Deflection and inaction: the Australian Government’s formal response to the Productivity Commission Review on Expenditure on Children in the Northern Territory.

  

Suit the action to the word, the word to the action…

Hamlet Act 3, scene 2.

 

Last week, the Australian Government released its formal response (link here) to the Productivity Commission (PC) report on Expenditure on Children in the Northern Territory. The Australian Government commissioned the PC to conduct this research following on from the recommendations of the Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory 2017 (Royal Commission). The PC commenced its study on 1 April 2019 and publicly released its final report on 8 April 2020.

 

I wrote a post analysing the import of the PC report in April 2020 (link here). It is worth re-reading that post in conjunction with the Government’s formal response. The analysis below complements that more detailed response, which in turn relied heavily on the PC report.

 

The recent Australian Government response notes at paragraph 3:

Consistent with the Royal Commission’s findings, the PC’s final report outlines that the Australian and Northern Territory Governments make funding decisions in relative isolation, leading to fragmentation, inefficiencies in service delivery, and significant overlap in expenditure effort.

 

In my April 2020 post, I characterised the PC report in the following terms:

The PC study report is a stunning document. It focusses on one strand of government service delivery (children’s services) in one jurisdiction (the NT), and lays out in forensic and stark detail the extraordinary complexity of the funding and service delivery arrangements, the extent of the overlapping funding, the ongoing existence of gaps in funding, the absence of coordination both between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions (see pages 112- 116), the underutilisation of agencies’ regional networks who of course have most direct contact with citizens, and the lack of internal coherence in funding decisions by both levels of government...

… What is crystal clear — even from a cursory reading of the report — is that the system for funding and delivering children’s services in the NT is not fit for purpose. What is particularly arresting is the PC’s documentation in various places (eg page 306) of the long history of previous reports and inquiries whose analyses and recommendations have not been taken on board by governments.

 

I went on to argue that the implications of the PC report’s forensic examination of just one sliver of the policy domain impacting families (predominantly Indigenous families) in the NT was that similar issues would apply much more broadly.

 

To what extent then does the Australian government response suggest that there has been or is a serious attempt to address the shortcomings identified by the PC?

 

The short answer is that the Governments response is deflection rather than action. It reflects the deep-seated inability of governments to come to terms with the deep structural issues confronting disadvantaged Australians in remote regions. Instead of a new strategy, backed by political will and determination, what has been served up is ‘more of the same’ clothed in layers of bureaucratic sophistry and verbiage.

 

In the words of the Government’s response (paragraph 7):

The Australian Government supports in-principle the PC’s final report, including the areas of reform outlined. However, while holding significant merit, the PC’s suggested reforms also introduce additional operational and strategic complexity. As a result, detailed consideration of each recommendation, including risks, timing, policy alignment, capacity building and resourcing requirements by each agency will be essential for steady, realistic and informed planning and implementation.

 

Sir Humphrey Appleby could not have said it better!

 

The response proceeds to consider in detail each of the PCs four suggested areas of reform, namely: coordinated funding underpinned by regional plans; longer term funding for service providers; better data at the regional and community level, and stronger supporting institutions. While the response points to a range of processes, some more developed and serious than others, there is no overarching commitment to see these reforms comprehensively implemented.

 

I don’t propose to undertake a forensic critique of each element of the response; however I will comment on two issues of current relevance mentioned: the new framework for closing the gap, and the role of evaluation.

 

At paragraph 31, in relation to the PC identification of better data as an area for reform, the Government response states:

The Australian Government recognises that accountability and access to the data being interpreted is another critical consideration to drive transparency. An example of the Australian Government’s commitment to this can be seen through the National Agreement on Closing the Gap. One of the four key priority reforms the National Agreement is centred around is ‘building better data and sharing access to the right data to support Indigenous communities to make informed decisions with us.’

 

This is all good and well, although it reflects the implicit strategy of the Government to deflect calls for greater transparency into processes of greater data provision and sharing at local levels, two quite separate issues. More fundamentally however, the National Partnership provides for a series of processes designed to deliver shared decision making with Indigenous interests on service delivery, and for structural reforms to mainstream government agencies to enhance engagement with Indigenous interests. Yet there is no indication here that DSS has engaged with Indigenous interests in devising the Government’s response to the PC report as a whole. This bodes ill for the quality of the implementation of the national agreement.

 

At paragraph 33, the Government’s response states:

The NIAA’s IAS Evaluation Framework is also a notable example of how the Australian Government is taking a continuous improvement approach to evaluation, and is designed to ensure evaluations are high quality, ethical, inclusive and focused on improving outcomes for Indigenous Australians.

