Tuesday, 1 September 2026

The Productivity Commission and Closing the Gap: a footnote in history?

                                                 Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back,

Wherein he puts alms for oblivion.

Troilus and Cressida, Act three, Scene three

 

Summary

This post covers a lot of ground, so I have decided to include an upfront summary which provides a high-level roadmap of the key arguments. Last week the Treasurer issued terms of reference for the Productivity Commission's second triennial review of Closing the Gap. On closer reading, those directions steer the Commission back towards refining the existing framework rather than considering why the Closing the Gap framework isn't working. Federal, state and territory governments have a poor record of translating their formal agreement to previous review recommendations into action. After almost a quarter century, the Closing the Gap Framework is looking tired and vulnerable, and community support is fading. In my estimation, the forthcoming Review is likely the last opportunity to revitalise and refocus the institutional architecture that governs Closing the Gap before community sentiment turns against it. If the opportunity is not taken, the National Agreement will be increasingly vulnerable to abolition. This will require the Commission to broaden its focus and undertake a hard-headed strategic and structural reconsideration that current circumstances require.

 

Background

This post focusses primarily on the role of the Productivity Commission (the Commission) in relation to the oversight and administration of the Closing the Gap process. The Productivity Commission has responsibility for producing the Closing the Gap Information Repository, which tracks progress against the 19 socio-economic targets and four Priority Reforms agreed in the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here). Under the National Agreement (link here), the Commission is also responsible for undertaking a triennial review of progress (see clauses 121–124). An important reason for ensuring strong analytical clarity in the Commission’s review derives from the reality that there is at least an appearance of conflict between the Commissions role as administrator of the target metrics and its role as an independent reviewer.

 

The terms of reference

The Commonwealth Government has announced the terms of reference for the Productivity Commission's second triennial review. The review is scheduled to be finalised by the end of 2027. According to Treasurer Chalmers and Minister McCarthy's joint media release (link here), the Commission will assess the outcomes, effectiveness and impact of measures by all governments and the Coalition of Peaks against the targets, and has been asked to complete a more explicit examination of funding, investment practices and community-controlled sector resourcing — including whether government expenditure is aligned with, and supporting, the Priority Reforms.

 

The review web page (link here) frames it this way:

Every three years, the Productivity Commission is required to independently review how parties to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap are progressing towards their commitments. This is the PC's second review. We will focus on what's working and why, and what can be done differently to achieve meaningful change.

 

The Terms of Reference issued by the Treasurer state, inter alia:

Background

… The review will provide an analysis of progress on Closing the Gap against the priority reforms, targets, indicators and trajectories, and examine the factors contributing to progress, including by drawing on evaluation and other evidence. Parties have committed to undertaking actions if the review indicates that achievement of any of the targets that are set out in the Agreement is not on track.

 

Scope of the review

The review will assess how effectively the Agreement is supporting improved life outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In undertaking the review, the Productivity Commission should:

·         Have regard to all aspects of the Agreement and consider the progress, implementation efforts and annual reports of all parties, including jurisdictional progress by the Commonwealth and states and territories

·         Assess progress against the four Priority Reform areas and 17 socioeconomic outcomes [sic — the Agreement specifies 19 targets], including identifying successful approaches, partnerships and delivery models that have demonstrated positive impact

·         Draw on available evidence and evaluation findings, to assess impact, deliverables and outcomes, and progress towards developing measures for the Priority Reforms targets and indicators and outstanding data under socioeconomic targets

·         Assess whether commitments under the Agreement that relate to prioritising and reporting on funding and resourcing to First Nations community-controlled sectors are being met, and whether they are driving changes in the way investments are made and improved outcomes against the Priority Reforms

·         Assess whether new and existing funding – both dedicated and mainstream – is being effectively mobilised to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. 

The review is to have regard to and complement – not duplicate – the previous findings of the first Productivity Commission review of progress on the National Agreement, published on 7 January 2024, and the Independent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-led Review, published on 21 June 2025.

 The Productivity Commission should provide recommendations on how to improve, hasten and strengthen implementation of existing commitments in the Agreement. Where necessary to support implementation of existing commitments, the Productivity Commission should provide recommendations on potential changes to the Agreement and its targets, indicators and trajectories, and on data improvements (emphasis added).

 

The terms of reference are, on the surface, reasonably comprehensive. There are some positive elements: the specific mention of the contribution of mainstream funding to shaping outcomes, and the narrow possibility left open for the Commission to recommend changes to the National Agreement — albeit given the repeated focus on ‘progress’, the subtext appears to be to nudge the Commission towards a narrow focus on incremental adjustment to targets, indicators, trajectories and data improvements. These are all potentially important, but I would argue that more structural reform is necessary.

