Monday, 20 January 2020

Food for thought: lessons from Singapore for remote Australia




I came across this article from the Global Times recently (h/t Pearls and Irritations). The following extracts are from a longer interview article focussed on China / US Relations and the future of Hong Kong. The article is titled ‘US needs to decide its core interests: Mahbubani’ dated 25 December 2019 (link here). I republish the following extracts without detailed comment or analysis, and merely note that this Blog has argued repeatedly over the past two years (eg link here and here and here) against the Commonwealth Government’s retrograde decision to withdraw from its historic role over the past half century in funding capital investment in remote housing.

Editor's Note:
Are the world's two biggest powers doomed to be enemies? Kishore Mahbubani (Mahbubani), distinguished fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, and a veteran diplomat, shared his insights with Global Times (GT) reporter Yu Jincui.

How do you view the problems Hong Kong faces? What could Singapore do to avoid a Hong Kong-like situation?

Mahbubani: Singapore is a very lucky country because it has clearly been one of the best governed in the world since independence in 1965

The second difference is that the Singaporean government decided long ago that we must take care of the interests of people at the bottom. So you must build public housing for them. So Singapore has the best public housing program in the world. In the case of Hong Kong, when Tung Chee-hwa was chief executive in 1997, he wanted to build 85,000 units of public housing per year for the people at the bottom, but he was blocked by some tycoons in Hong Kong. So no public housing was built. So if Tung had succeeded in 1997, there would have been 1.7 million units of public housing in Hong Kong in 20 years. So the problems Hong Kong is encountering today are not the results of decisions made yesterday but the result of decisions made 20 or 30 years ago. It is a deep structural problem, but at the same time, it can be fixed….

This analysis, and its recognition that public policy decisions have structural implications, should raise questions for policymakers here in Australia about our own approaches to recognising the ‘interests of the people at the bottom’. In our case, the largely invisible and definitely short-sighted decisions made over the past two years to retreat from a national program to support remote housing provision here in Australia will have long term consequences and implications for the life opportunities of thousands of remote citizens.

These decisions speak to our capacity as a nation to think strategically about our future. They highlight our apparent inability to prioritise quality of life for all over the interests of the few, and raise serious questions regarding the robustness of key governance institutions such as parliamentary oversight, ministerial responsibility, an independent public service and the effectiveness of our federal financial arrangements.

Wednesday, 15 January 2020

Words and actions: the future of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council



                  Suit the action to the word, the word to the action
                                                Hamlet Act 3, Scene 2.

In April 2017, I posted (link here) a critical analysis of the operations of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council (IAC). Among other things, I was critical of the use of government appointees as representatives of Indigenous interests, and concluded that:
…the risk of the current Advisory Council arrangements is that sooner or later they degrade into a generalised ‘talk shop’ without any real substantive policy content, with the real purpose being to provide a cover or façade to shield what are in effect unilateral government decisions from criticism….…… Perhaps the strongest argument for greater transparency around Indigenous advisory structures would be to eliminate the possibility that sceptics such as myself have cause to doubt the robustness of the policy process itself.

Re-reading my 2017 post has not led me to revise my views. I recommend readers read the full post.

In the almost two years since then, we have had a change of Prime Minister, and a change of Minister for Indigenous Affairs, along with the establishment of a new agency, the NIAA (link here), within the Prime Minister’s portfolio. We have also seen a number of related developments in the broader policy domain:

The emergence of the National Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations and an associated partnership agreement between COAG and the National Coalition focussed on refreshing the Closing the Gap targets (link here).


The Government’s rejection of the Uluru Statement and the subsequent establishment of a two-phase ‘co-design process to develop models for an Indigenous voice at local, regional and national levels’. An appointed Senior Advisory Group co-chaired by Tom Calma and Marcia Langton will oversee this process (link here). Just today (15 January 2020), the Minister has announced the appointment of the members of the National Indigenous Voice Co-design Group (link here). This latter group will be co-chaired by Dr Donna Odegaard and an un-named senior official of NIAA.


The establishment of an appointed Indigenous Reference Group (IRG) which ‘advises the government about northern Australia matters’ and ‘supports and advises the Ministerial Forum on Northern Development’ (link here). The IRG membership is expertise based and explicitly not ‘representative’ although it includes members from each of the three northern jurisdictions plus the Torres Strait. While it is not clear from the departmental website, it seems likely that Minister Canavan appoints the IRG members. He has responsibility for the Office of Northern Development and the implementation of the White Paper on Northern Development (link here).


Finally, the Government has allowed (through decisions to not provide funding) the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples to go into voluntary administration (link here). The National Congress, which was initiated and designed by Indigenous people (notably including Tom Calma), and was based on open membership and an elected leadership, was supported and funded by the former Labor Government as a national representative and advocacy body for Indigenous peoples.


Clearly, four different models for accessing Indigenous advice and views are in play here, including three that have been utilised by the current Government. This appears to point to a deep-seated structural confusion within the Government on the appropriate way to engage best with Indigenous interests on the breadth of its policy agenda.

Why does this matter? One reason it matters is that reliance on ad hoc advice on key issues meets immediate political and policy needs, but the majority of what Governments do relates to less high profile policy and program issues that nevertheless have the potential to impact on citizens’ lives. A focus limited to high profile policy issues will thus risk creating serious gaps in the structures of engagement on policy.

