The drivers of systemic exclusion

                                    Who loses and who wins, who’s in, who’s out.

King Lear, Act five, Scene three.

 

Two recent posts have elicited some commentary which I think deserves to be shared more widely, not least because the comments raise important issues in relation to policy development that are rarely discussed or considered.

My 25 May post, The drivers of stratospheric rates of Indigenous incarceration (link here), discussing an important Australian Institute of Criminology research report by Don Weatherburn, Michael Doyle, Tegan Weatherall and Joanna Wang elicited the following comment from Tim Rowse (emphasis added):

 

It is important that you write: 'a substantial "underclass" of excluded citizens, many of whom are Indigenous'. In his largely ignored 2022 Boyer Lectures Noel Pearson referred to the 'bottom one million'. Like you, he did not specify them as 'Indigenous', though he would probably agree that many of them are. What is at stake here is our theory of social exclusion: it is too much coloured by an assumption that the Non-Indigenous/Indigenous difference is the primary determinant of social exclusion, as if a person's relationship to colonisation (as coloniser or as colonised) is the primary determinant of their life chances. Don Weatherburn continues to assault this paradigm.

 In my most recent post, A legacy of plunder (link here) I argued inter alia that:

… the gradual and incremental deterioration of what were once reforming and pathbreaking institutional frameworks can, in worst case scenarios, facilitate the continuation (often in new guises and incremental steps) of economic and social dispossession.

 In response to that post, an un-named friend emailed me in the following terms:

 

Rather than expressing surprise at how recently people have been behaving very badly towards indigenous people, I think you should turn the question around.  Why did they stop?  For 10,000 years, since the advent of agriculture, people have been taking land from indigenous people, and nobody much cared, except the indigenous people.  This really only became an issue post WW2 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  But even then we here were still discriminating against Aboriginal people in many ways, cancelling the reservation of lands set aside of the use and benefit of Aboriginal people and employing them on low wages up until the 1960s, as you well know. I think this perspective is very important to getting the present into perspective.

 Both these comments direct attention to the importance of how the analysis of issues and events are framed in order to (a) understand their internal dynamics and (b) identify appropriate policy responses. Implicit in Tim Rowse’s comment is the notion that social exclusion (which I would argue is defined by having a systemic element or basis embedded institutionally) has historically facilitated violence against those excluded; that it is an endemic feature of human society; and that it can encompass, but is broader than, racial or ethnic discrimination, and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples.

Implicit in the second comment is the notion that the long and enduring historical propensity for powerful nations or societies to dispossess Indigenous peoples reflects the willingness of, and structural necessity for powerful interests to take whatever action is required to strengthen their own economic, social and ideological position vis a vis potential competitors and/or to make use of the human capital of less powerful interests to strengthen more powerful interest groups’ position. In such a dynamic (which I would argue is almost universal among human societies and particularly prevalent in more technologically complex modern societies), Indigenous societies are likely to be vulnerable to dispossession and exclusion. But so too are comparatively less powerful interests built around or associated with various economic or religious or social characteristics.

 In other words, in terms of understanding the reasons for colonisation and dispossession, I would argue that the best analytic frame is built around assessing the comparative power of key interest groups within or beyond national boundaries. Given the focus of this blog is on policy, I don’t propose to explore this issue further here.

Instead, I am seeking to focus more on the challenge of identifying appropriate policy responses in post-colonial contexts. The framework I see as being of most use relates to the nature of the power relations that apply within particular nations or societies. I acknowledge the potential importance of symbolic and in some contexts the real consequences of normative values such as are reflected in human rights declarations, but have formed the view that while these frameworks are essential in assessing policy outcomes, they are rarely decisive in shaping policy outcomes. In other words, policy outcomes are overwhelmingly shaped by the balance of power between competing economic and social interests which reach an equilibrium that establishes in effect a dominant coalition of (competing) interests.  

If I am right, the prospects for decolonisation (defined as the reversal of dispossession and exclusionary political structures) in Australia are extremely limited. The normative case for decolonisation may be extremely strong or even incontrovertible, but it will not persuade policymakers structurally beholden to maintaining an equilibrium between the most powerful competing interests in society.

Moreover, the equilibrium between key mainstream interests in any society is inherently dynamic and unstable, and those core interests are in perpetual tension vying for access to scarce public rents and resources. In these circumstances policymakers are loathe to unilaterally upset the equilibrium. Instead, they use a range of tactics to ensure the existing equilibrium within the dominant coalition is not threatened. In relation to conflicts between more powerful interests within the dominant coalition, policymakers explore compromise and trade-offs of various kinds. In relation to comparatively weak interests (such as the unemployed, or remote Indigenous communities) policymakers’ tactics include delay, protracted ‘consultation’, promising but not delivering, engaging in insincere ‘codesign’, co-option of individual leaders, over-engineering policy implementation, using funding to silence calls for substantive reform, and of course, from time to time, just plain dissembling and obfuscation.

In my view the only viable strategy for substantively advancing Indigenous interests  (and indeed the interests of other groups subjected to systemic exclusion) is to progressively build the alliances and coalitions necessary to exercise real power within society. There is a place for normative argument and ideology in prosecuting a real politik policy agenda, but to be effective normative arguments must contribute to building a power base, and thus they must be strategically targeted. Much more important than normative arguments are investing in building cohesion and unity, and building the capacity to engage on policy detail in ways that are sustained over time and which utilise policy language relevant to and understood by mainstream dominant interests and policymakers. In particular, the very process of building and sustaining policy relevant capabilities contributes to the accretion of greater power.

