IBA appointments: More questions than answers

 

The Minister for Indigenous Australians has this week announced new appointments to the Board of Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) (link here). There is only a single new appointment, Mr Rick Callaghan (link here). On its face, this appears to be a sensible appointment of a qualified and experienced Director.

 

The Minister has announced the reappointment of the Chair Mr Eddie Fry and two other existing Directors. The Minister’s media release omits mention of the terms of the new appointments, but notes that each of the three re-appointees have been on the IBA Board sine 2014.

 

There are a number of intriguing issues at play here. Good governance principles would normally dictate that after seven years, there would be significant  rejuvenation of the Board. This might particularly apply to the Chair, not least as the Minister previously expressed a lack of confidence in him in relation to his chairmanship at the ILSC (link here). Mr Fry was recently replaced as Chair of the ILSC (link here). The Minister has never explained how it was that Mr Fry lost his confidence as the ILSC Chair, but was able to stay on for the best part of a year as Chair of ILSC and has now been reappointed as IBA Chair.

 

Second, the IBA page on the Government’s online directory (directory.gov.au) lists IBA’s Directors and their terms. In relation to the three reappointments, the Directory includes start dates of 1 December 2021 and end dates of 28 February 2022. The page indicates that it was last updated on 25 October, but that may be an error. In any case, it appears that the three reappointments are for only three months.

 

So what might be the explanation for this ?

 

Perhaps the Minister’s reluctance to mention the appointment terms stems from a concern that by announcing what are clearly interim arrangements, it might suggest that he has been unable to obtain Cabinet approval for his preferred choices, and thus lacks influence within the Government.

 

An alternative , and more cynical, explanation might be that the Government is determined to make new appointments before the election that extend through the term of a potential new Labor Government.

 

A third explanation might be that the Minister just didn’t get his act together in time to make new appointments and was forced into making interim appointments.

 

None of these explanations reflect well on the Minister and has administration of the portfolio. It would have been better if the Minister took interested citizens into his confidence and provided a fuller explanation for his decisions.

 

A more worrying possibility is that the Ministers recent announcement applies to the post February terms of the three Directors. If so, this would lock in a serious failure of good governance principles.

 

Finally, the fact that the Minister has left us unclear as to what he has actually done, while purporting to keep us informed of his actions, reflects poorly on his commitment to open government and the highest quality of public administration.

 

The deeper issue that underlies the process of appointments to statutory offices within the Indigenous Australians portfolio (and no doubt beyond) is the increasing levels of politicisation of appointments.

 

It is time that the Parliament stepped up and legislate for much more transparency around the basis for appointments. The fiasco within the Board of the ILSC over the past two years (link here and link here) demonstrates unequivocally that the present system is broken. These most recent interim appointments confirm that conclusion. In particular, while there is a case for Ministerial decision making, there is a need for the establishment of multi-partisan/independent selection committees that propose a merit based short list to the minister for each vacancy. The process used for the ABC (link here) and largely ignored by recent Prime Ministers is one potential model. I would go further and propose that where Ministers ignore an independent selection committee shortlist, their nominees should stand down with a change of government.

 

Statutory corporations such as IBA are given independent remits for a reason. Governments should not be able to control their activities by default through informal influence over appointments.

 

 

 

 

Opportunities and risks: the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment (Economic Empowerment) Bill 2021

 

Our wills and fates do so contrary run
That our devices still are overthrown;
Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own.
Hamlet, Act 3, scene2

 

The Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee has now published its report of its Inquiry into the legislation. The Government and ALP members of the Committee recommended the Bill proceed unamended. The Greens provided a dissenting report. The report, copies of submissions, and some associated documents are available on the Committee’s web page (link here).

 

I expect that the Bill will be passed this week, probably without amendment.

 

From one perspective – that of Minister Wyatt, his agency, the NT Land Councils, and APONT (the Aboriginal Peak Organisations of the NT) – the Bill is a positive step towards Aboriginal empowerment and greater self-determination. It is the result of a codesign process over a number of years that inter alia streamline the mining provisions of the legislation (various mining interests were involved in the drafting of the legislation), reverses a number of provisions that the land councils have strongly opposed for some years, in particular relating to the capacity to delegate their powers to local corporations, and provisions relating to permits. The core of the amendments however are the proposal to establish a new statutory corporation, the NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC), which will be provided with a capital base totalling $680m over the first three years from funds already appropriated to the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA). The majority of the Directors of NTAIC will be appointed by the Land Councils. The NTAIC will have responsibility for investing that capital base (either passively or actively), and for deciding and making beneficial payments to community groups and projects across the NT.

 

On the surface, this all seems to be heading in the right direction, not least since the 1984 review of the ABA by Jon Altman recommended consideration be given to shifting the ABA under Aboriginal control, a proposal that has sat in abeyance for over thirty years (see Altman’s submission to the Inquiry).

 

Yet all is not what it seems. Of the 67 submissions to the inquiry, less than ten were supportive of the proposals. See Altman’s tabled supplementary document providing a critical assessment of the submissions in favour. Key issues raised by those with concerns (and I am one of those people)  included the extent of consultations including the lack of involvement of Aboriginal interests beyond the land councils, the effective secrecy of the process, alleged flaws in the design of the NTAIC that potentially compromise the quality of its governance, and structural tensions related to the NTAIC’s overarching functions (is it an investment body focussed on driving economic development as the name of the Bill suggests, or a beneficial grants body?). The Scrutiny of Bills Committee raised a series of technical concerns (that may nevertheless have real world implications) that the Minister proposes to disregard. An overarching concern was the potential for the land councils to accrue greater power at the expense of the interests of traditional owners.

 

It must be said that the Land Councils in their evidence to the Committee were adamant that the critiques of the Bill do not stand up to close scrutiny. Whether it is the land councils who are correct, or the critics, only time will tell.

 

For those interested in a more comprehensive understanding of the respective arguments, I recommend readers start with the Parliamentary Library’s excellent Bills Digest on the Bill (link here) read the submissions to the Senate Committee inquiry in favour of the Bill by the NIAA and the Land Councils, and for the critical perspective Jon Altman, Greg Marks, Bill Gray, the Australian Human Rights Commission, Ngurratjuta/Pmara Ntjarra Aboriginal Corporation and Michael Dillon (link here). The Committee’s majority and dissenting reports are also good overarching accounts of the arguments, albeit not entirely comprehensive (link here).