A second reason it matters is that in the absence of a comprehensive and cogent policy statement from Government on its approach to working with Indigenous interests, we are left having to parse and interpret both its words and its actions to discern its real policy approach.

A third reason it matters is that it makes comparing government actions against their own policy yardsticks all but impossible. To take a trivial, but highly apposite example, in his media release (link here) announcing the establishment of an appointed senior advisory group on the voice, the Minister stated, apparently oblivious to the deeply embedded irony:

“The best outcomes are achieved when Indigenous Australians are at the centre of decision-making. We know that for too long decision making treated the symptoms rather than the cause.”

“It’s time that all governments took better steps to empower individuals and communities, and work in partnership to develop practical and long lasting programmes and policies that both address the needs of Indigenous Australians and ensure that Indigenous voices are heard as equally as any other Australian voice.”

The reason this statement is infected with irony is that by reserving to itself the right to appoint who it engages with, the Government is effectively saying that it is prepared to empower some individuals and some communities, and will ensure that some Indigenous voices are heard as equally as any other Australian voice. How should we assess the stated commitment to empowerment and partnership when the Government chooses who it listens to and engages with?

Of the three approaches the Government has adopted, I strongly favour the model based on engagement with the coalition of peaks on national issues (and by implication engagement with sectoral peak bodies on second order issues). It provides a much more robust assurance of representative engagement than relying on appointed interlocutors, and simultaneously builds the institutional resilience of Indigenous organisations. Of course, Government is complex and there will be times and issues where appointed experts will be able to add value. However, if there is to be any suggestion that their work amounts to ‘representation of Indigenous interests’ or ‘co-design with Indigenous interests’, then the essential quid pro quo must be an entirely open process where the advice provided by appointed experts is open to all citizens to consider and if necessary critique.

In relation to the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council, setting aside the more fundamental issues raised in my earlier post, it has been apparent to close observers for some time that all is not well.

It appears that the IAC has not met since February 2019. Normally, the Council has issued a communique after each of its meetings, yet the most recent communique on the NIAA website (link here) is a report of the 13 February meeting. Nor has NIAA posted the Council’s annual report for 2019. Indeed, the NIAA web page fails to list the membership of the Council, apart from mentioning that the current co-chair is Roy Ah-See.

In April 2019, the Government appointed former Council co-chair Andrea Mason as a Commissioner on the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability (link here), creating a vacancy on the Advisory Council. To date, that vacancy has not been filled. In fact, for the bulk of 2019, the Council has had only five members out of a possible 12.

Mr Ah-See appears to have become disenchanted with the Government, probably over the approach to the Uluru statement and the voice. In August 2019, The Australian reported that 40 prominent Indigenous leaders (including Noel Pearson and Roy Ah-See had written to the Prime Minister and Minister Wyatt ‘with a proposed and ­detailed pathway for an Indigenous voice to parliament that they say can be enshrined in the ­Constitution by the end of 2021’ (link here).

The Government did not respond to this letter for an extended period (if at all) (Link here). The frustration of the Council co-chair Mr Ah-See was made public when he made a searing critique of the government on national radio on 20 October 2019 (link here). In a further interview on 29 October, he alleged that the Advisory Council had been put in a holding pattern and had not met since February (link here).

The failure of the IAC to meet since the election coincides with the change of minister from Scullion to Wyatt. However it also coincides with the Government’s apparent struggle to develop a coherent narrative on its approach to dealing with the calls for constitutional recognition and a Voice to Parliament.  What we haven’t had however is any clear explanation from the Government of its approach to engagement with Indigenous interests generally, and the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council in particular.

There was a request in September 2019 for documents relating to communications between the Minister and the Indigenous Advisory Council, and for documents relating to the appointment of members to fill vacancies. The documents released (link here) indicated that there was advice to the Minister and Prime Minister on 15 July 2019, but the content of that advice has not been released. A redacted question time brief for Minister Wyatt dated 25 June was released which stated, inter alia:

The Prime Minister and I value the advice we receive from the Council….…OUR COMMITMENTS
• The continuation of the Council demonstrates the Government’s commitment to work in genuine partnership with First Australians.
• The Council offers Indigenous Australians a voice at the highest level of government – directly to the Prime Minister.
• The Government’s priorities for Indigenous Australians include finalising the Closing the Gap Refresh, preventing young people from dying through suicide, increasing school attendance, getting people into jobs, enhanced local decision making through an enhanced Empowered Communities model, co-design of a Voice and truth telling.

Of course, the paucity of the documents listed in the FOI response, and the apparent complete absence of any written communication between the Minister and the Council over a three-month period early in his tenure as Minister gives the lie to these tendentious talking points.

The Government is approaching a decision point that will determine its approach to accessing high-level advice from Indigenous interests. This arises because the Council’s current membership is coming up for renewal. Reappointments if they are to be made are required as of 31 January (Link here).

So what will the Government decide? There are essentially two options.

The first (and in my view less likely) would be to refresh the membership of the Advisory Council and seek to continue as if nothing has occurred. There are a number of factors that mitigate against such an approach. The Prime Minister is clearly not as comfortable with Indigenous affairs as his two predecessors, and will seek to shift as much profile as he can to Minister Wyatt. Having an Advisory Council reporting to the Prime Minister does not sit well with such an approach. In addition, to the extent that a refreshed Council is appointed with a credible membership, it raises the prospect of future conflict or tension with the recently announced Senior Advisory Group and the Co-design Group on the Voice. The Government will be keen to minimise the possibility of different advice emerging from three (and eventually four when a local and regional co-design group is announced) appointed advisory bodies.

