Wending languidly towards Indigenous digital inclusion

 

That glib and oily art

To speak and purpose not.

King Lear, Act 1, scene 1.

 

The NIAA recently published a Discussion Paper to support the development of the Australian Government’s proposed Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan (link here).

 

According to The Mandarin (link here):

Federal Indigenous Australians minister Ken Wyatt said access to digital technology was closely linked with economic growth and social connection and was particularly essential because of COVID-19.

“Digital technology encourages entrepreneurialism, wealth creation and economic advancement – it’s about closing the gap and taking the next step after that,” Wyatt said.

“That is why we are developing a comprehensive plan to address the barriers to digital inclusion.”

 

My initial reaction to the NIAA Discussion Paper after a quick scan was that this was a useful and thorough piece of work. It included plenty of data, state by state analyses, and covered the key issues involved, with extensive reliance on the available academic literature. I made the decision to draft this post motivated in part by a desire to record some positive policy developments. Unfortunately, the closer I looked at the issues involved, the more disheartened and critical I became.

 

This post is not aimed at exploring in detail the elements of the Indigenous digital divide. The NIAA Discussion Paper, complemented by the research papers cited in its footnotes,  is in fact a good and timely introduction, albeit one that must be considered critically. For example, it glosses some important issues, for example the links between low rates of digital inclusion and high levels of financial literacy, and low levels of educational attainment. It fails to mention others such as the potential links between the extraordinarily high levels of pre-covid disengagement with the social security system in remote Australia and digital inclusion. See the April 2020 Senate Community Affairs Committee report into the adequacy of Newstart (link here) for a discussion of disengagement and a recommendation for further research to be commissioned by NIAA (paras 6.142–153). Eighteen months later, this appears not to have progressed.

 

Instead of an analysis of the Indigenous digital divide – an issue deserving of detailed research in the post covid policy world – this post aims to consider the backstory to the NIAA Discussion Paper.

 

The background is set out in the Discussion Paper’s Introduction:

In 2018, the Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee presented the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review – Getting it right out there (the Review). For Indigenous Australians, the report highlighted the need for those living in remote communities to have better access to phone and Internet services. Recommendation 8 called for a targeted Indigenous Digital Inclusion Program, with a focus on access, affordability and digital ability, to be developed in partnership with Indigenous communities.

In response to the Review, the Australian Government agreed in-principle to Recommendation 8, and committed to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan. 

 

So the genesis of the Discussion Paper is the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review (link here). That review allocated five pages (pp.57-61) to discussion Indigenous needs. While brief and succinct, it made the case for improvements in digital access:

A coherent and holistic policy approach to telecommunications services is needed for remote Indigenous communities. A number of stakeholders have called for the development of an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Strategy. It is important that there is local ownership in all aspects of the strategy, and that it builds upon the capacity of existing organisations, infrastructure and programs to avoid duplication.

The strategy should include data collection to measure whether remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community members have broadband available to them with the minimum requirements in terms of access, availability, affordability and digital literacy. The strategy should consider affordability and suitability of services for Indigenous communities, such as community Wi-Fi. It is important that a digital literacy program is included as part of any such strategy, and is developed to be culturally and linguistically appropriate for remote community members.

 

The review recommended

A targeted Indigenous Digital Inclusion program with a focus on access, affordability and digital ability be developed in partnership with Indigenous communities.

 

The Australian Government March 2019 response (link here) stated:

Recommendation 8:  The Government agrees-in-principle with this recommendation. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, will provide lead policy advice, with support from the Department of Communications and the Arts to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan. The Government will work through existing Indigenous consultative mechanisms such as the Indigenous Advisory Council to identify community priorities and ensure a tailored response.

The Government’s Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan will consider Government investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion and identify community priorities for further work (recommendation 8). A one-size-fits-all approach is not always appropriate, and specific action needs to be tailored to community needs.

 

Or as the NIAA Discussion Paper put it in more succinct terms, the Australian Government:

agreed in-principle to Recommendation 8, and committed to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan.

 

On its face, this seems positive. However, the response is qualified…it is ‘in principle’ and is a commitment to develop ‘a plan’, not to develop ‘a program’ (with the implication that funding would be allocated) nor does it commit to any tangible action to improve digital inclusion.

 

In mid-2021, the parties to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap added a new target on digital inclusion (link here). This sets an ambitious target of 5 years to Indigenous digital equality, but simultaneously points to a lack of data to enable measurement of the target.

 

In May 2021, the Government released its 2030 Digital Economy Strategy (link here) with associated finding of $1.2bn. The only mention of Indigenous digital issues was on p.33 in a section (misleadingly) headed ‘What has already been delivered’, where the review states:

Digital literacy and ability are being considered as part of an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan currently being developed. The Plan will consider Government investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion and identify priorities for further work. It will also have a focus on access and affordability.

