Institutional mayhem: insights gleaned from the ALC Annual Report 2024-25

Away, and mock the time with fairest show;

False face must hide what the false heart doth know.

Macbeth, Act one, Scene seven

 

On 29 August 2024 Minister for Indigenous Australians Malarndirri McCathy issued an unprecedented media statement which among other things extolled the virtues and rationale of good governance (link here). She proclaimed:

Good governance is the cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and accountability. Without the trust of the Anindilyakwa people and other key stakeholders, the ALC cannot properly represent its people and achieve its mission.

“I take governance at Land Councils seriously - poor governance and decision making can have a significant and detrimental impact on social, cultural and economic wellbeing.

This post provides a summary of the ALC’s most recent Annual Report (link here). I previously posted on the topic of delays in reporting to the Parliament and the public (link here) where I mentioned that the normal deadline for tabling annual reports of Commonwealth entities was before the supplementary Budget Estimates Hearings which are normally held after October each year.

In this post, I cover a wider set of issues than I would normally, essentially because they are all raised one way or another by the most recent ALC annual report. Significant issues covered include the basis for land councils assisting local corporations, education outcomes on Groote Eylandt and remote Australia generally, criminal justice outcomes, the status of the Winchelsea mine proposal, and the Ministers decisions on land council funding across the NT. I apologise for any induced indigestion!  

The Delay in Tabling

The ALC Chair’s cover letter to the Minister is dated 18 February 2026. The financial statements were signed by the members constituting the accountable authority on 13 February 2026. The ANAO signed off the audited financial statements on 17 February without qualification. No explanation was provided by the ALC nor the ANO for the delays in finalising the audit.

The Minister tabled the annual report on 16 April 2026. The Report was initially due to be tabled around the end of October 2025, a deadline that had been extended to end of February by the Minister. There does not appear to have been any explanation provided for the delays of five and a half months beyond the due date specified in the PGPA Act rules, and which includes a period of almost two months after it had been provided to the Minister. I find it problematic that a Minister who espouses the highest standards of transparency and good governance for agencies within her portfolio appears to allow lapses in such standards in matters within her control to occur without explanation or apology. It raises the question: what is it that is being hidden and downplayed, and why is that?

The CEO

On page 13, the Report states:

During the reporting period the Chair of the ALC was Ms Cherelle Wurrawilya. The CEO position was held by Mr Mark Hewitt until 16 October 2024. Mr Colin Wakefield held the position of Interim CEO from 17 October 2024 to 28 April 2025. Mr Matthew Bonson was CEO from 29 April 2025 and resigned on 17 July 2025. Michael Trainor was appointed Interim CEO on 22 August 2025 (emphasis added).

This is one of the few references to Mr Hewitt in the Annual Report. The section on the ALC CEO (page 17) focusses entirely on Mr Bonson who was CEO for only two of the 12 months in the reporting period. There is no mention of Mr Hewitt’s termination, nor the reasons or circumstances that led to it. See my blog post The Angels Weep (link here) for the partial details of these events on the public record.

Performance Reporting

The ALC performance reporting is linked to its corporate plan. See pages 48-50 for the explanation. In relation to the community and economic development objectives of the corporate plan, there are performance measures relating to school attendance, employment, law and justice outcomes and housing.

