Addressing family violence: the wider strategic context

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,

Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Hamlet, Act one, Scene five.

In November 2025, I published a post arguing for tangible actions to address the family violence epidemic across the nation, and especially amongst Indigenous families (link here). In that post, I wrote, inter alia:

The deeper problem of course is that governments are adept at creating policy silos, commissions, action plans and advisory committees that provide a defensive fig leaf against criticism when some egregious event hits the headlines but are content to do nothing to address systemic issues facing the most disadvantaged members of the Australian community. 

In recent months there have been two further related policy developments related to family violence policy.

The first policy development was in February when the Government announced, in the words of Minister McCarthy’s media release (link here), the ‘First ever dedicated plan to end violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children’. The plan (link here) is backed up by a funding package, described in Minister McCarthy’s media release as follows:

Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices is backed by $218.3 million in new funding over four years. As an immediate step, the funding will invest in a national network of up to 40 Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations (ACCOs) to deliver community-led specialist support services that help Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and families who are experiencing family, domestic, and sexual violence.

The minister goes on to note that:

This new funding [is] in addition to the record $262.5 million we’ve already invested in addressing immediate family, domestic and sexual violence safety needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families and communities through the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Action Plan 2023-2025, and our significant investment of $367 million to more than double funding for Family Violence Prevention Legal Services as part of the National Access to Justice Partnership 2025-2030.

There is more detail in her media release, and I am not in a position to establish the substantive value of these investments. They are surely welcome. I wonder however whether the amounts allocated are commensurate with the overall need for the types of services they fund, and whether the services are themselves effective in reducing family violence rather than assuaging its consequences. These are issues only an effective evaluation could determine, but despite rhetoric to the contrary, program evaluation is not a priority for recent Australian governments.

Unfortunately, I found the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan to be a deeply disappointing document. If it had been labelled a statement of aspirations, or a statement of values to be applied in devising policies, it could be defended (though even then I consider there are strong grounds for critique). But it is not a plan, and it is definitely not an action plan. It is best described as a plan to develop a plan about a plan.

Reading through the 100 page document, I found only three substantive proposed actions: first, a proposal to develop an action plan and sector strengthening plans (which appear essentially directed to clarifying relationships and roles) outlined in the Implementation section on pages 40; second, the establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to measure progress toward [yet to be agreed] outcomes that are to be agreed in partnerships [with unspecified partners] mentioned on page 43; and third, the establishment of a new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peak body for family, domestic and sexual violence [which has recently been established — see below]. In my view, none of these initiatives, either separately or together, amount to an effective plan to end violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families.

Reinforcing my pessimism, in the section on Implementation (page 41), it is noted, without any irony whatsoever, that the plan

will sit alongside and complement the large number of existing policies and plans designed to prevent and respond to violence nationally and in each State and Territory (see Appendix 2).

Appendix Two lists around seventy complementary strategies, frameworks, plans and the like across a range of jurisdictions which will complement this latest national plan. I recommend readers study Appendix 2 closely and ask themselves the question, if the seventy existing plans have not succeeded and are still in place, why should we take any notice of this current ‘non-plan’. While this is worrying on its own, of even greater concern is that this National Plan, which has been drafted by a Steering Committee of experts, has been endorsed in a Joint Ministerial Statement by ten Ministers responsible for overseeing family violence issues across the federation (pages 14-16).

As the Ministers themselves correctly state (with my added emphasis):

Across Australia, the unacceptable reality is that the prevalence of family, domestic and sexual violence remains too high. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children, the impact of violence is even greater, shaped by the legacy of colonisation, dispossession and intergenerational trauma. Behind every statistic are individuals, families and communities that deserve safety, respect and healing. 