 

The recently released NIAA Discussion Paper – which arrives two and a half years after the Government committed to develop ‘a plan’ – lists in an appendix all conceivable programs that might assist Indigenous citizens’ digital inclusion. The appendix lists 19 Australian Government universal programs (ie mainstream programs available to all citizens). There is no analysis of whether mainstream programs are underutilised by Indigenous citizens. Whatever their merits and take up by Indigenous citizens, the mainstream programs are delivering the current digital divide, and thus are conceptually irrelevant to addressing the issue of Indigenous digital exclusion. It also lists 6 targeted programs (ie Indigenous specific programs) only two of which appear to involve funding:

Remote Indigenous Community Telecommunications program: maintenance and monitoring of 245 community payphones and 301 Wi-Fi telephones, generally located in communities with less than 50 permanent residents that do not have reasonable access to a public telephone.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Technology-Facilitated Abuse Resources Program: co-designed resources and training to support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women to identify, report and protect themselves and their children from technology-facilitated abuse. Includes a grants program for Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations to develop culturally appropriate, place-based resources.

 

These are ‘the investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion’. The NIAA Discussion Paper does not indicate the funding levels involved, but they are likely to be less than $5m over four years. These are the programs to be ‘considered’ by the ‘plan’ which is unlikely to be finalised before the next federal election. Even if this funding amounted to $10m, it would only comprise less than one percent of the $1.2bn allocated in May 2021 under the Digital Economy Strategy. The Prime Minister’s media release accompanying the Digital Economy Strategy (link here) included reference to other significant digital economy funding announced by the Government totalling in excess of $7bn. Back of the envelope, $10m is 0.125% of $8bn. If actions speak louder than words, then this is the measure of the current Government’s commitment to Indigenous digital exclusion.

 

The Regional Telecommunications Review takes place every three years under Part 9B of the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999. It assesses the adequacy of telecommunications services in regional, rural and remote parts of Australia.

 

Past reviews and government responses are available on the Infrastructure Department website (link here).

 

The 2008 Glasson review included an extensive section on Indigenous telecommunications needs, which documented the existence of the an extensive digital divide. The then Government accepted the recommendation ‘to expand the implementation and maintenance of community phones, including pre-paid options for people in remote Indigenous communities’. It allocated $3.7m in funding.

 

The 2012 Sinclair review recommended that ‘there should be a continuation and expansion of the Indigenous Communications Program, with sufficient flexibility to allow for tailored localised training and digital literacy solutions. The program should include a trial of wi-fi hotspots using selected community phones’. The then Government responded that the recommendation required further consideration.

 

The 2015 Schiff review made no recommendations relating to Indigenous telecommunications needs.

 

The 2018 review has been discussed above.

 

In June 2021, the 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review began its work (link here). The Review issued an Issues Paper to guide its consultation processes (link here) which included a short section on Indigenous issues, listing (without attribution)  issues identified by the previous review:

Levels of digital inclusion amongst Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians continue to remain lower than the national average, including in regard to the take-up and affordability of telecommunications services.

As with the wider community, mobile phones are the most commonly used device for voice and data services in Indigenous communities. However, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians are also more likely to only use mobile services than the national average. This likely reflects a strong preference towards pre-paid mobile plans due to the ability to ‘pay-as-you-go', providing more financial control than other forms of access which charge monthly fees.

Wi-Fi services are also available in some remote areas, both through free access at local community facilities or using a pre-paid voucher system with data quotas. The National Indigenous Affairs Agency also funds community phones which may use a similar payment model. While Sky Muster is available across Australia, take-up is low in remote communities.

Although pre-paid mobile and Wi-Fi internet options are often easier to manage, these services can charge higher costs for data than post-paid mobile and broadband plans. Additionally, higher levels of 3G-only mobile coverage in remote areas can lead to slower speeds and heavy network congestion, which may reduce uptake of data-intensive activities.

The Committee is interested to examine the adequacy of telecommunications for Indigenous Australians in regional, rural and remote areas. In particular, the Committee welcomes views on ways to improve levels of telecommunications access and affordability in remote Indigenous communities.

 

The 2021 review’s consultation phase has recently concluded.

 

The latest NIAA Discussion Paper relies heavily on the 2020 Australian Digital Inclusion Index: Measuring Australia’s Digital Divide (link here). This is the fifth edition of a regular report, and is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding digital exclusion issues. On page 19, the report spells out in some detail the elements driving digital exclusion amongst urban and regional Indigenous citizens, spelling out the sustained lower index scores for Indigenous citizens used throughout the Discussion paper. But the data collection is only partial. As the report itself notes (p.19):

The ADII data collection does not extend to remote Indigenous communities, where high levels of geographic isolation and socioeconomic disadvantage pose distinct challenges for digital inclusion. In 2018 and 2019, ADII case studies were conducted in the remote indigenous communities of Ali Curung in the NT and Pormpuraaw in far north Queensland. Findings from these studies suggest that digital inclusion for Indigenous Australians further diminishes with remoteness, particularly in terms of Access and Affordability. [emphasis added].

 

See also the discussion on the Northern Territory at p.45. The report backs up the discussion of Indigenous digital divide in its concluding section (pp.46–7). It mentions the new Closing the Gap target, and mentions that while it focusses on access to digital services, it overlooks the issue of affordability.