Pages 59-61 deal with school attendance in a limited cohort of some 80 students supported by the ALC funded Groote Eylandt/ Bickerton Island Primary College Aboriginal Corporation (GEBIPCAC). Attendance rates are declining (and there are indications that wider attendance rates on Groote are similarly low and in decline). There is a long explanation of some of the local factors contributing to these outcomes, though it seems clear that more systemic factors are in play across the remote areas of the NT (link here) and probably beyond. What is demonstrably clear, and should be of critical concern to the NT Government and its Education Department, is that average attendance rates for the 80 students in the cohort being measured of less than 40 percent (see Figure 5c on page 61) are unlikely to deliver acceptable educational outcomes for the students. While the measure suggests that at least 4 out of 10 students are at school each day, the reality is that it is highly likely that virtually all students are missing some portion of each month’s schooling and thus missing key steps in their education. When this persists over time (just how long this period is I am not in a position to determine) the students reach a point where they cannot keep up with the standard curriculum…in turn this creates insurmountable gaps which make the standard curriculum inaccessible, leading either to disruptive behaviours in class, further non-attendance, and eventually permanent dropping out. This annual report is a micro window into a massive problem that is impacting remote communities across at least four jurisdictions. It should be acknowledged as a national tragedy, one that activates and enlivens the Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Australians. Instead, the response is invariably to shift responsibility: to the states, to the education portfolio, to the parents…yes they all have responsibilities, but in the circumstances we currently face, they all need to be encouraged, and activated to take those responsibilities seriously. This is a role for the Commonwealth Minister. Invariably however, what is in fact a national tragedy is merely presented as a static statistic framed as ‘low school attendance’.

On page 62, it is revealed that the employment rate of traditional owners by local organisations on Groote has fallen over the past year. In 2023-4, 307 TOs were employed, whereas in 2024-5, this had fallen to 199 (see Fig.5d on page 63). Here local factors are the cause, and particularly the drop-off in s64(3) payments arising from the cyclone damage to the wharf. This points to the urgent need for the Groote community to focus much more attention on reducing the dependency and reliance on the flow of royalty equivalents for key organisations on Groote.

Pages 64-68 record a truly exceptional improvement in justice outcomes on the Island. The report describes a range of new initiatives in recent years, and documents (using police data) substantial falls in arrest rates:

Ø  Total recorded offences dropped by 75%, from 1,041 in 2019 to 261 in 2024 (Figure 5e)

Ø  Youth offending decreased by 90% since 2019, from 267 offences to just 28 in 2024 (Figure 5f)

Ø  Arrests have declined 85% from 427 in 2018 to 61 in 2024 (Source: NTG data supplied to the ALC) These reductions are particularly notable in property damage, theft, and public order offences.

The report claims this is the result of greater Anindilyakwa control over justice initiatives and there is undoubtedly merit in this. The youth offending statistics are extraordinary, identifying almost a vertical drop in the last year (from around 250 to 50 offences), and suggest to me that the reduction in discretionary incomes may also have had an impact. In turn this points to issues that should perhaps be taken into account in future benefits distributions. The ALC would be wise (in my humble opinion) to commission an independent research project into the drivers of these improvements, and how best to institutionalise them into the future.

Finally, the Report describes desultory progress on housing construction, but this is perhaps also in large measure a consequence of the Cyclone Megan. Hopefully progress will improve going forward, noting that much of this is out of the hands of the ALC.

Mine related activities

The performance statements include a useful section on mining, and particularly a detailed discussion of engagement with GEMCO. This seems largely on track, with the ALC engaging to ensure minor contract issues are resolved.

On the proposed Winchelsea mine, (as I have previously noted (link here) the ALC appears to have stepped back and is now treating the mine as it would any other third-party proposal. It does mention the Winchelsea exploration and mining agreements but makes no comment. There is no reference to the possibility that the agreements may be sub-optimal due to the possibility of conflicts of interest (a matter that is not acknowledged and which is arguably contested but see my previous analysis here and here). The Report notes (page 72) that

Winchelsea Mining is yet to commence production and during the period was, in ALC’s opinion, dormant. There were no activities on Winchelsea during the reporting period.

On page 77, in a section reporting performance on cultural protection, one of the corporate plan priorities, the report states (emphasis added):

Secondly, cultural sites and burial sites on Winchelsea Island were documented during cultural surveys conducted in the context of mining exploration. The protection that has been afforded to the recorded cultural sites and burial sites identified during the cultural surveys are key to addressing Traditional Owner concerns about the impact of proposed mining activities. Additional cultural surveys are planned and may identify other burial sites for protection.