Yet collectively, these ministers are prepared to accept this reality. Their lack of substantive action, and particularly their complete silence regarding the systemic drivers of family violence, which include the insidious impact of alcohol and substance abuse magnified by loose regulation (link here), and widespread financial precarity of the most disadvantaged sectors of the community (where Indigenous families are over-represented) which are magnified by punitive welfare policies, lax regulation of gambling, and sub-optimal financial literacy support. Addressing these systemic drivers is not beyond the capabilities of governments, but effective responses are never considered let alone pursued, and instead a conspiracy of silence is maintained, and substantive action is replaced with the flim flam of (now) 71 plans to make more plans. The word alcohol appears only eight times in the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan, invariably in contexts which downplay or elide its substantive significance. Clearly governments are subservient to the corporate interests involved in the alcohol and gambling industries. This failure represents in my view an egregious disservice to the wider community.

The existence of this ‘plan’, and the seventy or so other ‘plans’ in effect represents an attempt to persuade the wider community that governments are taking the action necessary to address family violence issues. That in turn ultimately leads the wider community to blame the victim, to avoid the necessity of taking individual action, and diminishes the civic values that we purport to value and cherish. If one needs to understand why the general community is losing faith and trust in governments, one could do worse that consider this case study and think about what it means over the medium and longer term when governments do not address the very real issues that are impacting very real families.

The most recent policy development was the announcement of the peak body referred to above, now known as Our Ways Strong Together (link here) and which comprises the third proposed action in the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan. Minister McCarthy’s statement announcing its creation (link here) states:

The Albanese Government and the Coalition of Peaks have today launched a new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander National Peak Body for Family, Domestic and Sexual Violence – Our Ways Strong Together. 

Our Ways Strong Together brings together Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled organisations including specialist family, domestic and sexual violence services, peak bodies and the broader community-controlled sector. 

By amplifying the perspectives and experiences of community-controlled organisations and the communities they serve, Our Ways Strong Together will also play an invaluable role in shaping government policies and programs.  

Our Ways Strong Together also contributes to the Government’s work towards Target 13 of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, to reduce family violence and abuse against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children by at least 50% by 2031.  

The Coalition of Peaks and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sector leaders worked alongside government to establish the new peak body, drawing on their deep expertise and leadership across their sectors and communities.  

The proposed leadership of the new Peak Body is very experienced and highly regarded, a sentiment I share. I sincerely hope that they can guide the organisation to a position of real and sustained influence. That said, it concerns me that there is, as yet, no detail on the funding for the peak body (membership is free), nor its constitution and its staffing profile. The question that arises then is just how much influence and independence will the government grant this new Peak Body? And how will it sustain its own legitimacy with its Indigenous constituents if that autonomy is compromised? Imagine the response of a firms in a major industry, say chemists or farmers, if the government decided it would establish a new peak body to represent the voices of firms in those industries, and offered some firms or relevant chambers of commerce funding to establish it, funded a secretariat, and asserted the new entity would henceforth be influential in shaping government policy on regulation of pharmacies or agriculture. Deep scepticism would be pervasive. How would individual chemists or farmers be sure that the new peak was in fact truly representing their interests and not being unduly influenced by government?

A second concern related to the Peak Body is that Closing the Gap Target 13 is seriously flawed and in need of revision. I went to some lengths to demonstrate this in my previous post in November last year (link here). Yet the Minister blithely proceeds to argue that the new Peak will contribute to the Government’s efforts to meet this target, presumably by participating in the bureaucratic sludge of planning to plan.

Over and above the deliberate downplaying of the structural and systemic drivers of family violence, one further obvious gap in the whole approach outlined in this ‘First ever dedicated plan to end violence against women and children’ is any focus on system wide policies and initiatives aimed at changing men’s behaviour (noting of course that family violence is not only perpetrated by men). If the new Peak Body is to make a substantive difference in the pervasiveness of family violence, and play an influential role in shaping policy, it will need to engage proactively with the systemic drivers of family violence and find ways to counter the attitudes of entitlement that encourage or allow men to see resort to violent behaviours as being acceptable.  In other words, to succeed, the new Peak body will need to step beyond the limited policy imagination of governments and the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan.