 

The NIAA Discussion Paper mentions the data issues relating to remote communities in a single sentence (p.4) and on page 19. However, the rest of the report and the multiple graphics utilise the ADII index data. Given the genesis of the Discussion Paper in concerns around remote digital exclusion, the use of an index based on urban and regional surveys, and that excludes remote data, is in many respects misleading. The data utilised significantly understate the levels of Indigenous digital exclusion across remote Australia. The Discussion Paper does acknowledge these limitations, and hints that it plans to utilise a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, and data proxies in the absence of adequate data. Importantly, it notes that:

The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey, last conducted in 2014-15, generated data on digital access, use and training, but has not been undertaken recently [my emphasis].

 

One might ask why has it not been undertaken? Over recent decades, NATSISS has been a core element in policy and program development across the whole of the Indigenous policy domain.

 

The bottom line is that at least since 2008, Australian Governments have been aware of the existence of a substantial digital divide. While data is important, and useful, a Government and Minister that was serious about this issue would start by devising a basic program with some serious funding (say $20-40m) over four years, and then work to establish the data sets to establish underlying levels of need and finetune and improve the targeting of the program. In the face of overwhelming and demonstrable need, putting the data horse before the action cart is merely a ploy to do nothing.

 

After 13 years, and four completed statutory reviews, only $3.7m has been allocated as a result of the review recommendations, and the only action since 2008 has been a commitment tabled in the Parliament to develop a plan, a plan to be developed in consultation with an Indigenous advisory committee the Government has abolished without explanation (link here), a plan which is still unimplemented 30 months after the commitment was made.

 

Given the context outlined above, what are the odds that the Government is serious in publishing the latest NIAA Discussion Paper? Why should anyone take it seriously? What does it say about the Government’s level pf commitment to the new Closing the Gap targets? What does it say about Minister Wyatt’s influence within the Government that he can participate in a Cabinet discussion to approve $1.2bn in digital economy expenditure in May this year and extract zero for remote Indigenous citizens who confront multiple and complex needs in the digital policy space?

 

It is clear that the Australian Government’s failure to acknowledge that there is an issue requiring resolute and immediate substantive policy action – rather than a mere plan – is at the root of the continuing digital exclusion of Indigenous citizens, particularly in remote regions. In more ways than one, digital extraction is the prerequisite for improvements in Indigenous digital inclusion.

Into the blizzard: the current policy announcement blitz in the Indigenous policy domain

 

May the winds blow till they have wakened death

Othello Act 2, scene 1.

 

Almost a year ago, in September 2020, I published a post ‘Ways of Working’ assessing the Government’s broad approach to the Indigenous affairs portfolio based in large measure on a close reading the Minister Wyatt’s speeches (link here). I think that post is worth re-reading in full. In that post I noted:

If my reading of the Minister’s speech is correct, this is indeed a far-reaching policy agenda. It is not new, but is arguably a sharper and more overt justification and rationale for what has effectively been the Coalition Government Indigenous policy settings since it came to office. It implicitly seeks to justify policy inaction, shifting policy and funding responsibilities to the states and territories wherever possible, the substantial budget reductions and policy reversals since 2013, and the failure to step up and substantively address the investment implications of sustained disadvantage. Most importantly, it appears to implicitly seek to justify ongoing social and political structural exclusion through the use of rhetorical tropes designed to resonate with Indigenous citizens: self-determination, empowerment, and listening to as yet unheard voices. [emphasis added]

 

In recent weeks, the Minister has announced a veritable whirlwind of policy initiatives. This post aims to lay out the most significant announcements and assess at a high level their substantive policy and political significance. In particular, I ask the question: is it time to revise my  earlier conclusion that a core element of the Government’s approach to Indigenous affairs is a covert adherence to substantive policy inaction?

 

Before we list the recent announcements however, it is worth listing a number of the most prominent reviews and policy development exercises in the Indigenous policy space initiated by the Government, but for which there is as yet no substantive formal closure or completion.

 

In chronological order, the Government is presently sitting on recommendations from:

 

• The Australian Law Reform Commission on native title from 2015 (link here). While there have been technical amendments made to the Native Title Act in the period since this report was issued (link here), they do not address the substantive recommendations of the ALRC. See my previous posts on native title here, here and especially here.

 

• The 2015 COAG investigation into Indigenous land tenure (link here) which was technically endorsed in principle by COAG, but never implemented by any jurisdiction including the Commonwealth.

 

• The Indigenous Reference Group on Northern Australian apparently provided a series of 36 recommendations to the Government in 2017 (see their submission to the parliamentary inquiry into the Opportunities and engagement of traditional owners into the economic development of northern Australia – link here), but they have not been made public and there has been no response of any kind. The IRG web page on the website of the Commonwealth agency responsible for ‘northern development’, the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, (link here) has ceased listing any IRG meeting communique’s as of December 2019. The implication is that the IRG has ceased to operate.

 

• The Productivity Commission review into Indigenous evaluation delivered to Government in October 2020 (link here). See my September 2020 post which predicted the likely lack of action in relation to this issue (link here).

 

• The process to develop an Indigenous Voice was established by the Government in November 2019, and has apparently provided its final report to the Government although the Government’s web sites do not actually confirm this. The Minister last issued a media release on the matter in January 2021 (link here) when the Interim Report of the Advisory Groups established to provide advice to Government was released. I published a post on some of the key underlying issues involved in designing a Voice in February (link here). My recent academic paper on codesign included a case study on the Voice (link here).

