O, what men dare do! What men may do!
What men daily do, not knowing
what they do!
Much Ado About Nothing, Act
four, scene one
I ended part one of this post (link here) with the question: What then
are the strategies available to Indigenous interests to increase the
likelihood of gaining seats at the table when key decisions are being taken on
institutional design and development?
There are it seems two levels of action and engagement
that are required for Indigenous interest to obtain a guaranteed and long-term
seat at the institutional development table. Both are essential, but on their
own, (i.e. without the other) they will invariably fall short.
The first is to develop a conceptually coherent
and viable long term policy agenda. At least three recent attempts
have been made to do this: Ngunggai Warren Mundine has laid out one policy
agenda in his recent CIS report titled Where to Now: the road ahead for
Indigenous Policy (link
here). This road map is summarised as follows:
Market economy and democracy,
the rule of supply and demand as well as the rule of law are the blueprint for
economic prosperity and have been proven successful in communities all over the
world, regardless of their race, culture or religion. It can work for remote
Indigenous communities too.
This paper proposes a roadmap
to closing the gap through real economic solutions under four pillars: Economic
Participation; Education; Safe communities; Accountability.
A second has been overseen by Professor Peter Yu at the ANU
in the recent Murru Waaruu Outcomes Report (link here). The
approach proposed is summarised in the report as follows (emphasis added):
The paradigm shift envisaged
by the Seminar Series proposals is intended to change the current
transactional relationship that First Nations peoples have with governments
and industry to one of genuine partnership involving an equity stake in
economic projects. … developing and
implementing economic self-determination policy is a long-term approach and is
complementary to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap.
Ultimately, this Outcomes
Report argues that an economic self-determination agenda is about providing
First Nations communities and enterprises with opportunities to engage in
the Australian economy and to share in wealth creation opportunities on their
own terms. On this basis, as discussed throughout the Seminar Series, the
approach should be framed by the human rights of Indigenous peoples as
articulated in UNDRIP. A coordinated approach is required to reform policy and
institutional arrangements to support First Nations economic development in
relation to land and Sea Country, freshwater, intellectual property, and access
to finance. [The report includes an Appendix with 24 specific institutional
reforms, albeit vaguely specified].
A third is the implicit policy agenda in the 2020 refresh
of the Closing the Gap Strategy, ostensibly codesigned between the
Commonwealth, the states and territories and the nascent Coalition of
Indigenous Peaks. I say ‘ostensibly’, because the codesign negotiation was
undertaken by two parties, government interests and Indigenous interests,
operating within a significant and consequential power and capability
imbalance. The high-level summary of the Closing the Gap policy agenda might
best be summarised by pointing to the Four Priority Reforms agreed by all
parties to the National Agreement in the outcomes sought (clause 17) and in the
specific commitments to these outcomes spelt out in chapter six of the
Agreement (link
here):
17. The outcomes of this
Agreement are:
a. Shared decision-making: Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people are empowered to share decision-making
authority with governments to accelerate policy and place-based progress on
Closing the Gap through formal partnership arrangements.
b. Building the
community-controlled sector: There is a strong and sustainable Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled sector delivering high quality
services to meet the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
across the country.
c. Improving mainstream
institutions: Governments, their organisations and their institutions are
accountable for Closing the Gap and are culturally safe and responsive to the
needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, including through the
services they fund.
d. Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander-led data: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have access
to, and the capability to use, locally-relevant data and information to set and
monitor the implementation of efforts to close the gap, their priorities and
drive their own development.
e. The socio-economic outcomes
(listed at Table A).
Significantly, none of these three policy agendas has been
subjected to a rigorous and independent analysis or critique focussed on the
substantive feasibility and likely effectiveness of the proposed measures in
delivering more inclusive and positive benefits to First Nations communities
and citizens. The fact that there has not been so far such a constructive
critique reflects (in my subjective view) a deep-seated and widespread societal
shift away from rigorous analysis and its replacement by reliance on rhetoric
and assertion as the primary means of justifying social and political action. Each
of the proposed policy agendas is constituted by an amalgam of largely unspecified
initiatives located within a mostly open-ended conceptual framework. The result
is the articulation of agendas built around a series of largely implicit assumptions
regarding the presumed efficacy and effectiveness of the actions proposed.