Conclusion: the wider strategic context

I have long been a supporter of the potential of the Coalition of Peaks as a major addition to the institutional landscape that constitutes the Indigenous policy domain (link here). However, its major internal flaw is that it is not independent of governments and indeed is almost entirely reliant on government funding. Its first convenor, the recently retired Pat Turner, did an amazing job in standing the organisation up from a zero base. In doing so, she almost singlehandedly drove the most significant institutional reform within the Indigenous policy domain in a generation. It represents an extraordinary achievement. To do so she presumably made a conscious decision that to find the necessary funding and obtain the access necessary to establish the legitimacy and credibility of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap and to create the opportunity to work constructively with the Federal Government, she would have to accept the loss of financial independence given that there was no obvious alternative. She had the bureaucratic experience and skills, and the charisma, to work around that constraint. Moreover, she would not be the first successful policy innovator to pragmatically accept the necessity to work with the contradictions that are inherent in engaging with governments in order to gain a strategic foothold or traction on an issue or set of issues.

Unfortunately, her successors may not share her capabilities and will likely be constrained by the major limitation of working from the inside, namely, that the first and only rule is that one must never publicly rock the boat.

The strategic problem however is that eventually, the limitations of working on the inside will become apparent to the Coalition of Peaks constituency — the broader Indigenous population — and the support necessary to sustain it will wane and ultimately disappear. Perhaps of more pressing significance, there is an external threat linked to the internal contradictions of Closing the Gap emanating from the lack of commitment from governments to driving substantive change (link here). The threat is that a change of government or some other trigger will lead to governments walking away from the National Agreement. When that happens (I assess that it is near certain at some point in the coming decade) the Coalition of Peaks will lose its raison d’etre, and the funding essential to its long-term survival will dry up. For both these reasons there is an imperative for the Coalition of Peaks to begin the process of finding ways to become financially independent of government.

The bottom line is that the new Peak body must look ahead, decide how it would like to operate, and devise a strategy consistent with its aspirations and strategic choices. To the extent that it decides to seek to influence policy only from ‘inside the tent’, the prospects of driving the systemic change necessary to make a real difference to the crisis in family violence will be severely circumscribed. Unfortunately, even if the Coalition of Peaks can become more independent, and/or if the Indigenous leadership writ large is prepared to focus its advocacy on reforming these systemic drivers of family violence, the road ahead will be long and hard. And every day, every month, every year for as long as that journey takes, many Indigenous families are at risk of, and subject to, the trauma of family violence. As the Ministerial Statement included within the Our Ways – Strong Ways – Our Voices Plan observed:

Behind every statistic are individuals, families and communities that deserve safety, respect and healing.

 

13 April 2026

 

 

 

 

 

Domestic and Family Violence and Closing the Gap

Th’ abuse of greatness is when it disjoins

 Remorse from power.

Julius Caesar Act 2, Scene 1

The National Agreement on Closing the gap sets out 17 targets and four priority reforms. Target 13 relates to domestic and family violence (link here).

Target 13 is specified as follows:

By 2031, the rate of all forms of family violence and abuse against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and children is reduced at least by 50%, as progress towards zero.

The following text is taken from the Productivity Commission dashboard:

Nationally in 2018-19, 8.4% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females aged 15 years and over experienced domestic physical or face-to-face threatened physical harm (figure CtG13.1). There is no new data since the baseline year of 2018-19.

The national data point of 8.4% incorporates varying jurisdictional data points rangeing from 10% in NSW to 6.4% in Qld.

If we unpack the specification of the target, it becomes clear just how meaningless it is. The benchmark data have not been updated for six years. More problematically, the AIWH (link here) cites research from 2011 that found that ‘around 90% of violence against First Nations women and most cases of sexual abuse of First Nations children are undisclosed’. [Willis M (2011) ‘Non-disclosure of violence in Australian Indigenous communities’ Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 405, AIC]. Moreover, multiple instances of family violence against an individual are recorded as equivalent to one instance and thus embed the potential for systemic undercounting into the target specification.

The PC Closing the Gap dashboard section on Target specifications for Target 13 notes, inter alia:

Experiences of harm are likely to be under‑reported. Due to the sensitive nature of the questions, responses were not compulsory, and a person may have chosen not to answer some or any of the questions.

The physical and threatened physical harm data collected in the 2018–19 NATSIHS is not comparable to other ABS data sources collecting similar data, including data from: the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey; the General Social Survey; the Personal Safety Survey; or, Recorded Crime – Victims.