 

Recent announcements include:

 

• In May 2021, the Government announced its intention to codesign a replacement for the Community Development Program (CDP), the controversial program that combines and links income support with a punitive conditional job search requirement. The Government has recently announced that this new program will henceforth be called the Remote Engagement Program and released a Discussion Paper. In recent days (1 September) the Minister announced the introduction of legislation to provide for a supplementary payment for participants in the pilot trial sites involved in developing the new policy architecture (link here). A group of academics at the ANU and UQ have recently published a short paper suggesting the principles that should be guide the design of the new program (link here).

 

• On 5 August 2021, the Commonwealth issued its first implementation Plan as required by the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here). There has as yet been no comprehensive assessment of the Implementation Plan published. Early response from ANU academics and myself, which must be regarded as provisional, have raised various concerns (link here and here).

 

• On 24 August, 2021, the Government announced a National Roadmap for Indigenous Skills, Jobs and Wealth Creation (link here). The National Roadmap will (when completed) include short , medium and long term priority actions. The Minister recently announced a series of 12 roundtables to assist the development of the new Roadmap, kicking off the first roundtable by appointing 16 ‘Industry Champions’ to assist in developing the National Roadmap and driving change. I have a number of concerns that flow from my reading of the Discussion Paper, but will need to draft a separate post to explore them fully.

 

• On 25 August 2021, the Minister introduced a Bill (the ‘Economic Empowerment Bill’) to amend the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, in its words, the most comprehensive set of reforms to ALRA since its enactment in 1976 (link here). I previously published a post expressing deep scepticism regarding the overall approach to these changes based on an earlier announcement of the proposals (link here). I am yet to closely consider the proposed legislation.

 

• On 25 August 2021, the Minister introduced a Bill to make further amendments to the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders) Act 2006 (CATSI Act) (link here). The amendments appear to be largely technical in nature. The Government decided, against pressure from native title interests, to not draft a separate part of the CATSI Act for native title bodies. Instead, PBCs are treated like any other CATSI Corporation. While this is a defensible position (it will not increase the complexity of the legislation), there is a risk that the unique requirements of native title bodies will not be given adequate attention by regulators into the future.

 

How should we make sense of all this policy development activity?

 

The first point to make is that it is being laid down on a pre-existing policy terrain. That terrain is characterised by significant Commonwealth funding, notably the Indigenous Advancement Strategy (link here and link here); by demographic changes which have seen significant increases in the size and geographic distribution of the Indigenous community over the past decade, and portend major changes into the future (link here); by significant (but largely unacknowledged ) access to mainstream services and programs by Indigenous people; by a sustained effort by the Commonwealth to shift responsibilities and focus in the Indigenous affairs space to the states and territories wherever possible; and by the deliberate decision to withdraw funding from the portfolio underpinning the efforts on Closing the Gap; the most egregious example here was the decision to not renew the ten year $5.5bn National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing (link here). The recent media stories linking the outbreak of covid in western NSW to poor and overcrowded housing (link here) speaks forthrightly to the Commonwealth Government’s short sighted decision to cut short that program. It is worth noting that the decision to cut remote housing funding, and the associated decision to include a Closing the Gap target on national levels of overcrowding is consistent with a deliberate predisposition to downplay the needs of remote regions wherever possible.

 

Second, the pre-existing policy terrain is made opaque by minimising the release of meaningful information (or making it so difficult to find that it is effectively not released). The policy landscape is characterised by extremely constrained levels of transparency, an addiction to deflection and inaction (link here), and seriously degraded commitment to public sector accountability (link here).

 

Third, the Government can point to a number of policy successes: to mention the four that come immediately to mind, it has made substantial progress with the Indigenous Procurement Policy, though I continue to have some concerns about the robustness of the program (link here); it has maintained and expanded the footprint of Indigenous Protected Areas and Caring for Country ranger programs across the nation (link here); it has committed to (but not yet delivered on) a series of priority reforms as part of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here) (though I am less persuaded that the refreshed targets are in any sense being meaningfully pursued); and finally, it has recently committed to compensating up to 3600 individuals who are members of the Stolen generations and come within the Commonwealth’s responsibility (link here).

 

Fourth, a common theme in the recent announcements has been an element of future commitment rather than immediate delivery. Even the two legislative initiatives in the recent announcements section above are unlikely to be finalised before the election, and thus will need to be re-introduced if they fail to pass before the forthcoming election. The CATSI amendments largely technical; the ALRA initiatives are essentially a rearrangement of already appropriated funds to the ABA. Even the Government’s major policy success, the refresh of closing the gap and the successful negotiation of the National Agreement, is highly leveraged to future policy decisions.

 

Fifth, it is clear that the Government has consistently pursued a largely rhetorical policy narrative built around economic opportunity, jobs and wealth creation. This continues in the most recent National Roadmap discussion paper mentioned above. While this approach may work at the political level (in the same way that focussing on aspirational messaging attracts the votes of sole traders and tradies), it usually fails to deliver the substantive and tangible outcomes it promises. Perhaps the most obvious example after eight years of rhetorical policy announcements built around the importance of jobs, the current outcomes on Indigenous employment are desultory, and the closing the gap target is pathetic.