 

Reading between the lines

Close reading of the terms of reference raises a number of issues that are worth contemplating and may prefigure the approach the Government expects the Commission to pursue:

·         The Treasurer is at pains to avoid mentioning failure, and the repetitive use of the word "progress" continuously reinforces the ‘strength-based’ approach that infused the initial selection and framing of the targets by governments (and it must be said the Coalition of Peaks).

·         The focus is primarily on doubling down on the current framework and, ostensibly, on how best to refine it and make it work better.

·         The Treasurer sidesteps the elephant in the room: the failure to make progress against virtually all targets (especially in relation to remote regions where outcomes are much more dire than the national outcomes), and — more importantly — the adequacy (in terms of timely and tangible outcomes) of governments' own responses to the two previous reviews, most of all the first Commission Review.

·         The focus on funding has been left vague, and thus open to misinterpretation. The Ministers’ media release appears to make clear in relation to the ‘explicit examination of funding, investment practices and community-controlled sector resourcing’ (by referencing alignment with the Priority Reforms) that the intention is to nudge the Commission towards recommending funding shift from non-Indigenous private sector and NGO providers to community-controlled organisations — a strong nod to the Coalition of Peaks' primary agenda. However, it can equally be read as a call for more rigorous assessment of funding efficacy more generally. The Australian headlined its report of the announcement of the Terms of Reference on 29 August 2026 as ‘Review of Indigenous Funding: Is pouring cash into the Gap effective?’ (paywalled).

 

The tax expenditure blind spot

One important but invariably overlooked mainstream funding issue relates to the inequitable distribution of mainstream ‘tax expenditures’.  The Terms of Reference refer to ‘funding’, but tax expenditures are just as relevant to whether government support for Closing the Gap is effective. Take one obvious example: the benefits available to homeowners in our tax system are systemically biased towards non-Indigenous homeowners (link here). The Capital Gains Tax exemption on the sale of a primary residence alone is estimated by Treasury to cost the Commonwealth $66 billion in 2026–27, rising to $78.5 billion in 2028–29 (see exemptions E7 and E8, 2025–26 Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement, p.166: (link here). According to 2021 Census data, 42% of Indigenous households own their own home, compared to 67% of all Australians (link here). It follows that these benefits flow disproportionately to non-Indigenous homeowners.

 

While I accept that the language in the Terms of Reference's speaks of ‘funding’ and ‘investment’ rather than the tax system, the tax system is exactly the kind of ‘mainstream’ lever the Terms of Reference professes an interest in ("whether new and existing funding – both dedicated and mainstream – is being effectively mobilised"), and it bears directly on housing and economic outcomes that sit squarely within the socioeconomic targets. A serious assessment of whether mainstream expenditure is ‘effectively mobilised’ toward Closing the Gap objectives can't extend merely to direct program spending and ignore the significant sums the tax system silently redirects away from the people the Agreement is meant to benefit.

 

The missing 2031 endpoint

There is no term of reference raising directly the rapidly approaching endpoint for most of the targets in 2031. This is likely to be the last review before a post-2031 policy framework for the National Agreement, its targets and its priority reforms would need to be in place if there is not to be a temporal gap in the frameworks implementation. This makes the absence of a specific mention in the Terms of Reference potentially problematic.

 

Governments' record on implementing previous reviews

Perhaps the most egregious absence in the terms of reference is any reference to assessing the adequacy of governments' implementation of their own unanimously positive responses to the previous reviews under the National Agreement, both formal and informal.

 

In relation to the first Commission review, Joint Council met in July 2024 and noted (link here):

Joint Council welcomed the Productivity Commission's first Three-Yearly Review of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap … Halfway through the National Agreement key structures and processes have been established. But Joint Council agreed more needs to be done to deliver on the ground and in communities. Joint Council agreed to the four key recommendations of the Review and to 15 of the 16 recommended actions…

 

Given that governments agreed to the recommendations, and yet the rate of progress is in reverse virtually across the board, the obvious questions are: were the recommendations not implemented? Were they inadequately framed by the Commission review team in the first place? Or both? Hopefully the forthcoming Review will enlighten us.

 

The subsequent record is a case study in process overwhelming substance. At the June 2025 meeting, Joint Council noted the findings of the Independent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-led Review and undertook to ‘formally respond to the Report at their meeting in November 2025.’ At the November 2025 meeting, it agreed instead to ‘prioritise finalisation of its response by the end of February 2026.’ By the following meeting in May 2026, it had settled on implementing ‘11 Partnership Actions,’ (which are in fact agreements to cooperate, hardly actions) with members ‘committed to working through remaining Partnership Actions to find an agreed approach … as soon as possible.’ The Joint Council's formal response to the January 2024 Commission review was eventually published in June 2025 (link here), and its response to the subsequent Independent Review in May 2026 (link here).

