Saturday, 25 May 2024

The drivers of stratospheric rates of Indigenous incarceration

                                                            I have been studying how I may compare

This prison where I live unto the world.

Richard II, Act five, Scene one.

 

The Australian Institute of Criminology has just published a research report authored by academics Don Weatherburn, Michael Doyle, Tegan Weatherall and Joanna Wang titled Towards a theory of Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system (link here). In my view, this report represents the most important policy relevant research paper published in relation to Indigenous Australia in recent memory.

 

Over one third of the nation’s prisoners at any point in time are Indigenous. The ABS reports that at any one time, there are around 42, 000 people in prison in Australia, a rate of just over 200 per hundred thousand. Of these, some 14,400 prisoners are Indigenous, a rate of 2,549 per hundred thousand (link here). These data lead inexorably to a conclusion that Indigenous incarceration rates are a national disgrace.

 

Extremely high levels of Indigenous incarceration are directly and indirectly expensive for taxpayers, and impose extraordinary personal costs on those who are imprisoned and their families and on communities. These costs include diminished and constrained life opportunities; the economic and social ramifications of imprisonment; ongoing mental and physical health impairments to prisoners and their families; and ongoing intergenerational trauma. In addition, the opportunity costs (which we might conceptualise as the lost opportunities of high levels of incarceration) on both the Indigenous and mainstream Australian communities, while largely unmeasured and intangible, are bound to be substantial. In these circumstances, addressing over-incarceration of First Nations people should be a major policy priority for governments at all levels. 

 

Of course, under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, the parties have determined that there is a target to reduce Indigenous incarceration rates. Using a baseline of incarceration levels in 2019, Target 10 aims to reduce the rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander adults held in incarceration by at least 15% by 2031. This is a pathetically unambitious target, as (on my calculation) it merely aims to reduce the incarceration rate from 2549 per 100k down to 2167 per 100k. This extreme lack of ambition raises serious questions regarding whether the Commonwealth (and its state and territory government partners) were ever serious about addressing the underlying disadvantages arising from this target that the Closing the Gap framework claims to be focussed on.

 

Even so, according to the Productivity Commission (PC) dashboard (link here), incarceration rates nationally have worsened since 2019, albeit there has been improvement in some jurisdictions. Of greater concern, incarceration rates nationally are projected by the PC to continue to rise through to 2031. Given the lack of progress, it is unsurprising to observe that governments have singularly failed to outline a comprehensive methodological model (or hypothesis) underpinning their actions directed at decreasing incarceration rates for Indigenous people.

 

These concerning trends, and the concomitant social and economic pain that they impose on First Nation communities, provide an unassailable rationale for further policy reform and action by governments at all levels. The key question then is what should those policy changes focus on?

 

The AIC Research Paper is framed quite narrowly as a statistical exercise aimed at testing a particular hypothesis. The Abstract to the research paper describes it in the following terms:

The Australian Indigenous imprisonment rate is currently 16.7 times the non-Indigenous imprisonment rate. The leading proximate cause of this over-representation is a high rate of Indigenous arrest. In this report we develop and test a model of Indigenous arrest in which the primary drivers of risk are substance use, stress and trauma, adverse social environment, exposure to arrest, human/economic/social capital, and state/territory of residence. We test the model using data from the 2014–15 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (emphasis added).

 

The following paragraphs are extracts from the Research Paper designed to elucidate its major findings. I strongly recommend that interested readers look at the Research Paper as there is much nuance and detail (including a detailed account of the statistical analyses undertaken) that I have passed over.

 

From the Executive Summary:

Though the point is often overlooked, most Indigenous Australians are never arrested or imprisoned. It is impossible to understand Indigenous over-representation in prison without coming to grips with the factors that differentiate those who are arrested and, in many cases, imprisoned, and the majority who are not. In this report we outline and evaluate a preliminary theory of Indigenous arrest. The explanation we give treats Indigenous arrest as the interplay of two sets of factors, one of which increases the risk of arrest and the other of which reduces that risk. The first set includes factors such as age, gender, psychological distress, membership of the stolen generation, illicit drug use, alcohol use and state and territory laws and policies. The second (protective) set includes social embeddedness, income, school completion, marital status and living conditions that reduce contact with police. We evaluate the theory using the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS), a large nationally representative survey of Indigenous Australians. The results are largely consistent with the explanation we put forward. The risk of arrest is higher for males than females, rises to a peak around 21–30 years, and declines rapidly thereafter. Illicit drug and alcohol use increases the risk of arrest, as does a high level of psychological distress, being a member of the stolen generation, living in a problem-affected neighbourhood and having a higher level of exposure to police. The risk of arrest is lower among Indigenous Australians who are married, who have never been homeless, who have people they feel they can confide in, who have completed school, and who have an income in the top four deciles.

