Tuesday, 7 April 2026

Confusion abounds: the AINT strategy for the coming decade


My thoughts are whirled like a potter’s wheel;

I know not where I am, nor what I do.

1 Henry VI, Act two, Scene four.

Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) is a corporate Commonwealth entity established in November 2022 under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA). Initially named NT Aboriginal Investment Corporation, the operational name was changed by ministerial fiat from Northern Territory Aboriginal Investment Corporation (NTAIC) to Aboriginal Investment NT (AINT) in August 2024.

There are 12 board members: two appointed by each of the four Northern Territory land councils, two appointed by the Australian Government, and two appointed by the board. Board membership is specified in section 65EA of the ALRA. The board appoints a CEO who is responsible for day-to-day administration. Under the PGPA Act, the board is the accountable authority for Aboriginal Investment NT.

AINT was funded from the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA), with an initial $680 million over three years to invest and provide grants to Indigenous businesses and communities across the Northern Territory. The ABA is established by the ALRA to receive and distribute funds generated from mining on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory. Section 64AA of the ALRA sets out funding arrangements for the Northern Territory Aboriginal Corporation, also known as Aboriginal Investment NT. The $680m for investment and grants was allocated under subsection 64AA of the ALRA. AINT’s purpose is:

• To promote the self-management and economic self-sufficiency of Aboriginal people living in the Northern Territory (NT); and

• To promote social and cultural wellbeing of Aboriginal people living in the NT.

The outline above was taken from the 2024 ANAO Performance Audit (paragraphs 1.9 to 1.12). The text has been paraphrased to incorporate some footnotes and improve accessibility:

The ANAO 2024 Performance Audit

In December 2024, the ANAO published a Performance Audit examining the management of conflicts of interest by three portfolio agencies within the Aboriginal Australians portfolio, including for present purposes AINT (link here). The report is useful for a number of reasons, including for the high-level overview of the formal legislative and regulatory approach of the Commonwealth to conflict-of-interest issues in relation to Commonwealth agencies. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Summary and Recommendations section of the ANAO Report outline these, and Appendix 3 provides more detail in respect to the relevant legislative provisions.

AINT was established in 2022, and the ANAO audit was clearly designed to provide an early snapshot of the state of compliance.

The ANAO high level conclusions are outlined in paragraphs 13 to 15:

13. … Aboriginal Investment NT …. [was] partly effective in the management of conflicts of interest. While there were frameworks in place to manage conflicts of interest, there were shortcomings with the implementation of those frameworks. There were deficiencies with the documentation of board consideration of conflicts and documentation of conflicts of interest declarations and management actions for procurement, recruitment and grant activity.

14….  Aboriginal Investment NT [has] developed largely appropriate arrangements to manage conflict of interest consistent with legislative requirements of corporate Commonwealth entities …

15. The entities were partly effective in implementing arrangements for managing conflicts of interest. Board assessments of declarations of interest were not sufficient to record whether the board had determined declarations to be material personal interests. Aboriginal Investment NT’s board did not include declarations of interests in three out of session meetings and a workshop and did not always record the nature and extent of declared conflicts. There were instances of Aboriginal Investment NT Grants Committee members with declared conflicts of interest recommending grant applications for board approval ….  Aboriginal Investment NT did not adequately document conflict of interest management for procurement as required by its policy.

Most of these issues appear to have been addressed subsequent to the performance audit, but their early emergence demonstrates both the internal pressures in play in what are cross-cultural organisations, and the risks that continue into the future.

The AINT 2024-25 Annual Report

Under the PGPA Act, the AINT report was due on October 30, 2025. The AINT advised the Minister that the ANAO had experienced delays in finalising the audit, and as a result the Minister initially agreed to an extension to the end of November and then extended it to the end of February (link here). In the event the Annual Report was published on the AINT website in the first week of March 2026. The Chair wrote to the Minister providing a copy of the audited financial statements on 18 February, the accountable authority statement was signed by the AINT Chair, CEO and Chief Operating Officer on 19 February 2026, the unqualified ANAO audit opinion was signed on 20 February 2026. We live in strange times where time appears to move backwards (at least in the NT). The financial statements (without the ANAO audit opinion) are also available on the ACNC web site as the AINT has charitable status. Somewhat bizarrely, the Annual Report has since been removed from the AINT website and is not available on the Department of Finance Transparency Portal. To my knowledge, there has been no explanation provided by either the Minister or AINT for this action.