This is to my knowledge the first public acknowledgement of unaddressed traditional owner concerns regarding mining on Winchelsea. It may underpin the statement I drew attention to in my November 2025 post assessing the most recent ALC Corporate Plan (link here) that

The ALC will be reviewing arrangements with Winchelsea Mining to ensure Traditional Owner's interests are met and that the principles of free, prior and informed consent are adhered to.

Ministerial Directions

The report notes at page 78 that there were no ministerial directions issued during the year.

This was notwithstanding the ostensible Ministerial displeasure with the speed of progress in implementing the ANAO /Bellchambers report which led her to deferring approval of the ALC estimates in late August 2024. In a media release dated 29 August 2024, she stated (inter alia):

I have taken the unusual decision to withhold approval for the ALC’s 2024/25 budget, instead approving an operational budget until 1 December 2024. The full budget will only be considered when ALC has demonstrated to the NIAA that it is sufficiently prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit.  (link here)

She provided the following direct quotation:

The steps I have taken today put the ALC Board and management on notice. Their failure to sufficiently respond to the recommendations of the independent review and ANAO must not continue, and they need to demonstrate their progress to the NIAA.

This may not have been a formal ministerial direction (there is no provision in the ALRA for such formal directions) but strikes me as being in effect equivalent to a substantive direction. It also strikes me as being significant enough to warrant a mention in a Commonwealth agency’s annual report, perhaps in the section on significant actions and changes (see page 78) or in relation to ANAO reports (see pages 46-47 and 79-80). Given the Minister’s public statement calling on the ALC to engage more transparently, this seems like it might have been a good place to start!

Consultants (pages 85-87).

Note the quite high legal costs, which are on top of the in-house legal expertise on the ALC payroll. Yet there is absolutely no explanation in the report nor in the ALC’s media statements on what these legal costs are for (but see the section on contingent liabilities below).

Financial Statements 2024-25.

Note: Page numbering for the financial statements begins afresh.

Employee costs used

On page 5 in the Cash Flow statement, it is revealed that employee cash used has almost halved from the 2023-24 year, down from ($13,515,798) to ($7,725,279). No reason is provided.

Audit committee costs

On page 9, audit committee costs have almost halved, from $100,241 to $52,354. This suggests that the poor value for money practices that were adopted by the ALC over the past decade in relation to its Audit Committee costs (as identified by the ANAO in 2023) has finally been addressed.

Reimbursement of Expenses.

On page 11, wages and salaries, on-charged to local corporations (funded under 64(3)) reduced in 24/25, down from $6,874,714 to $3,818,802. Superannuation costs on-charged were down from $721,462 to $423,938.

Thus, total reimbursement of expenses fell from $8,599,473 to $4,959,070. The implications of this reduction in employment totalling over $3.5m is not clearly explained in the financial statement’s notes, nor as far as I can see in the Annual Report itself. This strikes me as a noteworthy omission in reporting significant events in the Land Council’s operations over the financial year.

The note explaining this states:

The Anindilyakwa Land Council sometimes pays for services and goods on behalf of other Aboriginal Corporations to support the Corporations in pricing and availability. Under Section 27 of the Aboriginal Lands Rights (NT) Act 1976 the Land Council can supply such support when requested. The Anindilyakwa Land Council charges this on to the Corporations with no further benefit. This note reports the substance of the transaction of the goods and services and ensures a clear ability to understand the true income and expense of the financial statements by all users.

Section 27 of the ALRA states inter alia:

(1)  Subject to this Act, a Land Council may do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connexion with the performance of its functions and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may:

 (a)  employ staff; …

 (1A) A Land Council may, on the request of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation that has received an amount of money from the Council under this Act, provide administrative or other assistance to the corporation.

There is no mention of reimbursement in this provision. The risk of utilising a reimbursement mechanism is that it creates a danger that a land council might use the mechanism to in effect fund itself especially if it can exercise influence or control over the local corporations being ‘assisted’. I have previously argued (and the ANAO pointed to the elements that allow this in its 2023 performance report) that the ALC exercises such influence over several corporations it has funded under section 64(3).

