But thou didst understand me
by my signs,
And dids’t in signs again
parley with sin…
King
John, Act four, Scene two.
The Commonwealth recently published the 2023
Intergenerational Report (link
here). The thumbnail description on the Treasury website states:
The 2023 Intergenerational
Report projects the outlook of the economy and the Australian Government’s budget
to 2062-63. This is the sixth report. Its analysis and projections of the key
drivers of economic growth will help inform and improve public policy settings
to better position Australia for the next 40 years. The report considers 5
major forces affecting the coming decades:
·
population ageing
·
technological and digital transformation
·
climate change and the net zero transformation
·
rising demand for care and support services
·
geopolitical risk and fragmentation.
The Treasurer’s Foreword states (inter alia):
The Albanese Government’s
first Intergenerational Report provides a big picture view of the forces that
will shape our economy and fiscal position over the next 40 years as we work to
create prosperity, expand opportunity, and build a stronger, more sustainable
and more inclusive nation. Digitalisation and the adoption of new technologies,
shifts in our industrial base, the energy transformation, demographic change,
and serious geopolitical uncertainty are already changing the shape of our
economy and this will continue over the coming decades.
There has been a plethora of commentary over the past week
which I do not propose to replicate. Instead, this post will focus on what the Report
says (or does not say) regarding Indigenous people, and what this means for
future policy directions.
The Report makes a series of passing mentions of Indigenous
policy issues: life expectancy at birth for First Nations people are about 8
years lower than the mainstream population (p. 43); First Nations people have a
‘significantly younger’ age profile than the general population (p. 49); and participation
rates for First Nations people are low:
The share of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people in employment remains lower than for other
Australians. Census data suggest that the gap in employment rates has narrowed
slightly from 25 percentage points in 1991 to 22 percentage points in 2021
(Chart 3.11). The employment rate of First Nations people is lower in more
rural and remote areas (pp.72-3).
It seems likely however that the uptick in participation
rates noted above are the result of higher levels of identification rather than
any underlying policy response. Even so more than four in ten Indigenous persons
between ages 25 to 64 are unemployed, a level of under-participation that has
existed for over thirty years.
The Report asserts the Commonwealth ‘is making significant
investments in closing the gap’ (p. xvii). In this statement, the word
‘significant’ is bearing all the weight, and is open to varying interpretations.
An amended version, stating the Commonwealth is making ‘significant but not
adequate’ investments would perhaps better reflect the reality.
In a discussion of critical minerals, the Report notes that
80 percent of the continental land mass is under-explored for critical minerals
and that this might offer ‘opportunities’. There is no mention of the fact that
the Indigenous estate comprises around 57% of the continental land mass (not
all in direct Indigenous ownership: link
here), and thus there is no discussion of the implications either for the
supply of critical minerals nor for the economic and other impacts on First
Nations communities of this sui generis institutional framework.
In relation to pre-school enrolment, the report notes (p.
181) that 99% of First Nations children in the year before school age cohort
are enrolled in preschool, a 225 increase since the 2016 census. The report
also reports encouraging school retention rates for all Australian students
including First Nations of 97 percent (p. 182) but falling mainstream and First
Nations attendance rates since 2015, with First Nation student’s attendance
being some 12 percent below mainstream rates (p.182). Not mentioned are the
geographic differences, with remote attendance rates and levels being much
lower than the national figures. For example, the most recent ACARA national
report on schooling in Australia (link
here) contains data suggesting in very remote regions, Indigenous
attendance levels (ie the proportion of students who attend more than 90
percent of available school days) is only 8.7 percent nationally and drops to
only 4.4 percent in the NT. The gap between very remote non-Indigenous students
and Indigenous students’ attendance levels is 33 percent. Unsurprisingly,
Indigenous educational outcomes are sub-optimal. Along with the recently
released NAPLAN figures, ACARA (the Australian Curriculum Assessment and
Reporting Authority) released a two page short commentary on the results for
each of the years 3, 5, 7, and 9 (link
here). Each commentary included the same text:
Non-Indigenous students’
average NAPLAN scores are substantially above and significantly different from
those of Indigenous students in all 5 testing domains.
The most consequential mention of First Nations in the Intergenerational
Report comes in the very last paragraph of Chapter Seven on Government
Spending. The Chapters major points are summarised at the front of the chapter
(p. 143):
Total Government spending is
projected to increase by 3.8 percentage points over the next 40 years, rising
from 24.8 per cent of GDP today to 28.6 per cent in 2062–63. Major spending pressures include health and
aged care, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), defence and
interest payments on Government debt. These are projected to rise from 8.8 per
cent of GDP today to around 14.4 per cent in 2062–63. Demographic ageing alone is estimated to
account for around 40 per cent of the increase in Government spending over the
next 40 years.
In a discussion of non-modelled ‘other payments’, the
report notes (p. 187; emphasis added):
Non-modelled payments includes
spending on all other areas not elsewhere included in this chapter, including
environmental protection and conservation, national parks and world heritage
area management, supporting First Nations
people and communities, the arts and the film industry, and the Australian
Public Service. Payments that are not
modelled are assumed to grow in line with GDP so are held as a constant
share of GDP over the projection period.