And also, in relation to Future Reporting:

Future reporting will seek to include the following additional disaggregations: remoteness areas and other small geographic areas (where available); disability status; gender; age; and Indigenous status.

Yet there appears to be no progress whatsoever in measuring the target trajectory, let alone updated disaggregation. Importantly, the PC dashboard also notes that comparable data on non‑Indigenous people is currently not available. Given that the problems with the target specification mean that the benchmark data points are essentially meaningless, this is perhaps not surprising.

The FDSV Summary on the AIHW website (updated July 2025) reports (link here) the following data on mainstream domestic and family violence:

Results from the 2021–22 PSS showed that an estimated 3.8 million Australian adults (20% of the population) reported experiencing physical and/or sexual family and domestic violence since the age of 15. It is estimated that of all Australian adults:

·         11.3% (2.2 million) had experienced violence from a partner (current or previous cohabiting)

·         5.9% (1.1 million) had experienced violence from a boyfriend, girlfriend or date

·         7.0% (1.4 million) had experienced violence from another family member (ABS 2023c).

Clearly this is substantial issue across all demographic segments of Australian society. The AIHW notes (link here) that:

Comparable national data are not available to compare the prevalence of FDV among different population groups.

This may be a deliberate policy by ABS and AIHW to avoid the potential misuse of such data to typecast and/or demonise ethnic groups in Australia. It does mean however that the fundamental conceptual basis of ‘closing the gap’, namely decreasing the variation in rates of domestic violence between mainstream population and First Nations populations cannot be applied to the issue of domestic violence.

There is a strong sense from the AIWH and ABS discussion of family violence that the rate of Indigenous family violence is higher than the rate in the mainstream. Yet there is no direct data available. One way to get a better sense of this is to consider national homicide rates. Intuitively, homicide rates are a function of numerous factors, but one of the obvious factors would be rates of family violence. Thus, by looking at the extreme outcomes of family violence, we can get a sense of the comparative significance of family violence within Indigenous and non-Indigenous contexts.

The Australian Institute of Criminology report Homicide in Australia 2023–24: Statistical Report 53 (link here) reports 55 intimate partner homicides nationally of which 46 were women (page 11) in 2023-24. The following extracts have been selected to shine more light on the potential significance for comparative rates of family violence, and bold text added for emphasis. The authors note (page 11):

The [national] female intimate partner homicide rate in 2023–24 was 0.43 per 100,000 female population aged 18 years and over. This is a marked increase from the rate of 0.32 per 100,000 recorded in 2022–23 and the second highest rate of female intimate partner homicide in the last 10 years.

In terms of geographic location, they note (page 14):

Excluding Western Australia, the homicide rate for incidents in regional and remote areas exceeded the national incident rate for 2023–24 (1.08 and 3.51 per 100,000 respectively vs 0.98 per 100,000), while the rate of incidents in major cities was lower than the national rate (0.77 per 100,000) [emphasis added].

In terms of Indigenous status (page 20):

Of the 277 homicide victims in 2023–24, 44 (16%) were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and 226 (82%) were non-Indigenous (see Table 13) ….. Between 1989–90 and 2023–24, 14 percent (n=1,407) of homicide victims were Indigenous and 85 percent (n=8,637) were non-Indigenous

In relation to Indigenous victims (page 24):

The homicide victimisation rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in 2023–24 was 4.31 per 100,000 relevant population (see Table 17), a decrease from the rate of 5.36 per 100,000 recorded in 2022–23.

On page 26:

Around two-thirds of Indigenous female victims from cleared incidents were killed by an intimate partner (64%, n=9; see Table 20), almost double the proportion of Indigenous women killed by an intimate partner in 2022–23 (38%, n=5). Between 1989–90 and 2023–24, over two‑thirds of Indigenous women victims of homicide were killed by a current or former intimate partner (69%, n=337). In 2023–24, Indigenous women experienced an intimate partner homicide victimisation rate seven times greater than the rate for all Australian women (2.84 per 100,000 relevant population vs 0.43 per 100,000 respectively).