Also relevant to the rationale for the provision of ‘assistance’ is s.23(1)(ea) of the ALRA which deals with assistance for commercial activities of the corporations, and which states:

(1)  The functions of a Land Council are [inter alia]:

(ea)  to assist Aboriginals in the area of the Land Council to carry out commercial activities (including resource development, the provision of tourist facilities and agricultural activities), in any manner that will not cause the Land Council to incur financial liability or enable it to receive financial benefit; …

In my view, the reimbursement of expenses mechanism as it has been utilised by the ALC can easily slide into arrangements that would be in breach of the terms of the legislation, and create opportunities for maladministration (and in a worst case fraud) that require much greater transparency than has been the case to date. The NIAA (including its Audit and Risk Committee) in my view also has responsibilities to advise the Minister of the risks involved in these processes. The fact that these arrangements have been in place for an extended period without any public indication that such warnings have been raised should be a major concern to oversight agencies such as the ANAO and ORIC. See my previous discussion of these issues in my November 2025 analysis of the ALC Corporate Plan (link here).

Contingent Liabilities

On page 29, there is mention of the litigation between the ALC and GEAT. It is not mentioned elsewhere in any ALC public documents. Nor has there been an explanation of the issues in play.

Note 11: Contingent Assets and Liabilities. On 19 June 2024, Groote Eylandt Mining Company Pty Ltd (GEMCO) served a writ to commence legal proceedings and seek a determination in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory concerning a dispute as to the proper division of mining royalties as between ALC and the Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust in respect of the 2016 Eastern Leases Mining Agreement signed under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The matter was listed for mention on 1 May 2025 was vacated and relisted for 12 June 2025. The matter remains 'on foot' in the court until the position between Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust (GEAT) and GEMCO is resolved. The parties through formal negotiation are close to finalising a 'Variation Agreement'. Legal costs are unknown at this moment.

Assets held in Trust

Within Note 15 on page 34, there is a table showing the financial flows through the Royalty Shoppa card system. Some $14m was lodged on Royalty shoppa cards in 2025, and $12m of that was spent. See this post (link here) where I discussed a range of concerns with the operation of the Royalty Shoppa card system. It seems clear that the scheme is still operational and widely used. Its current effectiveness and fitness for purpose is unknown.

ALC Income for operating costs under s.64(1)

The Minister approves operational costs for land councils under section 64(1) of the ALRA. It is the source of core operational funding for all four land councils in the NT.

In 2024-25, the Tiwi Land Council s.64(1) funding dropped by around 20 percent and the CLC funding dropped by around 5 percent. The NLC received an increase in funding of some $38.7m, with section 64(1) funding rising from $69.5m in 2023-24 to $108.2m in 2024-25 or just over 50 percent (see page 116 of the NLC Annual report 2024-25). A footnote on page 120 identifies capital expenditure of $39.5m for ongoing costs of the construction of office precincts in Darwin and Katherine. When adjusted to take account of this, the operational funding for the NLC fell from $69.55m in 2023-24 to $68.7m.

[Short digression: there is a slight discrepancy between the section 64(1) allocations for the NLC in the ABA financial statements appended to the NIAA Annual report (see page 178) and the NLC Annual Report financial statements (see page 116). It is a comparatively small amount, and I don’t consider it materially affects the substance of the argument I am making here. The same ANAO delegate signed both audit statements two days apart in September 2025.]

Thus, in 2024-25, the Minister approved funding providing for reductions in operational funding for three of the four land councils in the NT.

In contrast to the TLC, the CLC and the NLC, the ALC financial statements disclose an annual increase in section 64(1) funding of $2.59m, representing a 20 percent increase over the previous year’s approved allocation of section 64(1) funding. See Note 3F on page 15 which discloses that Section 64(1) revenue in 2024-25 was $13,702,683 and in 2023-24 was $11,105,777.

Somewhat extraordinarily, in a year when, and in which she had issued a media release on 29 August of the financial year announcing an unprecedented decision to publicly withhold approval of funding until December based on generic and unspecified concerns that the ALC was not ‘sufficiently prioritising and implementing the recommendations of the review and the ANAO audit’, the only land council to be granted an increased section 64(1) operational budget by the Minister was the ALC.