 

Yet the crucial issue is not the quality of myriad evaluations of small scale programs of limited strategic significance, but the use of evaluation to assess the overarching effectiveness of Government programs impacting (in the present case) disadvantaged children in the Northern Territory, most of whom are Indigenous.

 

Another example of (almost) seamless deflection…

 

In this context, it is worth noting that the response makes no mention of the PC report dated October 2020 on an Indigenous Evaluation Strategy, which incidentally recommended an independent evaluation capability across the Australian Government for policies and programs that impact Indigenous citizens. The Government has not formally responded to this report, and makes no mention of this fact in its response.

 

Finally, the most serious problem with the Government response to the PC report is not what is included, but what is omitted.

 

There is just no serious, comprehensive and thought through plan for substantive policy reforms, notwithstanding the fundamental shortcomings identified in the PC report.

 

In my April 2020 post, I outlined two potential approaches to substantive policy reform which would need to extend beyond children’s services to a range of related service delivery and policy domains:

The first approach would be  for Indigenous interests to implement a targeted strategy that picks out five or six of the key reforms identified by the PC (of course there may be others), and to make them core principles and advocate continuously for their implementation and ongoing retention at both national and jurisdictional levels….

…The second (and much more ambitious) approach would involve a fundamental reconceptualisation of the service delivery funding system to take decisions on grants and contracting out of the hands of politicians and place them in the hands of substantively independent service delivery purchasers (SDPs).

Governments would appropriate block amounts of funding over multiple years to say 20 regional SDPs across the nation for key social services, and provide broad (and public) guidance in terms of overall priorities. In turn, the SDPs would make funding decisions on service delivery within their regions, and report on progress to both the public at large and governments.

 

Neither substantive policy reform approach is seriously contemplated in the Government response issued last week. Nor is there anything else that might address the fundamental shortcomings in the architecture of service delivery identified by the PC report.

 

The Government’s response to the PC report is both a lost opportunity, and unfortunately and most seriously, given the lack of commitment to substantive reform, it seems likely that it is a portent of what we are likely to see when the first implementation plans under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap are released in July this year. Bureaucratic deflection and incessant process clothing underlying inaction are habits which are extraordinarily difficult for governments to break.  

Qld Productivity Commission Draft Report on service delivery in remote and discrete Indigenous communities

I have just come across the Queensland Productivity Commission Draft Report on service delivery in remote and discrete Aboriginal and Torres Strait communities which was released for public comment in October 2017 (link here).

I wrote a post in January 2017 when the Terms of Reference for the review were released (link here), and I have to say that I think the Commission has done a pretty good job notwithstanding my earlier trepidation.

The Final Report has now been delivered to the Queensland Government, but may not be published for up to six months.

Accordingly, I don’t propose to invest a huge amount of time and effort analysing the draft report, but will point to some issues which are likely to emerge as it is digested and then implemented, either in part or in full.

Having now read the draft report, and most of the subsequent submissions lodged following its release, I doubt that the Commission will have made major changes to the Report’s structure or key recommendations.

This draft report, and I expect the Final Report, are important contributions to remote policy analysis in their own right; the small number of largely high quality submissions add important insights in their own right into remote policymaking and Indigenous affairs generally.

So what are the positives in this process? The Commission has recognised that service delivery is systemic in nature and thus must be assessed and analysed systemically. It also recognises and acknowledges what everyone who takes an interest in these issues knows, namely that the system is not delivering; it is not fit for purpose. Further, the Commission has not shied away from advancing an ambitious agenda for change and improvement, one that amounts to a roadmap for major reform.

In essence, it argues for structural; reform which turns the current system on its head, and which places decision making in the hands of local and regional community institutions. While it suggests starting with indigenous specific programs, it recognises the importance of incorporating mainstream services eventually into any revised framework. The Commission also suggests two further reforms, both of which are extremely important and indeed would be crucial determinants of success were the reform proposal to ever be implemented.

The first is to provide for independent oversight of the implementation process, and more importantly the operations of the new service delivery arrangements.

The second which the Commission makes indirectly (and doesn’t explicitly recommend) is a focus on more timely and public performance information and the dissemination of evaluation results. The Commission notes in passing that evaluations are not routinely made public in Queensland. Both of these initiatives are designed to support and reinforce the more radical structural reforms outlined by the Commission. I can’t help but observe that they are potentially standalone reforms, and should be pursued under the current system whether or not the reform proposal proceeds.