The strongest risk factor is having used illicit drugs and alcohol over the preceding 12 months, which increases the marginal risk of arrest by 14 percentage points…The strongest protective factor is school completion, which reduces the risk of arrest by 7.9 percentage points….Measures to reduce illicit drug and alcohol use, improve school retention and improve economic outcomes for Indigenous Australians are essential if Australia is to achieve any longterm reduction in the scale of Indigenous over-representation in prison(emphasis added).

 

I omit any summary of the model description and the detailed statistical results, though I recommend readers examine Figures 1 through to 4. I have taken the following text from the concluding ‘Discussion’ section of the paper.

Discussion. We set out in this report to test a theory that linked the risk of Indigenous arrest to age and gender, illicit drug and alcohol use, stress and trauma, environmental factors associated with a person’s neighbourhood, state laws and regulations, exposure to police, and human, economic and social capital. Broadly speaking, our findings are consistent with that hypothesis…

As in past studies, illicit drug and alcohol use emerged as having the strongest relationship with the risk of arrest…More than one in 10 of those who do not use illicit drugs or alcohol had been arrested at least once in the past five years, compared with almost a third of those who use illicit drugs and alcohol. The fact that this difference in risk persists over such a long period (35 years), even after controlling for a wide range of other factors, underscores just how large a contribution illicit drug and alcohol use makes to the volume of Indigenous arrests and, therewith, to Indigenous imprisonment (emphasis added) ….

The two strongest protective factors are completing school, which was associated with a 7.9 percentage point (or 35%) reduction in the risk of arrest, and having an income in the top four deciles, which was associated with a 7.4 percentage point (or 33%) reduction in risk…Reducing the risk of arrest by improving Indigenous school completion and income clearly requires a concerted effort to address the sources of Indigenous disadvantage in the home, school and labour market (emphasis added)….

The benefits associated with living in a remote area and having a permanent home are interesting, given that these variables have received little research attention in the literature on Indigenous arrest. Both are strong protective factors. If, as we assume, they measure reduced exposure to police, they suggest that simply being visible to police increases the risk of Indigenous arrest, even if no serious offence is committed. This conclusion is consistent with evidence that police make less use of diversionary alternatives when dealing with minor offences (eg offensive language, offensive behaviour) committed by Indigenous Australians than when dealing with similar offences by non-Indigenous Australians (emphasis added).

 

The authors of the AIC Research report conclude by arguing for better data to enable more rigorous testing of new or alternative hypotheses; for policy to be based more closely upon theoretical analyses of the correlates of Indigenous arrest rates; and finally for the immediate development of policies where their research finding are consistent with rigorous studies of factors that increase the risk of involvement in crime. In relation to these factors, they state:

 Research on illicit drug and alcohol use, school completion, employment and income are just four examples [references removed]. There is no need to wait for further research before developing policies to improve outcomes on these dimensions. Progress on them is essential if we are to achieve any long-term reduction in the scale of Indigenous over-representation in prison (emphasis added).

 

The AIC research paper is valuable precisely because it provides an evidence-based policy roadmap which if implemented would begin to address rising Indigenous incarceration rates. Of course, the policy reforms required will themselves take time to be designed and implemented, tasks which are themselves complex and not without risk of failure. Even when implemented, it will take time for them to gain traction and have an impact. The consequence is that even with the right policy response not only is it highly unlikely that the 2031 target will be achieved, but it is also likely that it will take at least another decade to turn around the current trends.

In these circumstances, what is required is for governments at all levels, and most importantly, for the Commonwealth to first step up and devise and implement the required reforms, and second, to stay the course. This would require the Commonwealth to come clean with the Australian community regarding the extended time frames required and the financial costs and implicit risks in the strategies being pursued.

 

The reason I consider this to be one of the most important policy relevant research papers in recent times for the Indigenous policy domain is that it substantially strengthens the policy case not just for incarceration reform, but for much more ambitious policy action on a range of other fronts, including housing, education, income support and employment policies. In other words, the AIC Research Paper is so much more than a criminological study on Indigenous  incarceration rates. With good policy design, and adequate investment of financial and human resources, each of these policy issues have the potential in their own right to substantially improve the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of the most disadvantaged Indigenous citizens. In turn, the longer term pay-off for the broader society in improved social cohesion and reduced health costs arising from widespread existence of social determinants driving sub-optimal health outcomes will be significant.

