…. that
our stars,
Unreconciliable, should
divide,
Our equalness to this.
Antony
& Cleopatra Act V, scene 1
The Productivity Commission (PC) has released a draft
report on its review of progress on closing the gap (link
here). The draft report package comprises a nine page plain English
executive summary (which I found extremely useful); a 15 page Executive Summary
which includes six draft recommendations and a series of requests for
information/feedback; a 101 page Draft Report, and a series of seven
information papers totalling around 280 pages.
The review arises from the terms of the National Agreement
on Closing the Gap (link here), in
particular, clauses 121 to 124. In particular, clause 121 states:
The
Productivity Commission will undertake a comprehensive review of progress every
three years … It will provide an analysis of progress on Closing the Gap
against the priority reforms, targets, indicators and trajectories, and examine
the factors contributing to progress, including by drawing on evaluation and
other evidence.
The political and media reaction to the Draft Review has
been predictable with a large focus on the report’s implications for the Voice
(which to my mind prioritises means over ends). The Australian ran a series of articles on 26 July 2023 (behind its
paywall) with headlines such as ‘Closing
the Gap failures “show why the vote must succeed”’ (a view espoused by
Minister Burney); ‘Indigenous watchdog
“with bite” called for regardless of voice vote to deal with Closing The Gap’;
‘Closing the Gap scheme flounders within
states of cynical disregard’ (arguing the states have dropped the ball);
and an editorial headed ‘Bureaucracy firmly in the sights’. The Chair of the
PC, Michael Brennan published an article in the AFR on 30 July (link
here $) titled ‘The gap won’t change
without fundamental change’. The money quote was his assessment of progress
on closing the gap as ‘in large part, a hotted up version of business as
usual’. Crikey published an analysis (link
here) with the headline ‘Why the
Productivity Commission thinks a Voice is needed to Close the Gap’. This is
arguably a misinterpretation of what the PC intends. In a perceptive comment on
that article, Jon Altman wrote, inter alia, that the PC
continues
to produce detailed and expensive report after report carefully documenting the
nation’s failure to properly address Indigenous disadvantage. But it does not
address the first order issue: is the National Agreement on Closing the Gap
framework a sound basis for policy formation? And will valorising equality for
Indigenous populations as state-defined statistical subjects generate positive
wellbeing outcomes for First Nations people in all their diversity?
Like Jon, I wish to focus on the policy issues rather than
the quotidian political debate about the Voice (important as that is).
The
nature of the PC review
There are a number of seriously problematic issues with the
draft review (which I will seek to identify below); but these can be traced in
large measure to a more fundamental issue: the PC appears to have veered away
from the comprehensive review envisaged in the Agreement. The terms of
reference for the review provided by former Treasurer Frydenberg in April 2022 state,
inter alia:
Scope of the review: In undertaking the review, the
Productivity Commission should:
1. analyse progress on Closing the Gap
against the four Priority Reform outcome areas in the Agreement; 2.
analyse progress against all of the socioeconomic outcome areas in the
Agreement; and 3. examine the factors affecting progress.
These tasks can be interpreted in one of two ways. They
might be pursued broadly and holistically, in effect asking the strategic question:
is the current Closing the Gap process meeting the objective of the agreement
laid out in clause 15 of the National Agreement? Or they might be addressed narrowly
and less consequentially, in effect asking the question, are the terms of each element
of the agreement being met whether or not they are impacting the overall outcome
being sought. Unfortunately, on my reading of the report, the PC has adopted
the latter approach. I made this argument more expansively in my submission to
the review (link
here submission #5) based on my reading of an early issues paper.
The result is that despite nearly 400 pages of
investigative narration, we don’t really obtain an effective readout on the
required new policy roadmap for closing the gap. Instead we get what seems at
times an interminable litany of proposals for improved ways to hold governments
accountable for particular cogs in the complex machine that comprises closing
the gap. I am all for holding governments accountable, but there is an implicit
assumption embedded in calls for improved accountability that governments are in fact focussed on implementing actions designed
to achieve the overarching objective of the National Agreement. If that
assumption is wrong, then all that will be achieved will be more complexity,
more engagement/involvement, more process, more bureaucratic kludge, and no
change.