 

To demonstrate that point, it is worth noting that five in ten Indigenous people are not employed and the trend line is flat lining or decreasing (link here). Moreover the employment data has been carefully framed to measure only those aged between 25 and 64. The median age of the Indigenous population is around 20 years of age (link here). Of the Indigenous population in the age range 15 to 24, over four in ten are not in education or employed, and while the trend line is positive, it will be more than a decade before the gap with the wider community is closed on current policy settings (link here). Just think about the constrained lives and opportunities that lie behind these statistics. If the Government was serious about jobs and its policy rhetoric, and by the way, also serious about closing the gap, it would take action to establish a job creation program for Indigenous or low income citizens, targeted particularly towards remote Australia, rather than promulgating yet another roadmap, and announcing the third version of a program to deliver social security and job search services across remote Australia in eight years, namely its newly proposed remote engagement program.

 

Sixth, my subjective takeout based on the analysis above is that the Government’s policy agenda and the associated policy narrative is overwhelmingly shaped by politics. With an election looming, the announcement frenzy is focussed on creating the appearance of action, and thus minimising the chance that particular issues will emerge as matters of political contention without necessarily committing significant funds to a policy sector that is not high on the Government’s policy priorities. Unfortunately, the Labor Opposition appears unwilling to call the Government to account on these issues, preferring an election strategy based on mainstream bread and butter issues and focussed on the failures of the Government in relation to the Covid pandemic.

 

In conclusion, it is clear that  in relation to Indigenous policy, the Government is addicted to the appearance of action, while disguising policy inaction. Unfortunately, the Government has also learned to take out insurance against the absence of substantive action; hence its focus on codesign (link here) and the penchant for playing favourites (link here) and not wishing to hear critical advice (link here).

 

There certainly is a blizzard of policy initiatives underway in the Indigenous policy domain, but the likelihood that they will substantively address the challenges the nation faces in coming to terms with the deep-seated consequences of the dispossession and continuing structural exclusion of First Nations citizens seems extremely low. The continuing stream of announcements designed to shape a rhetorical rather than substantive policy narrative serves to deflect attention from the priority reforms required to drive real change for the better. Unfortunately, because this works as a political strategy, the winds will continue to blow hard.

Dispossession and belated steps toward reconciliation in Colorado

 

Th’offender’s sorrow lends but weak relief

To him that bears the strong offence’s loss

Sonnet 34.

 

Last week Colorado Government Jared Polis (link here) formally rescinded proclamations of the then Territory Governor John Evans.

 

The two orders were made by former territorial governor John Evans in 1864. The first required “friendly Indians” to gather at specific camps and threatened violence against those who didn’t comply. The second called for citizens to “kill and destroy” Native Americans who were deemed hostile by the state.

 

Here are links to a couple of the numerous media reports: (link here; link here). An excellent article laying out the background and recounting Indigenous lobbying that led to Governor Polis’ rescission can be found here.

 

The 1864 proclamations are widely held to be responsible for a notorious massacre the following year at Sand Creek. A 2014 article from the Smithsonian magazine by Tony Horwitz (link here) lays out the contextual background to the massacre as well as providing a rather horrific account. I recommend readers take a look at this article.

 

These events, distant as they are, should provoke us here in Australia to ask questions about our own history. Does Australian history contain parallels with the US experience? Even where we acknowledge dispossession, do we relegate it to some distant past? How should the past be acknowledged in the present? Are there events and policies that we have effectively forgotten?

 

 

A strong start for every Indigenous child: early childhood policy and deep disadvantage

 

 

Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so,

Lest child, child’s children, cry against you woe!

Richard II, Act 4, scene 1

 

The OECD has released a new working paper on early childhood education policy. The working paper is titled A strong start for every Indigenous child and authored by Australian authors led by Inge Kral of the ANU. The working paper (link here) provides an extremely useful comparative assessment of development in early childhood education policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, Canada and Australia.

 

Early childhood is a key policy issue in the Indigenous policy domain, and arguably underappreciated insofar as it is largely subsumed by the broader mainstream policy frameworks dealing with early childhood.

 

The latest Productivity Commission annual data report (link here) provides a quick snapshot of the relevant early childhood targets:

 

TARGET 3: By 2025, increase the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children enrolled in Year Before Full time Schooling (YBFS) early childhood education to 95 per cent.

Nationally in 2020, 93.1 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in the Year Before Full time Schooling (YBFS) age cohort were enrolled in a preschool program. This is an increase from 76.7 per cent in 2016 (the baseline year). Nationally, based on the most recent year of data, the target is on track to be met.

 

TARGET 4: By 2031, increase the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children assessed as developmentally on track in all five domains of the Australian Early Development Census (AEDC) to 55 per cent.

Nationally in 2018, 35.2 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children commencing school were assessed as being developmentally on track in all five AEDC domains. There are no new data since the baseline year of 2018.

 

In relation to Target 4, the Productivity Commission data (see Figure CtG4.1) indicates that over the decade from 2009 to 2018, the relevant figure has increased from around 25 to 35 percent. The target chosen – 55 per cent by 2031 would require the rate of improvement to double, which in turn would require significant increases in investment.