The second (and more likely) option is that the Government will allow the IAC to disappear. There is little substantive to show for the Council’s seven year existence, and there is no constituency advocating for its continuation. The Government may even be tempted to allow the Council to expire without any announcement. More likely would be a short announcement pointing to the new Senior Advisory Group and the associated Co-design Groups on the Voice as the key mechanisms for Indigenous input on policy (notwithstanding that it is a single issue mechanism).

It is clear that ever since the demise of ATSIC, Governments have struggled to devise effective mechanisms to engage with Indigenous interests. In my view the way forward is neither of the two options discussed above.

Rather, the Commonwealth should commit to actioning in a substantive way Minister Wyatt’s statement quoted above:

“It’s time that all governments took better steps to empower individuals and communities, and work in partnership to develop practical and long lasting programmes and policies that both address the needs of Indigenous Australians and ensure that Indigenous voices are heard as equally as any other Australian voice.”

This will require more than a minimalist adherence to the words in a media release. It will necessarily involve engaging with Indigenous interests that do not agree with the Government, or who are critical. It will necessarily involve committing (by which I mean substantive commitment) to co-designing policy and programs with leaders and individuals that are not selected and appointed by the Government, and who are broadly representative of the diverse range of interests within First Nations communities. One policy implication is that it will require governments to do much more than they have to ensure peak bodies exist and are funded for each of the major policy sectors impacting Indigenous lives.

Finding an effective way forward to engaging with Indigenous interest will also require a commitment to explaining policy approaches to the community at large, not hiding behind appointed individuals who are beholden to the Minister for their position and its associated status. Importantly, it will also require a commitment to openness and transparency not just with Indigenous citizens, but with the broader Australian community. After all, if the broader community is not in a position to understand the Government’s rationales for its policy directions, and thus is not inclined to be supportive, the prospects of constructive and inclusive engagement of the nation generally with First Nations citizens is a chimera.




Friday, 27 December 2019

The quality of public policy discourse: questions raised reading about the Jomon hunter gatherers of Japan




Some links to holiday reading which emphasises two different takes on the ongoing impact of Indigenous peoples in Japan over the longue durée.

First, a recent article from the Japan Times (h/t Marginal Revolution) which examines the renaissance of Jomon semiotics, particularly tattoos and ceramic designs (link here).

Second, an academic take by archaeologists Peter Bleed and Akira Matsui from 2010 on Jomon ecological practices and their implications for the wider theorising on the development of agriculture (link here).

I find these articles interesting both for the comparative perspectives they offer on Indigenous peoples economic and cultural practices both past and present; but also as counterbalance to the excessively short term perspectives of most policy making related to Indigenous peoples.

Thinking about these issues raises important questions in the Australian public policy context. What is the long term policy vision for Indigenous Australia? How do policymakers with short term spans of tenure and influence deal with long term issues? Are there institutional structures that might assist in embedding longer term perspectives? Or are we happy to see long term policy made via a series of erratic and potentially contradictory short term policy approaches? Is public policy formulation inevitably and invariably short term in nature?

These are questions rarely asked and never answered. What does that say about the quality of our public policy discourse?

Friday, 20 December 2019

Indigenous policy and northern Australia



Nothing will come of nothing: speak again
King Lear Act One Scene 1


The Prime Minister, Minister for Resources and Northern Australia, Minister for Indigenous Australians, and First Ministers of WA, NT and Qld issued a media release on 13 December titled ‘Boosting Indigenous participation in Northern Development’ (link here). The media release states, inter alia:

Indigenous Australians will take a stronger role in the economic development of Northern Australia under a new Accord launched at a Northern Australia Ministerial Forum in Katherine…
[The accord] will provide a framework for parties to work together to advance Indigenous economic development in northern Australia.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison said …“This is about creating jobs across northern Australia, which is so important for the region, and our indigenous population….”
Minister for Resources and Northern Australia Matt Canavan said Indigenous participation had always been a key aspect to economic development in the north…“The Northern Australia Indigenous Development Accord (the Accord) will ensure that governments, communities, individuals and industry work together to advance Indigenous economic development across our north.” …
… “The Accord sets out the commitment of governments to strengthen Indigenous economic participation in this nationally significant northern development agenda…” Minister Wyatt said…
…Ministers agreed to extend the term of the Indigenous Reference Group until December 2020. The next steps in developing an Indigenous Commercial Research Plan and locations for Regional Collaboration Areas will be considered at the next Ministerial meeting in 2020.

This all sounds terrific. Please read the whole statement.

While optics are not everything, it is strange that in contrast to Minister Ken Wyatt, the Commonwealth Minister for Northern Australia, Matt Canavan, failed to post this media release on his ministerial website. Moreover, his claim in the media release that Indigenous participation ‘had always been a key aspect to economic development in the north’ is not only historically misleading if not incorrect, but remains problematic today.
Of course, it is the new Accord (link here) where the rubber hits the road. Set out below is my brief and selective assessment of the likely impact of the NAIDA.

The headline conclusion must be that this is a deeply unambitious document.

The Accord has been developed in consultation with the Government appointed Indigenous Reference Group (IRG) (para.1) and is intended to provide a framework…to advance Indigenous economic development in northern Australia.