How might we determine if that assumption if in fact
correct? The answer is by examining the tangible plans that exist to achieve
the objective. Take this analogy. If I have an objective to build a new home, I
develop a plan (let’s call it an implementation plan). I buy some land. I
consider what I need to make the home useful to me. I engage an architect, and
develop detailed designs and have the design specifications costed. I allocate
financial resources both for the capital costs (construction) and for the
ongoing maintenance. If there is a mismatch between design and available financial
resources, I either adjust the design or allocate more financial resources. This
is not rocket science. If I don’t have a plan; if I don’t develop designs that
provide tangible links between my aspiration/vision and the ultimate outcome; if
my designs are not able to be constructed at present because the materials
required are not available; or if I don’t allocate resources and have some idea
about how much it will cost; then an objective observer would conclude that I
am not serious…
In relation to closing the gap, the National Agreement sets
out the aspirational plan and steps to achieve the ultimate objective (clause
15 says it is reduced inequality between indigenous and other citizens). But
Governments have failed to take it further. The implementation plans produced so far (required under the agreement)
are not in fact implementation plans, but lists of what governments are already
doing with some marginal new monies added. The PC identified that
jurisdictional implementation plans were not fulfilling their intended purpose.
See Box 4 on pages 27-8. I don’t agree with the detail of the PC analysis; for
example, the Joint Council has agreed that the implementation plans be produced
annually, a matter which strikes me as ridiculous, yet not commented upon by
the PC.
To return to the house construction analogy, you don’t
develop an implementation plan iteratively for each month or quarter of
construction, but for the complete project. Instead the PC argues for codesign
of these plans which is superficially attractive to Indigenous interests, but
will inevitably produce delay and a bureaucratic morass (already a problem with
this whole process). The time for Indigenous codesign is in developing the
targets. Governments then must deliver against them, consulting and codesigning
with relevant Indigenous interests as they go. The fact that jurisdictions do
not have adequate and effective implementation plans is a fundamental flaw that
requires rectification.
In relation to identifying the cost of closing the gap, including perhaps its constitutive elements,
Governments have made no commitments. Instead, they merely publicise the
financial commitments they make, often with little transparency of what the
expenditures are achieving. Worse still, in contrast to the original Closing
the Gap architecture under COAG (known as the National Indigenous Reform
Agreement or NIRA), governments do not in general utilise decade long financial
allocations. The problem with this general approach is that there is no way of
knowing whether the financial commitments of governments are adequate or not. It
is a truism that money is not everything, but in this case, it is an essential
component of strategies to reduce inequitable access to services and basic
infrastructure (like housing). Adequate funding may not be sufficient, but it
certainly essential.
In my submission to the review, I argued that the PC should
seek to estimate the likely total cost of closing the gap. To return to our
analogy, we don’t start building a house without knowing what it will cost.
Unfortunately, the PC has ignored this element of my submission. It is bad
enough that governments do not estimate these costs, but it is an egregious dereliction
of responsibility for the ‘independent’ reviewer to ignore this issue. No other
area of public policy is seriously analysed without a focus on cost. In areas
of high ideological salience like defence, the debate over cost is assessed not
just in terms of real growth rates, but the proportion of GDP allocated to the task
(link
here). In Indigenous affairs, all we get is an incessant flurry of media
releases announcing this grant and that, often directed at squeaky wheels.
One of the consequences of this seemingly deliberate blindness
by the PC is to promulgate and maintain the myth that closing the gap is solely
of concern to Indigenous interests. If adequate resources are to be allocated
to addressing Indigenous disadvantage, then mainstream attitudes need to
change. This requires understanding which is best obtained by encouraging wider
community involvement in the processes associated with closing the gap. [As an
aside, the forthcoming vote on the Voice is another example of the importance
of building wider community understanding in relation to the issues of core
concern to Indigenous citizens.]
A further issue identified by the PC relates to the status of the targets in the Agreement.
This is addressed at length in Information Paper 6, but it is too convoluted to
dissect here. Instead I suggest interested readers look at the plain English Executive
Summary (link
here). Alternatively, see the discussion on page 5 of the draft review. Here
are some choice extracts from the Summary (pp. 6-7) regarding targets and data
(emphasis added):
For
clear progress on the socio-economic outcomes and Priority Reforms, the
Agreement says there must be: • performance tracking • public reporting. But
doing this has been a big challenge. The
Priority Reforms are the basis of the Agreement. Even so, governments report no
data on: • the agreed targets •
indicators that support the Priority Reforms.
These are critical gaps in data.