In relation to non-Indigenous victims (page 27), the authors note:

The homicide victimisation rate of non-Indigenous Australians was 0.88 per 100,000 (see Table 22), an increase from the rate of 0.74 per 100,000 recorded in 2022–23.

In relation to offenders, the authors note inter alia:

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander homicide offender rate in 2023–24 was 6.87 per 100,000 relevant population). Males comprised 78 percent of Indigenous homicide offenders (n=43) with an offender rate of 10.80 per 100,000. A fifth of Indigenous offenders were female (22%, n=12) with an offender rate of 2.99 per 100,000 (page 37).

Two-thirds of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander [primary homicide offenders] … and 46 percent… of non‑Indigenous primary homicide offenders (excluding New South Wales) had a known history of domestic and family violence (page 44).

The AIC evidence that Indigenous female homicides occur at much higher rate than in the mainstream is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a very strong correlation between prior domestic violence and later homicides. While every homicide is a tragedy, my purpose here is to focus on family violence and the strong suggestions that it occurs as much higher rates within Indigenous households than mainstream households. The gap exists; we just do not know its depth and width.

Given that the current Closing the Gap target 13 is both only intermittently measurable, likely to be grossly under-reported, and deeply flawed conceptually, there is  an overwhelming case for the parties to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap to revise it into a form that both reflects the lived reality of Indigenous people’s lives and which allows progress or regression to be measured so that the results of government efforts to reduce the enormous adverse impact of family violence on Indigenous women and children will be transparent.

Last week, the Australian Government’s Domestic, Family and Sexual Violence Commission handed down its Yearly Report to Parliament (link here). The report includes a number of recommendations relevant to First Nations (Recommendations 11, 12, 15, 1617 and 18). The report identifies the data shortcomings related to Closing the Gap target 13 but doesn’t criticise its inherent limitations as a policy target. It mentions some extraordinary statistics, for example, that in 2023-24, Indigenous women were 27 times more likely to be hospitalised for family violence than non-Indigenous women (page 33). Yet despite a detailed account of the issues confronting Indigenous families (pages 78 to 89), its recommendations were bound up in process: the establishment of more advisory bodies, more funding, and commitments to work with organisations implementing various action plans and the like. In short, more of the same.

While the DFSV Commission is clearly well-intentioned, there was no cut through policy agenda proposed despite the discussion appearing in a section headlined Priority Areas for Action. There was minimal discussion of the role of alcohol and drugs in creating the preconditions for family violence to occur, and no discussion of the desirability of constraining access to alcohol across the community at large. To be clear, I am not suggesting that alcohol use is the only cause of family violence, but it clearly of such importance that reducing and /or constraining access to it is a necessary if not sufficient policy action in addressing the epidemic of family violence in remote Australia, and probably beyond. If the argument for doing so requires further strengthening, then its complicity in contributing to Indigenous hyper-incarceration (link here) provides a rationale in its own right for taking action.

I discussed the systemic underpinnings of the domestic violence crisis in remote Australia in an earlier post this year (link here). That post argued that the domestic violence crisis in the NT is a symptom of a wider crisis, and that alcohol is a key element of that. In an even earlier post from 2023 discussing the withdrawal of alcohol controls  following the lapse of the Commonwealth Stronger Future legislation (link here), I pointed to the clear statistical links between alcohol and domestic violence:

To take just one data point, alcohol related domestic violence assault offences spiked in Alice Springs, Katherine, and outside major centres in the 12 months to March 2023 (link here). The only location where there was a decline in these offences was in Darwin. Across the NT, there were almost 1000 extra reported assault offences over the year coinciding with the nine months of reduced [alcohol] restrictions. With the majority of NT electorates in the Darwin region, it is not difficult to develop a hypothesis for why the NT Government may have been intent on removing alcohol restrictions in the bush. In the light of the issues outlined above, the unqualified confidence of the Committee (set out in para. 3.66) in the capacity and political willingness of the NTG to manage alcohol related harm astounds me. [note: the hyperlink above is to a web page that has been updated since 2023]

While alcohol is likely a key driver of the high rates of domestic violence across remote Australia (and possible more broadly) it may not be the only driver. Nevertheless, I suggest that in the absence of greater controls, domestic violence and other social dysfunction will continue unabated, and in turn this will open the flood gates for more punitive social and economic policies.