Any suggestion that the ALC had somehow demonstrated that it was suddenly ‘sufficiently prioritising the implementation of these reviews and audits is undercut by the ANAO Financial Statements Audit Report issued on 6 February 2025 (link here) which noted in relation to the ALC, inter alia:

4.14.58 The status of the recommendations made by the ANAO, and the minister’s action to withhold funding, have heightened concerns about the ALC’s progress in addressing the governance findings. 

4.14.59 In view of the reduced available funding highlighted above, further audit work was required by the ANAO to understand ALC’s ongoing financial feasibility….

….

4.14.62 The ANAO concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the preparation of the 2023–24 financial statements on a going concern basis, and the action taken by ALC to address the performance audit recommendations will be revisited by the ANAO in the 2024–25 audit. (emphasis added)

In other words, the ANAO would not be able to formally conclude that the ALC was sufficiently implementing its recommendations until the finalisation of the 2024-25 Financial Audit. While this assessment may not have been published before the Minister approved the full year budget, it does raise questions as to how the Minister might have reached a view that increased funding was warranted.

It is perhaps worth asking the question, what changed for the ALC between 29 August 2024 when the Minister announced the funding freeze and December 2024 when she likely approved the full year budget? The answer of course is the information that neither the Minister nor the ALC wishes to discuss.  

My June 2025 post ‘FOI Updates on ALC and Groote Eylandt’ (link here) confirms that in July 2024 the NIAA (undoubtedly with the Ministers knowledge) referred the ALC CEO to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Within a month, the Minister issued her media release announcing a funding halt for the ALC. In October, the ALC Board met with no staff present and a single NIAA senior officer in attendance and decided to terminate on notice the former CEO (i.e. with a termination payment) with immediate effect. Within months, the full year funding for the ALC had been restored, and we now learn (alone among the four NT Land Councils) with additional funding of $2.5m, a 20 percent increase in operational funding. No public announcement was made notwithstanding the previous announcement of the funding halt. While a replacement CEO was not appointed until 29 April 2025, the appointee Mr Bonson resigned some months later. A new CEO has only recently taken up duty.

Readers and this author alike are left with the conundrum: what involvement did the Minister have in deciding it was time for the former CEO of the ALC to depart? Was there any effort made to encourage the ALC to terminate the CEO? Why might the Minister have thought it useful or necessary to provide the ALC with an unexplained 20 percent increase in the Land Council’s operational budget in the months after the CEO’s departure and before a permanent CEO had been recruited? And what does the Minister know about the causes of the institutional mayhem on Groote over the last decade that she is not telling us?

At the beginning of this post, I quoted the Minister’s statement that:

Good governance is the cornerstone of trust and needs to be based on transparency, fairness, and accountability…

For my part, I would reverse the order and suggest that trust and transparency are the indispensable prerequisite of good governance. Unfortunately, trust and transparency are in short supply in both Groote Eylandt and Canberra.

 

4 May 2026

The NIAA Annual Report 2020

 

Make not your thoughts prisons

Antony and Cleopatra Act 5, scene 2

 

NIAA is a new agency within the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) portfolio. The PMC Annual report had previously covered Indigenous affairs issues as Program 2 in its program structure. The PMC Annual Report (link here) deals with the Department’s oversight and assistance to advancing the Government’s Indigenous affairs agenda at pp. 105-107 of the PMC Annual Report. The Department sees its major achievements in this area as the development of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap with the Coalition of Peaks and the states and territories, as well as the development of an early national response to protecting Indigenous Australians from Covid-19 (see page 195).

 

The NIAA Annual Report for 2019-2020 was tabled last week (link here).