Also,
progress on socio-economic outcomes is measured against national targets. It is
not clear how to hold governments accountable for what happens at the regional
level. There are no data developed for: • any of the targets under the
Priority Reforms • 4 of the 19 socio-economic targets • roughly 140 supporting
indicators • more than 120 data
development items.
We
probably will not see these data
developed within 10 years from the start of the Agreement (that is, by
2030). More effort is needed to: •
improve governance • prioritise data
development.
In other words, we have the policy architecture, but not the
means to implement it. The PC
recommendation is for a dedicated government agency to drive data development.
I beg to disagree. To return to the house construction analogy, we have constructed
the frame, but the walls and roof are missing as the relevant materials are not
yet available or developed. Do we appoint another builder to supervise the
current builder, or go back to the drawing board?
I suggest the Commonwealth should step in and initiate an
immediate process of radical simplification to take this process back to its
core purpose. There is a need to consider once again what the targets are actually
for: instead of providing a policy roadmap indicating that we are heading in
the right direction, they have been transformed into an attempt (that is bound
to fail) which seeks to guide us each and every step along the way. Nineteen
targets times eight jurisdictions plus hundreds of supporting indicators and data
development items again across eight jurisdictions, all under constant change
and refinement, and we have a data labyrinth which is guaranteed to ensure that
any one foolish enough to enter is swiftly lost in the bowels of the machine.
There are a range of other issues embedded in this draft review
that require detailed consideration by those interested in seeing Indigenous
inequality and exclusion removed from Australian society. I will address a few below
in no particular order.
Conceptual
issues
Deficit
discourse and remote disadvantage
One of the key polemical drivers of the Closing the Gap
refresh process initiated by the former LNP Government which led eventually to
the National Agreement was an ostensible reaction to the notion of
deficit discourse which advocates argue is designed to blame Indigenous citizens for their own disadvantage.
This is clearly an important policy insight, one that has recently been
highlighted in relation to mainstream disadvantage by the Robodebt Royal
commission (link here
page iii). Yet when this concept is taken to extremes, it undercuts the whole
point of closing the gap.
Unfortunately throughout the draft report, the PC appears
to have adopted and endorsed such an extreme interpretation uncritically, thus
setting up a polemical dichotomy where governments can do no right and must be
held accountable for every shortfall and (paradoxically) where Indigenous
interests are ongoing victims without agency. So for example, in Information Paper 6 (Link
here pp. 14-5), the PC writes:
Review
participants indicated a role for performance monitoring in supporting a
paradigm shift in policy narratives about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people. This shift moves policy discourse away from framing Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people as a disadvantaged minority towards
rights-bearing peoples with strong connections to diverse cultures, Countries,
and communities that have withstood current and historical institutional racism
… In its submission, the Lowitja
Institute explained: Data is a powerful tool. Data can be used to hold
governments and the community-controlled sector to account on actions under the
National Agreement, however there is a risk that this can be decontextualised
and misused if data sovereignty and data governance mechanisms are not in
place. The oversupply of deficit-based
data has created a discourse that sees Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples presented as a problem, or as wholly responsible for
inequities…. (sub. 15, p. 7). (emphasis added)
One consequence of this aversion to anything that even
hints at deficit discourse is that important issues at the core of ongoing Indigenous
exclusion and disadvantage are being deliberately written out of the policy
relevant narrative and thus the policy agenda. It may not be a coincidence that
given the current demography of Indigenous Australia (link
here), it would be theoretically possible to conjure a positive narrative
on progress in closing the gap while ignoring the needs of remote Australia. The
losers from this process are the most disadvantaged Indigenous citizens,
particularly those in remote regions. So for example, in the 101 pages of the draft
report on the status of closing the gap, there are only seven mentions of the
word ‘remote’, most just passing references, and there are no specific statement
by the PC referencing the fact that Indigenous disadvantage is deepest and most
severe in remote regions. The closest is a reference in a case study on the
Torres Strait on p.62 where the Torres Strait Council refers to its very remote
location as an issue.