 

If we step back, and get up in the grandstand, what might we surmise about the drivers behind the process on this issue so far? In three words: politics, politics and politics.

 

The Government clearly wished to neutralise the potential threat of overwhelming anti-government sentiment from Territory Aboriginal voters. Labor too is focussed on this constituency, having preselected former NLC CEO and former NT Government Minister Marion Scrymgour for the House of Representatives seat of Lingiari. Labor’s support for this Bill may well be a result of the fact that to adopt an alternative position would be seen to undermine their candidate in the forthcoming election. IF so, this is astute politics at the cost of poor policy. On the issue of electoral disengagement, see this previous post analysing the extremely poor voting turnout amongst Territory voters (link here).

 

The Government also wished to deliver miners streamlined access for prospective mineral exploration on Aboriginal land, and was prepared to trade the Howard Government inspired, but now defunct and no longer contentious provisions on delegated powers and permits for these gains.

 

A further Government motivation is its need to deliver the appearance of action to its own ideological constituency. Thus we see it package up what I previously described as ‘a largely rhetorical policy narrative built around economic opportunity, jobs and wealth creation’ (link here). While the NTAIC gives the appearance of substance, the funds to be allocated are entirely transfers from already appropriated funds for the ABA. There is no net addition to the Government investment in ‘developing the north’ and for this reason, I continue to assert that this reform is, at its core, essentially rhetorical in purpose. Yes, it will potentially have substantive impacts (hopefully positive, potentially negative), but they will not in themselves make a serious difference to the economic status of Aboriginal Territorians. The amounts involved are, compared to the scale of the needs, not large enough.

 

A final Government motivation derives from its deep antagonism to funding social housing in remote areas, notwithstanding the crucial significance of overcrowding as a driver of poor social and economic outcomes. This is an issue I have posted about on numerous occasions previously. The Land Councils have for some years been pursuing an agenda to establish a community controlled housing entity, an agenda that I very strongly support. How might a government divert them from this agenda? By offering an alternative agenda and arguing that it is not possible to do more than one thing at a time. See my November 2020 post (link here) where I explicitly canvassed the possibility that the Minister was seeking to avoid progressing this agenda. The following exchange from the Committee’s public hearing is instructive:

CHAIR: Great. Do you see this legislation as the end of the codesign process?

Mr Nugent (CLC): Certainly not. From the views that've been expressed, and the documented resolutions of our council, the Central Land Council, there is still much reform and much to be done. One of the larger reforms that has been sought was the establishment of an Aboriginal community-controlled housing entity. It was hoped some years ago, when discussions began with the current minister and the current minister authorised discussions with his department, that an Aboriginal controlled-community housing entity would be part of this suite of reforms. It's a very large and complex piece—housing in the Northern Territory for Aboriginal people, particularly now in a time of a world-wide pandemic health crisis. It's absolutely vital. It was accepted some time ago that this particular piece, the community-controlled Aboriginal housing entity, still required further work. We're still endeavouring to engage with the government on that basis. That would be one major piece that still has a ways to go. (Committee Hearing 18 November 2021, pages 2/3; emphasis added).

 

The Land Councils clearly believe they have obtained adequate concessions from the Government during the codesign process to offset the adverse implications of the Government’s broader motivations. While that is an assessment for them to make, for what it is worth, I don’t see substantial benefits for Aboriginal interests. As I argued in my submission to the Committee inquiry, I do not accept that there is Aboriginal control over the NTAIC. Whatever increased influence is obtained (there will undoubtedly be some), it is partial and leaves open the potential for future co-option by governments regarding the ongoing flow of funds from the ABA to the NTAIC.

 

Moreover, as I argued in my submission, the broader risk to the core statutory role and modus operandi of the land councils is significant. This risk (discussed in detail in my submission) goes to the heart of the role of land councils, and to the very raison d’etre for land councils to have a role in negotiating third party land access on Aboriginal land in the NT. So too is the risk of economic loss significant if the NTAIC decides to adopt an active (as opposed to passive) investment strategy.

 

The huge and largely unpublicised increases in Land Council budgets that I pointed to in my November 2020 blog post (link here) is in retrospect directly relevant to the ongoing negotiations over the ABA and ALRA amendments. As I said then, Ministers generally expect a quid pro quo for these types of decisions. We can now see that whatever concessions were provided in return for these budget decisions relate to the provisions of this Bill. Without open and transparent process, codesign can easily slide into back room dealings. The fact that the Minister made no mention of the codesign process then underway when he announced the $100m for the land councils (by the way making him complicit in the secrecy that many of the critics – including Aboriginal critics – allege) only reinforces the reasonableness of a deeply sceptical perspective on the process adopted. In hindsight, it is clear that my 14 June 2021 post on the Minister’s first announcement of his proposals (link here) was correct in warning of the need for close consideration of any reform proposals.

 

Under these changes, the Land Councils have achieved only partial control over the ABA. A partial reform may seem attractive, but it can also operate as a rationale for leaving the status quo in place. One of the lessons I have learned over my career in public policy is that real reform is hard, and in particular, there are always unintended consequences. The risk of negative unintended consequences with these reforms strikes me as particularly high.

 

The Minister and the Land Councils should take careful note of Shakespeare’s warning: Our wills and fates do so contrary run!

 

 

Closing the Gap: rhetoric trumps substance

 

I have recently published two CAEPR Discussion Papers on Closing the Gap.

 

The first, titled The first decade of Closing the Gap: What went wrong? (link here), deals with the initial phase of Closing the Gap from 2008 to 2020. This phase extends from the announcement of the new policy architecture for closing the gap by the Rudd Government, established under a COAG agreement known as the National Indigenous Reform Agreement (NIRA), through to its expiry in 2018 -2020.

 

The second Discussion Paper, titled The new policy architecture for Closing the Gap: Innovation and regression (link here), covers the second ‘refreshed’ phase of closing the gap established under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here) promulgated in July 2020.