In addition to the apparent reversal of time, there is an unfortunate error in the heading to the figures in Note 10 to the (original) financial statements page 92 which has the effect of multiplying the relevant management personnel salaries one thousand times. It is not clear if this will be remedied when the Annual Report is finally republished. I do not believe that this is the reason for the withdrawal of the report as this error also occurs in the equivalent section on page 82 of the previous AINT 2023-24 Annual Report.

Given the comparative complexity of the AINT financial statements, and the delayed release of the report, the 2025 ACNC Annual Information Statement (link here) provides the best current snapshot of the AINT’s overall financial status. This shows that in June 2025, the AINT held net assets/liabilities of $693.3m. This comprised current assets of $422.9m (comprising according to the more detailed financial statements $300m in cash and cash equivalents and $100m in ‘other investments’), and non-current assets of $272.5m. Liabilities were only $2.1m. It seems likely that the non-current assets are all invested in the AINT Unit Trust (see below). It is unclear if any of the current assets are also in the Unit Trust.

The AINT Strategic Plan (available on its website) is built around the establishment of two Funds, the Future Fund and the Community Ready Fund. The Future Fund invests the AINT corpus, the Community Ready Fund is utilised for financing AINT operations and ongoing grants. See page 32 of the Strategic Plan for the best description of the Future Fund so far made public. Section 7 of the Strategic Plan describes the approach of the Community Ready Fund including some one-off allocations which allow the project grant profile to continue in the short term above the long-term level available from the Future Fund. See the graph on page 51 displaying the forecast grant spend from the Fund into the next four years.

The Annual Performance Statement in the Annual Report (pages 32-37) reports that both funds delivered above target returns over the past year.. In a section titled Investment Performance, AINT reports that the Future Fund achieved an annualised return of 5.8%, exceeding its benchmark target of CPI plus 3%. (In contrast, on page 36, the report states that the Future Fund achieved a 5.9% return). At 30 June 2025, the Future Fund held $522.5m in assets, comprising $100m in term deposits and $226.3m in cash awaiting investment. This suggests that $182m was invested. The Community Ready Fund delivered 4.9% return against its more modest target of CPI plus 1%. Its balance on 30 June was not stated, but the report notes that the fund ‘was fully invested with $120.6m deployed…’ While the investment returns are useful, without knowing the quantum of the funds invested, readers have little idea of their real significance.

Somewhat confusingly, the section on Financial Results (pages 68-69) refers to the commencement of investment activities through the AINT Unit Trust, a controlled entity established to manage long term investments. The AINT financial statements provide just a single column which consolidates the operations of both the AINT and the Unit Trust. A more transparent approach would be to do as the ILSC did before the recent sale of Voyages and list both the ILSC and the consolidated financials in separate columns. The Notes to the Financial Statements (Note 11) refer to the expenditure of $305m to purchase units in the Unit Trust during 2024-25, but this figure cannot be tracked into the financial statements themselves. The AINT Unit Trust presumably holds the $182m invested in the Future Fund and the $120.6m ‘deployed’ by the Community Ready Fund, which totals $302.6m.

Apart from Note 11 to the Financial Statements which lists fees of $717k in 2024-25 to advisory firms CIML and JANA paid from the Unit Trust, there is no reference in the Annual Report to the management fees and investment advice fees that underpin the Unit Trust arrangements. However the Senate Entity Contracts Listing for 2024-25 published on the AINT website lists contracted management fees for CIML over five years to 2029 as $19.24m and for JANA for investment advice over the five years as $1.9m. Combined, these two contracted firms will cost an average of $4.2m per annum for the next five years to manage the AINT investments within the AINT Unit Trust.

Not only is the Annual Report’s description of the relationship between the AINT Unit Trust and the two Funds operated by AINT opaque and indeed, confusing, but it is also unclear just how the AINT exercises its control over the Trustees as the Trust Deed between AINT and CIML does not appear to have been published or summarised in any public documentation. What is clear is that the AINT Investment Committee and in particular its Chair Peeyush Gupta and member Richard Brandweiner (both of whom come from finance backgrounds) play crucial roles in managing the Future Fund, and the Unit Trust investments. These two were the only Investment Committee members to attend all 7 meetings of the Committee during the financial year (see page 51 of the Annual Report).