The Nyunggai Mundine/CIS proposals argue for policies that
drive greater market-based approaches to land tenure and a stronger focus on
education and employment. While these proposals implicitly rely on
institutional change, they are largely about removing those institutional
provisions which acknowledge or deal with Indigenous citizens’ rights and
interests and replacing them with mainstream rights. They do not involve a
significant increase in government financial outlays. The Murru Waaruu proposals
advocated by Peter Yu are an amalgam of a focus on economic development rather
than welfare or basic services facilitated through the provision of more
inclusive institutional reforms based on the greater acknowledgment of human
rights instruments such as UNDRIP.
The implicit Closing the Gap policy agenda reflected in the
National Agreements four Priority Reforms is process oriented, and essentially
reflects the widespread First Nations’ aspiration for much greater involvement
in both policy development and service delivery. It assumes (in my view incorrectly)
that Governments are serious about policy reforms directed to shifting the dial
on closing the gap. As the Productivity Commission pointed out in its July 2024
Annual Data Compilation Report (link here; page 2), the four priority reforms
are underpinned by 17 socio-economic outcomes, and the 23 closing the gap
targets are underpinned by 164 indicators. According to the PC report: ‘The
targets are specific and measurable goals, while the supporting indicators provide
context and information on the drivers of the outcomes.’ At its core then, the
Closing the Gap policy agenda involves four priority reforms, 17 socio-economic
outcomes, 23 targets and 164 indicators which 9 jurisdictions are each
responsible for measuring and progressing. This matrix (which governments have
designed and committed to progress) thus comprises 1872 cells. The complexity
built into this policy agenda is both staggering and impossible to explain as
anything but a deliberate attempt to make the underlying process both
incomprehensible and impossible to criticize.
The Productivity Commission review of the Closing the Gap
process published in February 2024 was in my view seriously flawed. It was too
focussed on pushing Indigenous aspirations over substantive analysis, and in
many respects lacking in independence given the Productivity Commission’s role
in developing the data dashboard. To be clear, there is nothing inherently
wrong with advocacy for Indigenous aspirations, but this is not the
Productivity Commission’s role. It ended up preaching to the small church of
First Nations communities and citizens (around five percent of the nation’s
population) whereas what is desperately needed is coherent and conceptually
persuasive analysis aimed at persuading the mainstream population and interests
to support the reforms necessary to transform exclusionary institutions into
inclusive institutions.
Notwithstanding the flawed analytic underpinnings of each
of the three models outlined above, it seems to me that there is likely to be
much of use and relevance in each of the three policy agendas. The task
however is to identify the institutional reforms and associated policy initiatives
that will have outsized positive impacts and alongside, to develop a persuasive
and conceptually coherent narrative to persuade mainstream interests that it is
in their interests to expand the inclusive scope of Australia’s political
settlement. Moreover, the task of developing a long-term institutional
reform policy agenda is inherently dynamic and the optimal policies for
advancing Indigenous socio-economic and cultural wellbeing will inevitably
develop and change over time.
My own approach to developing a high-level
Indigenous institutional reform agenda and associated policy
framework would be simpler and more strategic than any of the three policy
models outlined above. It would include the following elements:
It would focus explicitly on advocating for institutional
reforms which have medium to long term consequences. Examples include
ten-year funding agreements for all priority sectors; financial adjustments to
the tax system to compensate taxpayers who do not take advantage of tax
expenditures (such as negative gearing).
It would advocate for explicit focus on ensuring all
mainstream policies and programs that have an outsize impact on First
Nations citizens should have needs-based access criteria. Examples
include financial literacy programs,
It would advocate for a comprehensive remote policy
framework which spans both mainstream and Indigenous specific policies and programs.