 

The first Discussion Paper demonstrates how LNP Governments from 2013 progressively dismantled and/or defunded the various National Partnership Agreements that were encompassed by the NIRA, based on an examination of key high level evaluations and reviews, and importantly, on a ‘review’ of the NIRA commissioned by COAG obtained, after extensive effort, under FOI (link here). The key point here (confirmed in the NIRA review prepared by Government officials and endorsed by the Joint Council on Closing the Gap) is that from 2013 onwards, while Prime Ministers stood up each year and delivered heartfelt reports to the Australian people and parliament on closing the gap, the overall funding allocated in phase one was progressively cut back and not renewed as appropriations ended.

 

See this earlier post for an account of the reasons the document was initially refused in full (link here). Following an appeal to the Australian Information Commissioner, and the preparation of multiple submissions countering the agency’s blustering, the Department finally released the document in full in November 2020, in advance of a pending decision by the Information Commissioner. The 15 months delay between the original request (in August 2019) and the release was justified by the agency on the basis that changed circumstances meant that it was no longer not in the public interest to refuse access. I for one was not persuaded by the agency’s rationales, both in refusing access initially, and releasing later in advance of the Information Commissioner review.

 

The second Discussion Paper critically analyses the policy architecture put in place by the ‘refresh’ process which was based on a codesign process with the Coalition of Peaks, comprising over 50 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled peak and member organisations across Australia. After describing the processes leading up to the negotiation of the new National Agreement on closing the gap, the analysis discusses the relevant academic literature and critically assesses the implementation risks that could undermine the success of the second phase of closing the gap. Those risks are more than substantial. The Discussion Paper then outlines a series of further reforms that might  be considered to address those risks.

 

While each Discussion Paper stands on its own, they are complementary insofar as they are chronologically sequential. The evidence shows that the LNP Government has for eight years cut or failed to renew financial resources directed to closing the gap. Over time, these decisions effectively eviscerated the capability of the initial policy architecture to gain traction. Looking forward, the LNP Government has deliberately shifted responsibility for much of the heavy lifting to the states and territories, and allocated what can only be described as a miserable contribution going forward (link here). In the future, any shortfall in meeting the Closing the Gap targets will be primarily the fault of the states and territories. Over the past eight years, the Opposition ALP, and to a lesser extent the Greens, appear to have run dead on these steadily accumulating incremental cuts, preferring to score vapid political points rather than mount a sustained campaign directed to holding the LNP Government to account for its (deliberate) policy failures. In these circumstances, the likelihood that the nation will get serious about closing the gap and make a substantial difference in the near future seems remote. Only sustained and effective political pressure will change this pessimistic reality.

 

I hope these Discussion Papers will go some way to highlighting the ways in which governments are failing not only First Nations, but the nation as a whole, and consequently, point towards strategies that might ultimately take us out of the wilderness. While the issues are articulated in bureaucratic and technical terms, the outcomes on the ground are measured in shortened lifespans, reduced educational opportunities, increased family violence, increased incarceration, increased out of home care, higher rates of mental illness, higher unemployment, and significantly reduced life opportunities. To some, this may sound like ‘deficit discourse’, but my point is that these outcomes are real and they are clearly and demonstrably a function of the lack of substantive policy and political commitment by governments and the political class generally.

The future of the Ayers Rock Resort: a soothsayer’s prognostications

 

How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds

Makes deeds ill done

King John Act 4, scene 2.

 

The ILSC Annual Report 2020-21 released on 27 October 2021 (link here) includes some interesting information on the state of play with the Ayers Rock Resort (ARR), owned and managed by ILSC subsidiary Voyages Indigenous Tourism Australia Pty Ltd.

 

ARR was purchased by the ILC in 2010/2011 for $300 million in contentious circumstances. According to the RBA inflation calculator (link here), $300m in 2010 equates to $360m in 2020. The then Board’s vision in pursuing the purchase was ostensibly to provide Indigenous interests with an iconic business asset at the symbolic heart of the continent. The ARR and its associated town infrastructure of Yulara had been established some decades before with substantial financial assistance from the then NT Government. The ARR’s location, control of the Yulara airstrip, and effective control over development activities within Yulara provide ARR with monopolistic commercial leverage over tourist access to Uluru.

 

While the strategic insight had merit, the issues in contention revolved around whether the substantial price paid by the ILC was excessive, and whether the ILC had the financial capacity to undertake the acquisition. There were also questions of alignment between the ILC’s objectives and the actual aspirations of the Anangu traditional owners (TOs) of the Yulara land. At a more fundamental level, there is an as yet unresolved question over whether a single purpose large scale commercial enterprise located remote from developed infrastructure and significant surrounding economic activity will ever have the robustness and resilience to develop into a long term sustainable and commercially viable enterprise. This is the question that has been at the heart of the aspirations for ‘northern development’ for well over a century.

 

My own view is that the price paid was excessive and the ILC did not have the financial capacity to fund the purchase. Over the decade since, the financial commitments arising from the purchase have imposed a significant constraint on the ILC’s ability to undertake its core statutory remit. That is, to acquire land for dispossessed Indigenous groups, and to provide assistance in land management for those with access to land through the multiple land rights and native title mechanisms in place across the nation. On the question of TO aspirations, it is a complex and evolving issue that I am not in a position to ascertain. My intuition however is that TOs have mixed feelings, appreciating the jobs and commercial opportunities arising from the influx of tourists, while not valuing the social and cultural impacts of tourists on their country. As for the fundamental question related to northern development, the answer so far has been that without substantial government subsidies, sustainable commercial survival is most often a chimera.

 

In 2010, the then ILC Board decided to proceed with the purchase of ARR against the wishes of the two Ministers responsible for the ILC legislation, the then Ministers for Finance Penny Wong and Indigenous Affairs Jenny Macklin. At the time, the ARR had been on the market for some time, and the former owners had allowed it to run down. The ILC funded the purchase through substantial borrowings. The purchase also involved a commitment by the ILC to offer 7 percent equity in the ARR to a local Aboriginal corporation, Wunu Unkatja (WU) after ten years. WU are currently considering whether to take up the offer. The ILC’s purchase was strongly supported by the then Opposition Shadow Minister Nigel Scullion (he was a Senator for the NT), and once he became Minister in 2013, he strongly resisted the attempts of the new ILC Board to review and address the implications of the previous Board’s decision to acquire ARR. Since the ILSC is a statutory corporation, the Commonwealth Government’s status as the ARR’s effective owner and ‘funder of last resort’ along with its ‘head in the sand’ approach since 2013 means it cannot avoid responsibility for future outcomes.