 

In this post, I propose to comment on three aspects of the NIAA Annual report: the overall approach of the Report; the various Activity Statements that report on areas of priority action; and the issue of evaluation and in particular evaluation expenditure. I will leave consideration of some technical issues related to the management of the Aboriginals Benefit Account to a subsequent post. While I proceed by pointing to perhaps the most egregious examples of shortcomings or shortfalls, it is my more general thesis that this Annual Report is designed to provide minimal information, and it fails to deliver a coherent account of the activities of the NIAA over the course of the past financial year.

 

Overall approach

 

I found the overall approach of the Report to be too narrow. On page 11, the Report helpfully lists the nine key functions of the agency as outlined in the Executive Order signed by the Governor General in May 2019. Yet having done so, there is no ordered (or even disordered) outline of the agencies activities against each of these functions. I won’t undertake a detailed analysis, but will point to just a few examples: the fourth function is to ‘lead Commonwealth activities to promote reconciliation’. Yet there does not appear to be any account of the Agency’s work on this issue, and the index makes no mention of reconciliation. Perhaps the best defence to this critique would be to argue that the agency’s work in relation to a voice and to constitutional recognition (see pp.38-9) is related to reconciliation. However, these activities do not involve open public engagement particularly with the wider community, and to my mind at least, do not constitute the promotion of reconciliation per se.

 

Similarly, the eighth core function of NIAA is to ‘coordinate Indigenous portfolio agencies and advance a whole-of-government approach to improving the lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’. There is no account in the Report of the Agency’s activities in oversighting the key portfolio agencies, no reference in the index to the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation, the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, nor to Aboriginal Hostels Limited, and only a single fleeting reference to Indigenous Business Australia. The Agency organisation chart at pp 18-19 mentions two statutory office holders, the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, and the Executive Director of the Office of Township Leasing, but neither Office is described or reported upon in the body of the report, and nor are they mentioned in the Index. There is a brief discussion of the operations of the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (pp. 181-2), although given its significance, even this is arguably too limited.

 

Similarly, the seventh function is to ‘analyse and monitor the effectiveness of programs and services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, including programs and services delivered by bodies other than the NIAA’ (emphasis added). There is some discussion of evaluation in the Report (see below), and somewhat confusingly, in the CEO’s overview where he states:

In 2019–20, we continued to implement the IAS Evaluation Framework, in place since 2018, as a guide for evaluation of programs and activities under the IAS. The Evaluation Framework aligns with the wider role of the Productivity Commission in overseeing the development and implementation of a whole-of-government evaluation strategy of policies and programs that affect Indigenous Australians (emphasis added).

 

Nowhere is it made clear how the role of the Productivity Commission in overseeing a whole of government evaluation strategy meshes with the function of the NIAA to analyse and monitor the effectiveness of programs and services. And nowhere do we get a succinct description of the state of play (as assessed either by the Productivity Commission or the NIAA) of the effectiveness of whole of government programs directed to Indigenous citizens. The significance of this gap is heightened by the Auditor General’s recent conclusions in his midterm report (link here).

 

Arguably, there is inadequate discussion of the NIAA’s activities in relation to other functions, although there is at least some reference to activities that might come within the allocated function, so I won’t press the point.

 

Given the centrality of the NIAA to the Government’s Indigenous affairs agenda, there is a strong case for the Annual Report to provide a more expansive overview of the breath of the Government’s activities in the Indigenous policy domain. For example, there are a number of entities and program initiatives that are focussed on Indigenous Australians, but are the responsibility of other agencies. The significant programs administered by the Health Department, and the operations of the Indigenous Land and Sea Fund administered within the Future Fund are just two examples. There is a case for NIAA to provide a conceptual map or overview so that the reader can obtain a sense of the totality of the Commonwealth’s activities in the Indigenous policy space. A point reinforced by the NIAA functions in the April 2019 Executive Order that require it to adopt a whole of government perspective in relation to a range of matters.

 

Activity Statements

 

Section three of the Report deals with Annual Performance Statements. I don’t propose to undertake a comprehensive analysis, but instead will merely comment on a number of issues that in my view deserve to be highlighted.