Point one: this framing of policy opportunities for northern Australia as all about commercial development is in my view deeply problematic. It essentially operates to provide a cover for governments to tread water on other potential policy opportunities, for example, the implications of climate change (link here) or mass incarceration of Indigenous citizens (link here) or welfare policy (link here).

Point two: given the extraordinary levels of deep-disadvantage impacting remote Indigenous citizens, one might have expected that the IRG and governments would have laid out a comprehensive policy agenda to address structural disadvantage and if necessary to allocate greater resources to improving outcomes. Instead, the Accord states (para.3):

The IRG has challenged governments to do more with existing resources; go beyond business as usual to facilitate Indigenous economic development; and improve collaboration across government…(emphasis added).

Point three: the contrast between the co-design approach adopted by COAG in relation to the Closing the Gap refresh where COAG has entered into a partnership agreement with the Coalition of Indigenous Peaks, and this process where Indigenous interests are not parties to the agreement, and the Indigenous representatives are appointed by the Commonwealth is stark.

Point four: the specific roles and responsibilities of the various governments are spelt out in the Implementation Plan at Schedule A of the Accord. They are deeply unambitious while apparently designed to give the appearance of government proaction. When contrasted with the aspirational language in para. 15 of the Accord, the Implementation plan is pathetically inadequate. Para.15 states, inter alia:

The Parties …agree to undertake decisive actions that contribute to…creating jobs…attracting infrastructure investment…facilitating access to capital…..activating the economic value of land….creating institutional arrangements that work to activate , accelerate and optimise Indigenous economic development across northern Australia.

The Implementation Plan proposes [underling added for emphasis]:
·         ‘expanded fee for service opportunities for Indigenous ranger groups’;
·         development of a ‘proposal for developing a Northern Australia Indigenous Enterprise and Employment Hub system’ (presumably four or five enterprise incubators across the North);
·         the ‘Ministerial Forum to understand options for funding feasibility studies’;
·         the provision of ‘proposal/s to consider for progressing land use planning and water reforms”;
·         the identification, trialling and scoping of ‘a process for selecting Regional Collaboration Area sites’ in each jurisdiction; and finally
·         the provision of a ‘proposal for developing a Northern Australian Indigenous Commercial Research Roadmap and Research Plan.

Decisive action indeed! The Government and the IRG have been developing this agenda since 2107, and on the present timeframes outlined in the Implementation plan, decisions to develop what are a set of extremely modest key initiatives will only be green-lighted by the Ministerial Forum later in 2020 and in some cases perhaps 2021. In the words of Sir Humphrey Appleby, implementation will follow in ‘due course’.

So what might a comprehensive plan for Indigenous participation in Northern Australia look like? Set out below is a provisional list of just some of the blindingly obvious candidates for driving improved economic, social, health and environmental outcomes in remote northern communities:

Increased investment in remote human capital development: Greater investment in early childhood programs, teacher quality and tenure, and a stronger focus on bicultural and ‘two way’ curriculums are each a prerequisite for improved outcomes.

Remote housing: A major need and opportunity is to significantly upgrade the quantum and quality of remote housing. This might be through expansion of public housing, but a better option may be to pursue alternative policy ideas including community housing options (link here). Capital might be obtained from a re-energised NAIF, from the Commonwealth’s new social housing bond aggregator (the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation), and ultimately from the private sector (particularly if underwritten by a short or medium term government guarantee).

Remote property and tenancy management: a plan to ensure locally based Indigenous corporations undertake remote housing maintenance would pay big dividends both socially and economically. 

Land tenure reform: There is a major and complex policy challenge in this area, but it requires sustained policy commitment and a clear vision of the outcomes sought. The failure of Governments to advance the COAG endorsed land tenure reforms (link here) serves to reinforce the political unwillingness of Governments to move forward even on the issues they identify themselves as important. Note that while land tenure is a major transaction cost impediment to efficient services and commercial activities in remote communities, it is not the only transaction cost impediment to commercial development in remote communities.

Governance reform of the native title benefits space: This is primarily a matter for the Commonwealth, Reforms might include requiring PBC’s to appoint independent directors from an approved list; to appoint their auditors from an approved list; and most importantly the provision of adequate core funding for PBCs by the Commonwealth. This is an area where there is probably a case for a short sharp review aimed at identifying a reform agenda.

NAIF Reforms: The Commonwealth could allocate say $1bn for remote Indigenous infrastructure from the $5bn in concessional loans available for infrastructure generally. This would need to be accompanied by a wider definition of infrastructure to include social infrastructure (as suggested by Infrastructure Australia in its most recent reports). Because the NAIF is effectively structured to provide access to concessional loans, there will be a need to develop a delivery strategy to ensure that these funds are able to be both allocated and spent for the benefit of remote Indigenous communities. For example, the Commonwealth might expand the capital base of Indigenous Business Australia with NAIF loans for on-provision to smaller Indigenous owned projects and enterprises in northern regions.

CDP Reforms: the operation of the operation of this program is excessively punitive and creates strong incentives for remote citizens to disengage entirely from both welfare and other government services.

Strengthened financial literacy programs: it was striking that a number of the case studies in the Hayne Royal Commission into the banks were drawn from the experience of Indigenous communities in the remote north.