 

Ten years on and the ILSC’s ownership of ARR has been demanding on a number of fronts, most recently arising from the impact of Covid 19. The 2020-21 financial statements for the ILSC value the ARR at $390 million although the ANAO auditor went out of his way to point out that this valuation is highly sensitive to the assumption of a return to pre-covid occupancy levels and room rates within two years. Over the past decade, the ILSC has invested at least $100m and probably closer to $150m in capital upgrades to the airport and all of the individual hotels that comprise ARR (see list below). The most recent Annual Report notes the completion of a number of major refurbishments (page 88). The size and age of the ARR’s infrastructure makes it inevitable that a process of ongoing and significant capital investment will be required for as long as the asset operates. The ILSC continues to carry $102.5m in debt related to the original purchase, and some $27m from the NAIF (link here) ostensibly related to the upgrade of the Connellan airport. Last financial year the ARR operated at an underlying loss, offset by Covid related subsidies. Voyages net loss for  2020-21 was $7.6m (page 87).

 

In real terms, and using conservative estimates, over the past decade the ILSC has spent at least $460m and still owes a further $127m on ARR, an asset worth $390m today. In round figures, the ILSC is at least $200m out of pocket (albeit this is a loss that remains uncrystallised). Moreover, it is quite clear that the ARR will continue to be a challenging and expensive asset to manage going forward.

 

These challenges are complicated by the statutory requirement in section 191D of the ILSC’s legislation (link here) that limits its acquisition functions to purchasing land for granting to Aboriginal corporations, and where circumstance require the ILSC to acquire the land directly, it is required to divest the land within a reasonable period. So, as the ILSC annual report (page 90) notes:

The ILSC’s commitment to its mandate of divesting acquired and improved land will see continued efforts to rebuild the value and financial sustainability of Voyages’ assets in readiness for future granting. The subsidiary will continue to focus on infrastructure improvements, operational efficiencies and Indigenous benefits.

 

The frank admission that the ‘value and financial sustainability’ of ARR requires rebuilding is significant and worth contemplating. Having now held direct title over the ARR for ten years, the question arises whether continued delay in divestment of the asset (which looks more like a liability) accords with the statutory requirement to divest within a reasonable period. There have been calls for early divestment for a number of years. See for example this 2015 Guardian article citing calls by Mick Dodson, and confirming that the ILC and the Central Land Council had been in discussion over the issue (link here).

 

While the genesis of this problem can be traced back to the original flawed decision-making by the ILC Board in 2010, finding a solution falls squarely on the current Directors, as well as the responsible Ministers. As explained below, the pressures to find a solution are likely to grow over the coming years.

 

The recent ILSC Annual Report contains (to my knowledge) the first formal indication that the ILSC Board is now focussed on the divestment issue. The Annual Report notes rather flatly (page 107) that the Board had established the ‘Project Aurora Steering Committee’:

The Project Aurora Steering Committee supports the ILSC in developing a pathway to divestment for the Ayers Rock Resort, land and business assets, including providing guidance on engagement with traditional owners. The Committee was established by resolution of the ILSC Board on 14 April 2021.

 

One very real constraint going forward – beyond Covid – will be the impact of Australia’s cooling strategic relations with China and the resulting likely fall off in the previously significant and growing Chinese tourism market, where over 50 percent of all Chinese tourist to the NT visited ARR. (link here).

 

Another constraint, perhaps the most significant, is finding a potential Aboriginal corporation with the skills, capability and financial resources to take over the ARR. At the moment, the only potential recipient would be Centrecorp, a development corporation closely associated with the CLC (link here). The risk for Centrecorp would be the uncertain, but potentially significant ongoing capital costs associated with running the ARR whether or not it is making a profit or a loss.

 

The ILSC Annual Reports and other corporate documents provide very little information on the strategic options being considered. Accordingly, it might be of use if I – in my role as an experienced soothsayer –  have a go at listing the options.

 

Options for solving the ARR divestment issue

 

Option one: sell the ARR asset. The advantage would be to cut the ILSC’s losses, which are likely to take many years to recover, and in some potential scenarios may worsen. The political reality however is that there would be strident opposition from a range of sources to relinquishing the Indigenous branded asset in such an iconic location. No Minister will want to oversee its sale to non-Indigenous owners.

 

Option two: reduce the ILSC equity exposure. This is similar to option one, with the added complication of adding complexity to future management, but without reducing the likely political reactions.

 

Option three: move to divest the ARR to an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation. The challenge is to find a corporation with access to the financial resources and management capabilities to take on what is an extremely complex business, subject to multiple risks, and revenue variability. Most importantly, given the ARR’s ANZ loan (with an outstanding balance of $100m) will fall due in 2025, and on current projections will need to be rolled over. Any recipient Aboriginal Corporation will need to be prepared to take on what is a very significant liability along with a highly risky asset, as well as having the capacity to manage relations with the local TOs who will expect to be involved as co-owners and co-managers.

 

The soothsayer’s prognostications

 

Clearly, there is no good option available. Ideally, the ILSC would paydown the outstanding loan before divestment. However, doing so would likely require the best part of another decade of ILSC ownership, financial uncertainty, and serious financial impact on ILSC core activities. As I pointed out in a recent academic article, (Unmet

Potential, esp. pages 113-4 in Rademaker & Rowse (eds) Indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, ANU Press, link here), the ILSC has funded much of its ongoing operations through selling down its previously substantial cattle herd. This is a strategy that is both short-sighted and which will not be available forever. Without pre-emptive action, the day is drawing close when the ILSC and importantly the Commonwealth Government will confront the reality that retaining ARR within the ILSC will drastically cut back its capacity to fulfill the ILSC’s core statutory remit.

 

Given this background, it seems more than a coincidence that the Commonwealth has recently introduced legislation to establish a Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) as the key part of a suite of amendments to the NT Aboriginal Land Rights Act. The amendments have been codesigned with the NT land councils, and are, in my view, conceptually flawed. In a separate post, I will link to key submissions to the Senate Committee when they become available.

