We know what we are, but know not what we may be.
Hamlet Act 3, scene 4.
I have previously posted a number of times on aspects of
the proposed Voice first outlined in the 2017 Uluru Statement from the Heart (indirectly
link
here and more directly link
here). I recommend readers scan both those posts as they provide very
useful background and I have not sought to traverse the ground they cover here.
A constitutionally enshrined Voice requires both a
successful referendum and legislation to establish the Voice’s operations. A
successful referendum to require a voice be established and operate can only be
reversed by a future referendum. Legislation to establish such a Voice can be amended
to either fine tune the initial design, or potentially to radically overhaul
that initial design. The proposal below is directed to the design of the legislation
and not to what would be included in the referendum question.
Nicholas Gruen has argued that there is a potential
democratic dividend in making greater use of secret ballots within Parliament.
In particular, he has argued (link
here) that a panel of randomly chosen citizens should have the power to
require a parliamentary vote to be retaken as a secret ballot. I recommend
readers have a look at Gruen’s proposal. I find his argument persuasive and the
idea attractive.
Thinking about it further, it struck me that the proposed Voice,
and in particular the legislation establishing the design and operations of the
Voice provides an ideal opportunity for the Gruen proposal to be road tested in
the current parliamentary term in relation to just one of the numerous issues
that Parliament deals with, namely, legislation which focusses substantially on
Indigenous issues. More importantly, it would potentially provide a means by which
Indigenous interests could be assured that their views have been considered and
their voices heard by the whole Parliament.
In particular, the proposal advocated here is that the
legislation establishing the Voice should include provision establishing a
secret ballot mechanism that would require the Parliament to vote secretly (or
revote secretly) on any proposal where a substantial majority of the Voice membership
(themselves voting secretly) required such an action.
While I would hope and expect that the Voice will express
views on mainstream legislation that impacts Indigenous citizens adversely, I
would limit the operation of the secret ballot mechanism (at least initially) to
Indigenous specific legislation such as the Native Title Act, the CATSI Act, the
Northern Territory Aboriginal Land Rights Act, and any new legislation aimed
directly at addressing Indigenous specific issues. Past examples would include
the Howard Government’s 2007 legislation to impose the NT Intervention which
passed with Labor support in the lead up to an election (a classic wedge
strategy). Had that legislation been subject to a secret ballot, and bearing in
mind that it included explicit provisions over-riding the operation of the
Racial Discrimination Act, the possibility emerges that a majority of the then Parliament
may well have refused to go along with the proposals emanating from the Howard
Cabinet, and which were arguably not in the public interest.
One of the original objectives of the proponents of constitutional
recognition was to address he potential for the so called races power in
section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution to be used in ways which were not beneficial,
and were adverse to the interests of Indigenous citizens (link
here). Midway through the last decade, the Indigenous leadership on
constitutional recognition were convinced by Liberal moderates that the likelihood
of crafting a proposal to limit the operation of the race power to beneficial
uses only would elicit opposition across the conservative political spectrum
and make a successful referendum almost impossible. They went back to the
drawing board and what emerged was the proposal for a Voice. In other words,
the Voice is already a compromise proposal, and has been explicitly articulated
as not amounting to a third chamber, and not seeking to threaten Parliamentary
sovereignty.
The existence of a secret vote mechanism as part of the Voice
would provide a means to allow individual parliamentarians to follow their
conscience in the event that any attempt was made in the future to enact laws
targeted negatively at Indigenous citizens. Such a mechanism would maintain the
sovereignty of the Parliament. As Gruen points out, it is already used to elect
the Speaker and President of the House and Senate. What it would constrain, but
not necessarily veto, are the ‘sovereignty’ of political parties, their more
extreme ideological views, and the influence of their unaccountable donors.
A Voice enshrined in the Constitution, with a legislative design that incorporates a mechanism to allow the Voice to require a secret ballot on Indigenous specific legislation (and regulations) would go a long way to signalling to distrustful First Nations that their concerns and aspirations will be considered by not just the political party or parties that control a majority in the Parliament, but by the whole Parliament. If the secret vote mechanism led to unintended consequences, it could be fine-tuned or even removed.
It would comprise both a social justice breakthrough, lead to better
policy focussed on the public interest (and not private interests or narrow political
advantage) and strengthen our democratic system overall. It would also signal
to the substantial and growing numbers of non-Indigenous Australians who are dissatisfied
with the culture of politics today that our political leaders are seeking to
respond and address the wider trust deficit which is undermining our democratic
norms and culture.