The deeper problem of course is that governments are adept at creating policy silos, commissions, action plans and advisory committees that provide a defensive fig leaf against criticism when some egregious event hits the headlines but are content to do nothing to address systemic issues facing the most disadvantaged members of the Australian community. The fact that we allow governments to pursue these fake strategies without holding them to account makes all of us complicit in creating and sustaining the existence of the conditions that engender violence against women and children.

Summing up, I see two specific policy opportunities which would make a tangible and substantive positive impact on the family violence crisis engulfing remote communities (and likely on communities beyond remote Australia). First, revise and reframe Target 13 in the Closing the Gap policy framework to replace the current unworkable and deeply flawed target with a target that is measurable and reflects the real world. Second, initiate a comprehensive policy shift based on the policy approaches recommended by experts and the World Health Organisation (WHO) to constrain and reduce unfettered access to alcohol in communities and regional towns (and ideally major cities). The adverse health impacts of alcohol use are well known, and the WHO now advises (link here):

There is no form of alcohol consumption that is risk-free. Even low levels of alcohol consumption carry some risks and can cause harm.

While the politics of controlling access to alcohol induced harm, and the consequential impacts such as family violence, are challenging, the objective case for doing so requires governments to take action even without considering the wider individual and societal costs of dealing with the fallout. These wider costs include the adverse impacts on the life opportunities of children born into families affected by alcohol abuse, family violence and whose parents are incarcerated, and the economic costs for taxpayers of excessive hospitalisations, and avoidable incarceration. Finally, what does it say about us as a nation when we can adopt without apparent remorse policies that create so much pain and harm. That truly is an abuse of our democratic power.

 

6 November 2025

Misdirected focus: the case for institutional policy reforms to alcohol supply

                                            To weep with them that weep doth ease some deal,

                                        But sorrow flouted at is double death

Titus Andronicus, Act three, Scene one.

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport has recently released a report titled Issues paper relating to the health impacts of alcohol and other drugs in Australia (link here). The report is effectively an interim report and is designed to form the basis of a more comprehensive report assuming the next Government is prepared to renew its terms of reference. While the terms of reference span mainstream society, the report unsurprisingly addresses Indigenous issues at various points.

Like most Parliamentary reports of this nature, this Issues Paper carefully navigates its way through what is a complex and at times prickly thicket. Its value in the Indigenous policy context is to remind readers of the multitude of ways in which AOD, the report’s acronym for alcohol and other drugs, impacts indigenous people and communities. Thus, there is mention of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FASD), criminal justice, numerous health impacts and in passing the potential influence of poor social and environmental infrastructure in driving AOD use and abuse. It is not my intention to seek to summarise the report, but rather I intend to cherry pick a number of propositions as a stepping stone to further discussion.

The report provides an excellent introduction to the overwhelming numbers of research activities, advocacy NGOs and treatment and service providers all operating across the mainstream system.

In the Chapter on AOD services, at paras. 4.19 to 4.36, the report provides an extended discussion of Indigenous issues related to AOD use, relying in large measure on submissions from NACCHO and the Queensland based Institute for Urban Indigenous Health.  These submissions were largely premised on arguments for community-controlled service provision based on evidence that Indigenous people are over-represented in the statistics depicting the adverse impacts of AOD abuse. At para 3.58, the Committee records this plea:

The Institute for Urban Indigenous Health submitted that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-led research and evaluation of AOD services must be recognised as a separate, dedicated stream of research and evaluation component of the AOD system. Such an approach would recognise that AOD has a disproportionate effect on Indigenous communities. According to the Institute, more Aboriginal Australians die due to drug and alcohol-related causes than any other disease group, including suicide and cardiovascular illnesses. Among young Aboriginal people aged 15 to 24, alcohol is the number one contributor to the burden of disease.