 

While it is unclear whether the land councils have been appraised of, or have considered, the possibility that the NTAIC will be asked to take over the ARR, it is inconceivable to me that the Commonwealth has not given this option serious consideration. The advantage for the Commonwealth would be to shift the ownership to a subsidiary of the NTAIC comprised potentially of an assemblage of smaller TO corporations with minority holdings. Importantly, while technically it would remain under Commonwealth control and ultimate ownership, any future financial recourse required to ensure the ongoing viability of the ARR would be made from pre-existing appropriations made to the ABA rather than from new appropriations. This would reduce the Commonwealth’s overall contingent liability. Conceivably, the Minister could also use ABA funds to pay off the ANZ loan either before or as part of the divestment transaction.  

 

The apparent advantage to NTAIC (and the land councils) would be that at face value, the NTAIC would increase its capital base by around $400m, with the potential to grow significantly over the coming decade. On the downside, that potential comes with very substantial commercial uncertainties and risk, and may well diminish further the funds available to NTAIC for distribution to thousands of potential beneficiaries across the NT. And it may also come with a net reduction in ABA funds available for distribution ot Aboriginal Territorians into the future.

 

If correct, these prognostications suggest a reason for the secrecy and haste surrounding the current legislative process. They also add weight to the case for much more rigorous scrutiny of the Government’s NTAIC proposals.

 

Appendix: Incomplete list of selected capital costs since 2011

$43m  2012 Refurbishment of Sails in the Desert and Uluru Meeting Place (link here).

$7m    2017 Tjintu solar field: (link here);

$27m 2019 Connellan airport upgrade (link here);

$?       2021 completion Sails in the Desert bathroom refurbishment (228 rooms) Ann. Rpt. p.88

$?       2021 final refurbishment and upgrade of five campground amenity blocks Ann. Rpt. p.88

$?       2021 refurb Connellan airport amenities; expansion security screening area Ann. Rpt. p.88

This list is the basis for my assessment that at least $100m has been spent on capital upgrades at ARR since its acquisition by the ILSC in 2010/11.

Wending languidly towards Indigenous digital inclusion

 

That glib and oily art

To speak and purpose not.

King Lear, Act 1, scene 1.

 

The NIAA recently published a Discussion Paper to support the development of the Australian Government’s proposed Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan (link here).

 

According to The Mandarin (link here):

Federal Indigenous Australians minister Ken Wyatt said access to digital technology was closely linked with economic growth and social connection and was particularly essential because of COVID-19.

“Digital technology encourages entrepreneurialism, wealth creation and economic advancement – it’s about closing the gap and taking the next step after that,” Wyatt said.

“That is why we are developing a comprehensive plan to address the barriers to digital inclusion.”

 

My initial reaction to the NIAA Discussion Paper after a quick scan was that this was a useful and thorough piece of work. It included plenty of data, state by state analyses, and covered the key issues involved, with extensive reliance on the available academic literature. I made the decision to draft this post motivated in part by a desire to record some positive policy developments. Unfortunately, the closer I looked at the issues involved, the more disheartened and critical I became.

 

This post is not aimed at exploring in detail the elements of the Indigenous digital divide. The NIAA Discussion Paper, complemented by the research papers cited in its footnotes,  is in fact a good and timely introduction, albeit one that must be considered critically. For example, it glosses some important issues, for example the links between low rates of digital inclusion and high levels of financial literacy, and low levels of educational attainment. It fails to mention others such as the potential links between the extraordinarily high levels of pre-covid disengagement with the social security system in remote Australia and digital inclusion. See the April 2020 Senate Community Affairs Committee report into the adequacy of Newstart (link here) for a discussion of disengagement and a recommendation for further research to be commissioned by NIAA (paras 6.142–153). Eighteen months later, this appears not to have progressed.

 

Instead of an analysis of the Indigenous digital divide – an issue deserving of detailed research in the post covid policy world – this post aims to consider the backstory to the NIAA Discussion Paper.

 

The background is set out in the Discussion Paper’s Introduction:

In 2018, the Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee presented the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review – Getting it right out there (the Review). For Indigenous Australians, the report highlighted the need for those living in remote communities to have better access to phone and Internet services. Recommendation 8 called for a targeted Indigenous Digital Inclusion Program, with a focus on access, affordability and digital ability, to be developed in partnership with Indigenous communities.

In response to the Review, the Australian Government agreed in-principle to Recommendation 8, and committed to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan. 

 

So the genesis of the Discussion Paper is the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review (link here). That review allocated five pages (pp.57-61) to discussion Indigenous needs. While brief and succinct, it made the case for improvements in digital access:

A coherent and holistic policy approach to telecommunications services is needed for remote Indigenous communities. A number of stakeholders have called for the development of an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Strategy. It is important that there is local ownership in all aspects of the strategy, and that it builds upon the capacity of existing organisations, infrastructure and programs to avoid duplication.

The strategy should include data collection to measure whether remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community members have broadband available to them with the minimum requirements in terms of access, availability, affordability and digital literacy. The strategy should consider affordability and suitability of services for Indigenous communities, such as community Wi-Fi. It is important that a digital literacy program is included as part of any such strategy, and is developed to be culturally and linguistically appropriate for remote community members.

 

The review recommended

A targeted Indigenous Digital Inclusion program with a focus on access, affordability and digital ability be developed in partnership with Indigenous communities.

 

The Australian Government March 2019 response (link here) stated:

Recommendation 8:  The Government agrees-in-principle with this recommendation. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, will provide lead policy advice, with support from the Department of Communications and the Arts to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan. The Government will work through existing Indigenous consultative mechanisms such as the Indigenous Advisory Council to identify community priorities and ensure a tailored response.

The Government’s Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan will consider Government investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion and identify community priorities for further work (recommendation 8). A one-size-fits-all approach is not always appropriate, and specific action needs to be tailored to community needs.

 

Or as the NIAA Discussion Paper put it in more succinct terms, the Australian Government:

agreed in-principle to Recommendation 8, and committed to develop an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan.

 

On its face, this seems positive. However, the response is qualified…it is ‘in principle’ and is a commitment to develop ‘a plan’, not to develop ‘a program’ (with the implication that funding would be allocated) nor does it commit to any tangible action to improve digital inclusion.