 

Between pages 23 and 27 the Report summarises nine activities (comprising 20 sub-activities) against its corporate plan objectives. Of the 20 sub-activities, 8 were listed as achieved, 9 were partially achieved, and 3 were not achieved. Two of the ‘not achieved’ activities related to the delivery of workshops and cultural activities related to mental health services for young adults. The third related to school attendance in communities where the RSAS program operates. I have previously commented on mental health and school attendance issues (link here and here). I am sceptical of the utility of these performance templates, since they lean heavily towards process rather substantive outcomes. Nevertheless, they at least provide a starting point for assessing performance, and the NIAA is to be applauded for adopting a degree of realism in its self-assessment. What is missing however is any analysis of discussion related to the implications of these shortfalls, their significance, and most importantly, what the agency proposes to do to ensure that there is substantive progress in the areas chosen as policy targets into the future.

 

Embedded in the various activity statements are various clues to the Government’s policy narrative and approach in Indigenous affairs that are worth flagging or noting. So, in relation to Activity 3: ‘progressing co-design of a voice for Indigenous Australians’ (p. 38), we see the repeated reliance on the co-design motif. Notwithstanding the assertion of co-design, the Government retains strong control over the development of options by its appointed committees, will then unilaterally consider the proposals , and then initiate a process, whose details are yet to be announced, of wider consultation ‘from late 2020 to early 2021’, and then again consider how it will proceed. There is nothing inherently wrong with this process, but it is not ‘co-design’. The codesign narrative is political spin.

 

In relation to Activity 4: ‘Progressing constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians during the current parliamentary term, providing there is consensus and a good chance of a referendum succeeding’ (p.39).  This heading almost says it all! In the section headed ‘Analysis’, the Agency notes:

 In line with the recommendations of the 2018 Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the Government supports finalising co-design of a voice ahead of constitutional recognition.

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in Minister Wyatt providing an updated timeframe for the Indigenous voice co-design process on 12 June 2020. Minister Wyatt noted that the substantial impact of COVID-19 could impact on the timing of reaching a consensus and progressing to a referendum within the current parliamentary term.

 

Activity 4 could have been more succinctly titled ‘Don’t hold your breath’ !

 

Activity 9 is headed ‘Undertaking evaluations of the National Indigenous Australians Agency programs in line with the IAS Evaluation Framework’. The agency reports that it achieved publication of an evaluation work plan, and achieved the finalisation of long-term performance measures, but only partially achieved the public release of completed evaluations. These are all process targets. In the analysis, the Agency notes (p.53):

To support transparency and use of evaluations in program and policy decision-making, the NIAA committed to publicly release all evaluations. To ensure evaluations are released in a timely manner, it is a requirement that completed evaluations are published within four months of receipt of the final report. Of the six evaluations that were completed in 2019–20, four were publicly released and one is on track to be published within agreed timeframes. The remaining evaluation is complete but publication has been delayed such that it wasn’t released within agreed timeframes.

 

Clearly the evaluation involved is potentially embarrassing in some way. The Report provides no information on which evaluation has not been released, and no explanation for the delay: was it an agency decision, or a Ministerial decision? The Agency’s ‘commitment’ to transparency, and particularly to evidence based policy and evaluation transparency goes only so far. Readers (and citizens) deserve better treatment than this.

 

Evaluation Expenditure

Nowhere in the Report is there a table outlining the detailed expenditure for each of the Activities nominated by the Agency as central to its overall performance. Activity 9 relating to evaluation is no exception.

 

Yet on 3 February 2017, the then Minister issued a media release on strengthened evaluation in the portfolio (link here). The release noted inter alia:

The Coalition Government will allocate $10 million a year over four years to strengthen the evaluation of Indigenous Affairs programmes.

Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Nigel Scullion, said the multi-year programme of evaluations would be underpinned by a formal Evidence and Evaluation Framework to strengthen reporting, monitoring and evaluation at a contract, programme and outcome level.

“The IAS has already greatly improved the transparency and accountability of Indigenous Affairs funding,” Minister Scullion said.