Given the potential complexities involved I asked my AI research assistant Claude for its view on the rationale for using such a structure. Given the tax-free status of the AINT, it responded inter alia as follows:

Compliance and reputational signalling arguably becomes the dominant remaining rationale. A [tax free] charitable entity established by Commonwealth legislation faces heightened scrutiny — from the ACNC, from its enabling legislation's oversight mechanisms, and potentially from parliamentary accountability processes. Holding investments through a formally constituted unit trust with a corporate trustee, a trust deed, and defined investment mandates demonstrates structured stewardship of assets in a way that direct holding does not. It creates a paper trail and governance architecture that can withstand external scrutiny.

The candid assessment is that for a sole-owner tax-exempt charitable entity, the unit trust structure offers relatively thin functional advantages compared to direct investment or a subsidiary company. The structure makes most sense if the trust deed itself — through its investment mandate and distribution rules — serves a constraining or accountability function, or if there is a genuine prospect of admitting other investors in future. If neither applies, the administrative overhead of maintaining a separate trustee, trust deed, and unit register may outweigh the residual benefits. [emphasis added]

The question worth asking in this context is whether the structure was chosen for sound governance reasons at the outset, or whether it persists as inherited architecture that has never been critically examined against the entity's actual circumstances.

These are more substantive questions that the AINT has not, so far, envisaged being asked, let alone answering. In my view, the AINT would be well advised to consider reframing future statutory reports to provide clearer and more transparent information about its investment operations.

A critique of the AINT Investment Strategy

 I should begin by noting that I was (amongst many others) a critic of the legislation establishing AINT for several reasons. My post from November 2021 titled Opportunities and Risks (link here) provides a high level critique of the proposed legislation (as it then was) establishing NTAIC (now AINT). For those interested in exploring the issues raised in more detail there is a link to the various submissions to the Legislation Committee considering the Bill and unsurprisingly I recommend reading my submission. It takes a wider lens than just the proposed corporation, and deals with the systemic conflicts that I suggested would inevitably emerge. I don’t propose to focus on this wider picture here but instead will focus on the potential alternative investment strategies available to NTAIC.

In relation to the operations of the Community Ready Fund, I don’t wish to say too much. It is clearly the ‘front of house’ for the AINT, and until recently there has clearly been a legacy of approved grants that had to be processed and finalised. In the discussion in the Strategi Plan of its objectives, there are four separate areas of focus, plus a vague commitment to focus on sector-based activities. The four foci are (i) grants, (ii) collective impact initiatives, (iii) place-based investments, and (iv) strategic investment. Areas (iii) and (iv) together encompass so called nation building investment. This strikes me as on over-engineered attempt to make the grants process look coherent and rational. To my mind it is both too all-encompassing (‘everything is a potential focus and priority’) and thus easily subverted for political or other reasons.

I will make two high level conceptual points that in my view the AINT should consider seriously. First, there is much greater impact in supporting high quality grass roots organisations with positive track records which deliver valuable services on the ground. It would be particularly valuable to identify elements of their activities that governments are not prepared to fund and/or elements that build organisational resilience. Second, for small Indigenous businesses, I would suggest that instead of grants that the AINT consider experimenting with low value interest free loans that are repayable once the business meets particular revenue or profit thresholds and are written off after a set period (say ten years) if those thresholds are not met.

In relation to the Future Fund, I have more serious reservations about the utility of the strategy that has been adopted. The current investment corpus appears to total around $500m to $600m. Taking $500m as the base, if the investment target is met, and there were zero distributions the Future Fund will compound each year and grow to $672m in current dollars over ten years. If the 3% growth ($15m pa) is fully distributed, the fund will continue to be valued at $500m over the decade. If say half of the growth was distributed each year ($7.5m) then the fund would grow to $581m over the decade. It is unclear if the target growth rate is net of management fees, but at $4m per annum that either cuts into the available funds for distribution or adds an effective premium of 0.7% to the target (i.e. it must actually return CPI plus 3.7% to allow $15m pa to be distributed on average). A long-term investment return of around $15m per annum will not sustainably fund the projected level of grant expenditure of $40m. Such a spend rate will either require additional injections of capital or lead to a reduction in the AINT investment corpus over time.

Given the passive nature of the Fund at present, and the current level of advisory fees, there may be merit in considering whether it would be more cost effective to utilise the Commonwealth Future Fund as a fund manager. This is the course adopted by the Commonwealth to manage the Land Fund which provides the annual revenue base for the ILSC.