Key components include the impacts of climate change on communities, addressing
housing and essential services (water, sewerage, power, kerbed streets) deficits,
improved digital access and food security, real reform to the Community
Development Program to shift all participants to funded employment in community
service roles including environment, health and disability service roles.
It would advocate for evidence-based approaches and maximum
transparency in the provision of services to First Nations across
mainstream and Indigenous specific policy sectors. Examples include rigorous
macro-level evaluation of comparative take up and access by mainstream and
First Nations citizens to key policy frameworks and programs, and rigorous
evaluations of policies to counter the rise of populist ideological approaches.
It would advocate for the creation of stand-alone agencies
to deliver core services in contexts where there is market failure which
inhibits private sector delivery. Examples include the overall delivery of the
reformed CDP in remote Australia, and the remote operations of the NDIS.
Importantly my approach differs from the strategies outlined
above in that it avoids listing particular sectors in recognition of the fact
that notwithstanding the Government silos that exist, there are strong
synergies and inter-relationships across all key sectors. The interconnections
between housing, health, education, and employment are complex and operate in
multiple directions. Identifying one sector as a priority that will on its own
address deep disadvantage is a chimera.
Of course, not all institutional reforms require financial
investments. It is important that governments acknowledge that the present is a
product and function of our nation’s history, and there can be no effective
policy frameworks developed by governments that do not acknowledge that
history.
Perhaps the most important difference between the policy
strategies listed above and my approach is that it shifts from assuming that
government will respond to the mere existence of a need and acknowledges the
(unjust) reality that Indigenous interests must robustly and effectively advocate
for the reforms they seek (probably over sustained periods).
It follows that the second level of action and
engagement is for Indigenous interests to develop an independent, broadly
representative, policy capable and well led advocacy organisation (or
complementary set of organisations). None of the three policy
agendas in the public domain have to my mind fully managed this.
The Mundine policy agenda in effect rests on the advocacy
capabilities of the Centre for Independent Studies, other conservative advocacy
entities (such as the Business Council and the Minerals Council) and a small
coterie of likeminded Indigenous intellectuals. It has strong political support
from the Liberal and National Parties.
Professor Peter Yu has established a new entity, the First
Nations Economic Empowerment Alliance to advance the Indigenous economic
empowerment agenda laid out in the Murru Waaruu Outcomes Report (link
here and link here).
The membership of the Alliance and its governance arrangements are as yet
unclear, and it does not appear to have a presence on the web. Its funding is
opaque.
The key advocacy mechanism driving Indigenous aspirations
within the Closing the Gap policy agenda is the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks
led by Pat Turner. The Coalition of Peaks includes some 80 peak bodies
representing Indigenous organisations across virtually all social sectors. The
depth of experience and representativeness of these peaks varies, with the
mainstay being the longstanding and well organised National Aboriginal
Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO) representing some 145 Indigenous
health organisations across all states and territories. Yet the Coalition of
Peaks appears to be funded almost entirely by governments and given its role
under the National Agreement it has limited staff in its secretariat.
The challenges facing both the First Nations Economic
Empowerment Alliance and the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks are multiple: how to
build and sustain policy capability; how to build and sustain widespread
Indigenous support for the agenda being pursued; how to engage with governments
while remaining financially and politically independent, and how to outlive the
charismatic and capable leaders who brought them into existence. These
challenges will inevitably need to address the inevitable ebbs and flows of
organisational life. They must be prepared to operate in an environment of
ongoing internal conflicts as new leadership aspirants vie for influence and
power as well as potential external threat as governments (and oppositions) seek
to influence and co-opt, with both the carrot and the stick. These pressures
will be applied not just to the organisation, but (from time to time) will be
directed towards individual leaders. Moreover, effective advocacy must manage
and deal with the inevitable transitions and dynamic inconsistencies that mainstream
electoral politics throws up, and which makes navigating these mazes high risk.