Finally, it is worth asking the question, is the IRG model fit for purpose? Why is it that after two years work, none of the pressing policy priorities identified in the alternative comprehensive plan set out above have emerged in the IRG’s advice to Government? Is it the case that the Commonwealth Government is limiting the advice that it is prepared to receive? Alternatively, is it the case that the IRG is providing hard-hitting advice, but government is not listening or hearing? Either way, there seems to be a case for an independent review of the IRG’s operations.

The details of the IRG’s advice to the Ministerial Forum do not appear to be public, and I would argue that this lack of transparency is a case where the confidentiality of advice (contra the accepted wisdom reiterated in the recent Thodey Review of the APS link here) actually encourages and facilitates sub-optimal outcomes. There is in my view no justification for the advice of a Government advisory body to be kept confidential. Indeed, how can the appointed members reassure their own communities that they are providing effective advice if their work remains confidential? The question whether the subsequent consideration by policymakers of those recommendations should be kept confidential under FOI is a separate matter. The risk is that the Commonwealth is effectively using the IRG as a convenient cover for government inaction. How else might we explain the deep-seated and sustained lack of substantive action in relation to the Government’s stated policy objectives for northern Australia?



Sunday, 15 December 2019

Our public service, our future….or is it?




               …That we would do
We should do when we would…
Hamlet Act 4, scene 7


The release of the Thodey Review of the Australian Public Service, Our Public Service, Our Future, (link here) on a Friday 12 days before Christmas is not designed to attract sustained attention to the important issues dealt with. The Prime Minister’s media release (link here) indicates that ‘The Government agrees with the majority of the independent panel’s recommendations and I have asked the heads of the public service to take these forward’. The Government’s response, Delivering for All Australians, addresses each recommendation (link here).

This post presents a provisional reaction to the key recommendations of the Review that relate to Indigenous Australians and then comments on the Government’s formal response. For ease of reference, I have set out relevant extracts of the Review recommendations and the Government’s response at the end of this post.

While there is a temptation to focus solely on the Government’s response, it seems to me that it is important to give serious consideration to the Review itself. These types of documents potentially have long half-lives, and in the long term are potentially influential for good or bad.

First some contextual issues. My initial response is that the Report’s recommendations are well meaning, worthwhile, but ultimately underwhelming. While there are numerous references within Thodey’s report to the 1976 Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (the ‘Coombs Royal Commission’), even a quick comparison of the two documents makes clear that the Coombs’ report was much more thorough, comprehensive, deeply argued and ultimately persuasive. This is even more particularly the case in relation to Indigenous policy issues.

The Thodey Report correctly concludes that implementation processes will be crucial if the Report is to have an impact. Yet in too many instances, it seems that the Review Panel have failed to understand the inherent complexity of what they are recommending, and thus left us with ‘feel good’ recommendations that if implemented, would ultimately fail.

The Government’s response in relation to the relevant recommendations discussed in this post is desultory and vague. While they claim to have endorsed a majority of the Review recommendations, it is clear that any recommendation for substantive change or that might threaten the status quo has been rejected or downplayed. This is consistent with the current playbook on virtually all policy: ramp up the rhetoric, create the appearance of some action somewhere (to avoid accusations of inaction), and continue business as usual. See below.

While virtually all activities of the Australian Public Service (APS) indirectly affect First Nations citizens, the Thodey Report’s chapter four is of most direct relevance to First Nations citizens. That chapter makes a strong case for stronger partnerships with ‘people [ie citizens generally] and communities… including [emphasis added] place based solutions and working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’. Thus, recommendation 8 does not mention Indigenous peoples. The core element in recommendation 8 is:

Secretaries Board to develop a Charter of Partnerships to promote an open APS and guide external engagement and collaboration.

The proposed Charter of Partnerships is designed ‘to set clear expectations – for Government, the APS, and the community – on how the APS will work with its external partners’. It is to be developed in collaboration with the APS’s partners, including Indigenous peoples (p.119). The Report then makes the point (correctly in my view) that partnerships rely on openness and transparency, and that this ‘will require real cultural change in the APS’ (p.120).

This is sensible and I support it. The overarching analytic framework is one of dealing with all communities and people, particularly disadvantaged citizens, and including Indigenous communities within this framework. A strong case can be made for such a framework (as opposed to a stand-alone Indigenous specific framework), although there is no discussion of the alternatives to the frame adopted by the Report. The ‘mainstream’ framework is just adopted.

The Report also recommends that the Government commission a review of privacy, FOI and record –keeping that accepts without question arguments from within the bureaucracy regarding the importance of protecting records of deliberative processes. The review panel fails to address at all the counter view that blanket protections of advice to government can also hide both poor quality advice from bureaucrats and allow governments to blame bureaucrats for decisions that are taken for political reasons. There is a case for a much more nuanced approach to this issue if we believe ‘open government’ and trust in government is important.

The Government response to recommendation 8, labelled misleadingly as ‘agreed in part’ is essentially to reject it, and maintain the status quo. In rejecting the proposed Charter of Partnerships framework, the suggestions for external involvement of the community (including First Nations interests) in developing the proposed Charter is ignored, as is the suggestion that an accountability framework be developed to ensure the Charter is implemented effectively. The suggestion of a review of the privacy and FOI legislation is just rejected outright.