The bottom line here is that the AINT has established what is effectively an endowment fund and without further injections of capital, and effective and serious constraints on transfers to the Community Ready Fund (which would lead to a loss of political support for AINT within the NT Indigenous community), it is unlikely to grow substantially beyond its current size. Even were a Commonwealth minister to inject further funds into the Future Fund from the ABA, say to double it to $1bn, the annual funds available for distribution would only be around $30m in current dollars. This does have the potential (if targeted and sustained) to make some difference in selected areas or sectors, but it is not going to ‘build intergenerational wealth’ for anywhere near the majority of Indigenous Territorians. This is the objective of the Future Fund as laid out in the AINT Strategic Plan, yet the rhetoric does not match the reality.

What then is the alternative?

My strong suggestion would be to adopt an entirely different approach aimed at leveraging the available capital to invest directly in a select number of sectors and enterprises in the NT that for one reason or another have not attracted either government or private sector investment in the past and which are also of direct relevance and significance to either remote communities and/or the Aboriginal community writ large. Sectors that are crying out for such a ‘social impact investment’ approach include establishing community housing entity to operate across the Territory, building a Territory wide disability coalition or service providing disability services funded by accessing mainstream funds from the NDIS, building an expanded territory wide mobile dental service, taking up an equity position across multiple Aboriginal owned building companies thus allowing them to access more capital both directly and indirectly. There are numerous other opportunities of a similar kind (see the link to the Centrecorp Foundation below). My assumption is that the AINT investments must be commercially based (i.e. designed not to lose money) and should actively seek to leverage their capital and Indigenous access to find commercial partners to take up influential stakes in commercial opportunities which directly provide benefits for Indigenous Territorians. I accept that this approach appears high risk but doing nothing (or a bare minimum) with available capital while persuading yourself that you are building wealth delivers certain failure. It will require sustained and strong governance, a disciplined approach to strategy, and strong commercial acumen, but these are not an unthinkable aspiration for Indigenous interests.

Examples of this broad approach include Indigenous Business Australia in Canberra, and the extraordinarily impressive Centrecorp Foundation in Alice Springs (link here) which manages a portfolio of assets valued at around $250m. Centrecorp has invested in core commercial real estate in the Alice Springs CBD, Darwin, and a number of other regional centres, some residential housing opportunities in Central Australia, and is a substantial owner of the major Toyota supplier in Central Australia and a major hire car business. These businesses operate across the Indigenous / non-Indigenous commercial domains and have been very successful in building credibility for Indigenous interests within the commercial circles in Central Australia. One consequence of such a strategy, if executed successfully, would be to build real political influence for Indigenous interests within the NT.

Confusion abounds

The confusion related to the delayed finalisation of the audited financial statements and the stop/go/stop imbroglio with the 2025 Annual Report are in the scheme of things of minor import. The early missteps over conflict-of-interest processes identified by the ANAO are easily rectified.

The confusion arising from the opaque relationship between the two strategic funds and the AINT Unit Trust is more significant as it reflects a degree of transparency failure which works against clear and rational thinking about the substantive reality and constraints facing AINT and its current investment strategy. The most significant consequence of portraying transparently the limited opportunities built into the AINT are the lost opportunities that nevertheless might be harnessed from the not inconsiderable quantum of financial assets under AINT management.

A major driver of these lost opportunities is the lack of clarity in the AINT’s various governance reports around the serious limitations in the outcomes negotiated by the Commonwealth and the Land Councils in 2021, which in turn arise from the systemic and structural conflicts of interest between the land councils and the wider Indigenous community in the NT, and the separate desire of the Commonwealth to respond to the longstanding demand from Indigenous interests for greater control over the ABA, while off-loading admin costs for grant management yet retaining substantive control. For an explanation of these in more detail, I refer readers (again) to my submission (#4) to the Legislation Committee in considering the legislation that established AINT in2021 (link here). That lack of clarity around the reality of the limitations of the legislation and thus the AINT, suggests that the confusion which pervades the AINT’s operations is in fact built into its institutional architecture.

For AINT, the most important factor in its ultimate success or failure will be whether it develops the capacity to think strategically about the opportunity matrix it faces and the capacity to act decisively to execute a cogent and considered plan. Confusion is the enemy of both prerequisites. Or as Mark Twain is reputed to have said:

It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.

 

7 April 2026

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