Yet the PC itself, in its July 2023 Annual Data Compilation Report identifies (albeit in cautious bureaucratese)
the dire state of disadvantage in remote regions (link here
page 30):
People
living in a more remote area may experience additional barriers to better
outcomes; for example, not having access to key government services or
infrastructure at the same level as people living in other areas. Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people typically experienced poorer target outcomes
as remoteness increased, which was mostly not the case for non-Indigenous
people … Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people living in more remote
areas also saw less progress toward target outcomes. Target outcomes typically
only improved for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in major cities
and regional areas where there may be fewer barriers, including better access
to key infrastructure. There was little or no improvement in remote and very
remote areas. The exception was for target 9A ‘appropriately sized housing’
where outcomes improved the most in very remote areas, though they remain well
below the outcomes in less remote areas…
Or more starkly, in the same report the PC states (emphasis
added):
One
jurisdiction where the worsening outcomes are particularly concerning is the
Northern Territory. The Northern
Territory’s outcomes worsened across eight target indicators and in most of
these they were already performing relatively poorly at baseline compared to
other jurisdictions. For example, the adult imprisonment rate in the Northern
Territory increased at the highest rate despite already being above the
national average at baseline.
It is worth noting that the NT has the most geographically concentrated
remote population, and has the weakest financial base in the federation.
Priority
Reforms
The PC’s approach to assessing progress on the Priority
Reforms, particularly Priority Reform 3, is in my view deeply flawed. I dealt
with this in my submission to the review, so won’t duplicate it at length here.
The key point is that increasingly, mainstream policies and programs are
gaining greater salience across the indigenous policy domain. Ensuing
mainstream agencies are focussed on addressing Indigenous disadvantage in their
core activities is crucial to ensuring that there is a whole of government focus
on these issues. Yet treating the priority reforms as akin to mechanically
constructed targets, and measuring important but incidental issues such as
levels of racism within agencies as the metric of success is a recipe for failure
and non-performance. Unfortunately, the PC does not see this as they ignore
this issue in its entirety.
Concluding
comments
The problem with this draft review is that it is fundamentally
misconceived, and fails to step back and look at the nation’s approach to
closing the gap holistically. This was a crucial opportunity only three years
into the revised process, and unfortunately, the PC has failed to grasp it. There
is a lack of real policy analysis throughout this report, and the attached information
papers.
As a consequence, the review fails to ask the hard questions
and ignores many aspects that should have been front and centre. For example, there
is no substantive assessment of the operations of the Joint Council. There is
no assessment of the capability requirements on the Coalition of Peaks and
whether the current levels of support are adequate. There are mentions of
states failing to deliver on their commitments, but no real solutions offered in
response. There is no recognition of the primacy of the Commonwealth in the federation,
and the implications of the deliberate strategy embedded within the
architecture of the agreement for the Commonwealth to outsource its overarching
responsibilities to the Joint Council and the states. There is no analysis of
the nature of the refreshed targets which are increasingly not focussed on
comparative economic and social status, but are framed in terms of absolutes (ie improvements
on current levels).
There is no recognition that the current design
architecture for the agreement, while incomplete and thus subject to ongoing
remedial work, is simultaneously over designed and in need of radical simplification.
As presently configured, it guarantees that the Coalition of Peaks (representing
Indigenous interests) will be wading through bureaucratic sludge for the next
ten years, and thus effectively distracted from the main policy game. It also ensures
that the probability of the national agreement imploding under the weight of its
accumulated complexity is high and bound to grow. Proactive reform is preferable
to stasis followed by abolition.
The bottom line however is that the six recommendations of
the draft review (see pages 10-15), if implemented, would in my view not make
any substantive difference to the nation’s progress on closing the gap within
five or even ten years. They are an amalgam of doubling down on the current hyper-complexity
of the policy architecture along with a hefty dose of blind faith in the bureaucratic
leadership of the nation. Did the robodebt royal commission not make any
impression at all on the PC? Notwithstanding the PC Chair’s view in his recent
AFR article that governments are engaged in ‘a hotted up version of business as
usual’, the draft recommendations in this report might be characterised in
similar terms.
I have
a recommendation for the Commonwealth Government.
Issue the PC with revised terms of reference, and perhaps an extension of time.
Request them to (a) develop an estimate of the cost of addressing the entrenched
inequality facing Indigenous Australians; (b) map out a realistic timeframe and
strategy for achieving that objective; (c) make a more fundamental analysis of
the current status of the Closing the Gap architecture; and (d) provide options
for radically simplifying the structure and design of the current architecture while
retaining the four priority reforms. And for good measure, keep it to fifty
pages. Such a report would then allow the Commonwealth Government to meaningfully
and honestly engage with Indigenous interests and the states and territories.
3 August 2023
Note this post was amended on 4 August to correct a number of typographical and grammatical errors
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