para.2.26), which includes roles ‘to lead and coordinate policy Commonwealth policy development’ and to ‘build and maintain effective partnerships…’, and then noted (in para 2.27) the NIAA’s advice of its perception of its role in relation to the NT Land Councils which adopted a much more passive approach. Then to ram home the point, in para 2.28, the ANAO stated without further comment:

2.28 As part of this audit, the ANAO approached the NIAA regarding a potential recommendation to the NIAA to support the Tiwi Land Council to develop appropriate delegation instruments. The NIAA responded that ‘This is a matter for the Tiwi Land Council’.

 

Anindilyakwa Land Council Audit

The ANAO headline findings for the ALC were:

The ALC’s governance arrangements under the ALRA and PGPA Act are partly effective …. The ALC’s arrangements to promote the proper use and management of resources under the PGPA Act are partly appropriate (page 6).

 

The ANAO notes that in 2021-22 the ALC budget was $7.4m, and it distributed $70.2m in land use payments to traditional owners (TOs). These are substantial amounts appropriated for Aboriginal benefit, and will add to around $770m over the span of a decade.

 

Notwithstanding this rather anodyne description, I was quite astonished to read the detailed analysis contained in the ANAO audit. While the audit focusses on a single organisation, the ALC, it necessarily describes a network of parallel organisations with interlocked directors, and senior staff, and a complex web of financial flows between them. Yet the financial books of the parallel organisations (and their commercial subsidiaries) are beyond the ANAO remit, leaving the readers to ponder the implications of a series of questionable arrangements and decisions taken within the ALC.

 

The high level conclusions of the ANAO are outlined at pages 8 to 10, followed by a series of technical recommendations. The following extracts pick out some of the more salient high level conclusions:

17. …. Key interests held by the CEO and Council members (including the Chair) in corporations that receive funding based on decisions of the Council, are not consistently declared and are ineffectively managed. (See paragraphs 4.19 to 4.51)…

18….The 2021-22 Annual Report was not published as at March 2023. Although the draft 2021–22 Annual Report mostly complies with PGPA Act and Rule and ALRA requirements, it lacks transparency in relation to operations.

19. The Audit Committee does not provide adequate oversight and scrutiny of the ALC’s operations. The Audit Committee is not independent from management and is not effective in the delivery of some of its key mandatory functions under the PGPA Act. It does not appropriately review the ALC’s performance reporting; system of risk oversight and management; and system of internal control. The Audit Committee secretariat is not effective. (See paragraphs 4.64 to 4.85)

 

The issue of conflicts of interest is at the core of this audit. In plain English, a conflict of interest opens the way for those conflicted to accrue inappropriate financial benefits. The ANAO has identified no instances where that has occurred, however its remit is limited to the ALC and it has not examined the financial affairs of the various parallel and subsidiary organisations. Figure 4.1 on page 68 provides a useful summary of the complex relationships involved. The key must read paragraphs are 4.45 to 4.50.

 

Some extracts:

4.32 The CEO’s declaration identified an interest arising from the ALC’s employment of his spouse (who was first employed by the ALC in 2014). The ‘notes’ section of the declaration was left blank, and no management plan was included in the register or elsewhere. The CEO had not made a written declaration of the interest prior to 2022...  

4.47 The involvement of the ALC Chair, CEO and CEO’s spouse in organisations that, in 2021–22, received the majority of royalty equivalents and that, in 2020–21 and 2021–22, received the majority of NT Indigenous Economic Stimulus Package funds, creates a risk of conflicted interests….

4.48 In Council funding decisions, the ANAO observed disproportionate benefit to the entities with which the CEO is associated. During the two 2022 Finance Committee meetings (at which the ALC CEO was present), 112 requests for funding valued at $109.1 million were reviewed… In summary, requests submitted by the ALC CEO represented 24 per cent of funding applied for, and 36 per cent of approved funding; and the success rate for requests submitted by the ALC CEO was 99 per cent by value, compared to a success rate for the other applicants of 53 per cent by value. 

4.50 Given the influence of the Chair and CEO over the ALC’s funding and management decisions; the financial benefit that AAAC, GHAC and consequently Winchelsea Mining obtain from the ALC; and the ALC Chair’s, CEO’s and CEO’s spouse’s positions in GHAC and Winchelsea Mining; the risk of conflicts of interest is high. The current management strategies applied to this risk are either insufficient or not implemented. 

