When we are born we cry that we are come
To this great stage of fools.
King Lear, Act four, Scene six.
I
recently put up two posts on the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) on Groote
Eylandt in the NT, ALC and a murky set of inter-related issues based around the
distribution of ABA monies (royalty equivalents) by the ALC and the proposed
development of a new mine on Winchelsea Island off the northern coast of Groote
Eylandt (link
here and link
here). These ‘royalty equivalent’ distributions are statutory functions of
land councils ostensibly regulated by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 which is Commonwealth legislation.
On
11 May, the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) published an article by investigative
journalist Nick McKenzie, based on leaked documents emanating from within the
ALC (link
here).
Key revelations included a report that the ALC CEO Mark Hewitt in 2023 had sought to have up to ten percent equity in the Winchelsea Mining Corporation (WMC) granted to him by the TOs who own 70 percent of the company (the other 30 percent is owned by an Australian corporation with Chinese connections, Aus China International Mining Pty Ltd). The article suggests that the value of the proposed shareholding proposed to be transferred to Mr. Hewitt was significant, and based on internal ALC estimates was currently worth $13m (which places the current valuation of the corporation at $130m) but was potentially worth $50m (which would place the potential value of WMC at $500m). In my previous post I argued that the commercial feasibility of the proposed Winchelsea project appeared to be seriously problematic given the data WMC had provided to the NT Government as part of the EIS processes required for a mine. Nevertheless, it is not clear what other exploration titles WMC owns or might seek to obtain and how prospective they might be. There are suggestions that the seabed surrounding Groote is highly prospective for manganese, but the TOs currently oppose any exploration. This could conceivably change in the future, and if it did, an Aboriginal owned Corporation would be in the box seat.
The
proposal for an equity transfer to Mr. Hewitt did not proceed after an ALC
employed lawyer raised concerns (presumably around conflict of interest) which
were confirmed in legal advice sought from an external lawyer Ron Levy. The ALC
lawyer’s employment ended two weeks later. According to the SMH article, Mr. Hewitt
acknowledged that he had informed the lawyer that his contract would not be
renewed.
The
article also mentions that a complaint had been made to the Commonwealth
Ombudsman in relation to the share transfer matter and that the Ombudsman had
requested the relevant agency (presumably NIAA) investigate.
There
are several implications that emerge or arise from the SMH article and its
revelations. The first is the discrepancy between Mr. Hewitt’s comments to the
Estimates Committee and the latest revelations that demonstrate not only that
he came very close to being granted ten percent equity in WMC, but that he had
indicated that he only agreed to forgo the offer until he stood down as ALC
CEO. In the Estimates committee hearing in February this year Mr. Hewitt stated:
I just want to say there are some
important points I'd like to put out straightaway and correct on the record.
I'm not a co-owner of the Winchelsea mine at all—not at all, in part or
completely. I'm not silly. The mine is owned by a 70 per cent share with
the Bara and Jaragba clans and they represent themselves through Anindilyakwa
Advancement Aboriginal Corporation, whose directors comprise senior TOs for
that island, where that resource is held. I think also I need to say that the
work I undertake with Winchelsea and other major projects are because there are
certain big things we need to do before the GEMCO mining operation closes. The
biggest piece of it all is the mining project, because the revenue for that
will enable all these other important things to occur—in particular, getting
our mining trust up to a figure which can sustain valuable, important cultural
and community support programs and things of that nature…[emphasis added].
While
these comments are factually correct, they fail to mention his previous proposal
for a transfer of ownership of ten percent of the mining company to himself. In
effect, the Committee was misled by omission (although to be fair, as I
previously argued, the Committee exhibited an excessive degree of
credulousness). Moreover, Mr. Hewitt also failed to mention his plan to take up
the offer of a future ownership transfer once he transitioned out of the ALC CEO
role.
A second,
and in my view much more salient implication of the SMH revelations was that in
his comments to the SMH justifying the ownership transfer proposal, Mr. Hewitt has
made crystal clear his role as the primary architect and most active proponent of
the overarching agenda being pursued by the ALC, central to which is the
development of the Winchelsea mine. This is the agenda which I was particularly
critical of in my previous posts, and for which the Land Council members must
be held ultimately responsible. Among the questions that emerge from this implicit
admission is how does it coexist with the commitment he gave former Minister
Scullion in September 2018 to recuse himself from land council dealings on the
mine venture? The SMH has apparently seen the letter making this commitment. It
is patently clear that in terms of the substantive issues that the land council
has responsibility for, his role as CEO places him in a situation where it
would be structurally impossible for him to completely recuse himself. This is
the deeper import of the conflicts of interest identified by the ANAO in their
May 2023 report.
The third
and perhaps most serious issue raised by the events outlined by the SMH is the possibility
that the degree of control exercised by Mr. Hewitt over the ALC Board (as
identified in the ANAO report) may have established a network of reciprocal
obligations between key Anindilyakwa TOs and Mr. Hewitt. Such control would be
facilitated by the level of control that the ALC holds over the Boards and decision
making of associated corporations as discussed in my previous post (link
here). Both these outcomes are enabled by the inter-connected memberships between
the ALC and the various associated corporations in receipt of royalty
equivalent payments from the ALC. If such a network of reciprocity exists (a
factual matter yet to be formally determined), it may make it extremely
difficult for individual TOs to say ‘no’ to proposals put forward by Mr.
Hewitt. The key issue would then become,
are such proposals in the interests of the Anandilyakwa people generally. These
are issues that are both philosophical in nature yet also require tangible real-world
decisions to be made.
The Aboriginal
Land Rights Act establishes the system of land trusts and Land Councils to
determine these issues in the real world, however imperfectly. Yet the independence
of the land council on Groote has potentially been compromised and successive Ministers
responsible for ensuring that the governance standards and normal checks and
balances are maintained have dropped the ball. While there is an extraordinarily
strong case for shining an accountability spotlight on what is happening on
Groote, there is also a much more fundamental case for holding Ministers to account
for their unwillingness to take appropriate and timely action to ensure strict
compliance with the statutory framework in place.
The case
for action is strengthened by the fact that prima facie, the facts as we now
know them are potentially consistent with public officeholders (which could
include ALC staff, the Minister and NIAA staff) being involved in two of the
four types of corrupt conduct which exist under the National Anti-Corruption Commission
Act, namely, breach of public trust and abuse of office.
All
I can say is that the longer the Minister delays taking action, the more
foolish she will ultimately appear.
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