 

In mid-2021, the parties to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap added a new target on digital inclusion (link here). This sets an ambitious target of 5 years to Indigenous digital equality, but simultaneously points to a lack of data to enable measurement of the target.

 

In May 2021, the Government released its 2030 Digital Economy Strategy (link here) with associated finding of $1.2bn. The only mention of Indigenous digital issues was on p.33 in a section (misleadingly) headed ‘What has already been delivered’, where the review states:

Digital literacy and ability are being considered as part of an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan currently being developed. The Plan will consider Government investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion and identify priorities for further work. It will also have a focus on access and affordability.

 

The recently released NIAA Discussion Paper – which arrives two and a half years after the Government committed to develop ‘a plan’ – lists in an appendix all conceivable programs that might assist Indigenous citizens’ digital inclusion. The appendix lists 19 Australian Government universal programs (ie mainstream programs available to all citizens). There is no analysis of whether mainstream programs are underutilised by Indigenous citizens. Whatever their merits and take up by Indigenous citizens, the mainstream programs are delivering the current digital divide, and thus are conceptually irrelevant to addressing the issue of Indigenous digital exclusion. It also lists 6 targeted programs (ie Indigenous specific programs) only two of which appear to involve funding:

Remote Indigenous Community Telecommunications program: maintenance and monitoring of 245 community payphones and 301 Wi-Fi telephones, generally located in communities with less than 50 permanent residents that do not have reasonable access to a public telephone.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Technology-Facilitated Abuse Resources Program: co-designed resources and training to support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women to identify, report and protect themselves and their children from technology-facilitated abuse. Includes a grants program for Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations to develop culturally appropriate, place-based resources.

 

These are ‘the investments to date to improve Indigenous digital inclusion’. The NIAA Discussion Paper does not indicate the funding levels involved, but they are likely to be less than $5m over four years. These are the programs to be ‘considered’ by the ‘plan’ which is unlikely to be finalised before the next federal election. Even if this funding amounted to $10m, it would only comprise less than one percent of the $1.2bn allocated in May 2021 under the Digital Economy Strategy. The Prime Minister’s media release accompanying the Digital Economy Strategy (link here) included reference to other significant digital economy funding announced by the Government totalling in excess of $7bn. Back of the envelope, $10m is 0.125% of $8bn. If actions speak louder than words, then this is the measure of the current Government’s commitment to Indigenous digital exclusion.

 

The Regional Telecommunications Review takes place every three years under Part 9B of the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999. It assesses the adequacy of telecommunications services in regional, rural and remote parts of Australia.

 

Past reviews and government responses are available on the Infrastructure Department website (link here).

 

The 2008 Glasson review included an extensive section on Indigenous telecommunications needs, which documented the existence of the an extensive digital divide. The then Government accepted the recommendation ‘to expand the implementation and maintenance of community phones, including pre-paid options for people in remote Indigenous communities’. It allocated $3.7m in funding.

 

The 2012 Sinclair review recommended that ‘there should be a continuation and expansion of the Indigenous Communications Program, with sufficient flexibility to allow for tailored localised training and digital literacy solutions. The program should include a trial of wi-fi hotspots using selected community phones’. The then Government responded that the recommendation required further consideration.

 

The 2015 Schiff review made no recommendations relating to Indigenous telecommunications needs.

 

The 2018 review has been discussed above.

 

In June 2021, the 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review began its work (link here). The Review issued an Issues Paper to guide its consultation processes (link here) which included a short section on Indigenous issues, listing (without attribution)  issues identified by the previous review:

Levels of digital inclusion amongst Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians continue to remain lower than the national average, including in regard to the take-up and affordability of telecommunications services.

As with the wider community, mobile phones are the most commonly used device for voice and data services in Indigenous communities. However, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians are also more likely to only use mobile services than the national average. This likely reflects a strong preference towards pre-paid mobile plans due to the ability to ‘pay-as-you-go', providing more financial control than other forms of access which charge monthly fees.

Wi-Fi services are also available in some remote areas, both through free access at local community facilities or using a pre-paid voucher system with data quotas. The National Indigenous Affairs Agency also funds community phones which may use a similar payment model. While Sky Muster is available across Australia, take-up is low in remote communities.

Although pre-paid mobile and Wi-Fi internet options are often easier to manage, these services can charge higher costs for data than post-paid mobile and broadband plans. Additionally, higher levels of 3G-only mobile coverage in remote areas can lead to slower speeds and heavy network congestion, which may reduce uptake of data-intensive activities.

The Committee is interested to examine the adequacy of telecommunications for Indigenous Australians in regional, rural and remote areas. In particular, the Committee welcomes views on ways to improve levels of telecommunications access and affordability in remote Indigenous communities.

 

The 2021 review’s consultation phase has recently concluded.

 

The latest NIAA Discussion Paper relies heavily on the 2020 Australian Digital Inclusion Index: Measuring Australia’s Digital Divide (link here). This is the fifth edition of a regular report, and is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding digital exclusion issues. On page 19, the report spells out in some detail the elements driving digital exclusion amongst urban and regional Indigenous citizens, spelling out the sustained lower index scores for Indigenous citizens used throughout the Discussion paper. But the data collection is only partial. As the report itself notes (p.19):

The ADII data collection does not extend to remote Indigenous communities, where high levels of geographic isolation and socioeconomic disadvantage pose distinct challenges for digital inclusion. In 2018 and 2019, ADII case studies were conducted in the remote indigenous communities of Ali Curung in the NT and Pormpuraaw in far north Queensland. Findings from these studies suggest that digital inclusion for Indigenous Australians further diminishes with remoteness, particularly in terms of Access and Affordability. [emphasis added].

 

See also the discussion on the Northern Territory at p.45. The report backs up the discussion of Indigenous digital divide in its concluding section (pp.46–7). It mentions the new Closing the Gap target, and mentions that while it focusses on access to digital services, it overlooks the issue of affordability.

 

The NIAA Discussion Paper mentions the data issues relating to remote communities in a single sentence (p.4) and on page 19. However, the rest of the report and the multiple graphics utilise the ADII index data. Given the genesis of the Discussion Paper in concerns around remote digital exclusion, the use of an index based on urban and regional surveys, and that excludes remote data, is in many respects misleading. The data utilised significantly understate the levels of Indigenous digital exclusion across remote Australia. The Discussion Paper does acknowledge these limitations, and hints that it plans to utilise a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, and data proxies in the absence of adequate data. Importantly, it notes that:

The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey, last conducted in 2014-15, generated data on digital access, use and training, but has not been undertaken recently [my emphasis].