 

Yet notwithstanding the clear benefits of addressing these policy issues, our political elites and thus our political system has demonstrated a longstanding and deep-seated aversion to acting in the public interest on these issues. The likelihood that necessary action will now be taken to address incarceration is thus remote. In a very real sense, the nation’s incarcerated, its unemployed, its unhoused and its under-educated citizens continue to inhabit a realm of sustained exclusion. There is no shortage of simplistic and instant solutions: many of us have a predisposition to blame the victim, and notwithstanding the existence of systemic constraints, there is no exemption for anyone from taking responsibility for their own life. Nevertheless, the extraordinary imbalance between government rhetoric and action, and between the preparedness of democratically elected governments to play politics rather than act in the public interest, suggests that there is something very awry in the economic and social governance of the Australian nation.

 

I previously published posts dealing with incarceration issues in 2019 (link here) and 2020 (link here and link here). On re-reading them, what strikes me most is how over the past five years and notwithstanding a change of government in Canberra, nothing has changed. The underlying dynamic of apparent policy intractability and avoidance of responsibility by governments remains ubiquitous and deeply embedded.

 

While the AIC Research Paper is of much wider policy relevance than its title suggests, it does not offer a pre-fabricated policy solution to the policy issues it identifies as crucial. It merely provides a roadmap. Each of the policy areas identified requires innovative and determined policy work at both political and bureaucratic levels to transform the roadmap into real world policy. Yet I fear that without sustained advocacy from Indigenous interests, there will be no appetite within policy circles to begin the journey so persuasively mapped out by the AIC Report authors. Even with Indigenous advocacy, there is no guarantee that policymakers will listen.

 

In other words, for all our self-confidence regarding the seemingly unquestionable merit of our existing systems of democratic governance, it remains the case there exists a substantial ‘underclass’ of excluded citizens, many of whom are Indigenous. This should prompt serious reflection by thinking Australians. Might it not be the case that the deeper drivers of continuing stratospheric rates of Indigenous incarceration can be traced to the self-imposed captivity of mainstream Australians by beliefs and mindsets that refuse to recognise the continuing existence of systemic exclusion embedded in our political systems.

 

25 May 2024

Monday, 13 May 2024

Slow walking towards disaster: new revelations regarding the proposed Winchelsea mine on Groote Eylandt.

                                                 When we are born we cry that we are come

To this great stage of fools.

King Lear, Act four, Scene six.

 

I recently put up two posts on the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) on Groote Eylandt in the NT, ALC and a murky set of inter-related issues based around the distribution of ABA monies (royalty equivalents) by the ALC and the proposed development of a new mine on Winchelsea Island off the northern coast of Groote Eylandt (link here and link here). These ‘royalty equivalent’ distributions are statutory functions of land councils ostensibly regulated by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 which is Commonwealth legislation.

  

On 11 May, the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) published an article by investigative journalist Nick McKenzie, based on leaked documents emanating from within the ALC (link here).

 

Key revelations included a report that the ALC CEO Mark Hewitt in 2023 had sought to have up to ten percent equity in the Winchelsea Mining Corporation (WMC) granted to him by the TOs who own 70 percent of the company (the other 30 percent is owned by an Australian corporation with Chinese connections, Aus China International Mining Pty Ltd). The article suggests that the value of the proposed shareholding proposed to be transferred to Mr. Hewitt was significant, and based on internal ALC estimates was currently worth $13m (which places the current valuation of the corporation at $130m) but was potentially worth $50m (which would place the potential value of WMC at $500m). In my previous post I argued that the commercial feasibility of the proposed Winchelsea project appeared to be seriously problematic given the data WMC had provided to the NT Government as part of the EIS processes required for a mine. Nevertheless, it is not clear what other exploration titles WMC owns or might seek to obtain and how prospective they might be. There are suggestions that the seabed surrounding Groote is highly prospective for manganese, but the TOs currently oppose any exploration. This could conceivably change in the future, and if it did, an Aboriginal owned Corporation would be in the box seat.

  

The proposal for an equity transfer to Mr. Hewitt did not proceed after an ALC employed lawyer raised concerns (presumably around conflict of interest) which were confirmed in legal advice sought from an external lawyer Ron Levy. The ALC lawyer’s employment ended two weeks later. According to the SMH article, Mr. Hewitt acknowledged that he had informed the lawyer that his contract would not be renewed.  

 

 

The article also mentions that a complaint had been made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to the share transfer matter and that the Ombudsman had requested the relevant agency (presumably NIAA) investigate.