The most obvious strategy for Indigenous
interests is to build on institutional infrastructure established by
the National Agreement on Closing the Gap by investing as much human,
intellectual and financial capital as they can muster into building the long-term
independence and sustainability of the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks. This
entity has several obvious advantages: it has an established base across
multiple sectors; it is a party to the National Agreement which while deeply
flawed provides significant legitimacy with mainstream Australia; its senior
leadership have deep experienced within government and are astute.
There is no reason why the First Nations Economic
Empowerment Alliance should not seek to strengthen its footprint in the
Indigenous public policy domain, however its focus and remit, directed to
economic development is in my view too narrow for it to stand alone. That said,
there are clear advantages in having more than one national advocacy body for
Indigenous interests, just as there are several peak interest group entities
representing mainstream interests.
The challenge for both the Coalition of Peaks and the
Economic Empowerment Alliance is to step up to the next level. For the
Empowerment Alliance, it is still in a nascent phase and lacks a track record. However,
its existing members (to the extent that this is known) appear to be highly
experienced and capable. For the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks, there seems to
me to be a real possibility that a change of government at the Commonwealth
level would bring a major reshaping (again) or even the abolition of the Closing
the Gap process. If that were to occur, it would be a tragedy for the Coalition
of Peaks to go the way of the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee and National
Aboriginal Conference of the 1970s/80s, of ATSIC in the early 2000s, and of the
National Congress of First Peoples a mere decade ago.
To be successful into the medium-term future, both the
Coalition of Peaks and the Economic Empowerment Alliance will need to devise
strategies to become financially independent of government and establish the transparent,
coherent and robust governance structures that address the inevitable
criticisms, from both within and beyond the Indigenous domain, that will
question their legitimacy. Given the importance of recruiting the very best
talent available, there is a case for broadening membership of each entity to
allow individuals to participate in their governance. There is also a strong
argument in favour of establishing two or three semi-autonomous divisions or
entities under the Coalition of Peaks focussed on sub-sets of the institutional
reform policy space: one option would be to establish a remote Institutions
division/entity along with a social and an economic division/entity. Another would
be to establish some geographical units to oversight developments in particular
jurisdictions. These entities could have their own Boards, staff and resources.
The rationale for such units is the need to build and sustain policy expertise
and capability: it is just too ambitious to think that one set of staff can
cover developments across the whole of government in nine jurisdictions.
Australia’s extant political settlement is determined by a
dominant coalition of commercial, social and political interests. Those
interests share an uneasy equilibrium which is built upon an array or
assemblage of institutions that operate to distribute societal benefits to those
included in the equilibrium. Indigenous Australians are over-represented
amongst those citizens who are comprehensively excluded by the operation of
multiple institutions, particularly in remote Australia. To reform those power
structures, Indigenous interests’ only realistic option is to strengthen their
capacity to advocate on policy and to progressively shift the shape of the
institutional framework thought strategic alliances with other interest groups.
To achieve such an outcome, Indigenous interests need to
develop a robust institutional reform agenda that aligns with the political
and policy demands of the present and the near future. They must develop the
independent organisational heft to engage robustly with existing interests
across the breadth of Australian society, seeking out allies and contesting the
agendas of opposing interests. Governments respond to the sustained advocacy of
organised interests, especially when that advocacy is backed up by the threat
of political consequences.
Conclusion
As I argued at length in Part one of this post, the Indigenous
policy domain has been characterised by Institutional stasis over the last
thirty years. To the extent that there has been institutional change, it has
been to degrade and walk back previous institutional reform. There is no
shortage of Indigenous political activism, but my point is that it will only
ever be effective if it is informed by a conceptually sound Institutional
reform agenda with a medium to long term horizon. This must be complemented by the
organisational capability and heft to prosecute detailed policy arguments
against those who either oppose or merely ignore the legitimate aspirations of
Indigenous interests to be part of an inclusive society. If institutions
matter, then addressing structural and system exclusion and disadvantage requires
institutional reform. That is the mountain that First Nations leaders will have
to climb to achieve their legitimate aspirations
23 October 2024
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