 

One might ask why has it not been undertaken? Over recent decades, NATSISS has been a core element in policy and program development across the whole of the Indigenous policy domain.

 

The bottom line is that at least since 2008, Australian Governments have been aware of the existence of a substantial digital divide. While data is important, and useful, a Government and Minister that was serious about this issue would start by devising a basic program with some serious funding (say $20-40m) over four years, and then work to establish the data sets to establish underlying levels of need and finetune and improve the targeting of the program. In the face of overwhelming and demonstrable need, putting the data horse before the action cart is merely a ploy to do nothing.

 

After 13 years, and four completed statutory reviews, only $3.7m has been allocated as a result of the review recommendations, and the only action since 2008 has been a commitment tabled in the Parliament to develop a plan, a plan to be developed in consultation with an Indigenous advisory committee the Government has abolished without explanation (link here), a plan which is still unimplemented 30 months after the commitment was made.

 

Given the context outlined above, what are the odds that the Government is serious in publishing the latest NIAA Discussion Paper? Why should anyone take it seriously? What does it say about the Government’s level pf commitment to the new Closing the Gap targets? What does it say about Minister Wyatt’s influence within the Government that he can participate in a Cabinet discussion to approve $1.2bn in digital economy expenditure in May this year and extract zero for remote Indigenous citizens who confront multiple and complex needs in the digital policy space?

 

It is clear that the Australian Government’s failure to acknowledge that there is an issue requiring resolute and immediate substantive policy action – rather than a mere plan – is at the root of the continuing digital exclusion of Indigenous citizens, particularly in remote regions. In more ways than one, digital extraction is the prerequisite for improvements in Indigenous digital inclusion.

Into the blizzard: the current policy announcement blitz in the Indigenous policy domain

 

May the winds blow till they have wakened death

Othello Act 2, scene 1.

 

Almost a year ago, in September 2020, I published a post ‘Ways of Working’ assessing the Government’s broad approach to the Indigenous affairs portfolio based in large measure on a close reading the Minister Wyatt’s speeches (link here). I think that post is worth re-reading in full. In that post I noted:

If my reading of the Minister’s speech is correct, this is indeed a far-reaching policy agenda. It is not new, but is arguably a sharper and more overt justification and rationale for what has effectively been the Coalition Government Indigenous policy settings since it came to office. It implicitly seeks to justify policy inaction, shifting policy and funding responsibilities to the states and territories wherever possible, the substantial budget reductions and policy reversals since 2013, and the failure to step up and substantively address the investment implications of sustained disadvantage. Most importantly, it appears to implicitly seek to justify ongoing social and political structural exclusion through the use of rhetorical tropes designed to resonate with Indigenous citizens: self-determination, empowerment, and listening to as yet unheard voices. [emphasis added]

 

In recent weeks, the Minister has announced a veritable whirlwind of policy initiatives. This post aims to lay out the most significant announcements and assess at a high level their substantive policy and political significance. In particular, I ask the question: is it time to revise my  earlier conclusion that a core element of the Government’s approach to Indigenous affairs is a covert adherence to substantive policy inaction?

 

Before we list the recent announcements however, it is worth listing a number of the most prominent reviews and policy development exercises in the Indigenous policy space initiated by the Government, but for which there is as yet no substantive formal closure or completion.

 

In chronological order, the Government is presently sitting on recommendations from:

 

• The Australian Law Reform Commission on native title from 2015 (link here). While there have been technical amendments made to the Native Title Act in the period since this report was issued (link here), they do not address the substantive recommendations of the ALRC. See my previous posts on native title here, here and especially here.

 

• The 2015 COAG investigation into Indigenous land tenure (link here) which was technically endorsed in principle by COAG, but never implemented by any jurisdiction including the Commonwealth.

 

• The Indigenous Reference Group on Northern Australian apparently provided a series of 36 recommendations to the Government in 2017 (see their submission to the parliamentary inquiry into the Opportunities and engagement of traditional owners into the economic development of northern Australia – link here), but they have not been made public and there has been no response of any kind. The IRG web page on the website of the Commonwealth agency responsible for ‘northern development’, the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, (link here) has ceased listing any IRG meeting communique’s as of December 2019. The implication is that the IRG has ceased to operate.

 

• The Productivity Commission review into Indigenous evaluation delivered to Government in October 2020 (link here). See my September 2020 post which predicted the likely lack of action in relation to this issue (link here).

 

• The process to develop an Indigenous Voice was established by the Government in November 2019, and has apparently provided its final report to the Government although the Government’s web sites do not actually confirm this. The Minister last issued a media release on the matter in January 2021 (link here) when the Interim Report of the Advisory Groups established to provide advice to Government was released. I published a post on some of the key underlying issues involved in designing a Voice in February (link here). My recent academic paper on codesign included a case study on the Voice (link here).

 

Recent announcements include:

 

• In May 2021, the Government announced its intention to codesign a replacement for the Community Development Program (CDP), the controversial program that combines and links income support with a punitive conditional job search requirement. The Government has recently announced that this new program will henceforth be called the Remote Engagement Program and released a Discussion Paper. In recent days (1 September) the Minister announced the introduction of legislation to provide for a supplementary payment for participants in the pilot trial sites involved in developing the new policy architecture (link here). A group of academics at the ANU and UQ have recently published a short paper suggesting the principles that should be guide the design of the new program (link here).

 

• On 5 August 2021, the Commonwealth issued its first implementation Plan as required by the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here). There has as yet been no comprehensive assessment of the Implementation Plan published. Early response from ANU academics and myself, which must be regarded as provisional, have raised various concerns (link here and here).

 

• On 24 August, 2021, the Government announced a National Roadmap for Indigenous Skills, Jobs and Wealth Creation (link here). The National Roadmap will (when completed) include short , medium and long term priority actions. The Minister recently announced a series of 12 roundtables to assist the development of the new Roadmap, kicking off the first roundtable by appointing 16 ‘Industry Champions’ to assist in developing the National Roadmap and driving change. I have a number of concerns that flow from my reading of the Discussion Paper, but will need to draft a separate post to explore them fully.