The chapter then moves onto a discussion of ‘Solutions with communities’ where it argues for and recommends ‘that the APS develops, for Government consideration, a whole of government policy framework for place based investment’ (p.126). Again, this is a mainstream recommendation, targeted at disadvantaged communities generally and not just Indigenous communities. Of course, given the over-representation of Indigenous communities (especially in regional and remote areas) amongst the most deeply disadvantaged Australians, this discussion is highly relevant to First Australians.

While the review panel recognises that it would be ‘a considerable change to the status quo’, its level of analysis around the potential implementation challenges is quite shallow. It does suggest a progressive rollout, which begs the question, what about those communities that are not being included. It also tentatively proposes ‘shared accountability between ministers for placed base approaches’ (p126) which in my experience is a recipe for non-accountability and non-delivery. The review panel also correctly notes that:

If Australian Government and state and territory agencies work in isolation on place-based approaches, communities will continue to receive fragmented support and governments will continue to duplicate effort and resourcing [emphasis added].

Recommendation 9 recommends that the Government commit to establishing a place based investment framework to address intergenerational and multi-dimensional disadvantage. In my view, the recommendation is conceptually correct, but as framed in the Report (see full recommendation below) suffers from at least two fundamental flaws. First, a progressive roll out leaves inequity and deep disadvantage unaddressed in those communities that miss out.

Second, it fails to acknowledge or analyse the fundamental budget management reality that place-based approaches are fundamentally at odds with portfolio-based appropriations. Ever since ATSIC and its regional councils, the Department of Finance has resisted all approaches to move to pooled place-based appropriations. The problem is exacerbated when state and local government jurisdictions are brought into the equation (as they must if it is to work).

I am a supporter of place-based approaches. In my experience, they can be implemented and made to work by engaged and energetic bureaucratic entrepreneurs operating with ministerial support. But eventually, either the bureaucratic entrepreneur or the Minister changes and the place based arrangements default to the status quo ante. The Review should have – but hasn’t - engaged with these issues which require legislative or institutional buttressing if they are going to work. In short, the odds of this recommendation being implemented (despite its inherent merits) are very low. Of course, there should be more emphasis on local engagement and community involvement, but governments must be careful not to raise expectations beyond what they can deliver and sustain.

The Government response to recommendation 9 is again labelled ‘agreed in part’ whereas the substantive response is to ignore the Review recommendation and indicate that the hard working Secretaries Board will tweak current approaches and undertake a ‘cross-portfolio analysis on lessons learned and success factors for place-based approaches, including opportunities to expand this work.’ There is no time frame for this work to be undertaken, and no guarantee that it will be published.

Having made the case for stronger more robust partnership framework, and a place based investment framework, only then does the review panel address Indigenous Australians.

‘Solutions with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ (p.129)

This section builds on the previous sections on the proposed Charter of Partnerships and a framework for place-based investment. The text and analysis is carefully crafted to hit the key issues of concern to the majority of Indigenous citizens, and on a first read, the review panel appear to have made a strong case for substantive partnership with Indigenous Australians. An aspiration I share.

However on closer reading, the text is subtly qualified and caveated such as to undermine the likelihood that real change will ensue. Let me start with the core elements of Recommendation 10 that is titled Work in genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. I have added the underlining for emphasis:

• Government and APS to recognise the importance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples making decisions on matters affecting their lives and communities, and support their full participation in the social and economic life of Australia.

• National Indigenous Australians Agency and PM&C to lead the APS’s application of the framework for place-based investment and the Charter of Partnerships in working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, including to:
promote joint decision-making with communities on design and implementation of policies and services
 adopt flexible funding arrangements that cater for different opportunities and needs across communities, and
delegate authority for investment decisions to regionally-based APS employees.

The first paragraph is easy to support, but almost impossible to disprove in terms of its implementation. It involves no substantive policy change, and is arguably (at least formally) existing government policy. A cynic might say it is motherhood.

The second paragraph recommends the adoption (or actually the promotion) of joint decision making, commonly referred to as ‘co-design’. However, either deliberately or by oversight, it is framed solely as one part of place-based frameworks, rather than in terms of joint decision-making in relation to national level policies and programs. I support greater use of co-design at all levels of the policy making process, however there are limits to its application, and these require a process of open discussion if they are to be accepted by the community. There are also complex issues related to the operation and interaction of mainstream programs with Indigenous communities that again require open discussion and explanation if Indigenous expectations are not to be raised and then dashed. The review in my view could have done better in elaborating these potential complexities and risks.

The recommendation regarding flexible funding arrangements is quite vague, but to the extent it refers to pooled funding, it suffers from the flaws identified above in relation to place based investment frameworks. The Minister has made funding decisions in Indigenous affairs (particularly in the Indigenous Advancement Strategy) in secret for the past five years, with extremely limited delegations to officials. The ANAO has been very critical (link here). The recommendation for greater delegation thus seems unlikely to be accepted, at least in the short term, though I would love to be proved wrong on this.

The review also discussed the merits of strengthening parliamentary oversight, including the possibility that Indigenous community representatives might participate in some way. The review panel’s recommendation was merely that the Parliament consider establishing a Senate or Joint Committee on Indigenous Affairs to oversee Australian Government expenditure and policies relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Nevertheless, the fact that this issue has been raised in the review points to an emerging view that the current oversight arrangements are not working as effectively as they might. This is a complex issue that required more nuanced discussion that space permits here, but is an issue that I predict will continue to gain profile and salience.

