Friday, 5 July 2024

Regional governance on Groote: financial and governance risks

 

And blind oblivion swallowed cities up…

Troilus and Cressida Act three, Scene two.

There is no doubt that the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) is at the apex of the complex organisational structure that underpins and shapes Anandilyakwa community life on Groote Eylandt. The ALC is not without its competitors: GEMCO the operator of one of the world’s largest manganese mines dominates the local economy (link here); the Commonwealth and NT governments are the source of significant funding for infrastructure and services across the Archipelago, but neither government has a substantial presence.

If we were to map the institutional framework on Groote utilising the economists definition: institutions are the systems and structures that  comprise  the ‘rules of the game’, then the key nodes in that map would be the NT’s mining legislation; the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) which establishes the ALC and governs royalty and royalty equivalent distributions; the Commonwealth’s Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (CATSI Act) which provides incorporation status to the various corporations in receipt of royalty equivalent payments from the ALC; the NT Local Government Act; and of course the swathe of civil and criminal legislation that applies to all Australian citizens wherever they reside.

What sets Groote Eylandt apart from the rest of Australia is its remoteness; the existence of the mine and its concomitant economic, social and environmental implications; the existence of a synergistic swathe of economic, social and health challenges (link here); the ubiquity and strength of Anindilyakwa language and culture (link here); and the existence of a concentrated cohort of people suffering from or at risk of developing a neuro-degenerative disease known as Machado Joseph disease (link here).

In contrast to many remote communities, local government and its associated services is not a high-profile player on the Groote Eylandt archipelago. However, there are processes in place which may change that. This post is aimed at documenting these processes given the ongoing and perhaps expanding focus on local governance on Groote over the past year or so.

For a high-level summary of what is happening, it is difficult to go past the ‘Future Groote’ tab on the ALC website. The following text has been taken from that web page which links to detailed underlying documents:

Future Groote Strategic Plan: The purpose of the ALC 15-year Strategic Plan (2012 – 2027) is to allow the Anindilyakwa people to take the future into their own hands. It is a culmination of the thoughts, vision and articulation of the Anindilyakwa people (link here).

6 Local Decision Making Agreements: On 14 November 2018, the ALC and NT Government entered into a Local Decision Making Agreement (LDMA). Under the LDMA, the Anindilyakwa people of the Groote Archipelago now determine the service delivery models that work best for their communities and region (link here).

Anindilyakwa Treaty: The ALC sees the Local Decision Making agreement as a pre-curser to a treaty agreement. Under the Local Decision Making, the Northern Territory Government has agreed in principle to the creation of a new Anindilyakwa Local Government Council. The ALC sees this as an important step towards self-governance on the Groote Archipelago (link here).

One of the six Local Decision Making Agreements related to local government. In July 2023, the NTG and the ALC finalised a Local Government Implementation Plan, with the title: Groote archipelago local decision making agreement schedule 3.6 – Local Government Implementation Plan (link here).

The implementation plan provides for the existing East Arnhem Regional Council (EARC) to be split in two to allow the creation of a new Groote Archipelago Regional Council (GARC). 

The Minutes of the meeting of the Angurugu Regional Authority of 28 May 2024 (link here) confirm, in the report of the AERC CEO, that the planned de-amalgamation of the EARC to create the GARC is proceeding, and that NT officials have advised the EARC that GARC will be formally gazetted on 1 September, under the control of an appointed ‘Constituting Member’, and that elections will be held to elect Councillors on 26 October. The minutes discuss various administrative matters, including a planned phasing in of CARC service delivery, and arrangements for a cost sharing agreement with EARC over this transition period. The minutes also document concerns, arising from a Financial Assessment Report dated February 2022, that there would be a funding shortfall arising form the de-amalgamation, and canvasses various correspondence seeking commitments from the NT to fund this shortfall. The minutes not that the 2024 NT Budget allocated only $3m to fund the de-amalgamation and to support other local governments, whereas the shortfall totalled around $6m.

The minutes note that the EARC CEO had written to the NT Local Government Minister in April regarding this issue and was yet to receive a response. The EARC also wrote to the Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Australians, Linda Burney expressing concern at the prospect that ALC may be directing royalty funds to meet the funding shortfalls from the NTG. IN this context, they also expressed concern regarding the media coverage of wide-ranging concerns related to the allocation of royalty funds on Groote. In a similar vein, the President of the Local Government Association of the NT, Kon Vatskalis  a former Minister in the Martin Labor Government) wrote to the NT Local Government Minister expressing concern that the ALC was involved in the proposed local government Council given that the Federal Minister had referred concerns to the NIAA Integrity Unit. The Minutes attached the relevant correspondence and press reports.

Finally the Minutes include (on page 33) the following text:

Current ALC Payment of $1.5 Million of Anindilyakwan Royalties

This deep concern on the appropriateness of payments, includes an ALC commitment to provide 1.5 million dollars in royalty derived money requested by the Anindilyakwa Land Council and approved by the Anindilyakwa Royalty Aboriginal Corporation (ARAC), that GARC confirmed has actually been paid in the last two to three weeks, when we met to assist planning on 10 March.  I asked a joint GARC/EARC/NT CM&C collaboration meeting on 8 May: “What is the $1.5 million is for.” The Northern Territory Government senior representative stated “that NTG is committed to provide necessary funds” and the Constituting Member stated “…it was based on the principle that it’s not to substitute for required NTG funds”.  The GARC Constituting Member went on to state that: “There’s no limitations on it. It’s for us to utilise as we see fit. But there is a view down the track that it may fund transitions of ALC businesses to the Council, but there’s no plans for that now. It was given by ARAC as a sign of support for the new Council. I can’t recall in detail. There is nothing that confines us to anything.” The GARC Transition Manager (Interim CEO) Brooke Darmanin then stated that: “It’s very much a gesture. It recognises that there will be far more a cost in creating the Council than even recognised in the FAR report (Financial Assessment Report)” There was no comment on the $1.5 million royalty funding by the NT senior representative after that.

 

Conclusion

The concern being expressed by the EARC CEO is that the funding from ARAC will mitigate against the provision of adequate funding by the NT Government to both AERC and GARC. While there appears to be nothing illegal in such a payment by ARAC, the inherent and admitted vagueness of the purpose of the funding, when combined with the risk that ARAC is effectively controlled by the ALC, raises the clear potential for the grant to be some sort of quid pro quo. At the very least, it establishes a relationship of dependency between the ALC/ARAC and the GARC.

While it is clearly in the interests of everyone on Groote Eylandt that the various corporate entities operating on Groote co-operate and coordinate, it is not in the interest of the Groote population, nor is it consistent with normal principles of good governance, for a local government entity charged with delivering services to be beholden to and in debt to more powerful interests. There is a reason that local governments in the NT are based on democratic elections. Governance failures are a recipe for inequitable service delivery into the future.

The concerns expressed by the EARC CEO are serious and deserve appropriate consideration —not blind oblivion — by both the NT Local Government Minister and the Commonwealth Minister.  Unfortunately, deliberate blindness is endemic in public policy in modern Australia.

 

 

 

 

 

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