Of course, in the scheme of things, these payments are
comparatively minor, and arguably any variations will not be statistically
significant. Yet there is also an inference here that notwithstanding the significant
shortfalls in health, education, infrastructure, housing, and justice outcomes,
and the consistent failure to make a dent in closing the gap, that there is no
substantive pressure to increase the proportion of GDP that is allocated to
these issues.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Report’s silence, the
salience of mainstream programs in addressing (or not addressing) Indigenous
disadvantage is increasingly acknowledged in policy circles, not least in the
National Agreement on Closing the Gap, and in particular in its Priority
Reforms. Considering the five major forces shaping the future, it is worth
considering how those forces might impact Indigenous interests and communities.
An
ageing mainstream population is not aligned with the
current and likely continuing youthfulness of the Indigenous population, and
will likely engender a shift in the political pressures shaping governments’
policy priorities towards the concerns of an older mainstream community, and at
the expense of younger cohorts. This is a potential risk for Indigenous
interests that is rarely mentioned let alone considered in depth. There is a
related issue of the surging growth in the national Indigenous population,
driven by increasing self-identification. The report makes a glancing reference
to ‘changing First Nation identification rates’ in a footnote (p.49), but does
not consider whether the recent trends will continue into the medium term, nor
what the implications then might be.
The coming technological
and digital transformation will adversely impact the least educationally
qualified segments of the Australian population, and Indigenous interests are
over-represented in that cohort.
The accelerating impact and risks of climate change and the potential of the net zero transformation will impact remote and regional Indigenous
interests significantly. The increasing salience of energy insecurity in remote
communities is just one example (link
here). The commercial and economic opportunities are significant, but rely
on the development of widespread (not isolated pockets) commercial and economic
expertise amongst Indigenous communities as well as the structural and systemic
changes to the institutional frameworks designed to facilitate the taking up of
those opportunities. The existence of the potential will require sustained and
complex policy engagement by all governments, but particularly the
Commonwealth. Unfortunately I see little evidence that policymakers are
prepared (in both senses of the word) to focus on making these opportunities
realities. Moreover, the risks of climate change, especially if global
temperatures rise to 3 degrees or above (as the Report canvasses and as many
scientists are predicting) will have huge and adverse consequences for the
viability of many First Nation communities across remote and regional
Australia, and perhaps for the medium to long term viability of human
habitation in these areas.
The rising demand
for care and support services will impact Indigenous interests severely
given their existing vulnerabilities in the health, mental health, disability
and other sectors. There may be a silver lining in terms of increasing
employment opportunities for Indigenous people in these sectors, but it is
difficult to suggest that the net impact will be unequivocally positive.
Finally, the increasing strains of geopolitical risk and fragmentation will impact Indigenous
interests in variable ways. The biggest risk of rising international tension
will be to distract policymakers from focussing on the needs of the most
disadvantaged and to divert funding away from social and ‘soft’ priorities
towards military spending aimed at enhancing our strategic priorities. While
there may be opportunities for Indigenous interests in some of this activity,
the risks are considerable and the shift towards sophisticated and
technologically complex military systems (including support systems) does not
bode well for the least educationally qualified members of society, a segment
where Indigenous interests are over-represented.
Conclusion
The Intergenerational Report is designed not as a definitive
prediction of the future, but as a mechanism for building support for the
policy reforms required to address the challenges the nation faces over the coming
forty years. It is also deliberately framed so as to lay out a narrative that
makes the Government’s current policy priorities appear rational and necessary.
In doing so, it is inevitable that it unintentionally provides signposts to the
Government’s underlying priorities, and to the pace at which it wishes to
prosecute those policy agendas.
In terms of the Indigenous policy domain, the Intergenerational
Report appears to signify a deep-seated complacency, and preparedness to merely
keep kicking issues down the road. There are a plethora of systemic policy
challenges that have been around for decades and continue to remain
under-addressed and under-acknowledged. Moreover, the future trends identified
by the Report are (on the whole) going to impact far more seriously and more
adversely on First Nations than on the mainstream community. In other words,
without systemic reform, the trends identified will contribute to greater
social and economic inequality between First Nations and the mainstream
community.
Implicitly, the policy settings of the current Governments
appear to signify a commitment to business as usual. Clearly, the efforts to
establish an Indigenous Voice is the major exception to that assessment. The
proposed Voice is clearly important and would be a major institutional reform
if the referendum succeeds. Yet notwithstanding the merits, importance and
potential of the Voice, there remains a responsibility on governments to govern
and to invest in desperately needed infrastructure and services.
The deep-seated comparative shortfalls in First Nations lifespans,
education outcomes, in First Nations incarceration levels, in remote housing, in
health issues such as FASD and suicide and mental illness, in alcohol and drug
abuse, in domestic violence and the extraordinary levels of First Nations
children in out of home care are all scandals in their own right. Taken
together, they represent a human catastrophe which will endure well beyond the
timeframe covered by the Intergenerational Report. In these circumstances, the
inaction and lack of substantive policy focus by governments appears
incompetent at best and malign at worst. It is incomprehensible that any government focussed
on advancing the public interest could in good faith merely assert these issues
must wait while a mechanism is put in place that will itself inevitably call on
governments to act on these very issues. Yet this is the underlying signal that
the Intergenerational Report sends First Nations, and the wider community.
1 September 2023