Deflection and inaction: the Australian Government’s formal response to the Productivity Commission Review on Expenditure on Children in the Northern Territory.

  

Suit the action to the word, the word to the action…

Hamlet Act 3, scene 2.

 

Last week, the Australian Government released its formal response (link here) to the Productivity Commission (PC) report on Expenditure on Children in the Northern Territory. The Australian Government commissioned the PC to conduct this research following on from the recommendations of the Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory 2017 (Royal Commission). The PC commenced its study on 1 April 2019 and publicly released its final report on 8 April 2020.

 

I wrote a post analysing the import of the PC report in April 2020 (link here). It is worth re-reading that post in conjunction with the Government’s formal response. The analysis below complements that more detailed response, which in turn relied heavily on the PC report.

 

The recent Australian Government response notes at paragraph 3:

Consistent with the Royal Commission’s findings, the PC’s final report outlines that the Australian and Northern Territory Governments make funding decisions in relative isolation, leading to fragmentation, inefficiencies in service delivery, and significant overlap in expenditure effort.

 

In my April 2020 post, I characterised the PC report in the following terms:

The PC study report is a stunning document. It focusses on one strand of government service delivery (children’s services) in one jurisdiction (the NT), and lays out in forensic and stark detail the extraordinary complexity of the funding and service delivery arrangements, the extent of the overlapping funding, the ongoing existence of gaps in funding, the absence of coordination both between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions (see pages 112- 116), the underutilisation of agencies’ regional networks who of course have most direct contact with citizens, and the lack of internal coherence in funding decisions by both levels of government...

… What is crystal clear — even from a cursory reading of the report — is that the system for funding and delivering children’s services in the NT is not fit for purpose. What is particularly arresting is the PC’s documentation in various places (eg page 306) of the long history of previous reports and inquiries whose analyses and recommendations have not been taken on board by governments.

 

I went on to argue that the implications of the PC report’s forensic examination of just one sliver of the policy domain impacting families (predominantly Indigenous families) in the NT was that similar issues would apply much more broadly.

 

To what extent then does the Australian government response suggest that there has been or is a serious attempt to address the shortcomings identified by the PC?

 

The short answer is that the Governments response is deflection rather than action. It reflects the deep-seated inability of governments to come to terms with the deep structural issues confronting disadvantaged Australians in remote regions. Instead of a new strategy, backed by political will and determination, what has been served up is ‘more of the same’ clothed in layers of bureaucratic sophistry and verbiage.

 

In the words of the Government’s response (paragraph 7):

The Australian Government supports in-principle the PC’s final report, including the areas of reform outlined. However, while holding significant merit, the PC’s suggested reforms also introduce additional operational and strategic complexity. As a result, detailed consideration of each recommendation, including risks, timing, policy alignment, capacity building and resourcing requirements by each agency will be essential for steady, realistic and informed planning and implementation.

 

Sir Humphrey Appleby could not have said it better!

 

The response proceeds to consider in detail each of the PCs four suggested areas of reform, namely: coordinated funding underpinned by regional plans; longer term funding for service providers; better data at the regional and community level, and stronger supporting institutions. While the response points to a range of processes, some more developed and serious than others, there is no overarching commitment to see these reforms comprehensively implemented.

 

I don’t propose to undertake a forensic critique of each element of the response; however I will comment on two issues of current relevance mentioned: the new framework for closing the gap, and the role of evaluation.

 

At paragraph 31, in relation to the PC identification of better data as an area for reform, the Government response states:

The Australian Government recognises that accountability and access to the data being interpreted is another critical consideration to drive transparency. An example of the Australian Government’s commitment to this can be seen through the National Agreement on Closing the Gap. One of the four key priority reforms the National Agreement is centred around is ‘building better data and sharing access to the right data to support Indigenous communities to make informed decisions with us.’

 

This is all good and well, although it reflects the implicit strategy of the Government to deflect calls for greater transparency into processes of greater data provision and sharing at local levels, two quite separate issues. More fundamentally however, the National Partnership provides for a series of processes designed to deliver shared decision making with Indigenous interests on service delivery, and for structural reforms to mainstream government agencies to enhance engagement with Indigenous interests. Yet there is no indication here that DSS has engaged with Indigenous interests in devising the Government’s response to the PC report as a whole. This bodes ill for the quality of the implementation of the national agreement.

 

At paragraph 33, the Government’s response states:

The NIAA’s IAS Evaluation Framework is also a notable example of how the Australian Government is taking a continuous improvement approach to evaluation, and is designed to ensure evaluations are high quality, ethical, inclusive and focused on improving outcomes for Indigenous Australians.

 

Yet the crucial issue is not the quality of myriad evaluations of small scale programs of limited strategic significance, but the use of evaluation to assess the overarching effectiveness of Government programs impacting (in the present case) disadvantaged children in the Northern Territory, most of whom are Indigenous.

 

Another example of (almost) seamless deflection…

 

In this context, it is worth noting that the response makes no mention of the PC report dated October 2020 on an Indigenous Evaluation Strategy, which incidentally recommended an independent evaluation capability across the Australian Government for policies and programs that impact Indigenous citizens. The Government has not formally responded to this report, and makes no mention of this fact in its response.

 

Finally, the most serious problem with the Government response to the PC report is not what is included, but what is omitted.

 

There is just no serious, comprehensive and thought through plan for substantive policy reforms, notwithstanding the fundamental shortcomings identified in the PC report.

 

In my April 2020 post, I outlined two potential approaches to substantive policy reform which would need to extend beyond children’s services to a range of related service delivery and policy domains:

The first approach would be  for Indigenous interests to implement a targeted strategy that picks out five or six of the key reforms identified by the PC (of course there may be others), and to make them core principles and advocate continuously for their implementation and ongoing retention at both national and jurisdictional levels….

…The second (and much more ambitious) approach would involve a fundamental reconceptualisation of the service delivery funding system to take decisions on grants and contracting out of the hands of politicians and place them in the hands of substantively independent service delivery purchasers (SDPs).

Governments would appropriate block amounts of funding over multiple years to say 20 regional SDPs across the nation for key social services, and provide broad (and public) guidance in terms of overall priorities. In turn, the SDPs would make funding decisions on service delivery within their regions, and report on progress to both the public at large and governments.

 

Neither substantive policy reform approach is seriously contemplated in the Government response issued last week. Nor is there anything else that might address the fundamental shortcomings in the architecture of service delivery identified by the PC report.

 

The Government’s response to the PC report is both a lost opportunity, and unfortunately and most seriously, given the lack of commitment to substantive reform, it seems likely that it is a portent of what we are likely to see when the first implementation plans under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap are released in July this year. Bureaucratic deflection and incessant process clothing underlying inaction are habits which are extraordinarily difficult for governments to break.