Finally, there is a significant fudge by the review panel in this chapter, and perhaps elsewhere, which derives from its propensity to talk as if the APS makes most decisions and sets directions, something that is just not the case. Thus for example, the panel states:

The ANZSOG First Peoples Team labelled the relationship between the APS and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as ‘fraught and lacking in trust’. This is a damning assessment of years of focus on gaps and problems, not on strengths and assets. Too often, this approach has seen the APS do things to, not with, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, and substantially fail to improve social and economic outcomes [emphasis added; footnote deleted].

This sort of analysis by explicitly focussing on the APS implicitly assumes that governments and ministers are not responsible for policy decisions and directions, and the design and funding levels of programs, and in particular, for setting constraints and parameters that public servants must apply (either formally or informally). The complexity of this relationship and the propensity of politicians to play politics is a core reason for the majority of the trust issues that exist between Indigenous citizens and government. It is of concern that the review panel have not addressed this issue head on here (and I suspect anywhere in their report). The resort to denigrating a ‘focus on gaps and problems’ misconstrues the concerns of Indigenous peoples about deficit discourse. Again, I think the Australian public deserved better from the high-level review team. Instead, there appears to have been resort to ideological fudging dressed up as support for Indigenous culture.

The Government response to recommendation 10 is again ‘agreed in part’ and seeks to deflect the review panel recommendation in three ways. First, by asserting in the first two sentences that the Government is already working with First Nations peoples; second by referring to the recent partnership agreement between the National Coalition of Indigenous Peaks and COAG which is focussed on refreshing the Closing the Gap framework, and third by claiming that:

The Government is committed to improving local and regional decision-making and considering options for a national Voice, and has commenced a process to co-design models and options for this.

Each of these three claims are factually true, but open to question in terms of the parameters that are implicitly or explicitly placed around the various processes. While each of the three claims is positive on its face, it is the quality of the substantive interactions that will determines its ultimate impact. The absence of any commitment to underlying transparency in relation to these processes (for an example see the link here) and much else that the Government is doing in the Indigenous policy domain, facilitates the potential ‘management’ of each of these processes in ways which do not allow for real partnership relationships to emerge. For example, how does the selection and appointment by government of representatives on a committee to develop the national voice (link here) amount to ‘co-design’?

Moreover, the Government’s decision to not proceed with an accountable Charter of Partnerships framework, nor a commitment to a place based investment framework, removes the foundation that the review panel’s recommendation 10 was built on. The bland assertions by the Government along the line that everything is fine and we are already doing working in partnership must be taken with a grain of salt. Moreover, it must be remembered that while the Closing the Gap refresh and National Voice issues are important, there is much else occurring in the Indigenous policy domain. Where are the co-design processes in these areas?

Finally in relation to recommendation 10, and perhaps predictably, the Government response made clear that they see no need to change or strengthen current parliamentary oversight of Indigenous policy and programs.

This response by government, and indeed the totality of its response to recommendations 8, 9 and 10,  is arguably emblematic of a deep-seated issue in Indigenous affairs. Across Indigenous Australia, there is a widespread view that governments no longer retain their former legitimacy and that their policy and program activities writ large are misdirected at best and punitive at worst. Perhaps cognisant of this widespread lack of trust and legitimacy, the review panel made a relatively low key effort to argue for greater engagement and partnership between government and Indigenous communities. The Government’s response has essentially been to say “nothing to see here, all’s good, no action required’. While I suspect that the Government has never been open to an alternative view, in my view the Thodey led review panel did the nation and Indigenous Australians a disservice by not articulating in more detail and more clearly the issues that confront the APS is developing and implementing policies and programs that impact Indigenous Australians.

Forty three years ago, the Coombs Royal Commission stated:

The realities of power mean that ultimate decisions about them [Indigenous citizens] and the allocation of resources to them will finally be made, in present circumstances, by white decision makers. The Commission is satisfied, however, that unless these decision makers act in accordance with procedures which give Aboriginals a substantive and conscious participation in the processes of decision and, within broad limits, in the decisions themselves, programs will continue to fall short of their objectives, and resistance, hostility and a rejection of responsibility will continue to mark Aboriginal attitudes (para 10.5.6; p.337).

It is time that policy analysts, royal commissioners, evaluators and members of review teams with remits focussed on improving policy and program outcomes related to Indigenous Australians ceased merely reiterating that place based and co-design approaches (to use current terminology) are required, and began to examine why it is that Governments across the political spectrum have been and continue to be so resistant to implementing these policy approaches. Might it be that Coombs was on the money in pointing to ‘the realities of power’?


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Set out below are recommendations 8, 9 and 10 of the Review
Recommendation 8

Harness external perspectives and capability by working openly and meaningfully with people, communities and organisations, under an accountable Charter of Partnerships.
• Secretaries Board to develop a Charter of Partnerships to promote an open APS and guide external engagement and collaboration.
• All agencies to embed Charter expectations into individual and agency head performance management and corporate planning and reporting.
• All agencies to draw on diverse and rich community and partner insights in advice to Government, including in Cabinet and budget processes.
• Government to commission a review of privacy, FOI and record-keeping arrangements to ensure that they are fit for the digital age, by: ِ supporting greater transparency and disclosure, simpler administration and faster decisions, while protecting personal data and other information, and ِ exempting material prepared to inform deliberative processes of government from release under FOI.