 

• On 25 August 2021, the Minister introduced a Bill (the ‘Economic Empowerment Bill’) to amend the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, in its words, the most comprehensive set of reforms to ALRA since its enactment in 1976 (link here). I previously published a post expressing deep scepticism regarding the overall approach to these changes based on an earlier announcement of the proposals (link here). I am yet to closely consider the proposed legislation.

 

• On 25 August 2021, the Minister introduced a Bill to make further amendments to the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders) Act 2006 (CATSI Act) (link here). The amendments appear to be largely technical in nature. The Government decided, against pressure from native title interests, to not draft a separate part of the CATSI Act for native title bodies. Instead, PBCs are treated like any other CATSI Corporation. While this is a defensible position (it will not increase the complexity of the legislation), there is a risk that the unique requirements of native title bodies will not be given adequate attention by regulators into the future.

 

How should we make sense of all this policy development activity?

 

The first point to make is that it is being laid down on a pre-existing policy terrain. That terrain is characterised by significant Commonwealth funding, notably the Indigenous Advancement Strategy (link here and link here); by demographic changes which have seen significant increases in the size and geographic distribution of the Indigenous community over the past decade, and portend major changes into the future (link here); by significant (but largely unacknowledged ) access to mainstream services and programs by Indigenous people; by a sustained effort by the Commonwealth to shift responsibilities and focus in the Indigenous affairs space to the states and territories wherever possible; and by the deliberate decision to withdraw funding from the portfolio underpinning the efforts on Closing the Gap; the most egregious example here was the decision to not renew the ten year $5.5bn National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing (link here). The recent media stories linking the outbreak of covid in western NSW to poor and overcrowded housing (link here) speaks forthrightly to the Commonwealth Government’s short sighted decision to cut short that program. It is worth noting that the decision to cut remote housing funding, and the associated decision to include a Closing the Gap target on national levels of overcrowding is consistent with a deliberate predisposition to downplay the needs of remote regions wherever possible.

 

Second, the pre-existing policy terrain is made opaque by minimising the release of meaningful information (or making it so difficult to find that it is effectively not released). The policy landscape is characterised by extremely constrained levels of transparency, an addiction to deflection and inaction (link here), and seriously degraded commitment to public sector accountability (link here).

 

Third, the Government can point to a number of policy successes: to mention the four that come immediately to mind, it has made substantial progress with the Indigenous Procurement Policy, though I continue to have some concerns about the robustness of the program (link here); it has maintained and expanded the footprint of Indigenous Protected Areas and Caring for Country ranger programs across the nation (link here); it has committed to (but not yet delivered on) a series of priority reforms as part of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (link here) (though I am less persuaded that the refreshed targets are in any sense being meaningfully pursued); and finally, it has recently committed to compensating up to 3600 individuals who are members of the Stolen generations and come within the Commonwealth’s responsibility (link here).

 

Fourth, a common theme in the recent announcements has been an element of future commitment rather than immediate delivery. Even the two legislative initiatives in the recent announcements section above are unlikely to be finalised before the election, and thus will need to be re-introduced if they fail to pass before the forthcoming election. The CATSI amendments largely technical; the ALRA initiatives are essentially a rearrangement of already appropriated funds to the ABA. Even the Government’s major policy success, the refresh of closing the gap and the successful negotiation of the National Agreement, is highly leveraged to future policy decisions.

 

Fifth, it is clear that the Government has consistently pursued a largely rhetorical policy narrative built around economic opportunity, jobs and wealth creation. This continues in the most recent National Roadmap discussion paper mentioned above. While this approach may work at the political level (in the same way that focussing on aspirational messaging attracts the votes of sole traders and tradies), it usually fails to deliver the substantive and tangible outcomes it promises. Perhaps the most obvious example after eight years of rhetorical policy announcements built around the importance of jobs, the current outcomes on Indigenous employment are desultory, and the closing the gap target is pathetic.

 

To demonstrate that point, it is worth noting that five in ten Indigenous people are not employed and the trend line is flat lining or decreasing (link here). Moreover the employment data has been carefully framed to measure only those aged between 25 and 64. The median age of the Indigenous population is around 20 years of age (link here). Of the Indigenous population in the age range 15 to 24, over four in ten are not in education or employed, and while the trend line is positive, it will be more than a decade before the gap with the wider community is closed on current policy settings (link here). Just think about the constrained lives and opportunities that lie behind these statistics. If the Government was serious about jobs and its policy rhetoric, and by the way, also serious about closing the gap, it would take action to establish a job creation program for Indigenous or low income citizens, targeted particularly towards remote Australia, rather than promulgating yet another roadmap, and announcing the third version of a program to deliver social security and job search services across remote Australia in eight years, namely its newly proposed remote engagement program.

 

Sixth, my subjective takeout based on the analysis above is that the Government’s policy agenda and the associated policy narrative is overwhelmingly shaped by politics. With an election looming, the announcement frenzy is focussed on creating the appearance of action, and thus minimising the chance that particular issues will emerge as matters of political contention without necessarily committing significant funds to a policy sector that is not high on the Government’s policy priorities. Unfortunately, the Labor Opposition appears unwilling to call the Government to account on these issues, preferring an election strategy based on mainstream bread and butter issues and focussed on the failures of the Government in relation to the Covid pandemic.

 

In conclusion, it is clear that  in relation to Indigenous policy, the Government is addicted to the appearance of action, while disguising policy inaction. Unfortunately, the Government has also learned to take out insurance against the absence of substantive action; hence its focus on codesign (link here) and the penchant for playing favourites (link here) and not wishing to hear critical advice (link here).

 

There certainly is a blizzard of policy initiatives underway in the Indigenous policy domain, but the likelihood that they will substantively address the challenges the nation faces in coming to terms with the deep-seated consequences of the dispossession and continuing structural exclusion of First Nations citizens seems extremely low. The continuing stream of announcements designed to shape a rhetorical rather than substantive policy narrative serves to deflect attention from the priority reforms required to drive real change for the better. Unfortunately, because this works as a political strategy, the winds will continue to blow hard.