 

The Commonwealth recently announced its commitment to investing a further $122m in new funding for an Early Childhood Education Package (link here and here). This is a welcome injection of funds. What is unclear however, to reiterate points made in my previous post (link here), is that early childhood education is funded by both the Commonwealth and state and territory levels of government, and it is unclear (a) what levels of funding overall is presently being invested by both the Commonwealth and the states/territories; and (b) what level of funding would be required to increase services, particularly where need is greatest, and thus bring outcomes for Indigenous children up to the same level as for mainstream community children within a reasonable period.

 

It is clear then that the OECD working paper is timely and important, as it provides a wealth of informed insight into both what has been happening on the ground in the three national jurisdictions under consideration, and what will be required to ensure policy engagement is both effective and successful.

 

I don’t propose to attempt to summarise the OECD working paper, but will cherry pick a few paragraphs to illustrate some (but not all) of the important insights included. I recommend interested readers take the time to have a quick look at the report itself.

 

Below are a number of extracts from the working paper:

 

Here is the Abstract:

This Working Paper was developed to assist policy makers, education and Indigenous leaders, as well as education practitioners, to better support Indigenous children’s early learning and well-being. The paper focuses on early years policies and provision in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and Canada. It sets out a synthesis of evidence on children’s early development, with a particular focus on the conditions and approaches that support positive outcomes for Indigenous children. The Working Paper then outlines a set of promising initiatives that seek to create positive early learning environments for Indigenous children. Drawing on the available evidence and promising approaches, the paper presents a framework for strengthening Indigenous children’s early learning and well-being.

 

From page 12:

The size of early learning effects on adult outcomes is significant. As set out in Figure 3, four key longitudinal studies have found effect sizes on adult earnings ranging from 10% to 25%.

 

From pages 17-18:

Nonetheless, almost all trends pertaining to child health and well-being in Australia are worse for Indigenous Australian children (Wise, 2013[38]). In addition, a clear gradient is evident of increasing disadvantage the further children live from major cities (Bankwest Curtin Economic Centre, 2017[39]). …  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in remote Australia are more likely to experience a lack of access to appropriate services, known to mediate the impact of adversity in early childhood (SNAICC, 2020[40]).

 

From page 19

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children account for 44% of all children in remote areas in Australia, despite making up less than 6% of all children in Australia and are 12 times as likely as non-Indigenous children to live in remote areas (SNAICC, 2020[40]).

 

From page 42:

The states and territories where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children are provided free or near-free access to preschool from age 3 tend to achieve the national “Closing the Gap” target of 95% enrolment of Indigenous children in the year before school, whereas this is not achieved in states where such provision is not made (Early Childhood Australia., 2019[105]).  

 

From page 45:

In Australia, a shortage of qualified Indigenous educators and difficulty in accessing training, particularly for educators in remote areas, are significant constraints.

 

According to Minister Wyatt’s media release (link here), the recent Commonwealth investment of $122m includes $82m to expand the Connected Beginnings Program to create four new replication sites in Queensland and Victoria. If we take a moment to think about this, four new sites, no matter how beneficial they will be in improving life opportunities for the Indigenous children in their footprint, will have only a marginal impact on addressing the needs of Indigenous children nationally.

 

While any increase is welcome, the increase offered here will clearly not be adequate to double the rate of progress required to achieve parity in Target 4 of the Closing the Gap framework. There is clearly a need for a much more rigorous assessment of the resourcing required to address deep seated disadvantage amongst pre-school age children in the Indigenous community. A failure to do so will perpetuate disadvantage into disadvantaged children’s adult years, and constrain the nation’s ability to address deep-seated disadvantage within a reasonable period.

 

The OECD working paper lays out a coherent rationale, and a persuasive roadmap, for improving the access of Indigenous children to early childhood education. It emphasises the sorts of interventions that work, the multiplicity of factors that can constrain the full development of children, and provides an evidence base for prioritising policy reform and increased investment in this area.

 

The OECD paper also reinforces the crucial importance of allocating available resources on the basis of relative need. It is clear from the available data that regional and remote areas require greater policy attention and significantly more investment if we are to remove both inequality within First Nations communities, and the disparity between First Nations and the wider mainstream community.

 

What the OECD working paper doesn’t do is assess the level of resources required to meet the targets adopted by all Australian Governments in the National Agreement on Closing the Gap. Yet this is a necessary step in the policy development process.

 

To my mind, the OECD working paper A strong start for every Indigenous child should be considered closely by the relevant agencies in each jurisdiction. A proactive bureaucracy could make use of the working paper to inform development of a succinct policy proposal to relevant Ministers and Cabinets, linking the strategies and approaches required with a summary of existing jurisdictional program investment, and identifying the opportunity and benefit of lifting investment in early childhood services for Indigenous communities based on a clear assessment of need. In addition, there would be benefit in the Joint Council on Closing the Gap established by the new National Partnership on Closing the Gap considering the OECD working paper, and in interrogating the issue of just what level of investment would be required to make a real and sustainable difference to the life opportunities of Indigenous children across the nation.

 

What is clear is that the policy frameworks required to address disadvantage in early childhood education are known to policymakers. What is missing is the political will to drive the necessary policy reforms, and to make the necessary policy investments. The opportunity to make a difference stares us in the face. Yet so too does the prospect of failure. We should prevent such a failure, resist such a failure, lest our children, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, cry woe!