These two initiatives are thus important elements of any long term reform process. While technically easy to implement, they run counter to government inbuilt reluctance to operate transparently. The Queensland Government has not been alone in holding fast to this predisposition in the past, so its substantive response to the report will be test of its commitment to operating differently going forward.

The Commission recognises that implementation will be crucial, and indicates that this is an area it will give further consideration to in its final report. Nevertheless, it is a huge leap from having a reform plan to implementing it. Whether the Queensland Government and its public service has the capacity and expertise to implement such an ambitious strategy is in my view uncertain. Perhaps more saliently, whether the Queensland Government will be prepared to implement what is in effect a radical overhaul of the state’s remote service delivery system is even more uncertain. One risk is that the Qld Government indicates a preparedness to do so, but instead goes through the motions.

The Commonwealth Government appears to have adopted this approach in relation to the Empowered Communities strategy advocated by Noel Pearson and Ian Trust, and backed by the business oriented charity Jawun (link here). The design document dated March 2015 languishes apparently largely unimplemented on the DPMC website (link here), and ironically, like the QPC’s draft report, it too identifies implementation as a key challenge. The bottom line is that there are two major hurdles in driving such an ambitious reform: one is to overcome the inevitable and mind-numbing complexity of the system overall; the second is to overcome the innate inertia and conservatism of governments who do not wish to rock the boat unless there is an overwhelming imperative to do so.

Were the Qld Government to wholeheartedly support the reform proposals outlined by the QPC, what are the potential downsides or shortfalls?  The sixteen draft recommendations are well constructed and thought through. They target important issues, and on the whole are worth supporting. My reservations are minimal compared to my support for the three overarching reform initiatives outlined above.

Nevertheless, it is worth outlining the potential problems:

·         As identified in my January 2017 post, there is a requirement for policy focus on the issues which the service delivery system is not reaching. While the bottom up approach recommended by the Commissions holds out real hope that this will allow these sorts of issues to be addressed, the Commission’s failure to focus on these issues in the Draft Report increases the likelihood that they won’t get the attention they need.

·         In draft recommendation 3, which deals with implementation, the Commission suggests an incremental approach to implementing the reforms, starting in two regions. While this may appear to facilitate change, the risk is that the process will bog down and fail to gain the necessary momentum to be carried through to completion.

·         Draft recommendation 7 dealing with economic development appears to implicitly assume that the removal of ‘impediments’ to private sector activity will lead to commercial activity which in turn will raise the tide of poor social outcomes. I am sceptical; in particular, I disagree with the suggestion that the Qld Government should divest its ownership of community stores. The rationale of government ownership of stores (something which is far from uniform across remote Australia) is that market failure in supply chains can mean that food security is placed at risk, and in worst case situations, the failure of privately owned stores can leave communities without access to food at all.

·         Draft recommendation 8 refers to publishing various information about services ‘every one to two years’. This needs to be every three months if it is to have any real impact.

·         Draft recommendation 10 deals with land tenure. It is a huge reform challenge in its own right, and my sense is that the Commission has not adequately come to grips with the changes required.

·         Draft recommendation 11 deals with housing. While there is a case for greater community involvement in property and tenancy management, to talk of control really requires transfers of asset ownership, and this raises the spectre of the Government transferring liabilities rather than assets to Indigenous communities. This needs greater clarity and careful consideration.

·         Finally, draft recommendation 16 makes the inarguable caser for greater inter-governmental coordination with the Commonwealth, but doesn’t really identify a way to ensure that the Commonwealth plays ball. This is a major issue in remote indigenous policy.

Some comments about the submissions on the draft report. They are largely supportive, but pick up a range of themes and issues which go beyond what I can cover here. Two general themes stand out. One is the underfunding of remote local governments in Queensland (but in reality nationally); a second is what at least one submission (from the Yarrabah Council) refers to as a housing crisis. I may come back to these submissions in a later post. But they provide a wealth of data on the challenges faced by people and organisations operating in remote regions. And taken together, they reinforce the challenges involved in driving systemic structural reform.

I will aim to take a closer look at these issues once the Final Report is released, presumably with a response from the Queensland Government.

Finally, I can’t help but compare the approach taken by Queensland to examining what is a complex policy area with the Commonwealth’s more opaque and confused approach to policy development. It is a cause for concern that the Commonwealth is not prepared to put in place independent and transparent policy review processes in relation to important national Indigenous policy issues such as Queensland has adopted in relation to its service delivery issues.