Implementation guidance

• Establish a cross-agency team to develop the Charter in collaboration with APS partners, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
• Ensure the Charter:
 ِ highlights the value of better external engagement
 ِ guides the APS to work openly and respectfully with partners on policies and programs before and after government decisions
 ِ reflects the importance of seeking diverse external views, and
 ِ sets reciprocal expectations for APS partners — including engaging with honesty and pragmatism.
• Measure APS adherence through partner feedback, annual reports, capability reviews and individual and agency head performance management.
• Consider amending the Public Service Act 1999 to require the APS to develop a Charter of Partnerships


Recommendation 9

Use place-based approaches to address intergenerational and multi-dimensional disadvantage.
• Government to develop a framework for place-based investment, based on:
ِ joint decision-making with communities and other levels of government on designing and implementing policies and services
 ِ flexibility, including through funding arrangements, to cater for the different needs and opportunities in particular communities
ِ use of data to support decision-making and measure progress, and
 ِ clear accountability for outcomes, including shared ministerial accountability where appropriate.
• Government to pilot approach in communities with entrenched disadvantage or complex needs and strong community leadership.
• Agencies to appoint regionally-based SES as APS Community Partners to work with local communities and other jurisdictions, with delegated authority for investment decisions where appropriate.
• Secretaries Board to ensure APS makes place-based data available to help understand local needs and opportunities and measure progress.

Implementation guidance

• Build on existing collaborations with communities, governments and other partners in finding tailored solutions to achieve local priorities.
• Include an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander community in initial pilot areas.
• Adapt framework in light of results of the trials.
• Consider pooling discretionary grants funding from across portfolios to allocate to community-led initiatives to achieve jointly-agreed objectives.


Recommendation 10

Work in genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
• Government and APS to recognise the importance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples making decisions on matters affecting their lives and communities, and support their full participation in the social and economic life of Australia.
• National Indigenous Australians Agency and PM&C to lead the APS’s application of the framework for place-based investment and the Charter of Partnerships in working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, including to:
ِ promote joint decision-making with communities on design and implementation of policies and services ِ adopt flexible funding arrangements that cater for different opportunities and needs across communities, and
 ِ delegate authority for investment decisions to regionally-based APS employees.
• APSC and relevant agencies to work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander employees, the Indigenous SES Network and Secretaries Board to improve recruitment and development of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the APS.
• Secretaries Board to ensure cultural competency training remains a core part of APS professional development.
• Parliament to consider establishing a Senate or Joint Committee on Indigenous Affairs to oversee Australian Government expenditure and policies relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Implementation guidance

• Secretaries Board to ensure the APS works in effective partnerships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, including responding to and supporting future changes in Indigenous Affairs.
• Improve recruitment pathways and develop Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people for EL and SES levels.
• Provide cultural competency training for all APS employees. All SES officers to complete training by end-2020.



Government Response to recommendations 8, 9 and 10


Recommendation 8: Harness external perspectives and capability by working openly and meaningfully with people, communities and organisations, under an accountable Charter of Partnerships

Agreed in part.

The Government expects the APS to better understand the needs and expectations of all Australians, and to work effectively with them. This is an integral part of good policy, implementation and service-delivery. Rather than agree a new framework like the proposed Charter of Partnerships, the APS will apply the recently-agreed APS Framework for Engagement and Participation to support genuine collaboration with Australians in designing better services and finding solutions to policy problems. Application of this Framework will be monitored through individual and agency-level performance processes. Building on existing tools, the Board will pursue two new initiatives to better understand the needs of Australians – an APS-wide survey of business (to be trialled in 2020 for Government consideration before being rolled-out), and an APS-wide analysis of complaints hotspots. Agencies will use these data and insights to inform its advice to Government. The Government notes the proposal for a new wide-ranging review of privacy, FOI and record-keeping arrangements. The Government’s principal focus is to ensure that agencies effectively implement current requirements, addressing practical problems where required. Any further reform to these arrangements would be considered separately to the Government’s response to the APS Review.


Recommendation 9: Use place-based approaches to address intergenerational and multi-dimensional disadvantage

Agreed in part.
The Government is already pursuing place-based approaches in a number of regions, including in responding to natural disasters (e.g. through the National Drought and North Queensland Flood Response and Recovery Agency) and other initiatives like regional and city deals in places like the Barkly Region, Darwin, Townsville, Western Sydney, Geelong, Launceston, Hobart and Adelaide. Rather than develop a new framework, the Secretaries Board will first undertake cross-portfolio analysis on lessons learned and success factors for place-based approaches, including opportunities to expand this work. As part of this analysis, the Board will consider how regionally-based Senior Executive Service (SES) can better work with local communities and other jurisdictions. The Board will also consider how to best use different data sources in place-based work.


Recommendation 10: APS to work in genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples

Agreed in part.
The Government and the APS are committed to improving the lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. The new National Indigenous Australians Agency is working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities around Australia, and with other portfolios and state and territory governments, to ensure Government policies, programs and services address the needs of different communities. The Government is committed to improving local and regional decision-making and considering options for a national Voice, and has commenced a process to co-design models and options for this. The Council of Australian Governments and the National Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations have agreed to a formal Partnership Agreement to finalise the Closing the Gap Refresh and provide a forum for ongoing engagement throughout implementation of the new agenda. The Government notes the recommendation that Parliament consider establishing an additional parliamentary committee on Indigenous Affairs. The establishment of parliamentary committees is a matter for the Parliament. The Government considers that the current arrangements are appropriate.