 

The Commonwealth Closing the Gap Implementation Plan: a provisional assessment

 

Hamlet:                      What news?

Rosencrantz:            None my Lord, but that the world’s grown honest

Hamlet:                      Then is doomsday near?

Hamlet, Act 2, scene 2

 

This morning the Prime Minister released the Commonwealth Closing the Gap Implementation Plan (link here). The National Agreement on Closing the Gap agreed by all Australian jurisdictions with the Indigenous Coalition of Peaks a year ago provides for each party to the agreement to develop an implementation plan to lay out how the commitments made in the agreement will be implemented.

 

This post amounts to a provisional assessment of where we are at. The issues involved are simply too complex to be comprehensively analysed in a few hours. Nevertheless, in the interest of getting an alternative perspective into the public domain, I have decided to lay out my initial assessment.

 

At the time the Federal Budget was handed down in May this year, the Commonwealth advised that it would be deferring specific funding on Closing the Gap until the midyear publication of the Commonwealth Implementation Plan

 

In the May Budget, the Commonwealth allocated in excess of $600m in Indigenous specific funding, focussed largely on income support and employment, education, and health including mental health, including $149m for statistical surveys related to mental health and violence.

 

In response to the May Budget, Pat Turner, the CEO of the Coalition of Peaks issued a media release (link here) stating inter alia:

“We are encouraged to see significant funding in areas of aged care, Indigenous skills and jobs, mental health and women’s safety; but this is very much a ‘wait and see’ budget as the majority of funding directed towards Closing the Gap won’t be announced until later in the year,” she said…

… “Given the massive new investments seen in this Budget, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have a legitimate expectation that there will be a significant boost in funding in all areas of Closing the Gap — including implementation of the Priority Reforms in the National Agreement that we believe will accelerate the closing of gaps,” Ms Turner said.

 

The Prime Minister’s Implementation Plan covers a plethora of initiatives and actions of variable significance, covering both mainstream and Indigenous specific actions and allocations across four Priority Reforms and 17 Closing the Gap targets. Alongside, the Government has announced more than $1bn in ‘new investments’ (link here) as part of the Commonwealth’s implementation plan.

 

There are a number of ways to assess and consider the Government’s announcements: one is to focus on the four priority reforms; a second to assess the actions and associated investment allocated to each of the targets; and a third to focus merely on the dollars invested. While funding is arguably not the best criterion to use in assessing the quality of these announcements, it is the criterion that the Government itself has focussed on.

 

The first paragraph of the Prime Minister’s media release (link here) notes that the Government has committed ‘more than $1 billion in new measures to support to help achieve Closing the Gap outcomes’ [sic].

 

The Coalition of Peaks has issued a media release (link here) welcoming the new funding, albeit noting that more needs to be done:

We have a long way to go to seeing improvements in the lives of our peoples across the country and for the gap in life outcomes to be closed, but today is an important step forward in making this a reality.

 

Of the $1.1bn in ‘new investments’ listed in the Prime Minister’s media release, four broad initiatives account for some $880m. A Territories stolen generations redress scheme (link here) has been allocated $379m and will run for five years; remote health clinics and staff housing is allocated $254m; early childhood education is allocated $123m; and three education initiatives are allocated $126m. These allocations are clearly welcome, but they also serve to highlight areas where the Commonwealth has decided against investing new funds. For example, the Commonwealth invested $5.5bn over ten years in remote housing provision in 2008, and the current Government has not renewed this except in part (it has previously invested $500m over five years) in the NT where it has potential landlord liabilities in relation to long term leases.

 

The Commonwealth’s most significant investment, the stolen generations redress scheme, is limited to former Commonwealth responsibilities in the Territories, and has a target of just 3600 potential recipients (see page 92 of the Implementation Plan). While the investment quantum appears significant (it equates to the price of 380 median priced houses in Canberra), the potential ameliorative impact on deep disadvantage across First Nations citizens is minimal. Moreover, while the ethical case for redressing discriminatory policies is unquestionable, whether this should be classified as closing the gap is much less certain. The real import of this measure is symbolic, a matter that would require separate consideration to fully explore.

 

My major criticism however of the Commonwealth announcement relates to the deliberate opacity and lack of transparency relating to government investments.

 

The action tables at pages 83 to 185 of the Implementation Plan list in the order of 200 to 300 individual actions (I haven’t counted them). Against each action, there is listed any relevant funding, along with a notation indicating whether it is existing or new investment. In many cases, the funding listed is indicated as being mainstream funding relevant to the target, but without any indication or estimate of what proportion of that mainstream funding should be notionally allocated to Indigenous citizens. Moreover, there is no consistent effort to allocate investments over a uniform timeframes. The action items list variable dates, with the majority of funding allocations having no link to the time span of the target.  While some funding is undoubtedly ongoing (eg the income support payments listed in relation to the employment targets) in many cases funding will have been allocated for only a few years.  

 

The result is twofold. First, the Implementation Plan is fundamentally incomplete with existing and new investments not aligned with the target timeframe. To take a random example, Target 10 has a time frame to 2031, but includes a range of funding allocations with timeframes ranging over three, four, five, and seven years. None of the funding extends to 2031. See pages 145 to 148 of the Implementation Plan. This contrasts with the first iteration of Closing Gap where funding was largely (but not entirely) locked in for up to ten years through the use of National Partnership Agreements under COAG, each of which had a specific implementation plan.