 

I haven't had time or inclination to analyse these documents in detail, but it's worth noting that while governments agreed unanimously to all but one of the Commission's recommendations, the proposed implementation of each in these formal responses is invariably framed in terms of process rather than tangible action. The Commission might have made more action-oriented, action-limited recommendations; but the responsibility for what transpired ultimately lies with governments.

 

The process problem

 

My overarching assessment is that the whole business of responding to, and then acting upon, the various statutory reviews required by the Closing the Gap Framework is both extraordinarily slow and overburdened with process. Governments can manage complex processes, albeit often at a snail's pace, but most external interests and the public at large have limited capacity to follow what is being decided (or not) when it extends over years. The effect is to prioritise torpidity and lethargy as guiding principles for how business is done. I should note at this point that my earlier submissions related to the first review (see below for links) made this argument at much greater length. The more important question — whether recommendations will make a substantive difference, and whether they will actually be implemented — gets lost in the mists of that process. Hopefully the current review will both get to the bottom of this snail-like process and recommend radical simplification, but as noted above, the current Terms of Reference do not acknowledge this issue and do not encourage such an analysis.  

 

While this process of incessant review — two multi-year reviews every three years, followed by a multi-year process of responding to their recommendations — grinds on, governments remain relatively immune to any criticism that they aren't acting, because they can always point to an ongoing review. This mire of pervasive process, underpinned by a rolling negotiation between nine jurisdictions and the Indigenous Peaks, seemingly designed to produce lowest common denominator outcomes, virtually ensures substantive and visionary reform will never emerge.

 

Again, hopefully the Commission's forthcoming review will cut through and make clear-cut recommendations that create the preconditions for future reform — because without that, the prospects for the future viability of the Closing the Gap framework are dire.

 

What the Commission's own members have said

It's worth reflecting on the perspective the Commission itself brings to these two roles — and the place to start is how its members describe them publicly.

 

In an August 2023 speech to the National Press Club titled Reflections on Productivity, Public Policy, and Challenges Associated with Closing the Gap (link here), outgoing Chair Michael Brennan spoke at length about the Commission's role. Two lines stand out:

Only 4 of the 17 targets set out in the Agreement are on track to be met at this early stage. Others are going in the wrong direction, like the rate of incarceration … It was never clear what governments felt they were putting in place that would reverse this trend.

and, on the labyrinthian impact of the 2,000-plus implementation actions in play at any one time across the nine jurisdictions:

Granted, governments are busy … But this busy-ness is, in many ways, just business as usual.

 

In her May 2024 Stretton Oration (link here), new Chair Danielle Wood gave a masterful summary of income and wealth inequality in Australia (not that Indigenous disadvantage is entirely encompassed by these metrics), pointing to health and education, welfare supports, minimum wage settings and full employment policy as levers for entrenched disadvantage, while correctly noting that particular levers must be context-specific. Indigenous Australians were not, as far as I can tell, explicitly mentioned.

 

In August 2024, then-Commissioner Natalie Siegel-Brown put the data more starkly (link here):

Another five of the targets are improving but not on track to be met, one has not progressed at all, and four targets are actually going backwards … government performance on reducing rates of removal of children from their families, adult imprisonment, children in detention and suicide is even worse than when we started measuring … this coincides with some states knowingly contravening their commitments under the Agreement.

 

In a November 2024 speech (link here), Commissioner Wood described the first Review's consultation with Indigenous communities as central to its ‘success’. Given the dismal outcomes to date, and the slow progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations, the assertion of ‘success’ appears misguided and Panglossian.

 

The two Commissioners now responsible for the current Review, Selwyn Button and Angela Jackson, struck a similarly optimistic note in an article earlier this year (link here). In August 2025, Commissioner Button wrote an op-ed in the AFR (link here) extolling community control as the key to closing the gap. His argument downplayed the impact of FASD by pointing to successful community-led initiatives such as had taken place in Fitzroy Crossing, and, on alcohol, cited national data against what he termed "lazy stereotypes." Yet the outcomes on the ground continue to take a terrible toll (link here: my own analysis, not official data), and "strength-based" arguments risk taking pressure off governments to strengthen controls on access to alcohol and other harmful substances for vulnerable remote residents. Community control is arguably a necessary contributor to achieving many of the Closing the Gap targets, but (especially at the macro-level) it is not sufficient on its own; that control must translate into effective and sustainable policy which increasingly encompasses engagement with other interest groups, negotiation and trade-offs with multiple levels of government, effective advocacy and sustained cohesion so as to resist the countervailing efforts of governments and third parties to undermine Indigenous voices.