In a discussion of the links between AOD use and the prison population generally, the report notes (para 459):

People entering adult prison are more than four times as likely to report recent illicit drug use than people in the general community, and seven times more likely to drink to excess, according to the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales (Legal Aid NSW). Mental health conditions also tend to be over-represented in the prison population.

Given the over-representation of Indigenous citizens in the prison system, these correlations are likely to apply to that subset too.

Chapter Five of the report deals with preventing and reducing harm caused by alcohol and other drugs. This strikes me as the crucial set of issues for policymakers. At para 5.18, the report notes a submission arguing:

 there is growing evidence to support a shifting of focus away from the law enforcement response, ‘especially with regard to communities disproportionately impacted by policing, including LGBTQ+ people, but also First Nations communities and people experiencing complex mental distress’.

The crucial issues for reducing the harm of alcohol across the community are somewhat buried within the report. At para 5.18 and following, there is a discussion of regulatory oversight policy issues including product labelling. At para 5.100, there is an important point made by the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education regarding the extent to which the current regulatory regime in Australia is out of date and in effect unfit for purpose. At para 5.97, the report notes:

Multiple submissions, … drew the Committee’s attention to the World Health Organization’s three key strategies … in the regulation of alcohol beverages to reduce health harms from drinking: • restricting exposure to alcohol advertising • increasing excise taxes on alcohol beverages, and • restricting the physical availability of retailed alcohol.

There is discussion in the report in relation to each of these points, albeit largely anodyne and descriptive. There is no criticism of the fact that advertising of alcohol appears to be largely based on industry formulated schemes. As is the way with these reports, the views of diverse interests are laid out without detailed analysis or critique. It is largely an exercise in ‘He said / she said’…. Perhaps we are meant to be reassured by the Committee’s observation (para 5.123) that:

In their submissions to the inquiry, industry representatives highlighted that the majority of Australians were drinking responsibly and in moderation.

The Committee’s final commentary (para 5.131) is carefully framed to acknowledge the range of points raised, but it assiduously steers clear of suggesting that there may be a role for government in controlling alcohol advertising, and crucially in limiting access to alcohol or in raising taxes to reduce demand and to remove inconsistent volumetric rates for tax on alcohol. The Opposition members’ addendum goes further making very clear that the current report has no status whatsoever and is merely an issues paper. They go on to make crystal clear that commercial interests must be engaged before reaching any substantive policy positions:

In chapter two, in relation to the regulation and effects of alcohol there is a need to hear from both sides before coming to any concluded views. In chapter three there are a range of controversial observations that have been made about harm minimisation and the approaches of law enforcement—these need to be tested with evidence from state and territory police. In chapter five, a range of highly contested policy responses are raised. It will be important that the Committee receives submissions and takes evidence from a much wider range of stakeholders to test the evidence, on all matters contained in that chapter, before reaching any conclusions.

For Indigenous interests, this report provides a case study which should cause them to rethink their advocacy strategy in relation to alcohol. The advocacy voices representing Indigenous prison inmates, Indigenous victims of family violence, Indigenous families of individuals suffering acute health issues, Indigenous children growing up in alcohol induced poverty and trauma are either non-existent or severely muted. Instead, the Indigenous interests making submissions to this inquiry are service delivery organisations with a particular focus on accessing the resources necessary to ensure service delivery is effective. These are important and legitimate interests, but they are not the whole picture. The consequence is that the report is able to effectively ignore these hidden or muted perspectives in favour of a focus on service delivery. This amounts to a structural blind spot that will only be filled when Indigenous interests adopt a broader advocacy strategy. In my view, the Coalition of Peaks (which I acknowledge is fundamentally under-resourced) should make addressing these systemic issues a priority for its advocacy efforts. The absence of such a broader systemic perspective in Indigenous advocacy leaves the field open to those mainstream interest groups arguing against reform.