In such a world, from time to time, windows of opportunity open for talented individuals with influence to drive and implement reform. For example, Gough Whitlam and the NT Land Rights Act; or Paul Keating and the Native Title Act; or Gerry Hand and ATSIC. There are probably many other examples at a smaller scale. Yet all such reforms are vulnerable to being wound back as the dominant interests in society exert pressure on policymakers to reverse the gains and return to something approximating the status quo ante.

In these circumstances, as I suggested in my recent post on the Legacy of Plunder, it is crucial that Indigenous interests allocate advocacy and policy resources to protecting past gains as well as investing in further reforms. Of course this is never easy, but the first step in building the capacity to influence policy in modern Australia is to be clear headed and clear sighted about what will be necessary to drive sustained policy reform. In my view, one element of the necessary strategy is to look forward, not backward. The normative arguments against colonisation are irrefutable, but the past cannot be undone. A second element is to build the policy expertise and capability to apply sustained pressure on policymakers on strategically important key policy issues (ie not just on the political issue of the day). A third requirement would be to develop a strategic framework which identifies the crucial issues worth allocating significant time and attention.

The import of Tim Rowse’s comment quoted above is that structural exclusion is broader than past or ongoing colonisation (or racism) and that this points to a cohort of potential allies for Indigenous interests seeking to build the political power necessary to overcome systemic exclusion, and join the key interests in society who are included in the dominant coalition that shapes the institutions that in turn allocates the distribution of society’s available resources. The import of the second comment by my un-named friend is to point to the longstanding propensity of the members of the dominant coalition in any society to determine/define what are ‘core state imperatives’ (to use a phrase coined by the political philosopher John Dryzek). These determinations operate to maximise or even monopolise the societal dividend going to members of the dominant coalition, and to justify the exercise raw power to achieve that objective where feasible, including by shaping institutions to systemically exclude less powerful groups where they can.

In other words, reversing exclusion requires excluded interests to lift themselves by the bootstraps and progressively accumulate the political power to force entry into the dominant coalition of interests. In the absence of a successful revolution, the only viable pathway for excluded interests to reverse their exclusionary status is the gradual accumulation of policy influence using sustained and strategically informed advocacy, and the accumulation of organisational and political skills. Normative arguments can assist in such a process, but on their own are not sufficient to drive change.

 

Note: the ideas in this post draw on political settlement theory. For those interested, a good place to start is with Kelsall et. al. (2022) Political Settlements and Development: Theory, Evidence, Implications, Oxford University Press, https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/58143

 

18 June 2024

The Voice result will be seen as an inflection point for Indigenous policy

 

I am amazed, methinks and lose my way

Among the thorns and dangers of this world.

King John, Act four, scene three.

 

Following the defeat of the Voice referendum, I published a short article in Inside Story (link here) arguing that the referendum will come to be seen as an inflection point in Indigenous policy: no longer will it be tenable to conceptualise the policy domain as involving a single Indigenous interest that must be weighed and factored into the public interest. Instead, policymakers will increasingly deal with Indigenous issues on the basis of particular Indigenous interests, and these will be advocated and articulated against the countervailing pressure of other interests, Indigenous and non-Indigenous.

 

In my view, this is increasingly how public policy is made — the current reality — albeit it has not been widely recognised. Instead, the virtually ubiquitous perspective, including amongst the advocates for the Voice, has been that it remains possible to span the competing Indigenous sub-voices, and conjure up a single national First Nations Voice which represents or speaks on behalf of all Indigenous nations, communities and people on all major issues of concern to First Nations. I too have, until comparatively recently, unthinkingly shared this view.

 

To be clear, while it is possible to argue that the multiplicity of Indigenous views (reflecting different yet cogent perspectives and interests) contributed to the defeat of the referendum, I am not seeking to engage with why the referendum failed. Instead, I am seeking to look forward, and make a hard-headed assessment of how mainstream policymakers will increasingly engage with policy issues involving Indigenous interests into the future.

 

Nor am I seeking to deny the existence and importance of shared histories, shared cultures and shared identity amongst First Nations people. My point is merely that in policy contexts, interests and interest group competition will increasingly come to dominate decision making processes. I am not arguing in favour of this, merely making an assessment that this is what is happening.

 

An aspect not directly addressed in my article, but of increasing significance, are two trends: the first is the inexorable shift by governments to utilise mainstream policies and programs rather than Indigenous specific programs and policies combined with greater policy reliance on, and deference to, the states and territories rather than the Commonwealth, and the second is the trend in mainstream policy and political decision-making forums to give increasing profile and attention to special interests (link here). Both trends reinforce the argument I am making; both can be persuasively criticised, but they are nevertheless happening. One implication is that when interest group influence is pervasive, governments are not as focussed on ensuring that the public interest is protected.

 

The bottom line for First Nations is that if they desire to shape policy, they will increasingly need to engage in the struggle for influence with competing interests, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous. See this earlier post on similar development in the US (link here). Of course, there is enormous scope to critique such an outcome, and it is important in democratic polities that such critiques exist. But such critiques (however persuasive) are normative and conceptually distinct from the ways and processes that apply to the of making of policy impacting and affecting First Nations. Reliance on mere rhetoric, or an implicit assumption that democracy (where voters are properly informed) will always deliver just outcomes aligned with the general public interest will not be enough to shape policy. The outcome of the Voice referendum provides a clear cut demonstration of this point.

 

I recommend the Inside Story article to interested readers.