 

Second, it is actually impossible to calculate or assess the total level of resources allocated against each target, (and thus to make an assessment of how serious the Government is in relation to meeting those targets). It follows that it is also not possible to calculate the total investment in closing the gap. This problem is likely to be replicated across eight jurisdictions (my examination of the two available state Implementation Plans confirms that they suffer from similar issues).

 

The Commonwealth has made a point of claiming to be accountable (see the Prime Minister’s foreword to the Implementation Plan and pages 8 and 79), yet the deliberate decision not to be fully transparent about the investments being made is a fundamental constraint on that accountability.

 

To emphasise the risks that the public and Indigenous people will be misled either deliberately or through honest mistakes, one need look no further than the Prime Minister’s media release listing $1.1bn in new investments. Yet an examination of the action plan item for the investment of $254m in health clinics and associated housing indicates that $100m of the $254m (see page 98 of the Implementation Plan) is actually existing funding from the Indigenous Australians’ Health Programme. That single case drops the headline figure of $1.1bn in new investments to $1bn (see for example The Age article of 5 August which refers to the $1.1bn figure (link here).

 

For a Prime Minister trumpeting a ‘new partnership based on trust and truth’ (page 1 of the Implementation Plan), a $100m discrepancy may be neither here nor there. Others may disagree.

 

To my mind, the most important issue here is that we face a situation where First Nations citizens disproportionately suffer levels of inequality and deep disadvantage. As a nation, we have known about this for more than two decades, and have had a formal policy framework to address it since 2008. Yet our targets are partial (ie they aim to merely close part of the gaps); the policy reforms promulgated by governments are more fluff than substance, and are continually changing; the investments that governments allocate are inadequate to address the disadvantage we know exists, and have been declining over the past five years. We have established an elaborate bureaucratic and policy ritual designed to persuade ourselves that we are doing all we can to address deep-seated disadvantage and to close the gap. In reality however, we are effectively making a choice to not close the gap.

 

While the Coalition of Peaks deserves credit for seeking to move the government and the nation forward on this issue, and has successfully manoeuvred the Government into a rhetorical proclamation of good faith and serious intent, the reality is that the Commonwealth Government has successfully shifted responsibility for any failure to the states and territories, and bought insurance by locking Indigenous interests into taking at least partial responsibility for the outcomes.

 

So much for a new partnership based on truth and trust.

Rio and BHP’s North American Oak Flat copper project

 

Thus the native hue of resolution

Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought…

Hamlet Act 3, scene 1

 

This week the New Yorker reviews a book (link here) which explores various perspectives on a proposed copper mine being developed on Apache land in Arizona in the US by Resolution Copper, a joint venture between Rio Tinto (55%) and BHP (45%).

The project will be the largest copper mine in North America, and if it proceeds, it has the potential to meet 25% of US demand for copper over the life of the mine. Here and here are timelines that recounts the steps leading to the present state of play.

Native American  and environmental interests are mounting a campaign to prevent the mine from proceeding (link here and here).

There has been some media coverage in Australia (link here and  here).

The Rio web site has limited information on the project, though I did find a description of the project at this web page (link here), a hyper link to the Resolution Copper website (link here) plus a number of media releases including this January 2020 release (link here) and this 2019 media release (link here). The January media release (Resolution Copper project enters next phase of public consultation) notes inter alia:

The Resolution Copper project has entered the next phase of public consultation in the ongoing permitting process, led by the US Forest Service, with the release of its independent Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

Decisions on whether to invest fully in developing the project, a proposed underground mine located in Arizona and one of the world’s most significant undeveloped copper deposits, remain subject to further permitting processes and a feasibility study that will be conducted over several years.

Resolution Copper is committed to continuing its engagement with Native American Tribes and working to seek consent before any decision on the development of the project, consistent with the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Statement on Indigenous Peoples and Mining…

…Extensive consultation with 11 Native American Tribes and local communities has guided significant changes to the project design and measures including:

The permanent protection of the culturally significant natural feature of Apache Leap

A Tribal Monitor program focused on cultural heritage protection

A partnership to protect and conserve culturally significant Emory Oak groves across Arizona.

Economic and community development agreements that can deliver significant long-term benefits for the Superior community.

The Resolution Copper website is worth visiting not least to view this statement issued in March 2021 (link here) which provides information related to the land swap involved in allowing the project to proceed on public lands. The details of the proposed land exchange can be viewed here, while details related to the block known as Apache Leap can be viewed here.

I decided to put up a post on the project as it appears to have received minimal attention in Australia, and had certainly passed me by. While there is clearly some way to go before the project goes ahead, there appears to be huge momentum behind it, not least derived from the $2bn in capital costs already expended by Resolution Copper, and the strong growth projections for demand for copper (link here).

Native American interests do not appear to have a legal right to veto the project, nor to negotiate financial benefits given that they do not own the land involved [I freely admit that I don’t have an adequate background to make this assertion with 100 percent confidence]. It is of interest however that the Juukun Gorge experience has been prominently reported in the US media coverage of Oak Flat and thus appears to have strengthened Native American leverage vis a vis Resolution Copper.