 

There is clearly a place for rigorous monitoring and data contextualisation, but it's far from clear the Commission has been applying that rigour in the Indigenous policy space. Economist and former Commission employee Cathal Leslie has published a number of op-eds on Closing the Gap in the AFR (link here: paywall) one of which apparently prompting Commissioner Button's article above, another on 10 August 2026 pointing to methodological issues in the Commission's target metrics and to a critical ANAO report and a commissioned ANU report. Leslie's central point is the Commission's downplaying of demographic change in the national Indigenous population — the statistically significant rise in people self-identifying as Indigenous — and he concludes that the Commission has chosen to present statistics it knows cannot be believed, giving ‘cover to failing policies by telling the country that life for Indigenous children is better than it is.’ While I am not privy to the Commission’s internal processes, and so don’t presume to take one side or the other, the methodological and data issues raised by Cathal in a credible national newspaper deserve to be taken seriously by the Commission in its substantive analysis to be published in the forthcoming review.  

 

Déjà vu all over again

The fundamental problem with the terms of reference, and with the Commission's recent signalling of its likely approach, is that it is, to borrow from Yogi Berra, ‘a case of déjà vu all over again.’

 

In December 2022, following a call for submissions to the first three-year review, I submitted a nine-page submission to the Commission (link here). In August 2023, I published a blog post critiquing the Commission's draft report (link here). In September 2023, I submitted a further response (link here), attaching an outline of a potential alternative framework for Closing the Gap. All three failed to gain obvious traction. Rereading them today, I think they made a very strong case then and still do. The concluding paragraphs of the 2023 post included:

 

There is no recognition that the current design architecture for the agreement, while incomplete and thus subject to ongoing remedial work, is simultaneously over-designed and in need of radical simplification. As presently configured, it guarantees that the Coalition of Peaks will be wading through bureaucratic sludge for the next ten years … and ensures that the probability of the national agreement imploding under the weight of its accumulated complexity is high and bound to grow. Proactive reform is preferable to stasis followed by abolition.

 

The bottom line … is that the six recommendations of the draft review … would not make any substantive difference to the nation's progress on closing the gap within five or even ten years. They are an amalgam of doubling down on the current hyper-complexity of the policy architecture along with a hefty dose of blind faith in the bureaucratic leadership of the nation. Did the robodebt royal commission not make any impression at all on the PC?

 

My recommendation for the Commonwealth Government remains the same: issue the Commission with revised terms of reference, and ask it to (a) estimate the cost of addressing entrenched Indigenous inequality; (b) map out a realistic timeframe and strategy for achieving that objective; (c) undertake a more fundamental analysis of the current status of the Closing the Gap architecture; and (d) provide options for radically simplifying the structure and design of that architecture while retaining the four priority reforms. And, for good measure, keep it to fifty pages. Such a report could create a pathway for the Commonwealth Government, which in reality and despite its dissembling, retains primary responsibility for the effectiveness and long term viability of the National Agreement, to engage meaningfully with Indigenous interests and the states and territories.

 

The bottom line

The Productivity Commission has an admirable and long record of real and forthright independence, most recently on the GST and fiscal equalisation. What's needed now is hard-headed policy analysis focused on making a tangible difference to the lives of the most disadvantaged Australians within a finite period. The Commission is not primarily responsible for the poor outcomes to date, but its inability so far to identify a feasible, constructive strategic pathway forward for the National Agreement and its constituent parties has been a major contributor to letting governments evade real accountability to the public and to First Nations.

 

If it were up to me, I would favour narrowing the focus of the National Agreement to the five issues identified by Coalition of Peaks Lead Convenor Ms Donnella Mills who in her comments in response to the Terms of Reference (link here) argued inter alia:

Positive outcomes are achieved when governments have genuinely partnered with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community‑controlled organisations, it is now up to all governments to demonstrate and lead the change our people have said is needed to shift the dial in areas of health, housing, education, employment and justice (emphasis added).

I would add to those proposed priorities the adoption of a robust needs-based funding criterion to ensure that geographic areas or program sectors without access to appropriate mainstream program equivalents are prioritised.

 

It's now almost a quarter of a century since the Rudd Government adopted the Closing the Gap agenda. The patchy progress that has been achieved owes more to wider economic and demographic shifts than to specific policy reform, and in many key areas — especially remote Australia — progress in many respects has been negative. Without a new approach, which in my view will only emerge if the Commission bites the bullet, the National Agreement, which I still see as pathbreaking reform of historic significance, will be vulnerable to abolition. Without a sense across the breadth of mainstream Australia that Closing the Gap is working, the framework will lose the broad-based political support necessary for its ongoing survival.

 

The work of the forthcoming Review, and its ability to persuade governments to pursue substantive reform, may well be the last real opportunity to ensure the National Agreement and Closing the Gap does not go the way of the NAC, the NACC, ATSIC and the Voice to Parliament, and becomes a mere footnote in the history of the ongoing struggle for inclusion within the nation’s institutional architecture by First Nations citizens. That would be a tragedy for First Nations, and for the nation.

 

1 September 2026

 

This post has benefited from editorial assistance from Claude Sonnet 5. The text and arguments are entirely my own.

 

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