The clear if implicit message from the major parties is that they do not wish to upset the apple cart vis a vis the major alcohol industry interest groups. Instead of policy reforms aimed at reducing access to alcohol and other drugs, the major parties will focus on the provision of health services and other supports. The report made no attempt to address the particular issues facing remote Indigenous communities (but see para 6.4) notwithstanding that they arguably bear the brunt of lax regulation and encompass the most vulnerable subset of the Indigenous population. The submissions to the Committee by NACCHO and the Institute for Urban Indigenous Health (available on the Committee website link here) were premised on making the case for community-controlled service delivery and largely ignored the importance of institutional reforms to reduce easy and cheap access to alcohol, and the issues associated issues around incarceration and domestic violence. The NIAA submission ( #140 at this link but not available on its website) focusses on its financial support for AOD treatment:

Through the IAS, the NIAA provides approximately $70 million annually to deliver around 90 AOD activities across Australia. IAS AOD funding is supplementary to Health and state government funding and prioritises treatment that is culturally safe and tailored to First Nations clients. These services offer evidence based, and trauma informed models of care for First Nations people and their families. This includes individual and group based therapeutic care, client-based family support, case management, referrals, and AOD prevention and education activities.

In relation to regulation, the NIAA states:

There are various regulations, laws and restrictions that aim to reduce alcohol related harms in jurisdictions around the country. While some laws, such as the legal drinking age, are in place across Australia, the majority of alcohol regulation is the responsibility of the states and territories. The weight of evidence suggests measures to reduce the availability of alcohol through strengthened controls on price and promotion can contribute to reducing harm and improving public safety.

The submission’s conclusion states:

While substance use impacts all Australians, it disproportionately affects First Nations people. The NIAA emphasises the importance of working in partnership and taking a strengths-based, trauma informed, culturally safe and holistic approach to addressing harmful AOD use. It is critical that First Nations voices are elevated throughout the Inquiry, and that the Committee’s recommendations are informed by the unique histories, cultures and experiences of First Nations people.

The subliminal message from the NIAA then is don’t look to the Commonwealth to drive institutional policy reform, its someone else’s responsibility. See this page on their website too (link here). For what it’s worth, I just don’t buy that argument.

The appendix to the NIAA submission ( #140 at this link) which I strongly recommend readers seek out and read very usefully provides a comprehensive and powerful snapshot of the impacts of alcohol on various sectors. Here are a few data points I have cherry picked from the NIAA submission appendix:

… First Nations people were 4.2 times as likely to die from alcohol-related causes as non-Indigenous Australians. They were also 3.8 times as likely to die from alcoholic liver disease, and 4.7 times as likely to die from mental and behavioural disorders due to alcohol use….

AOD are involved in more than half of all police-reported family and domestic violence incidents in Australia, and are likely to be involved in a substantially greater proportion of all family and domestic violence…. For homicides in the period from 1989–90 to 2016–17, 72% of First Nations offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident, as were 71% of First Nations victims…

If those data points don’t make the case that a national crisis exists and is ongoing for Indigenous communities in relation to the use of alcohol, then what will?

For those still unpersuaded or just interested in exploring the issues further, the following posts deal with various aspects of alcohol policy in remote Australia (link here, link here, and link here). The consistent theme of these posts has been to point out the excessive influence of the alcohol industry in shaping remote alcohol policy, to encourage the Commonwealth to engage proactively in driving reforms including in relation to the accessibility of alcohol.

Conclusion

If Australia was serious about reducing Indigenous incarceration, we would implement significant policy reforms in relation to alcohol advertising, taxation and retail availability.

If Australia was serious about reducing family violence within Indigenous contexts, we would implement significant policy reforms in relation to alcohol advertising, taxation and retail availability.

If Australia were serious about improving Indigenous health status, we would implement significant policy reforms in relation to alcohol advertising, taxation and retail availability.

If Australia were serious about improving socio-economic status within the Indigenous community, we would implement significant policy reforms in relation to alcohol advertising, taxation and retail availability.

If Australia was serious about closing the gap, the Commonwealth would step up and lead, and one of its first steps would be to implement significant policy reforms in relation to alcohol advertising, taxation and retail availability.

Unfortunately, it is quite clear from a close reading of this report that neither the Government nor the Opposition are serious about any of these issues.

 

18 March 2025