 

The ANAO analysis of the ALC Audit Committee is also eye watering. The ANAO identifies that the ‘independent chair’ costs nine times more than other land councils expend on their audit committee chairs (para. 4.73), and is engaged by the parallel organisations that are also effectively controlled by the CEO and ALC Directors.

 

The ANAO identified several significant issues in relation to the independence of the Audit Committee Chair (para. 4.70):

• The Chair of the Audit Committee is the founding director of Enmark Pty Ltd (Enmark). Between 2014–15 and 2021–22 the ALC paid $896,056 in fees to Enmark for services. Between 2017–18 and 2021–22 Enmark was one of the top three consultants by value engaged by the ALC.

• Enmark provides consultancy and other services to several Aboriginal corporations receiving royalty equivalent funding from the ALC. This includes GHAC and AAAC.  The ANAO identified numerous deficiencies in the approach of the Audit Committee to its responsibilities.

 

One further issue that I won’t explore in detail relates to the ALC’s use of royalty payments to third party organisations which were then effectively reallocated to the land council for the payment of salaries (see paras 3.51 and 3.52). The ANAO correctly identifies this mechanism as a potential source of fraud, but fails to note that it effectively undermines one of the Minister’s tools available to ensure the land council is appropriately focussed on its legislated remit. Under the ALRA, the Minister approves the budgets of the land councils, but the ALC has effectively been redirecting royalty equivalent funding away from community benefit and towards its own operations, thus undermining the fiscal constraints that incentivises good priority setting.

 

Finally, the ALC Board and CEO provided a ten page response to the Audit report, which needs to be read in full. The response focusses on the undoubted achievements of the ALC and its associated organisations in a range of areas. It documents a massive increase in staff of the ALC, many from the local communities. It also notes that the former Minister for Indigenous Australians Ken Wyatt was kept fully informed of development on Groote Eylandt, and that the CEO of NIAA has been briefed. It points to the ALC’s involvement with the ANU in documenting the social indicators on Groote; a matter I commented on in an earlier post (link here).

 

Clearly whatever its other deficiencies, the capability of the ALC Board to write entertaining prose far exceeds that of the ANAO. The ALC response provided my favourite line from the whole report in a comment on the ANAO’s conclusions on conflict of interest:

The ALC has effectively managed conflicts of interest in the context of this operating environment and accepts that we have not always properly documented these practices. Therefore, instances of typographical errors have given the auditors a negative overall impression.

 

Conclusion

These two audits raise important issues regarding the quality of governance in two of the four NT land councils. The TLC appears to have taken a series of remedial actions and should hopefully make good progress. The ALC faces more deep-seated issues and notwithstanding its response, I for one am unconvinced that it is yet on the right path.

 

The existence of these issues however is not just an issue for the Land Council directors and management. It seems to me that the relevant Ministers over the past decade have allowed the quality of regulatory oversight of the NT land councils to significantly weaken and in some cases to perhaps disappear. Not only has this laissez faire approach opened up the opportunities for conflicts of interest to emerge (and thus to opportunities for fraud against local communities and the Commonwealth), but it has also undermined the overall effectiveness of the land councils in fulfilling their statutory obligations and remit.

 

To address the issues raised in these audits, it strikes me that there are two essential actions required.

 

First, to provide an assurance to the ordinary members of the Groote community, there appears to be an overwhelming case for an independent forensic investigation into the financial affairs of the ALC, its associated organisations, and its key staff and Directors. It seems to me imperative that Minister Burney should both initiate such an investigation immediately, and initiate a short sharp review of the way in which NIAA oversights portfolio bodies.

 

Second, given that it is now almost fifty years since land councils were established, and that there has been no overarching review for two decades or so, there is a strong case for a high level independent review of the appropriate regulatory framework for the operations of the NT land councils. Such a review should reconsider their statutory remit, their funding arrangements, and importantly, how land councils relate to associated Indigenous entities that have responsibilities for utilising the royalties, royalty equivalents, and other land use payments that accrue to landowners and affected communities. Such a review should not have any overt political agenda apart from considering the best way to meet the future needs and aspirations of Aboriginal landowners and native title holders in the NT into the future.

 

 

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