  

There are several implications that emerge or arise from the SMH article and its revelations. The first is the discrepancy between Mr. Hewitt’s comments to the Estimates Committee and the latest revelations that demonstrate not only that he came very close to being granted ten percent equity in WMC, but that he had indicated that he only agreed to forgo the offer until he stood down as ALC CEO. In the Estimates committee hearing in February this year Mr. Hewitt  stated:

I just want to say there are some important points I'd like to put out straightaway and correct on the record. I'm not a co-owner of the Winchelsea mine at all—not at all, in part or completely. I'm not silly. The mine is owned by a 70 per cent share with the Bara and Jaragba clans and they represent themselves through Anindilyakwa Advancement Aboriginal Corporation, whose directors comprise senior TOs for that island, where that resource is held. I think also I need to say that the work I undertake with Winchelsea and other major projects are because there are certain big things we need to do before the GEMCO mining operation closes. The biggest piece of it all is the mining project, because the revenue for that will enable all these other important things to occur—in particular, getting our mining trust up to a figure which can sustain valuable, important cultural and community support programs and things of that nature…[emphasis added].

  

While these comments are factually correct, they fail to mention his previous proposal for a transfer of ownership of ten percent of the mining company to himself. In effect, the Committee was misled by omission (although to be fair, as I previously argued, the Committee exhibited an excessive degree of credulousness). Moreover, Mr. Hewitt also failed to mention his plan to take up the offer of a future ownership transfer once he transitioned out of the ALC CEO role.

  

A second, and in my view much more salient implication of the SMH revelations was that in his comments to the SMH justifying the ownership transfer proposal, Mr. Hewitt has made crystal clear his role as the primary architect and most active proponent of the overarching agenda being pursued by the ALC, central to which is the development of the Winchelsea mine. This is the agenda which I was particularly critical of in my previous posts, and for which the Land Council members must be held ultimately responsible. Among the questions that emerge from this implicit admission is how does it coexist with the commitment he gave former Minister Scullion in September 2018 to recuse himself from land council dealings on the mine venture? The SMH has apparently seen the letter making this commitment. It is patently clear that in terms of the substantive issues that the land council has responsibility for, his role as CEO places him in a situation where it would be structurally impossible for him to completely recuse himself. This is the deeper import of the conflicts of interest identified by the ANAO in their May 2023 report.

  

The third and perhaps most serious issue raised by the events outlined by the SMH is the possibility that the degree of control exercised by Mr. Hewitt over the ALC Board (as identified in the ANAO report) may have established a network of reciprocal obligations between key Anindilyakwa TOs and Mr. Hewitt. Such control would be facilitated by the level of control that the ALC holds over the Boards and decision making of associated corporations as discussed in my previous post (link here). Both these outcomes are enabled by the inter-connected memberships between the ALC and the various associated corporations in receipt of royalty equivalent payments from the ALC. If such a network of reciprocity exists (a factual matter yet to be formally determined), it may make it extremely difficult for individual TOs to say ‘no’ to proposals put forward by Mr. Hewitt.  The key issue would then become, are such proposals in the interests of the Anandilyakwa people generally. These are issues that are both philosophical in nature yet also require tangible real-world decisions to be made.

  

The Aboriginal Land Rights Act establishes the system of land trusts and Land Councils to determine these issues in the real world, however imperfectly. Yet the independence of the land council on Groote has potentially been compromised and successive Ministers responsible for ensuring that the governance standards and normal checks and balances are maintained have dropped the ball. While there is an extraordinarily strong case for shining an accountability spotlight on what is happening on Groote, there is also a much more fundamental case for holding Ministers to account for their unwillingness to take appropriate and timely action to ensure strict compliance with the statutory framework in place.

  

The case for action is strengthened by the fact that prima facie, the facts as we now know them are potentially consistent with public officeholders (which could include ALC staff, the Minister and NIAA staff) being involved in two of the four types of corrupt conduct which exist under the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act, namely, breach of public trust and abuse of office.

 

 I wrote to the Minister for Aboriginal Australians ten weeks ago recommending several actions be taken based on a detailed analysis of what has transpired on Groote. Inter alia, I recommended an immediate forensic inquiry extending beyond the implementation of the ANAO report, and immediate action to resolve the conflict of interest held by the Chair and CEO of the ALC who are both directors of WMC. To date I have received no reply.

 

 Last week I lodged an FOI request for various documents including for copies of the report referred to in the Minister’s comments cited in the Canberra Times article. I was advised by the NIAA that following preliminary inquiries with the relevant business area of the agency, it appears that the NIAA does not hold any documents matching my request. There are potentially several alternative explanations for NIAA not having such a report in its possession. However whatever the reason, in the light of the SMH revelations regarding Mr. Hewitt’s September 2023 attempt to be gifted an equity holding in WMC, and its referral to the Ombudsman, who in turn referred it to NIAA, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Minister is slow walking the investigation of these allegations, and delaying taking any action to address what are clearly significant issues both for the Aboriginal population of Groote Eylandt, and for effective and responsible public administration.

  

All I can say is that the longer the Minister delays taking action, the more foolish she will ultimately appear.