“As a result of the reforms the Coalition introduced through the IAS, we now know, for the first time, how much money is being spent across the Indigenous Affairs portfolio – and what outcomes we expect from the investment of taxpayers’ money. (emphasis added)

 

At pages 82-3 of the Report, the Agency reports on ‘Administered Program Performance’. Table 4.15 lists an expenditure of $6.0m for Evaluation and Research activities against a column headed IAS. This figure falls short of the $10m a year commitment in 2017. A search of the budget papers reveals that last year there was a significant under-expenditure against budget for evaluation and research.

 

The PMC 2019-20 Portfolio Budget statements lists the research and evaluation budget for 2019-20 as $12m (p.45) (link here). The 2020-21 NIAA Budget Statements (link here) provide an estimated actual for 2019-20 as $5.99m and indicate that the four out years budgets will be $10m, $10.1m, $10.2m and $10.3m, presumably reflecting expected indexation off the base of $10m. The budget papers reveal that the agency only spent 50% of the budget allocation for Evaluation and Research in 2019-20. Notwithstanding this shortfall, nowhere in the Annual Report is any explanation offered. Nor is there any information on where the unused funds were redirected.

 

Furthermore, there are two fundamental issues worth considering. First, why is the IAS program (administered expenditure) used for this purpose and not departmental expenditure. The use of administered expenditure for a function related to the work of government has the effect of undercounting the true cost of delivering programs. If used more widely it would in effect short-change the potential recipients of programs.

Second, table 4.15 notes that total NIAA expenditure in 2019-20 was $1.93bn, comprising $1.66bn in administered expenditure and $272m in departmental expenditure. The Evaluation and Research expenditure amounts to 0.4% of this allocation.  What is the appropriate level of investment in evaluation and research for an agency such as NIAA? I would argue that it is much higher than 0.4%. Nowhere is there any discussion of the rationale for the level of investment in evaluation. The Auditor General’s mid-term report referenced above in effect make the case for much greater investment in program effectiveness, not the minimal investment that appears to have been incurred (and effectively hidden) in the Agency’s Annual Report.

 

Evaluation will continue to have a salient profile in the Indigenous policy domain over coming months. According to its website (link here) the Productivity Commission’s Final report on an Indigenous Evaluation Strategy has been completed and was delivered to Government on 16 October. It will be publicly released on 30 October. NIAA will be an important player in assessing the report and providing advice to Cabinet on the future directions of evaluation in the Indigenous policy domain. In due course, the Government will announce its proposed response to the Productivity Commission proposals, no doubt accompanied by further rhetorical flourishes on the importance of evaluation Indigenous related programs.

 

Conclusion

 

The NIAA Annual Report suffers from a lack of imagination and preparedness to adopt a more open and engaging style. It is permeated with bureaucratic opaqueness and fails to substantively engage with the most significant issues of concern to Indigenous Australians and the wider community. It is just one document amongst many; a single snapshot floating in the huge and continuing avalanche of information that tumbles out of government.  One of the strongest arguments for adopting a new and more open approach is that for so long as citizens are fed a diet of manufactured information dressed up as accountable governance, levels of trust in government will remain low.

 

An Annual Report is an opportunity for an agency like NIAA to bring some order and coherence to the disorganised and chaotic state of public administration in this policy domain. To describe what is going on across the country, whether in remote communities, regional towns, or urban environments in metropolitan Australia. To canvass some of the important demographic challenges facing Indigenous citizens and the nation. To describe, explain and constructively critique the impact of whole of government activities on Indigenous Australia. To explore issues relating to regulation and regulatory failure as they impact Indigenous citizens. It is an opportunity to explain, to synthesise especially complex data sets, to acknowledge different views and opinions, and to argue for the hard decisions that governments are inevitably required to make.  

 

The fact that such an outcome is virtually unthinkable reflects the reality that the NIAA does not see itself as having a proactive and engaged stance vis a vis Indigenous Australia, and/or that Governments have decided that real policymaking is just too hard, and that it is much easier to manufacture the appearance of policymaking. Either way, not only do Indigenous citizens lose out, but so too does the nation and the public interest.